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I. Project Requirements 
A. Research Team 
 
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (Upjohn) in partnership with the Center for 
Employment Security Education and Research (CESER) in the National Association of State 
Workforce Agencies (NASWA) has been contracted by the North Carolina Department of 
Commerce (Department) to develop options for improving the North Carolina unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefit financing system. The work will also review alternative financial 
management strategies to regain and maintain solvency of the North Carolina account in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) and to service debt to the federal government under Title XII 
of the US Social Security Act. 
 
Upjohn Institute Team: 
Dr. Christopher J. O’Leary:  Project Director and Principal Investigator. 
Dr. Randall W. Eberts:  Upjohn Institute, Executive Oversight. 
Brian Pittelko:  Regional Analyst. 
 
CESER/NASWA Team: 
Dr. Richard Hobbie:  CESER/NASWA, Executive Oversight. 
Dr. James Van Erden:  Principal Investigator, CESER/NASWA. 
Brian Langley MBA:  Unemployment Insurance Subject Matter Expert. 
Benjamin Fendler:  Senior Research Associate. 
B. Scope of Work 
 
The work undertaken in this project includes the following: 
 
 Analyze the current tax structure and other contributory factors that lead to the current 
level of North Carolina’s Title XII debt and the insolvency of the state’s UI Trust Fund. 
 
 Research the status of other state’s UI Trust Funds and Title XII debt and strategies that 
led to solvency in their UI Trust Funds and/or strategies that they are employing to 
service current debt. 
 
 Develop detailed options for tax structure changes and other financial options and the 
methodology for servicing the state’s Title XII debt and regaining and retaining solvency 
in its UI Trust Fund. 
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II. Report Overview 
A. Structure of the Report  
This report, prepared for the North Carolina Department of Commerce, is designed to provide 
decision makers in the state with options to consider for modifying the states’ Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) system to reduce or eliminate the current level of insolvency in the State’s 
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF).  The report presents information on the current status of the 
North Carolina UI Financing system, options to consider to change the current UI Tax and/or 
Benefit structure, comparisons with other state systems on both a national and regional basis, and 
options to issue Bonds to repay all or a portion of the current UTF debt. 
 
The report is divided into eleven sections: 
 
1) Section I covers the project requirements as laid out in the contract between the State and 
CESER-UPJOHN. 
 
2) Section II provides a high level overview of the Report. 
 
3) Section III presents a brief overview of the historical and current status of the State’s 
UTF balance, benefits paid, and contributions collected. 
 
4) Section IV describes a series of options for North Carolina to consider to modify the 
State’s current tax structure, benefit determination formulas under differing economic 
scenarios in order to achieve long term balance between revenues and expenditures.  In 
the section we discuss: 
 
a. The use of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Benefit Financing Model (BFM).  A 
computer simulation model adapted to the specific program parameters in North 
Carolina’s UI system.  All simulation results presented in this report were 
generated using the BFM.  The BFM requires the input of forecast values for 
three exogenous variables: (1) Total unemployment rate, (2) Wage growth rate, 
and (3) Labor force growth rate. The forecasts used for these three variables were 
provided by the North Carolina Assistant State Budget Officer, Office of State 
Budget and Management. 
 
b. We examine trust fund balances overtime given a baseline economic scenario and 
three alternatives.  The baseline economic forecast is used in conjunction with 
current state law to generate a “do-nothing” (DN) scenario, which is then 
displayed against a series of bundled options in four tables in this section.  
Summary results include: 
 
i. DN only:  debt paid off in 2017; reserves are $675 million (m) in 2020. 
ii. Relative to DN, increase the new employer rate to 1.8 percent, min rate to 
1 percent, max rate to 6 percent, reduce weekly benefit amount (WBA) to 
60 percent of average annual wage: debt paid off in 2017; reserves are 
$1.4 billion (b) in 2020. 
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iii. Relative to (ii), decrease max rate to 5.8 percent, raise min for negative 
balance employers to 3.0 percent, raise maximum for positive balance 
employers to 2.8 percent, base WBA on two high quarters: debt paid off 
in 2016; reserves are $469m in 2020. 
iv. Relative to (ii), raise new employer rate to 2.7 percent, base WBA on two 
high quarters:  debt paid off in 2017; reserves are $1.7b in 2020. 
v. Relative to (iv), raise maximum rate to 7.0 percent, base WBA on two 
high quarters; debt paid off in 2016; reserves are $1.0b in 2020. 
vi. Relative to DN, add solvency tax with $1b target, (0.1 to 1.0 percent), new 
employer rate 1.8 percent, minimum tax rate 0.1 percent, maximum tax 
rate 6.0 percent, and maximum WBA set at 60 percent of average weekly 
wage; debt paid off in 2015, reserves are $1.8b in 2020. 
vii. Relative to (vi), add solvency tax with $2b target (0.1 to1.0) percent; debt 
paid off in 2015, reserves are $2.2b in 2020. 
viii. Relative to (vi), base WBA based on two high quarters; debt paid off in 
2015, reserves are $1.0b in 2020.  
ix. Relative to DN, pay off current debt with Bonds; zero current debt then 
some new loans but; debt paid off in 2016, reserves are $372m in 2020. 
x. Relative to DN, pay off debt in 2013, zero debt then some loans; debt 
paid off in 2016, reserves are $259m in 2020. 
xi. Relative to DN, pay off debt in 2012, add solvency tax with $1b target; 
some additional loans; debt paid off in 2016, reserves are $2.5b in 2020. 
xii. Relative to DN, pay off debt in 2012, add solvency tax with $2.2b target; 
some additional loans; debt paid off in 2016, reserves are $1.8b in 2020. 
xiii. Relative to DN, restore system to 1992 parameters, increase new employer 
rate to 2.25 percent, raise relative taxable wage base to 60 percent and 
base AWB on two high quarters; debt paid off in 2016, reserves are 
$767m in 2020. 
xiv. Relative to (xiii), pay off debt in 2012, then additional loans; debt paid 
off in 2016, reserves are $767m in 2020. 
xv. Relative to (xiv), add a solvency tax with $1b target, system meets the 
reserve criteria for zero cost borrowing from 2014 to 2019, and 
reserves are $3.0b in 2020. 
xvi. Relative to (xv), add a solvency tax with$2.2b target; system meets the 
reserve criteria for zero cost borrowing from 2014 to 2019, and 
reserves are $2.6b in 2020. 
 
c. This Section also presents detailed results from simulations of single changes in 
policy parameters relative to the DN scenario. These one-way simulations 
include: 
 
i. New employer rates range (1.2 to 3.7 percent):  The simulations relative to 
the DN option suggest that a 0.3 percentage point increase in the new employer 
rate increases the terminal reserve balance in 2020 by $73 million (Table 4.6).  
Additional incremental increases of 0.3 have an additive effect on tax 
contributions. 
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ii. Minimum rates for positive balance employers:  These simulations start 
at the current rate of 0.0 and increase in 12 increments of 0.1 percentage 
points to 1.1.  Simulations suggest that increasing the minimum rate in 
increments of 0.1 from zero to 0.9 has an exponential effect on tax 
contributions, but increases to 1.0 and 1.1 lower the 2020 year end value of 
reserves because the trigger moves to tax schedule B. 
iii. Middle range tax rates:  In addition to raising the top and bottom rates, we 
simulated raising the tax rates on employers in the reserve range from -0.5 
to 0.7.  Reserve balance changes resulting from these changes were very 
modest. 
iv. Taxable Wage Base:  The North Carolina UI taxable wage base is indexed 
to reset annually at fifty percent of annualized average weekly wages 
(AWW) in UI covered employment.  This study reports on a range of 
proportions starting at forty percent and increasing by 2.5 percentage points 
in eight steps to sixty percent.  The effects of lowering and raising the 
taxable wage base are nearly symmetric.  Neither a 10 percentage point cut, 
nor 10 point increase changes the payoff year from 2017. 
v. Shifting Up the Tax Schedule:  Upward shifts in tax schedule A were 
simulated in six increments of 0.1 percentage points to 0.6 and to 1.0.  
Raising A by 0.1 point generated about $268 million more than the do-
nothing scenario by year end 2020, but did not change the payoff year from 
2017 or change the tax schedule in effect from A. 
vi. From Tax Schedule to Formula:  We simulated replacing the current tax 
schedule A with algebraic approximations that would permit employer tax 
rates to adjust more smoothly year to year.  Simulations included: do-
nothing, a piecewise-linear formula to mimic schedule A with slopes (-2/3, -
1, -1/2), a piece-wise formula with a slightly higher negative balance slope 
(-4/5, -1, -1/2) and intercept and a cubic approximation to schedule A.  
Changing the tax schedule from a stepped system to a smoother function 
does not change the payoff year of 2017, but yields $98 million more in 
reserves by 2020 compared to A. 
vii. Solvency Taxes:  We reexamined three scenarios considered by the TPRC 
(2011) with levies of 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 depending on accumulated reserves 
ranging up to $800 million.  We also simulated two more gradual systems 
with rates ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 rising in one-tenth increments with target 
reserve balances of either $1.0 billion or $2.0 billion.  All five sets of 
simulation results for solvency tax plans suggest the trust fund would be 
paid off in 2015.  
viii. Maximum Duration and Waiting Week:  Currently up to 26 weeks of 
regular compensation are available to every UI beneficiary in North 
Carolina.  Simulations were run reducing the maximum potential weeks 
incrementally by one week down to 20.  Simulations suggest that shortening 
entitled duration by one to five weeks will pay off the outstanding debt in 
2017, with the year-end reserve balance higher for each additional week 
removed from potential duration.  
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ix. Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount and Replacement Rate:  The WBA 
in North Carolina is currently indexed to the average weekly wage (AWW) 
of all UI covered workers in the state.  The index formula annually sets the 
max WBA at two-thirds (66.7 percent) of the AWW.  We simulated 
lowering the maximum rate from 66.7 to 60 percent in one percentage point 
increments.  The debt payoff year does not change in any of the simulations; 
neither does the 2020 tax schedule in effect. 
x. Economic Conditions:  Some of the UI reform bundles were subjected to 
the “IUR severe” economic scenario listed in the introduction.  In that 
scenario the insured unemployment rate (IUR) jumps up in 2014 to the 2010 
level and decreases following the same pattern as 2011 through 2013.  The 
simulation results suggest that the do-nothing scenario actually reaches 2020 
with a higher yearend balance, by nearly $700 million, due to federal offsets 
and increased taxes from employers not moving to higher experience rates.  
Other outcomes are also shown. 
 
5) Section V provides a series of Fact Sheets on: 
  
a. North Carolina UI Solvency Status:  North Carolina faces the challenge of 
providing a benefit structure for unemployed individuals, developing financing 
systems that can provide adequate funding for current benefits and repay 
significant debt to the federal government. 
 
b. The Economic Cycle and UI Financing:  The UI system has been characterized 
as a “countercyclical’ program.  Designing a system that is countercyclical 
requires knowledge of the nature of U.S. and state economic cycles.  Forecasting 
the length and depth of future economic cycles is a difficult science. 
 
c. North Carolina’s Benefits Compared to Neighboring States:  Key UI program 
factors are compared with other states in the regions (AL, FL, GA, KY, MI, SC, 
TN, and VA).  
 
d. North Carolina’s Taxes Compared to Neighboring States:  Comparing North 
Carolina with other states in the region (AL, FL, GA, KY, MI, SC, TN, and VA) 
reveals one major difference; the new employer tax rate is about 55 percent lower 
than the average of the other eight states 
 
e. Status of UI Trust Funds:  State UI Trust Funds receive funds from employer 
taxes and federal interest on reserves and distribute funds to pay benefits for UI 
claimants.  If sufficient funds are not available to pay benefits when due a state 
may borrow from Federal UI Accounts to cover shortfalls.  
 
f. Issuing Bonds to Repay Outstanding Title XII Loans:  Analysis of an option 
for North Carolina to issue five year bonds to repay the state’s current outstanding 
Title XII loans. 
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6) Section VI provides a more detailed discussions of economic and systems structure 
parameters that need to be considered when addressing UI solvency issues including:  
a. The impact of changing economic cycles on UI Financing systems:  The UI 
system is designed to be “countercyclical.”  The demand for UI benefit payments 
increase as the economy slows, and even more dramatically during more severe 
recessions and their aftermath.  With higher levels of unemployment, more 
individuals file for UI and receive payments for longer periods, thereby increasing 
the need to pay more benefits from the UI system.  The duration and amplitude of 
U.S. economic cycles have varied significantly.  Understanding how cycles 
change is important when developing alternative UI benefit and financing 
systems. 
 
b. The impact of changing economic conditions on UI Benefits:  State laws 
determine when an individual is eligible for benefit payments and based on 
factors in state law, the level of the weekly benefit amount, the duration of 
benefits usually up to 26 weeks, (seven states now have a maximum UI benefit 
duration of less than 26 weeks) whether to allow partial earnings, how to treat the 
claimant’s action with respect to work search requirements and other ongoing 
eligibility issues, etc.  Changing any of these factors can impact the amount of 
benefits paid, and thereby the impact on a state’s trust fund and the level of taxes 
necessary to assess on employers to cover UI benefit outlays. 
 
c. Considerations of the status of Unemployment Trust Funds:  A state faces 
three tasks if its state unemployment trust fund is insolvent: 1) reviewing its 
current UI tax structure to determine if changes are required, 2) managing 
political pressure to reduce benefit eligibility and amounts; and 3) managing 
political pressure in mapping the most effective way for state employers to repay 
loan balance and interest on the loan balance.  Some options for states when 
seeking to regain unemployment trust fund solvency include:  1) increasing the 
taxable wage base for employers; 2) increasing the tax rate schedules or indexing 
method; 3) Reduce benefit amounts; 4) reducing benefit duration; 5) tightening 
benefit eligibility and participation requirements; and/or 6) a combination of the 
above. 
 
In the early 1990s, the Federal Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation (FACUC) developed the term of the Average High Cost Multiple 
(AHCM).  The AHCM is defined as how long a state could sustain payments 
equal to the average of the three highest benefit cost rates in the 20-year period 
ending with the preceding year, without additional tax revenue coming into the 
unemployment trust fund. 
 
d. Structures of the UI financing system:  There are two primary approaches for 
UI financing models: pay as you go financing and forward financing.  Pay as you 
go financing assumes a state maintains a low trust fund balance and a relatively 
low level of UI taxes, and relies on the state’s ability to automatically increase UI 
taxes during economic downturns in order to finance the increased level of benefit 
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outlays.  Forward financing assumes a state maintains a higher level of reserves in 
its UI trust fund through the use of higher UI taxes during economic expansions. 
State governments and policymakers can, however, attempt to increase the 
flexibility or responsiveness of their unemployment compensation financial model 
in order to impose the least substantial burden on their state economies during 
economic contractions – periods of time when individuals and businesses in a 
state can least afford economic shocks, such as reduced benefits and increased 
taxes.  In some sense, by stabilizing the financial model of a state’s 
unemployment compensation system, the state allows for the full countercyclical 
benefits intended by the UI system to occur, 
 
e. Solvency status since 2007:  the Federal Unemployment Account (FUA) 
provides for a loan fund for state unemployment programs to ensure a continued 
flow of benefits during times of economic downturn. As of April 18, 2012, there 
are 30 states (AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IL, IN, KS, KY, MA, 
MI, MN, MO, NV, NJ, NY, NC, OH, PA, RI, SC, VA, VI, VT, and WI) currently 
borrowing from the federal government to cover unemployment benefits.  
Combined there are $41.5 billion in outstanding loans and $736.1 million in 
accrued interest for 2012.  Employers in 21 states with outstanding UI loans had a 
reduction in FUTA credit for 2011 (3 states had a reduction for 2010).  The 2011 
credit reduction applies to the 2012 payroll for employers in those 21 states. 
 
f. Reducing Benefit Outlays:  Adequate benefit amounts and the duration of those 
UI benefits are left to a state to determine based on local economic conditions and 
the will of state leadership.  In looking at the fourth quarter 2011 national UI 
information, the average weekly benefit amount was $275 with a range of $16 
minimum to a maximum of $625.  When looking a North Carolina’s weekly 
benefit amounts over the last few years and comparing the numbers against her 
sister states, one anomaly stands out – North Carolina’s maximum weekly benefit 
amount is over 70 percent higher than the average of the other eight states.  When 
looking at the average weekly benefit amount as a percentage of the average 
weekly wage and exhaustion rate, North Carolina is within a normal range of the 
other surrounding states. 
 
7) Section VII provides information on two significant provision of federal law affecting UI 
financing:  
 
a. FUTA Tax Requirements:  UI is a federal-state program jointly financed by 
federal taxes under the FUTA and by state payroll taxes under the State 
Unemployment Tax Act.  FUTA covers the costs of administering the UI and Job 
Service programs in all states. In addition, FUTA pays one-half of the cost of 
extended unemployment benefits (during periods of high unemployment) and 
provides for a fund from which states may borrow.  Employers in states with 
programs approved by the federal government and with no delinquent federal 
loans may credit 5.4 percentage points against the 6.0 percent FUTA tax rate, 
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making the minimum net federal unemployment tax rate 0.6 percent, regardless of 
the rate of tax paid to the state. 
 
b. Title XII of SSA: Borrowing for States to Finance UI Benefit Payments:  
States are required by federal law to pay UI benefits to eligible workers; 
regardless of the solvency status of a state unemployment trust fund.  Thus, if a 
state’s fund is insolvent, the state will be forced to borrow money from the 
dedicated federal UI loan account, the FUA, other state revenues, or from the 
private market.  
 
8) Section VIII in this section further analysis of the different financing, benefit and 
economic scenarios are presented.  The objective of the simulation analysis is to provide 
the North Carolina Department of Commerce a menu of balanced options for reforming 
UI.  We start by enumerating the features of the North Carolina UI system that are 
subject to change.  We then inventory the current values of these variables and run the 
baseline simulation on current values of all program parameters and various forecast 
values of exogenous economic variables.  For each category of program parameter we 
then simulate the effect of changes in the parameter value relative to the baseline 
scenario.  For example, for the new employer tax rate we separately simulate each value 
in the range of possible tax rates and compare these singly to the baseline.  We proceed 
with sensitivity testing for eight categories of tax parameters and four categories of 
benefit parameters.  After considering a full range of one-way contrasts to the baseline, 
we then examine bundles of program changes that balance tax and benefit changes in the 
same simulation.   
 
Specific UI system features examined include the: 
 
a. New employer rate: starts at the current value of 1.2 percent then increases in 
nine increments of 0.3 percentage points 
b. Minimum rate for positive balance employers: starts at the current rate of 0.0 
and increases in 12 increments of 0.1 percentage points to 1.1. 
c. Minimum rate for negative balance employers and maximum rate for 
positive balance employers: The current system maintains a gap of 0.2 
percentage points between positive and negative balance employers with 2.7 and 
2.9 being the current respective rates around the zero reserve balance level. 
d. Taxable wage base:  the North Carolina UI taxable wage base is indexed to reset 
annually at fifty percent of average weekly wages (AWW) in UI covered 
employment. 
e. Upward shift of the tax schedule: Starting from the current tax schedule A, the 
TPRC (2011) examined the effects of shifting the schedule up by 0.2 and by 1.0 
percentage points.  This study starts at the current schedule A and increases in six 
increments of 0.1 percentage points to 0.6. 
f. Tax schedules to formulas: We simulated replacing the current tax schedule A 
with algebraic approximations that would permit employer rates to adjust more 
smoothly year to year. 
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g. Solvency Taxes:  We reexamined three scenarios considered by the TPRC (2011) 
with levies of 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 depending on accumulated reserves ranging up to 
$800 million (see Table 5.2).  We also simulated two more gradual systems with 
rates ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 rising in one-tenth increments with target reserve 
balances of either $1.0 billion or $2.0 billion. 
h. Maximum potential duration of benefits: North Carolina currently has a 
uniform eligibility of 26 weeks.  Relative to the baseline of 26 we consider six 
incremental one week declines to 20 weeks. 
i. Maximum weekly benefit amount (WBA): North Carolina currently sets the 
maximum at two-thirds of the AWW.   The baseline simulation starts at the 
current rate of 0.67 and decreases in one percentage point increments to 0.60. 
j. Waiting weeks: one week is common, and North Carolina has one week.  We 
simulate the first order effects of adding a second waiting week that is the savings 
of one week for all who exhaust. 
k. Replacement rate: North Carolina replaces fifty percent of high quarter wages 
below the maximum WBA.  We simulated the effect of the sum of two highest 
quarters). 
l. Employment Security Reserve Fund (ESRF):  Simulating the effect of the 
ESRF tax with the BFM required some creativity.  The BFM does not allow 
proportional tax rates, rather only additional points.  To model the Special 
Reserve tax correctly we had to simulate taxes under schedule A scaled up by 1.2.   
The simulation suggested debts would be paid off in 2017. 
m. Balanced elements of system reform: After reviewing results of simulations on 
individual changes to tax and benefit features of the North Carolina UI system, 
bundles of changes were combined for analysis.   A total of 15 bundles were 
chosen with the components of each bundle listed in Table 5.17 and 5.18.  
  
9) Section IX provides an overview of other options for the state to access capital to repay 
all of a portion of outstanding Title XII loans to impact federal loan and interest payment 
requirements.  This section specifically covers:  
 
a. Municipal Bond Basics:  Municipal bonds (munis) are debt securities issued by 
states, municipalities, counties, or agencies or commissions that act as agents of a 
state or local government to finance capital and operating expenditures.  Two 
varieties of munis exist in practice, general obligation bonds (GO bonds) or 
revenue bonds (although many sub-categories of revenue bonds are classified as 
separate varieties) specifically:  
 
i. GO bonds are only issued by states, counties and municipalities to 
provide short term – usually stop-gap – capital financing to cover the costs 
of a specific, finite liability or budget obligation. 
 
ii. Revenue bonds can be issued by states, municipalities, counties, or 
agencies or commissions that act as agents of a state or local government 
to finance infrastructure projects or projects unique to the agency or 
commission issuing the bonds. 
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b. Credit Ratings and Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations: 
Most bond issuers maintain up-to-date credit ratings from at least one (and up to 
three) credit rating agencies, officially titled Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations (NRSROs).  Three NRSROs are eligible to rate issuers of 
municipal securities: Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Standard & Poor’s Ratings 
Services, or Fitch, Inc.   
 
c. Historical UI Bond Issues and Outlook for the Municipal Market: Since 
1987, a total of eight states have secured financing from the capital markets in 
eleven different bond issues.  Today, the municipal marketplace is a relatively 
attractive place for issuers; as record low interest rates help to ensure easy access 
to cheap capital. 
 
d. Reasons to Issue Bonds: Potential Cost Savings and Program Benefits: Before 
a state decides to issue debt in the municipal market, it should compare the cost of 
borrowing in the private sector verses obtaining a Title XII advance. 
 
e. Achieving a Credit Spread:  Title XII loans have recently maintained higher 
rates of interest than the coupon rate available to states seeking to borrow from 
the private market.  If the difference (or the spread) between the rate of interest on 
a Title XII loan and the coupon rate a state could access borrowing in the private 
market results in a substantial net positive (or credit), the cost savings to the state 
would be classified as a “credit spread,” and the state might examine issuing 
bonds more closely to borrow for its UTF. 
 
f. Avoiding a FUTA Credit Reduction:  Title XII of the SSA has provisions to 
ensure automatic repayment of outstanding debts known as the FUTA credit 
reduction.  To avoid the credit reduction a state must repay all loans for the most 
recent one-year period ending on November 9, plus the potential additional taxes 
that would have been imposed for the tax year.  In addition, the state must have 
sufficient amounts in the state unemployment trust fund to pay all compensation 
for the last quarter of that calendar year without receiving a loan.  Finally, the 
state must also have altered its state law to increase the net solvency of its fund. 
 
g. Avoiding the Accrual of Interest on Title XII Loans:  States might also issue 
bonds in the private market in order to avoid being charged interest on Title XII 
loans accessed from January 1 to September 30 of the current taxable year. 
 
h. Borrowing to Avoid the Imposition of a State Tax:  A state might issue debt 
into the private market in order to avoid a specific state assessment that would 
otherwise be imposed on a state’s employers. 
 
i. Borrowing to Qualify for Cash-Flow Loans under New Eligibility Criteria:  
A state could issue bonds in order to meet the new eligibility standards required to 
NC Final Report  14 CESER-UPJOHN 
access interest-free cash-flow loans that will begin a five-year phased 
implementation process starting in 2014. 
 
10) Section X covers the prospect of North Carolina issuing Bonds, North Carolina might 
consider issuing bonds in order to avoid the imposition of an additional FUTA credit 
reduction on employers in the state, cap the level of the FUTA credit reduction, repay its 
outstanding title XII loans, or qualify for cash-flow loans when new regulations begin 
restricting their eligibility to do so in 2014.  Specific items discussed in further detail 
include:  
 
a. Bonds Authorizing Legislation:  The enactment of state legislation would be 
required to authorize a bond issue in North Carolina. 
 
b. Loan Authorization Level:  The loan authorization level establishes the 
maximum dollar value a state is allowed to issue in a bond offering, and details 
the allowable uses of a bond issue’s proceeds in a state’s bond authorizing 
legislation. 
 
c. Special Obligation Fund:  Most state bond authorizing legislation includes 
language that establishes a supplemental fund outside of the state unemployment 
trust fund, to act as a repository and clearing house for either the bond proceeds or 
the contributions collected by the state UI agency to pay the debt service on the 
bonds. 
 
d. Special Assessments:  All bond authorizing legislation includes provisions 
addressing the mechanisms or methods a state will use in order collect the funds 
necessary to pay the debt service on the outstanding bonds. 
  
11) Section XI includes several appendices: 
 
a. Supporting Simulation Tables:  This appendix presents detailed results from 
simulations summarized in tables appearing in the body of this report. 
 
b. Title XII Advances Activities Schedule:  this Table provides state specific 
information related to Title XII advances s of April 18, 2012, including 
Outstanding Advance, Advanced Authorizations, Gross Draws, Interest FY 2012, 
and Deferred Interest for states. 
 
c. UI State Trust Fund Loans: Date of First Loan. 
 
d. Important Dates for Title XII Advances and Repayments:  Displays 
information on when interest is due and payable, defines a cash flow loan, defines 
a May/September delay in payment of interest, defines a high unemployment 
deferral, defines a high unemployment delay, defines a avoidance of credit delay, 
defines a cap on credit reduction, and a fifth year waiver.  
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e. Significant State Metrics: this table presents a variety of significant data on UI 
system in all states. 
f. State Legislation Affecting UI Program Features that Impact Solvency 2009 
– 2012: in this appendix a compilation of state legislation is presented including: 
 
i. Introduction of a Flexible Taxable Wage Base or an Increased Taxable 
Wage Base, 
ii. Modification of New Employer Tax Rate, 
iii. Implementation/Authorization of a Special Assessment/Surtax/Solvency 
Tax/UTF Adjustment Factor, 
iv. Modification of Employer Tax Schedule, 
v. Modification of Formulas for Tax Schedule Triggers, 
vi. Increase of Employer Tax Rates, 
vii. Elimination of Zero-Rated Options for Employers, 
viii. Modification of Experience Rating Formula, 
ix. Modification of Benefit Charging Methodology, 
x. Modification of Experience Rating Formula: Moving from a Reserve 
Ratio Experience Rating Formula to a Benefit Ratio Experience Rating 
Formula or a Payroll Decline Experience Rating Formula, 
xi. Modification of Minimum/Maximum Weekly Benefit Amounts and/or 
Modification of Requirements for Base Period Wages (Monetary 
Eligibility), 
xii. Modifying Wage Replacement Ratio, 
xiii. Modification of Minimum/Maximum Weekly Benefit Amounts (Non-
Monetary Eligibility), 
xiv. Introduction or Extension of a Wait-Period (a Waiting Week), 
xv. Targeting resources for Reemployment Services to Claimants or 
Implementing a Work-Share Program, 
xvi. Introduction of Enhanced Integrity Efforts or Overpayment Recovery 
Efforts, 
xvii. Reducing the Eligible Duration of Unemployment Compensation for 
Claimants, 
xviii. Introduction of Alternate Base Period, 
xix. Introduction or Modification of a Special Set-Aside Obligation Fund (for 
Training, Benefit Payments, Bond Debt Service, Repayment of Title XII 
Loans, or Repayment of Interest on Title XII Loans),and 
xx. Authorization/Reauthorization of Bond Issuance or Means of Alternative 
Financing. 
 
g. January 2012 UI Significant Provisions: a compilation of recent changes in 
State UI laws. 
 
h. Comparisons of State UI Taxing Laws: a detailed comparison of the provisions 
of state UI tax legislation. 
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i. Comparisons of State UI Benefit Laws: a detailed comparison of the provisions 
of state UI benefits legislation.  
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III.   Overview of North Carolina’s Current Law 
 
North Carolina’s Financial Data chart shows after the early 1980s recessions, that North 
Carolina’s was able to build a fairly high level of UI trust fund reserves to pay benefits during an 
economic downturn.  During the 1990s, North Carolina undertook a series of tax reductions and 
holidays, and the level of the trust fund began to decline which is indicated by the steady decline 
in the green line as unemployment rose in the 2001 downturn.  The 2002 Reed Act distribution 
of $240.9 million also delayed the necessity of North Carolina of having to borrow to cover UI 
benefits paid.  The 2007-2009 recession caused reserves to dip further and finally become 
negative leading to a current (May 1, 2012) unemployment trust fund outstanding loan balance 
of $2.84 billion with $55.0 million in interest due.  Subsequent borrowing after May might result 
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IV. Options for NC to Consider Moving Forward 




Unemployment insurance (UI) is intended to provide adequate partial income replacement to 
workers during temporary periods of involuntary joblessness.  The North Carolina UI system 
meets the accepted standard of benefit adequacy by providing 50 percent wage replacement for 
approximately 80 percent of beneficiaries (ACUC 1996, p. 22).  The latter is assured by having 
the maximum weekly benefit amount (WBA) annually adjusted to two-thirds of the average 
weekly wage (AWW) in UI covered employment.   
 
To have a UI system that is balanced and sustainable for the long-run, revenues should match 
expenditures on average over business cycles.  The accepted standard for UI benefit financing is 
based on the principle of forward funding.  To meet this standard, state accounts in the federal 
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) should maintain balances “sufficient to pay at least one year 
of unemployment insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous “high cost.” (ACUC 
1996, p. 11)  The ACUC rule was put into place as a federal requirement for interest free loans.  
The final regulation on this matter was published by the USDOL in the Federal Register on 
September 17, 2010 as 20 CFR Part 606.   
 
To maintain privileges for interest free short-term borrowing, the new regulation requires that 
states hold one year of reserves in the UTF equal to the average of the three highest cost rates 
experienced in the prior twenty years. This rate is known as the average high cost rate (AHCR).  
For North Carolina the current AHCR is 1.54 (USDOL, 2012).  The federal regulation requires 
reserve balances to have a high cost multiple (HCM) of 0.5 in 2014 increasing by ten percentage 
points per year to reach 1.0 in 2019 and thereafter.  Based on 2011 total payrolls of taxable 
employers in UI covered employment, the target level of North Carolina UI reserves was $1.9 
billion for 2011.  At the end of 2011 the North Carolina fund was in debt to the U.S. Treasury by 
the amount of $2.67 billion.  Based on projected total payrolls for UI taxable employers, the new 
zero interest borrowing rules set the required year end reserve balances for North Carolina in the 









2012 0.0 $0 
2013 0.0 $0 
2014 0.5 $990 
2015 0.6 $1,217 
2016 0.7 $1,453 
2017 0.8 $1,695 
2018 0.9 $1,946 
2019 1.0 $2,204 
2020 1.0 $2,245 
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Methodology 
 
This report presents strategies for achieving long term balance between revenues and 
expenditures in the North Carolina UI system.  Simulation analyses rely on the Benefit Financing 
Model developed by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL).  “The Benefit Financing Model 
(BFM) is an econometric forecasting model designed to help analysts project the condition of 
their Unemployment Insurance (UI) trust funds several years into the future, and quickly assess 
the financial impact of various economic scenarios and possible law 
changes.”(USDOL 2010, p. 1).    
 
The BFM is maintained by the Division of Fiscal and Actuarial Services, Office of 
Unemployment Insurance, Employment and Training Administration, USDOL in Washington, 
DC.  Professional staff at USDOL have initialized the BFM with data for North Carolina through 
2010, and made the BFM available to the Upjohn Institute for use in preparing estimates for this 
report.  All simulation results presented in this report were generated using the BFM.   The 
Benefit Finance Model (BFM) requires users to input forecast values for three exogenous 
variables: (1) Total unemployment rate, (2) Wage growth rate, and (3) Labor force growth rate. 
 
The forecasts used for these three variables were provided by the Assistant State Budget Officer, 
Office of State Budget and Management.  These estimates were provided to North Carolina 
through a contract with Global Insight.  We examine trust fund balances overtime given the 
baseline economic scenario and three alternatives.  The UI benefit cost estimates directly rely on 
the insured unemployment rate (IUR) forecasts.  The alternative economic scenarios are 
summarized by severe, moderate, and mild IUR patterns as follows: 
 









2011 0.83 0.91 10.51 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 
2012 1.03 0.92 10.14 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 
2013 1.05 0.89 9.32 3.54 3.54 3.54 3.54 
2014 1.21 0.88 8.70 3.31 5.15 4.00 4.00 
2015 1.22 0.87 7.76 2.95 3.79 3.50 2.95 
2016 1.15 0.87 7.11 2.70 4.06 2.70 2.70 
2017 1.11 0.86 6.75 2.57 3.54 2.57 2.57 
2018 1.09 0.85 6.53 2.48 3.31 2.48 2.48 
2019 0.91 0.84 6.35 2.41 2.95 2.41 2.41 
2020 0.93 0.84 6.14 2.33 2.70 2.33 2.33 
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Plan for Simulations 
 
We start by enumerating the features of the North Carolina UI system that are changeable within 
a reserve ratio tax system.  Below we list the features and the range of changes tried for each 
feature.  We then specify the current value of these variable features and run the “do nothing” 
simulation on these parameters and baseline forecast values of exogenous economic variables.  
Next we present simulation results for several different bundles of program reforms relative to 
the do-nothing scenario.  The key outcomes examined for each simulation are: the year in which 
debt is paid off, the fund balance at the end of the payoff year, the fund balance at year end 2020, 
the fund balance difference in 2020 from the do nothing scenario, and the tax schedule in effect 
in year 2020.  For simulations that yield year end reserves in the neighborhood of $2.0 billion we 
also report year end forecast trust fund balances for 2014 and 2019, since scenarios these might 
meet the new federal standards for zero interest borrowing. 
 
Tax Features Examined: 
 
New employer rate  
Minimum rate for positive balance employers 
Maximum rate for negative balance employers 
Min for negative balance and Max for positive balance 
Taxable wage base 
Upward shift of the tax schedule 




Benefit Features Examined 
 
Maximum potential duration of benefits 











The impact on reserve balances of bundles of changes are summarized on the next four pages.  
Each page presents a table listing the features of the reform bundles with any changes relative to 
the do-nothing scenario indicated.  The one page summaries that follow the bundles summary 
pages present one-way contrasts of single parameter changes relative to the do-nothing scenario. 
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Taxable wage base 
 
50% 
    
 









Tax schedules to formulas 
 
No 










    
 
Maximum duration of benefits 
 
26 




































    
 






















































This table lists the features of the “do-
nothing” (DN) scenario, and contrasts 
that mix of UI tax and benefit rules to 
four different bundles of program 
parameter values labeled B1 to B4.  
All five of the simulations were run 
under the baseline economic scenario.  
The bottom four table rows 




 Program parameters remain at 2012 
values throughout simulation. Debt is 
paid to zero in 2017 mainly through 
FUTA tax offset.  Reserves at year 
end 2020 stand at $675 million which 
is below zero interest loan 
requirement of $2.4 billion in 2020. 
 
Bundle 1 (B1) 
Relative to DN, increase: new 
employer rate (1.8), minimum rate 
(0.1), maximum rate (6.0). Reduce 
max WBA (60%). Debt reaches zero 
in 2017. Reserves in 2020 are $1.4b, 
or below zero interest standard. 
 
Bundle 2 (B2) 
Relative to B1, decrease max rate 
(5.8), raise min for negative balance 
(3.0), raise max for positive balance 
(2.8), base WBA on two high 
quarters.  Debt is zero in 2016. 
Reserves in 2020 are $ 469 million 
which is below the new zero interest 
reserve standard.  
 
Bundle 3 (B3) 
Relative to B1, raise new employer 
rate (2.7), base WBA on two high 
quarters.  Debt is zero in 2017. 
Reserves in 2020 are $ 1.6 billion or 
below the standard.  
 
Bundle 4 (B4) 
Relative to B3, raise max rate (7.0), 
base WBA on two high quarters. Debt 
is zero in 2016. Reserves in 2020 are 
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Min rate for neg bal employers 
 
2.9 
   
 
Max rate for neg bal employers 
 
2.7 
   
 
Taxable wage base 
 
50% 
   
 
Upward shift of tax schedule 
 
No 
   
 
Tax schedules to formulas 
 
No 















   
 
Maximum duration of benefits 
 
26 


























   
 








































Figure 2: Bundles 5-7 (with solvency taxes) 
 
 
Adding Solvency Taxes 
 
This compares features and 
simulation results from “do-
nothing” (DN) against three 
different bundles of program 
parameter values along with two 
different systems for solvency 
taxes (ST).  ST3 targets a reserve 
of $1b with rates ranging from 
0.1 to 1.0 rising in one-tenth 
increments; ST4 does the same 
while targeting a reserve balance 
of $2.b.  Relative to DN, all three 
bundles increase: new employer 
rate (1.8), minimum rate (0.1), 
and maximum rate (6.0). Reduce 
max WBA (60%).  
 
Bundle 5 (B5) 
 
With solvency tax scheme ST3 
targeting $1.0 billion, debt 
reaches zero in 2015 and 
reserves in 2020 are $1.8b, 
somewhat below the zero interest 
standard of $2.4 billion for that 
year. 
 
Bundle 6 (B6) 
 
With solvency tax scheme ST4 
targeting $2.0 billion, debt 
reaches zero in 2015 and 
reserves in 2020 are $2.2 b 
slightly below the zero interest 
standard of $2.4 billion for that 
year. 
 
Bundle 7 (B7) 
 
Relative to B5, base WBA on 
two high quarters.  Debt is zero 
in 2015. Reserves in 2020 are $ 
1.0 billion or far below the new 
standard for forward funding of 
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Figure 3: Bundles 8-11 (Current System) 
  
 
Bonding and Solvency Taxes 
 
This table lists the features of the 
“do-nothing” (DN) scenario, and 
contrasts that mix of UI tax and 
benefit rules to four different 
bundles which change only 
solvency taxes and introduce 
bonding.  B8 bonds to pay-off debt 
in 2012, B9 bonds to pay-off debt in 
2013. B10 bonds in 2012 and adds 
ST1 targeting $2.2b with rates up to 
1.0.  B11 bonds in 2012 and adds 
ST2 targeting $2.2b in reserves with 
rates up to 0.5. 
  
Bundle 8 (B8) 
Relative to DN, bonding in 2012 
reduces debt to zero immediately 
with the existing system reaching 
zero again in 2016.  Reserves in 
2020 are $372m or about half the 
2020 balance for DN. 
  
Bundle 9 (B9) 
Relative to DN, bonding in 2013 
reduces debt to zero immediately 
with the existing system reaching 
zero again in 2016.  Reserves in 
2020 are $259m or less than half the 
2020 balance for DN which relies 
on FUTA offset. 
 
Bundle 10 (B10) 
Like B8, bonding in 2012 reduces 
debt to zero immediately adding the 
solvency tax ST1, the system 
reaches zero again in 2016.  
Reserves in 2020 are $2.5b or above 
the 2020 balance needed to qualify 
for interest free loans. 
 
Bundle 11 (B11) 
Like B8, bonding in 2012 reduces 
debt to zero immediately adding the 
solvency tax ST2, the system 
reaches zero again in 2016.  
Reserves in 2020 are $1.8b, and 
therefore below the 2020 balance 

















































New employer rate 
 
1.2 
    
 
Min rate for pos bal employers 
 
0.0 
    
 
Max rate for pos bal employers 
 
5.7 
    
 
Min rate for neg bal employers 
 
2.9 
    
 
Max rate for neg bal employers 
 
2.7 
    
 
Taxable wage base 
 
50% 
    
 
Upward shift of tax schedule 
 
No 
    
 
Tax schedules to formulas 
 
No 






















Maximum duration of benefits 
 
26 
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Max rate for pos bal employers 
 
5.7 
    
 
Min rate for neg bal employers 
 
2.9 
    
 
Max rate for neg bal employers 
 
2.7 
    
 












Upward shift of tax schedule 
 
No 
    
 
Tax schedules to formulas 
 
No 




















Maximum duration of benefits 
 
26 



























    
 




















































Restore 1992 System 
 
This table lists the features of the 
“do-nothing” (DN) scenario, and 
contrasts that mix of UI tax and 
benefit rules to those in effect in 
1992.  Relative to DN, increase: 
new employer rate (2.25), raise 
taxable wage base factor (60%), 
replacement rate base on two high 
quarters of base period earnings 
(1/52). 
 
Bundle 12 (B12) 
Relative to DN, the 1992 system 
would pay down debt to zero a year 
earlier in 2016, and leave a reserve 
balance of $767m in 2020 or about 
$142m more than the do-nothing 
scenario. 
 
Bundle 13 (B13) 
Relative to B12, selling bonds in 
2012 pays debt to zero that year, but 
the system returns to deficit until 
2016.  Reserves recover to reach 
$767 million in 2020.  That level is 
$142m above the DN 2020 
scenario, but remains below the 
average high cost multiple (AHCM) 
standards to maintain zero interest 
short term borrowing privileges 
from the unemployment trust fund.  
 
Bundle 14 (B14) 
Relative to B13, adding a solvency 
tax targeting $1b in reserves yields 
a system that remains in positive 
balance after the 2012 issuance of 
bonds.  The system achieves the 
reserve criteria set for zero cost 
borrowing from 2014 through 2019.  
Yearend reserves in 2020 are 
estimated to stand at $3.0 billion. 
 
Bundle 15 (B15) 
Relative to B14 with 2012 bonding 
and a solvency tax that targets $2b, 
like B14 reserves remain positive 
yearly after 2012 and the system 
reaches the annual zero cost 
borrowing AHCM criteria. Yearend 
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Following are one page summaries of program feature simulations: 
Tax Features Examined: 
 
New employer rate:  
From 1.2 to 3.7 in steps of 0.3  
Minimum rate for positive balance employers:  
From 0.0 to 1.1 in steps of 0.1 
Maximum rate for negative balance employers:  
From 5.5 to 10.0 in steps of 0.5 
Min for negative balance and Max for positive balance:  
(2.7, 2.9), (2.8, 3.0), (2.9 and 3.1) 
Taxable wage base:  
From 40 to 60 percent of AWW*52 in steps of 2.5 percentage points  
Upward shift of the tax schedule:  
Shift A up from 0.2 to 1.0 in steps of 0.1 percentage points  
Tax schedules to formulas:  
Formulas on the reserve ratio interval [-3.5, 3.5]  
Solvency taxes:  
From 0.1 to 2.0 percentage points and targets of $1 billion and $2 billion 
Bond issuance: to pay off debt balance in 2012 
 
Benefit Features Examined 
 
Maximum potential duration of benefits:  
From 26 to 20 in steps of -1 week 
Max weekly benefit amount (WBA):  
0.67*AWW to 0.60*AWW in steps of -0.01 percentage points 
Waiting weeks:  
From 1 week to 2 weeks 
Replacement rate:  
From (1/26)(HQW) to (1/52)(HQW1+HQW2) 
 
Economic Scenarios Examined  
 
Baseline:  
Based on Global Insight forecast 
Severe:  
In 2014 a 2008 style recession begins again 
Moderate:  
2014, 2015 unemployment above Global Insight forecast  
Mild:  
2014 unemployment above Global Insight forecast  
26 
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B. New Employer Rate 
 
The new employer rate simulations start at the current value of 1.2 percent then increase in nine 
increments of 0.3 percentage points.  The terminal value is set at 3.7 which was considered by TPRC 
(2011). 
 
The simulations relative to the Do-nothing suggest that a 0.3 percentage point increase in the new 
employer rate increases the terminal reserve balance in 2020 by $73 million (Table 4.6).  Additional 
incremental increases of 0.3 have an additive effect on tax contributions.  That is each 0.3 increase 
adds another $73 million or so to the 2020 year-end balance.  This results from a relatively fixed 
amount of new employers in the state every year.  Regardless of the new employer rate examined, the 
payoff year remains 2017 for every level of new employer rate tried between 1.2 and 3.7, and the tax 
schedule in effect is always A for any of the new employer rates tried. 
 
Table 4.6  New Employer Rate Simulations 






















1.2* 2017 483 625 0 A 
1.5 2017 525 699 73 A 
1.8 2017 567 772 147 A 
2.1 2017 610 846 220 A 
2.4 2017 652 919 294 A 
2.7† 2017 694 993 367 A 
3 2017 737 1,066 441 A 
3.3 2017 779 1,140 514 A 
3.7† 2017 835 1,238 612 A 
*Do-nothing scenario 




NC Final Report                                    CESER-UPJOHN 
C. Minimum Tax Rate for Positive Balance Employers 
 
These simulations start at the current rate of 0.0 and increase in 12 increments of 0.1 percentage 
points to 1.1, as considered by TPRC (2011).  These changes are shown graphically against tax 
schedule A in Figure 4.3.  Currently employers with a reserve ratio of 4.2 and over pay no UI taxes. 
The North Carolina finance committee previously simulated minimum tax rates of 0.2 and 1.1 
percent.  Simulations suggest that increasing the minimum rate in increments of 0.1 from zero to 0.9 
has an exponential effect on tax contributions, but increases to 1.0 and 1.1 lower the 2020 year end 
value of reserves because the trigger moves to tax schedule B (see Table 4.7).  The biggest marginal 
revenue effects occur for minimum tax rates between 0.5 and 0.9.     
 
















0.0* 2017 483 625 0 A 
0.1 2017 490 636 11 A 
0.2† 2017 498 649 24 A 
0.3 2017 510 674 49 A 
0.4 2017 534 719 94 A 
0.5 2017 565 780 155 A 
0.6 2017 610 868 243 A 
0.7 2017 672 990 365 A 
0.8 2017 752 1,143 518 A 
0.9 2017 853 1,330 705 A 
1.0 2017 973 1,347 722 B 
1.1† 2017 1,094 1,282 657 B 
*Do-nothing scenario 



















Schedule A Minimum Rate .1
Minimum Rate .2 Minimum Rate .3
Minimum Rate .4 Minimum Rate .5
Minimum Rate .6 Minimum Rate .7
Minimum Rate .8 Minimum Rate .9
Minimum Rate .10 Minimum Rate .11
28 
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D. Middle Range Tax Rates 
 
In addition to raising the top and bottom rates, we simulated raising the tax rates on employers in the 
reserve range from -0.5 to 0.7.  Reserve balance changes resulting from these changes were very 
modest. Raising these rates alone by 0.1 or 0.2 points generated little additional revenue relative to 
the baseline scenario.  Results are reported in Table 4.9.  The payoff year remains 2017.  The 0.1 
increase raises 2020 reserves by $7 million and the 0.2 increases raises them by $31 million.  Like 
the baseline both of these alternatives end on rate schedule A in 2020. 
 
Table 4.9  Middle Tax Rate Simulations Summary 





Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 







(2.9, 2.7)* 2017 483 625 0 A 
(3.0, 2.8) 2017 387 632 7 A 
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E. Taxable Wage Base 
 
The North Carolina UI taxable wage base is indexed to reset annually at fifty percent of annualized 
average weekly wages (AWW) in UI covered employment.  That is, 0.5*(52)*AWW.  A proportion 
of sixty percent was simulated for the TPRC (2011) report.  This study reports on a range of 
proportions starting at forty percent and increasing by 2.5 percentage points in eight steps to sixty 
percent.  As can be seen in Table 4.10, the effects of lowering and raising the taxable wage base are 
nearly symmetric.  Neither a 10 percentage point cut, nor 10 point increase changes the payoff year 
from 2017.  A cut of 10 points lowers the 2020 yearend balance by $351 million, while a 10 
percentage point increase raises the balance by $309.  The gains or losses are in arithmetic proportion 
to the change in the taxable wage base. 
   






Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Diff from 




40.0% 2017 227 274 -351 A 
42.5% 2017 287 358 -267 A 
45.0% 2017 348 444 -181 A 
47.5% 2017 419 539 -86 A 
50.0%* 2017 483 625 0 A 
52.5% 2017 532 699 74 A 
55.0% 2017 584 769 143 A 
57.5% 2017 650 855 230 A 
60.0%† 2017 706 934 309 A 
*Do-nothing scenario 
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F. Shifting Up the Tax Schedule 
 
Upward shifts in tax schedule A were simulated in six increments of 0.1 percentage points to 0.6 and 
to 1.0 as in TPRC (2011).  These changes are shown graphically below against schedule A. We also 
examine the effect of using shorter triggers (0.25) to shift between tax schedules.  Raising A by 0.1 
point generated about $268 million more than the do-nothing scenario by year end 2020, but did not 
change the payoff year from 2017 or change the tax schedule in effect from A.  Raising tax schedule 
A by 0.4 percentage points yielded an additional $1 billion in 2020 with payoff in 2017, and the tax 
schedule drops down to B.  Raising the schedule by 1.0 yielded $2.27 billion in 2020 with tax 
schedule C in effect that year.  Shifting up the positive balance part of schedule A by one step in 
proportion to the relationship between other schedules increases reserves by $209 million relative to 
the baseline at year end 2020, the system remains on that tax schedule from 2012 through 2020. 
 
Table 4.11  Changes in Tax Schedule and Triggers Simulations Summary 
Schedule Change Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




A* 2017 483 625 0 A 
A+.1† 2017 672 893 268 A 
A+.2 2017 865 1,166 541 A 
A+.3 2017 1,058 1,444 818 B 
A+.4 2017 1,253 1,648 1,023 B 
A+.5 2016 188 679 54 A 
A+.6 2017 548 1,000 374 A 
A+1.0† 2016 1,109 2,274 1,649 C 
Change Triggers 2016 483 309 -316 C 
New A, Positive 
only 2017 648 834 209 A 
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G. From Tax Schedule to Formula 
 
We simulated replacing the current tax schedule A with algebraic approximations that would permit 
employer tax rates to adjust more smoothly year to year.  Simulations included: do-nothing, a 
piecewise-linear formula to mimic schedule A with slopes (-2/3, -1, -1/2), a piece-wise formula with 
a slightly higher negative balance slope (-4/5, -1, -1/2) and intercept and a cubic approximation to 
schedule A.  These tax formulae are shown graphically below.  Changing the tax schedule from a 
stepped system to a smoother function does not change the payoff year of 2017, but yields $98 
million more in reserves by 2020 compared to A. Raising the intercept and pivoting the linear rate 
system upward raises 2020 year end reserves by an estimated $390 million.  The cubic 
approximation fits the negative balance employers well, but poorly fits the positive range, and yields 
$104 million less revenue at year end 2020. 
 
Figure 4.7: Schedule to Slope 
 
 









2020 Difference from 
Do-nothing 
($ millions) 
Do-nothing* 2017 483 625 0 
Schedule A** 2017 435 586 -39 
Linear A 2017 526 723 98 
Linear A Shift 2017 707 1,015 390 
Cubic A 2017 403 521 -104 
*Do-nothing scenario.   
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H. Solvency taxes 
 
Revenues from solvency tax assessments flow into the state reserve account, but do not improve 
reserve balances for individual employers.  As such they affect tax triggers, but do not affect 
individual employer experience rates.  We reexamined three scenarios considered by the TPRC 
(2011) with levies of 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 depending on accumulated reserves ranging up to $800 
million.  We also simulated two more gradual systems with rates ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 rising in 
one-tenth increments with target reserve balances of either $1.0 billion or $2.0 billion.  With a three 
year average high-cost rate of 1.54, the target level of North Carolina UI reserves should be about 
$2.3 billion in 2020.   
 
All five sets of simulation results for solvency tax plans suggest the trust fund would be paid off in 
2015.  The 2015 year-end balance is identical for four of the scenarios examined since they all start 
with a solvency tax rate of 1.0 percent.  For the three schemes considered by TPRC (2011) the 2020 
year end trust fund balances are projected to be higher when the solvency tax triggers off at a higher 
level.  Aggressive tax rates when the fund balance is low in the TPRC (2011) scenarios build up 
reserves early, and the system maintains high balances given the assumed steady labor market 
recovery over the period.  The two other scenarios gradually reduce the solvency tax and target fund 
reserve levels at $1 billion and $2 billion.   
 










from Do-nothing  
($ millions) 2020 Schedule 
No Solvency Tax* 2017 483 625 0 A 
North Carolina 1† 2015 497 797 172 A 
North Carolina 2† 2015 497 1,154 529 A 
North Carolina 3† 2015 1,403 1,728 1,103 B 
Solvency Tax 3 2015 497 1,302 677 B 
Solvency Tax 4 2015 497 2,124 1,499 C 
*Do-nothing scenario.  †Used in Tax Policy Review Committee (2011) simulations 
 
Summary of Solvency Tax Plans Analyzed in UI Financing Simulations 
Solvency Tax (NC1) Solvency Tax (NC2) Solvency Tax (NC3) 
0.0 $100m<B 0.0 $500m<B 0.0 $800m<B 
0.5 $25<B<$100 0.5 $100<B<$500 1.0 $100<B<$800 





















Maximum solvency tax 1.0 $0.0b 0.5 $0.0b 1.0 $0.0b 1.0 $0.0b 
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I. Maximum Duration and Waiting Week 
 
Currently up to 26 weeks of regular compensation are available to every UI beneficiary in North 
Carolina.  Simulations were run reducing the maximum potential weeks incrementally by one week 
down to 20.  Simulation results are shown in Table 4.14. The BFM does not permit changing North 
Carolina rules regarding the maximum potential duration.  However, the model does allow for 
reducing the total amount of weeks paid each year.  Data published by the USDOL (2012) report an 
average of 43 percent of people between 2006 and 2011 exhausted their maximum eligibility of 26 
weeks.  That is, shortening potential duration to 25 weeks means actual durations will be one full 
week shorter for 43 percent of beneficiaries.  Shortening the maximum entitled duration by one week 
translates into a decline in weeks compensated of 2.05 percent, additional weeks of shortening were 
considered up to 20 weeks which cut weeks compensated by 14.6 percent.  Simulations suggest that 
shortening entitled duration by one to five weeks will pay off the outstanding debt in 2017, with the 
year-end reserve balance higher for each additional week removed from potential duration.   
 
Of the 53 state UI programs 41 have one waiting week including North Carolina.  The remaining 
states do not require a waiting week, and no states require more than one.  We simulate the first order 
effects of adding a second waiting week by computing the reduced benefits to for all who exhaust.  
We ignore the likely second order effect from reduced entry into the system by those who expect to 
have very short durations of joblessness.  Given that the average UI exhaustion rate was 43 percent 
between 2006 and 2011, therefore 57 percent of beneficiaries did not exhaust.  Assuming average 
benefits are paid regardless of duration, an added waiting week will reduce benefit payments by 
about 2.73 percent.  The effect on 2020 year end reserve balance is $175 million or about $50 million 
more than shortening maximum potential duration by one week. 
 







Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




26* 2017 483 625 0 A 
25 2017 593 784 159 A 
24 2017 718 963 338 A 
23 2017 859 1,146 520 A 
22 2017 995 1,346 721 A 
21 2017 1,154 1,469 843 B 
20 2016 52 700 75 A 
Waiting 
Week 2017 636 844 219 A 
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J. Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount and Replacement Rate 
 
The maximum weekly benefit amount (WBA) in North Carolina is currently indexed to the average 
weekly wage (AWW) of all UI covered workers in the state.  The index formula annually sets the 
max WBA at two-thirds (66.7%) of the AWW.   The max WBA for 2012 is $524.  We simulated 
lowering the maximum rate from 66.7 to 60 percent in one percentage point increments.  The debt 
payoff year does not change in any of the simulations; neither does the 2020 tax schedule in effect. 
When the maximum benefit is set to 60 percent of the AWW, the 2020 year end trust fund balance is 
just over $1 billion. According to 2010 American Community Survey data, about one third of 
employees in North Carolina earned $52,000 per year or more.  That is, about one-third of North 
Carolina workers would qualify for the maximum WBA if involuntarily jobless. 
 
Rather than changing the North Carolina rule to replace fifty percent of the prior wage rate below the 
maximum WBA, since it is the ideal standard of UI benefit adequacy, we simulated the effect of 
changing the formula from (1/26) times (high quarter earnings) to (1/52) times (sum of two highest 
quarters).  Computations based on administrative data from a state neighboring North Carolina 
suggested this change would lower system-wide benefit charges about five percent per year.  The 
main impacts will be on persons with uneven earnings patterns over the course of the year.  This 
change pays off system debt by 2017 leaving a year end reserve balance of $765 that year and a 
system balance by year end 2020 that is $402 million higher than the baseline scenario suggests.   
 















66.7% of AWW* 2017 483 625 0 A 
65.0% of AWW 2017 553 731 106 A 
64.0% of AWW 2017 609 812 186 A 
63.0% of AWW 2017 651 868 243 A 
62.0% of AWW 2017 681 920 294 A 
61.0% of AWW 2017 702 970 345 A 
60.0% of AWW 2017 726 1,008 383 A 
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K. Economic Conditions 
 
Some of the UI reform bundles were subjected to the “IUR severe” economic scenario listed in the 
introduction. In that scenario the insured unemployment rate (IUR) jumps up in 2014 to the 2010 
level and decreases following the same pattern as 2011 through 2013.  The simulation results below 
suggest that the do-nothing scenario actually reaches 2020 with a higher yearend balance, by nearly 
$700 million, due to federal offsets and increased taxes from employers not moving to higher 
experience rates.  Bundles 8 and 10 start from the current system, both add a $3 billion bond in 2012, 
and B10 also adds a solvency tax scheme. Notice that B8 yields a negative balance in 2013, and 
remains negative until 2019.  With the solvency tax targeting $2.2 billion, B10 provides the second 
highest pattern of reserves. Bundles 14 and 15 restore the 1992 tax system as well as bonding and 
solvency tax. Both use a targeted tax of $2.2 billion, but B15 has a tax rate of 0.5 as the maximum. 
Bundle 14 is the only scenario that reaches the DOL target of $2.2 billion in reserve in 2019, 
although the target is not met in any prior year.  
 





Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Diff from 




Do-nothing 2019 1,202 1,324 699 A 
B8 2019 251 323 -302 A 
B10 2012 492 1,925 1,300 B 
B14 2012 776 2,327 1,702 C (1992) 
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North Carolina’s Financial Data chart shows after the early 1980s recessions it was able to build 
a relatively high level of UI trust fund reserves to pay benefits during an economic downturn.  
During the 1990s, North Carolina enacted a series of tax reductions and holidays, and the level of 
the trust fund began to decline, which is indicated by the steady decline in the green line as 
unemployment rose in the 2001 downturn.  The 2002 Reed Act distribution of $240.9 million 
delayed the necessity of North Carolina having to borrow to cover UI benefits paid.  The 2007-
2009 recession caused reserves to dip further and finally become negative leading to a current 
(May 1, 2012) unemployment trust fund outstanding loan balance of $2.84 billion with $55.0 
million in interest due.  Subsequent borrowing after May might result in a higher indebtedness 
and additional interest will continue to accrue through September 2012.  
  
North Carolina faces the challenge of providing a benefit structure for unemployed 
individuals, developing financing systems that can provide adequate funding for 
current benefits and repay significant debt to the federal government.  
A. Fact Sheet: North Carolina UI Solvency Status 
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The UI system is designed to be “countercyclical.”  The demand for UI benefit payments increase as 
the economy slows, and even more dramatically during more severe recessions and their aftermath.  
With higher levels of unemployment, more individuals file for UI and receive payments for longer 
periods, thereby increasing the need to pay more benefits from the UI system.   
Most UI financing systems also are 
countercyclical. Employer taxes are usually 
low shortly before recessions and they do 
not increase substantially during the 
downturn or shortly thereafter.  Tax 
revenues begin to increase as the economy 
improves.  Individual employers who lay off 
more workers face increased tax rates based 
on their experience with increased 
unemployment.  All employers might face 
increases in taxes too if a state has a general 
solvency tax that activates when trust fund 
balances are relatively low.  The duration 
and amplitude of U.S. economic cycles have varied significantly.  Understanding how cycles change 
is important when developing alternative UI benefit and financing systems. Changing formulas on 
how an employer’s experience with benefits paid from their respective accounts, changing the 
number of tax schedules and the trigger mechanism to determine which schedule is in effect as a 
function of the level of the UI trust fund are just a few ways to affect the timing of the changes in 
employers taxes.  In the figure above, a comparison for the lengths of U.S. recessions since 1937 are 
shown, the average length (peak to trough) is 11 months. Three recent recessions 1973, 1981, and 
2007, exceeded the average and placed increased pressure on state UI benefit and tax systems.  
 
Anticipating the length of the “next recession’ is important to the designers of a state’s UI financing 
system, but so is determining the amplitude of the downturn, and the length of the recovery.  In the 
next figure, the total unemployment rates for the U.S. and North Carolina are compared for the years 
1980 to 2012.  Four economic cycles are clearly shown for 1981, 1990, 2001, and 2007.  The peaks 
appear to be at close to 10 year 
intervals and the severity 
varies with 1981 and 2007 of 
similar amplitudes but very 
different recovery periods.  
Even though the 1991 and 
2001 cycles have a longer 
recovery and expansion 
period, the levels of 
unemployment reached was 
clearly less resulting in less 
pressure for UI financing 
systems.  
B. Fact Sheet: The Economic Cycle and UI Financing 
The UI system has been characterized as a “countercyclical’ program.  Designing a system that is 
countercyclical requires knowledge of the nature of U.S. and state economic cycles.  Forecasting 
the length and depth of future economic cycles is a difficult science. 
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Comparing North Carolina with other states in the regions (AL, FL, GA, KY, MI, SC, TN, and 
VA) reveals the following.  When looking a North Carolina’s weekly benefit amounts over the 
last few years and comparing the numbers against her sister states, one anomaly stands out – 
maximum weekly benefit amount is over 70 percent higher than the average of the other eight 
states.  When looking at the average weekly benefit amount as a percentage of the average 
weekly wage and exhaustion rate, North Carolina is within a normal range of the other 
surrounding states. 





























as % of 
AWW 
US   $295 53.4 %   $297 48.8%   
AL $45 $265 204 44.2 $45 $265 204 39.9 $766 26.7% 
FL 32 275 229 67.0 32 275 232 55.9 803 28.7 
GA 44 330 268 54.0 44 330 268 50.9 848 31.7 
KY 39 415 285 41.9 39 415 287 35.6 746 38.5 
MS 30 235 188 47.9 30 235 191 45.2 655 29.1 
NC 43 506 292 60.7 43 525 291 55.3 797 36.6 
SC 20 326 233 55.8 42 326 238 54.6 726 32.6 
TN 30 275 233 53.0 30 275 238 49.8 800 29.3 







C. Fact Sheet: North Carolina’s Benefits Compared to Neighboring States 
States often compare their UI program parameters with each other to gain an understating 
of how different systems work and how employers and workers see the various advantages 
and disadvantages among them. 
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Comparing North Carolina with other states in the region (AL, FL, GA, KY, MI, SC, TN, and 
VA) reveals the following.  When looking at North Carolina’s tax statistics for 2011 and 
comparing the numbers against her sister states, one difference stands out – new employer tax 
rate is about 55 percent lower than the average of the other eight states.  North Carolina’s new 
employer tax rate allows new employers to come into North Carolina’s UI tax system as if they 
have already been experienced rated for three to five years.  Also, North Carolina’s percentage in 
2011 for relieving charges to employers is slightly higher than some of her sister states. 
 
Mississippi was the only state out of the nine with enough reserves to continue benefits without 
borrowing.  Mississippi’s average high-cost multiple (AHCM) in December 2007 was 1.70 
compared to North Carolina’s AHCM of 0.23.  Tennessee had to borrow, but has since repaid its 
loans with a 0.6 percent surcharge.  The remaining seven states as of May 1, 2012, have 
combined loans of $6.8 billion with $0.3 billion in interest due in September 2012.  North 
Carolina’s debt is $2.84 billion with $0.055 billion in interest due.  Subsequent borrowing after 
May might result in a higher indebtedness and additional interest will continue to accrue through 
September 2012 in September 2012.     
 




























AL 8,000 2.19% 8.34% 2.7% 7% 67% N/A 
FL 8,500 1.03 5.40 2.7 22 63 11% 
GA 8,500 0.03 5.40 2.6 11 41 11 
KY 9,000 1.00 10.00 2.7 10 19 5 
MS 14,000 0.85 5.40 2.7 12 62 17 
NC 20,400 0.24 6.84 1.2 10 20 16 
SC 12,000 0.10 11.28 2.9 6 56 18 
TN 9,000 0.50 10.00 2.7 6 15 9 
VA 8,000 .77 6.87 3.2 10 69 7 
 
 
States often compare their UI program parameters with each other to gain an understating 
of how different systems work and how employers and workers see the various advantages 
and disadvantages among them. 
D. Fact Sheet: North Carolina’s Taxes Compared to Neighboring States 
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The federal-state UI trust fund system has always been intended to be countercyclical to lessen 
the impact of the economic business cycle in a state and the nation.  The “rainy-day fund” allows 
reserves to build during a strong economy so benefits can continue to be paid when a state’s 
economy shrinks.  This structure also reduces tax increases on employers during a recession that 
might further constrict businesses and a state’s economy. 
  
There is no federal requirement for what a state’s reserve level must be for their unemployment 
trust fund at a given state in the economic cycle.  Federal law generally limits the use of a state’s 
unemployment trust fund only for the purposes of paying benefits.  Over the years, the U.S. 
Department of Labor (USDOL) and others have suggested a commonly used measure of the 
adequacy of financial reserves known as the high-cost multiple.  The high-cost multiple 
compares current reserves with a state’s past peak benefit payout.   
 
In the early 1990s, the Federal Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation developed the concept 
of the Average High Cost Multiple (AHCM).  The 
AHCM is defined as how long a state could sustain 
payments equal to the average of the three highest 
benefit cost rates in the 20-year period ending with the 
preceding year, without additional tax revenue coming 
into the unemployment trust fund. The AHCM is used 
as a watermark for states in reviewing the health of 
their unemployment trust fund.  For example, a state 
with an AHCM of 1.0 could support 12 months of 
historically high benefits.  The 23 States with positive 
AHCM’s as of December 2011 are shown in the figure 
to the right.  AHCM’s are not determined for 
borrowing states because their balances are negative.) 
  
During the 1990s decade, the 
General Assembly voted to cut taxes five different times and it authorized a 
one-year tax holiday.
1
  The 2002 Reed Act distribution of $8 billion delayed 
addressing solvency issues in many states; the $240.9 million NC received 
helped improve their trust fund reserve balance.  By the fall of 2003, NC was 
anticipating borrowing since their trust fund balance was below $11 million 
and NC had an AHCM of 0.14.   To be completed for final report.  
  
                                                 
1
 Karin Schill Rives, Higher Payroll Taxes on Way, http://www.newsobserver.com (February 8, 2002). 
E. Fact Sheet: Status of UI Trust Funds 
State UI Trust Funds receive funds from employer taxes and federal interest on reserves 
and distribute funds to pay benefits for UI Claimants.  If sufficient funds are not available 
to pay benefits when due a state may borrow from Federal UI Accounts to cover shortfalls. 
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Decision to Issue Bonds  
 
North Carolina might consider issuing bonds in order to repay its outstanding Title XII loans and 
avoid the higher interest rates and Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) credit reductions 
associated with the federal loans.  At this time, employers in the state face a uniform FUTA tax 
increase of 0.6 percent in 2012, for a total FUTA tax rate of 1.2 percent.  In 2013 this FUTA tax 
rate will increase by another 0.3 percent to 1.5 percent.  This tax increase is not stratified 
amongst employers according to their relevant experience rating; rather, it is imposed equally on 
each employer that would otherwise pay the normal FUTA tax of 0.6 percent.  North Carolina 
might seek to avoid the FUTA tax increase in whole by repaying the state’s outstanding Title XII 
loans and maintaining a zero positive balance in the state’s unemployment trust fund on January 
1.  North Carolina would have to decide how to service this debt through state revenue or other 
source.  North Carolina also could, as some states have, impose an additional surtax or special 
assessment on employers in order to pay the debt service associated with the bond issue.  The 
incidence of who pays would depend on the source of funds, if an employer tax was used; the 
assessment could be structures in such a manner that employers would be assessed according to 
employers’ respective experience ratings. 
  
North Carolina might decide to issue bonds because doing so might result in a credit spread or 
cost savings to the State due to the lower cost of capital associated with borrowing in the private 
market.  The rate of interest North Carolina currently pays on the State’s outstanding Title XII 
loans is approximately 3.0 percent annually.  If North Carolina could receive a lower rate of 
interest by issuing bonds in the private market, the proceeds of which would be used to repay the 
outstanding Title XII loans, the difference in annual interest payments would result in a net credit 
to the state in the form of interest rate savings and additional FUTA tax increases for all 
employers.   
 
Description of Bond Issue 
 
North Carolina could seek to issue bonds with a maximum maturity of no longer than five years.  
While the State might select any number of bond types (taxable or tax-exempt issues, with fixed 
or variable rates of interest, and optional redemption and enhancement features) in our analysis 
we will assume North Carolina would issue fixed-rate serial bonds in which an equal portion of 
the bond’s outstanding principal is repaid each year, while coupon payments are made on a semi-
annual basis (for a total of 10 payments).  From a cursory review of recent bond issues of similar 
maximum maturities and credit qualities, we can assume North Carolina would pay a rate of 
interest of approximately 2.0 percent on five year serial bonds issued at par with a total principal 
value of $3,000,000,000.  Finally, we will assume that the bonds are issued by September 30 of 
2012 in order for the State to avoid the interest charges associated with its outstanding Title XII 
loans (charged on loans outstanding as of October 1, 2012), with the first coupon payment 
F. Fact Sheet: Issuing Bonds to Repay Outstanding Title XII Loans 
Analysis of an option for North Carolina to issue five year bonds to repay the 
state’s current outstanding Title XII loan.  
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2011 $0 ($2,789,756) $1,484,619 $1,203,467
2012 2,653 14,272 1,670,683 1,335,119
2013 165 (256,708) 1,444,674 1,173,528
2014 0 (279,340) 1,375,379 1,352,747
2015 0 (138,149) 1,234,773 1,375,964
2016 5,072 242,037 1,139,212 1,366,782
2017 12,436 291,767 1,097,975 1,135,270
2018 14,114 314,930 1,073,998 1,083,047
2019 15,367 341,002 1,056,521 1,067,227













Amt Paid on 
January 1 as a 
result of FUTA 
Reduction 
2011 $2,789,756,000 $109,596,383 0.3% 0.0% $0
2012 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 136,938,813
2013 256,708,248 3,709,516 0.0% 0.0% 0
2014 279,340,076 14,577,908 0.0% 0.0% 0
2015 138,148,829 12,436,430 0.3% 0.0% 0
2016 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 147,542,673
2017 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0
2018 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0
2019 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0

















2011 - $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
2012 - 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 2.00% 3,000,000,000 60,000,000 600,000,000 660,000,000 0 660,000,000
2014 2.00% 2,400,000,000 48,000,000 600,000,000 648,000,000 0 648,000,000
2015 2.00% 1,800,000,000 36,000,000 600,000,000 636,000,000 0 636,000,000
2016 2.00% 1,200,000,000 24,000,000 600,000,000 624,000,000 0 624,000,000
2017 2.00% 600,000,000 12,000,000 600,000,000 612,000,000 0 612,000,000
2018 - 0 0 0 0 0 0
2019 - 0 0 0 0 0 0
2020 - 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3
commencing on January 15, 2013.  Coupon payments will then be payable twice annually, on 
January 15 and July 15, with an equal portion of the principal due (one-fifth of the par value of 
the principal at issuance) also due on July 15.   
 
Simulation of Bond Issue 
 
As Table 1 shows, assuming all other variables are held constant, a benefit finance model (BFM) 
simulation of a $3.0 billion bond issue by September 30, 2012 results in the unemployment trust 
fund maintaining a surplus of nearly $16 million by December 31, 2012 (assuming the bond 
proceeds are used to repay outstanding Title XII loans, and the remaining funds are used to 
capitalize the trust fund).  
However, due to the fact that 
no tax modifications or 
benefit reforms are included 
in this simulation, the 
simulation projects the trust 
fund will fall into negative 
territory again in 2013.  As a 
result, North Carolina would 
be required to borrow funds 
to pay unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, either from the private market (which is unlikely 
to occur), or from the federal government in the form of Title XII loans.  The simulation projects 
that the trust fund would fail to maintain a zero positive balance until 2016, after three years of 
additional borrowing in the form of Title XII loans.     
 
The simulation projects that North Carolina would face interest charges and a FUTA credit 
reduction as a result of the state’s Title 
XII borrowing from 2013 to 2015.  As 
Table 2 illustrates below, interest 
would be charged against outstanding 
Title XII loans and owed to the federal 
government in 2013, 2014, and 2015; 
while the State’s employers would 
face a FUTA credit reduction equal to 
0.3 percent in 2016. 
 
Debt Service or Total Costs of 
Bonding 
 
In order to calculate the total debt 
service associated with the bond 
issuance we need to add the debt 
service payable as a result of 
outstanding Title XII loans to the 
debt service payable under the 
bond. Table 3 below shows the 
outstanding principal owed by 
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Total Interest Due 
Under Bonding 
Scenario














the State under the bond issue on January 1.  Because the bond indentures stipulate that an equal 
portion of the principal due (one-fifth of the par value of the principal at issuance) is due on July 
15 each year, the chart below assumes $600 million in principal will be paid annually.  As the 
bond’s principal is reduced, the interest payments are reduced by approximately $12 million each 
year.  The column to the far right in table below shows the annual debt service associated with 
the bond, calculated by adding each year’s principal and interest payments.  The far right column 
in Table 3 adds the total interest payments and the total level of funds owed as a result of FUTA 
credit reductions to calculate the total debt service associated with maintaining outstanding Title 
XII loans under the bond issuing scenario. 
 
Adding the annual debt service payments for the bond issue 
with the debt service owed on Title XII loans accessed by the 
State over the life of the bond issuing scenario results in a total 




In order to determine whether issuing bonds would result in any cost savings for North Carolina, 
we need to compare the debt service associated with the bond issue to the debt service payable as 
a result of maintaining outstanding Title XII loans under the “Do Nothing” scenario.  The total 
debt service payable under the Do Nothing scenario is slightly less than $3.7 billion, as 
illustrated by Table 5 below.   
 
 
As a result, the total savings the State would realize by issuing 
bonds to repay its outstanding Title XII debt (under this 
specific bond issue) would equal approximately $90 million.  It 
is also worth noting that the total savings in interest payments 
between the two scenarios is substantial, as the interest the 
State would owe the federal government under the Do Nothing 
scenario is more than $300 million higher than the interest payable under the bonding scenario, 
as illustrated by Table 6.  This analysis is based on assumptions and variables that North 
Carolina may not be able to duplicate in the actual bond market depending on the state’s rating 










Amt Paid on 
January 1 as a 
result of FUTA 
reduction 
Title XII Debt 
Service 
2011 $2,789,756,000 $109,596,383 0.3% 0.0% $0 $109,596,383
2012 2,988,381,000 134,307,004 0.6% 0.0% 136,938,813 271,245,817
2013 2,789,463,000 133,604,196 0.9% 0.0% 279,085,494 412,689,690
2014 2,359,072,000 116,113,256 1.2% 0.3% 426,492,972 542,606,228
2015 1,638,193,341 90,243,345 1.5% 0.3% 579,687,876 669,931,221
2016 672,909,475 50,573,485 1.8% 0.3% 737,713,365 788,286,850
2017 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 900,756,666 900,756,666
2018 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0
2019 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0
2020 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0
Table 5
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VI. Comparative Analysis of State UI Trust Funds 
A. Cyclical Economic Conditions & UI Financing 
The UI system is designed to be “countercyclical.”  The demand for UI benefit payments 
increase as the economy slows, and even more dramatically during more severe recessions and 
their aftermath.  With higher levels of unemployment, more individuals file for UI and receive 
payments for longer periods, thereby increasing the need to pay more benefits from the UI 
system.   
Most UI financing systems also are 
countercyclical. Employer taxes are 
usually low shortly before recessions 
and they do not increase substantially 
during the downturn or shortly 
thereafter.  Tax revenues begin to 
increase as the economy improves.  
Individual employers who lay off more 
workers face increased tax rates based 
on their experience with increased 
unemployment.  All employers might 
face increases in taxes too if a state has 
a general solvency tax that activates 
when trust fund balances are relatively low.  The duration and amplitude of U.S. economic 
cycles have varied significantly.  Understanding how cycles change is important when 
developing alternative UI benefit and financing systems. Changing formulas on how an 
employer’s experience with benefits paid from their respective accounts, changing the number of 
tax schedules and the trigger mechanism to determine which schedule is in effect as a function of 
the level of the UI trust fund are just a few ways to affect the timing of the changes in employers 
taxes.  In the accompanying figure, a comparison for the lengths of U.S. recessions since 1937 
are shown, the average length (peak to trough) is 11 months. Three recent recessions 1973, 1981, 
and 2007, exceeded the average and placed increased pressure on state UI benefit and tax 
systems.  
Anticipating the length of the “next recession’ is important to the designers of a state’s UI 
financing system; but so is 
determining the amplitude of 
the downturn, and the length 
of the recovery.  In the next 
figure, the total 
unemployment rates for the 
U.S. and North Carolina are 
compared for the years 1980 
to 2012.  Four economic 
cycles are clearly shown for 
1981, 1990, 2001, and 2007.  
The peaks appear to be at 
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close to 10 year intervals and the severity varies with 1981 and 2007 of similar amplitudes but 
very different recovery periods.  Even though the 1991 and 2001 cycles have a longer recovery 
and expansion period, the levels of unemployment reached was clearly less resulting in less 
pressure for UI financing systems.   
The UI state benefit financing systems are complex, dynamic systems:  The basic components of 
a state taxing system consist of a set of tax schedules.  The particular tax schedule in effect in a 
given year is generally determined by a formula which ties the trust fund level to some scale that 
further links to a set of tax schedules.  As the trust fund balance declines, tax schedules with 
higher rate should come into play.  Employers are assigned a tax rate based on their own 
experience rating ratio, the more their workers file for, and receive unemployment the lower their 
ratio and the higher their tax rate.  States have many provisions as to what “employment” is 
charged to an employer and the formula used to compute their experience rating.  Once an 
employer’s tax rate is determined, the rate applies to the wages paid to each employee each year 
up to the states maximum taxable wage base.   
The 2007-2009 Great Recession has been often characterized as a recovery without 
corresponding growth in the level of employment.  A comparison of respective employment 
recovery times in recent recessions is shown in the accompanying figure.  In the recessions of 
1973, 1981, and 1990, employment returned to pre- recession level within six months.  In the 
2001 downturn it took almost eleven 
months.  In the current recession, 
employment levels while slowly 
recovering are still well below pre-
recession level 14 months out. 
This slow recovery can further impact 
the timing mechanisms in a state’s UI 
financing system.  Many systems 
assume a gradual recovery over 18 to 
36 months and they are designed to 
slowly increase employer tax rates to 
build trust fund balances as benefit 
payments decline.  In the current 
recovery period neither of these is true.   
Changing any of the variables in a state financing system can have short term, and/or longer term 
impacts on the solvency UI trust fund.  For example, (GAO 2006), a state’s maximum tax rate 
limits the size of an employer’s tax payment, regardless of the costs an employer may have 
imposed on the system.  Similarly, minimum tax rates ensure that an employer’s tax rate will not 
drop below a specified floor, no matter how much its experience rating improves.  Other aspects 
of state systems cause significant portions of total benefit payments to become “shared”—that is, 
to become a common cost of all firms.  Under some conditions, states pay benefits but do not 
attribute those benefits to a specific employer.  One type of such a “non-charge” is a benefit 
payment made that is finally reversed, but not recovered.  Such shared benefit costs reduce 
experience rating and impose additional costs on all employers.  State legislatures will often 
freeze tax rates, or eliminate or reduce other experience rating charges. While these actions 
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directly affect the employers who receive such actions they also impact other employers who 
must make up the difference through higher individual taxes or paying a higher rate for an 
extended period of time.  
All state unemployment insurance programs adjust the tax rates of individual firms on the basis 
of their experience with unemployment, and 50 of the 53 systems do so based on one of two 
basic systems—the reserve ratio system or the benefit ratio system.  Under both systems, benefit 
payments charged to a firm over a defined period of time become a key basis for an employer’s 
experience rating, however the “memory” of these systems can be long and slower to change, or 
short leading to more rapid changes in the employer’s tax rate.   
Reserve Ratio systems tend to have longer memories than Benefit Ratio systems.  The 
experience-rating aspect of the unemployment insurance systems is unique in the world—the 
United States is the only nation that finances its UI system though an experience-rated tax.  
Estimating the length of future recessions is a critical component for setting the parameters of 
state financing systems. 
B. Cyclical Economic Conditions and UI Benefits  
With respect to UI benefit payments, as more eligible workers lose their jobs during recessions, 
they typically apply for UI benefits to access income to replace the wages they would otherwise 
receive.   State laws determine when an individual is eligible for benefit payments and based on 
factors in state law, the level of the weekly benefit amount, the duration of benefits usually up to 
26 weeks, (Seven states now have a maximum UI benefit duration of less than 26 weeks) 
whether to allow partial earnings, how to treat the claimant’s action with respect to work search 
requirements and other ongoing eligibility issues, etc.  Changing any of these factors can impact 
the amount of benefits paid, and thereby the impact on the states trust fund and the level of taxes 
to assess on employers to cover benefit outlays. 
The duration of state benefits is an indicator of changes in the extent of benefits paid.  In recent 
recessions this figure has been rising consistently, but the levels seen since the 2007-2009 
recession have been unprecedented.   In 
the next two figures, the average 
duration of regular state UI programs 
for North Carolina and the U.S are 
displayed.  Extended durations of 
unemployment place increasing stress 
on the financing mechanisms to pay for 
these benefits. 
 
The UI system plays an important role 
in stabilizing the macro economy during 
economic contractions by supporting 
consumption of goods by unemployed 
workers who would otherwise have less 
income.  Providing adequate benefits, 
timely to the unemployed is a critical 
aspect of the UI system but determining 
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the proper wage replacement rate, the eligibility requirements and extent of payments ultimately 
affects the financing capabilities of the UI system.  Finding the proper balance in a dynamic and 
changing economic environment remains a difficult challenge. 
C. Current Economic Climate 
In their most recent minutes, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal 
Reserve indicated that labor market conditions continue to improve and the unemployment rate 
declined further, although it remains elevated. Private nonfarm employment rose at an 
appreciably faster average pace in January and February than in the fourth quarter of last year, 
and declines in total government employment slowed in recent months. The unemployment rate 
decreased to 8.2 percent in March.  In April 2012, the unemployment rate dropped another tenth 
of a percentage point to 8.1 percent.  Both the rate of long-duration unemployment and the share 
of workers employed part-time for economic reasons continued to be high.  Initial claims for 
unemployment insurance trended lower over the intermeeting period and were at a level 
consistent with further moderate job gains.  Furthermore, the FOMC minutes explained that 
measures of labor compensation generally indicated that nominal wage gains continued to be 
subdued. Increases in compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector picked up somewhat 
over the four quarters of 2011. 
D. Status of State Unemployment Trust Funds 
A state faces three tasks if their state unemployment trust fund is insolvent: 1) reviewing their 
current UI tax structure to determine if changes are required, 2) managing political pressure to 
reduce benefit eligibility and amounts; and 3) managing political pressure in mapping the most 
effective way for state employers to repay loan balance and interest on the loan balance.   
A state may also need to revisit the fundamental core values of the federal-state UI system goal 
of having a safety net for unemployed workers and to stabilize the economy in periods of 
unemployment.  Some options for States when looking to their unemployment trust fund 
solvency issue include:  
1. Increase the taxable wage base for employers;  
2. Increase the tax rate schedules or indexing method; 
3. Reduce benefit amounts; 
4. Reduce benefit duration; 
5. Tighten eligibility and participation requirements; and/or 
6.  A combination of the above.  
The federal-state UI system is a cooperative arrangement between the Federal government and 
the individual states to provide UI to unemployed individuals who meet the requirements of the 
specific state’s law.  Federal laws pertaining to UI provide broad requirements that state UI laws 
must contain.  Otherwise, states are free to enact provisions that serve the needs of the 
unemployed within their jurisdiction, including the establishment of eligibility requirements for 
receiving UI and taxes on their employers.  There are 53 jurisdictions that operate under the 
federal-state UI system - all 50 states plus the DC, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
Since the federal-state UI system was established in 1935, a state’s unemployment trust fund is 
built from state UI taxes collected from employers hiring workers in their state.  The federal UI 
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taxes on employers are under the authority of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA).  
State UI taxes are under the authority of the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA).  The 
collected payroll taxes are deposited in the applicable Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) 
accounts. The federal UI accounts in the U.S. Treasury includes among its accounts: the 
administration account (Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA)), the extended 
benefits account (Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA)), the loan account 
(Federal Unemployment Account (FUA)), 53 state accounts, and the Federal Employees 
Compensation Account (FECA).  The federal loan account was established in 1954 to provide 
advances to state programs that otherwise do not have enough funds to cover UI benefit 
payments. 
 
Employers receive a 5.4 percent credit on their FUTA tax if the state’s UI program is in 
compliance with all the federal rules and broad guidelines for UI benefit eligibility.  The FUTA 
tax rate for employers is 6.0 percent for a net rate of 0.6 percent on the first $7,000 of each 
workers gross earnings, thus equating to a $42 annual tax per worker.  Administration of the 
federal-state UI system is appropriated by Congress from the FUTA revenue.  State UI payroll 
taxes fund benefit payments to unemployed individuals who meet the requirements of the 
specific state’s law.  Individual states set the state taxable wage base at a level at or above the 
federal wage base.  State taxable wages range from the federal level of $7,000 to $38,800 for 
2012.  Thirty-seven states have taxable wage bases below $20,000.  Twenty-one states have not 
adjusted their taxable wage base over the last six years.  For 2012, twenty-five states increased 
their taxable wage bases.  North Carolina increased from $20,400.  All states base UI tax rates on 
an “experienced rated” structure.  The essence of an experienced rated system involves linking 
tax rates levied on employers to the layoff history.  As with any insurance program, the rate for a 
member will increase if usage increases.  The more employers use the state UI program by 
terminating workers who file for benefits; the annual tax cost for that employer will increase.  
The minimum state UI tax rates range from zero percent to 2.68 percent.  Maximum rates range 
from 5.4 percent to 13.5 percent.  North Carolina’s 2012 tax range for employers is 0.24 to 6.84 
percent.    
 
Federal law limits the use of a state’s unemployment trust fund only for the purposes of paying 
benefits.  The federal-state UI system is designed to operate on a forward-funding basis, under 
which the program in each state is supposed to accumulate sufficient reserves during periods of 
economic growth to pay UI benefits during periods of economic decline.  UI Trust fund solvency 
is not a new issue and the federal-state UI system has struggled with balancing this issue since its 
inception.  Over the last forty years, many states have not maintained sufficient balances to 
sustain their UI program during recessions including the latest great recession.   
 
As discussed above, the federal-state UI trust fund system has always been intended to be 
countercyclical to lessen the impact of the economic business cycle in a state.  This means, when 
a state’s economy is strong, reserves build up to help pay benefits when a state’s economy 
shrinks.  This structure rescues employers from shouldering enormous tax increases that would 
further constrict a state’s economy in hard economic times. 
 
Title III of the Social Security Act authorizes grants to states for the administration of state UI 
laws, Title IX authorizes the various components of the federal UTF, and Title XII authorizes 
advances or loans to insolvent state UI programs.  Loans to states during the 1970s and early 
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1980s were interest free and “federal UI loan policy allowed insolvent state trust funds to repay 
their federal loans slowly or not at all.” (GAO/HRD-88-55, page 67)  In the early 1980s, 
Congress provided motivations for states to replay unemployment trust fund loans quicker and in 
some instances, avoid interest assessments. 
 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), which is the investigative arm of Congress, 
charged with examining matters relating to the receipt and payment of public funds, pointed out 
in different reports over the last thirty years that states have not been diligent in having adequate 
reserves in place for hard economic times.  GAO in its reports over the years highlights the 
tendency for states to ignore increases in extra revenues.  So when states are forced to borrow 
funds to replenish their unemployment trust fund, they have a tendency to reduce benefit 
eligibility, or payments, as a method of reducing program costs.    
 
There is no federal requirement for what a state’s reserve level must be for their unemployment 
trust fund.  Section 1202(b)(2)(c) of the Social Security Act says states meet funding goals 
relating to its account in the UTF, established under regulations by the Secretary of Labor.  Over 
the program’s history, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) and Congress have suggested a 
commonly used measure of the adequacy of financial reserves known as the high-cost multiple.  
The high-cost multiple compares current reserves with a state’s past peak benefit payout.  Some 
analysts thought the 1.5 standard as being too difficult to achieve.  In 1986, only 11 states had a 
high-cost multiple of 1.0 compared to 1969 when 51 state trust funds could achieve that mark.   
 
In the early 1990s, the Federal Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (FACUC) 
developed the term of the Average High Cost Multiple (AHCM).  The AHCM is defined as how 
long a state could sustain payments equal to the 
average of the three highest benefit cost rates in the 
20-year period ending with the preceding year, 
without additional tax revenue coming into the 
unemployment trust fund.  The “benefit cost rate” 
is the total annual benefits paid, including the 
state's share of extended benefits but excluding the 
federal share of extended benefits and cost 
reimbursable benefits, divided by the total annual 
covered wages excluding cost reimbursable wages. 
The resulting average high cost ratio is multiplied 
by the desired fund size multiple and the result is 
referred to as the AHCM.  The Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33, section 5404) encourages 
States to improve their level of “forward funding.”  
Forward funding as a method of financing a state’s 
unemployment trust fund began deteriorating in the 
early 1990s.  Since then, the AHCM has been used 
as a water mark for states in reviewing the health of their unemployment trust fund.  For 
example, a state with an AHCM of 1 could support 12 months of historically high benefits.   
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The GAO-10-440 report (April 2010) stressed, “An AHCM of 1.0 is the target level of solvency 
recommended by the ACUC and is inherent in USDOL’s draft regulations on cash-flow loans.”  
The GAO report made the following recommendations to Congress: 
 
 Provide incentives for states to build up and maintain stronger UI trust fund reserves; 
 Consider raising the FUTA taxable wage base from its current level of $7,000; 
 Consider indexing the FUTA taxable wage base to the average annual wages; and/or 
 Consider measures to ameliorate the potential increase in the tax burden on employers of 
increases in taxable wages, such as lowering the FUTA statutory tax rate or increasing 
the FUTA tax credit. 
 
Over the last 20 years, States have struggled to meet the funding goals and keep adequate 
reserves on hand.  NASWA’s recent UI tax survey indicated a 64 percent decline of average 
national UI tax rate on total wages since 1938.  Over the past 75 years, unemployment insurance 
tax rates, as a percentage of total wages, have been declining steadily from a high of 2.5 percent 
in 1940 to about 0.38 percent last year.   
 
The figure shows this decline for the US for the period 1938 to 2011 and comparable data for 
North Carolina for 2000 to 2011. 
 
While the percentage increases in UI 
taxes for some employers in 2011 is 
substantial, the average tax rate on 
total wages paid by employers is 
relatively low by historical standards.  
Since 1938, the average national UI 
tax rate on employers as a percent of 
total wages ranged from 0.5 percent 
to 2.7 percent, while the average 
national UI tax rate on employers as a 
percent of taxable wages has varied 
between 1.25 percent and 3.25 
percent.  The average national 
employer tax rate as a percent of total 
wages in 2008 was 0.6 percent. Among the states in 2008, the average state UI tax rate on 
employers as a percent of total wages ranged from 0.09 percent to 1.29 percent, while the 
average state UI tax rate on employers as a percent of taxable wages varied between 0.15 percent 
and 4.72 percent.  
 
USDOL in the early 1940s  suggested a reserve balance of 7.5 percent of one year's total wages, 
derived from the Federal standard for reduced rates under reserve-account laws in section 
1602(a) (3)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code (2.5 percent of three years’ pay rolls).  Their 
research later in the decade suggested a reserve requirement of 6 percent of taxable payrolls 
because this level approximates three times the estimated long-range benefit costs for the country 
as a whole.  The reserve percentage required for any reduced rates under a state law should have 
a definite relationship also to benefit costs in the state, averaged over a period of years.  USDOL 
also suggested in states in which benefit costs in relation to taxable pay rolls have been low, a 
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safe reserve requirement might be even lower than 6 percent while in high-cost states, 8 percent 
or more might be more realistic. 
 
State unemployment taxable wage bases have been relatively low compared to other social 
insurance programs.  In 2012 state unemployment insurance taxable wage bases will range from 
$7,000 in Arizona, California, and Puerto Rico to $38,800 in Hawaii.  In contrast, the taxable 
wage base under the social security old age, survivors and disability insurance program will be 
$110,100 in 2012.   
 
Since 1969, states’ unemployment trust fund reserve levels have continued 
to shrink.  During the 1990s decade, the General Assembly voted to cut 
taxes five different times and it authorized a one-year tax holiday.
2
  The 
2002 Reed Act distribution of $8 billion delayed addressing solvency 
issues in many states.  Half of the states used the funds to allow cuts in UI 
taxes on employers.  The $240.9 million NC received were devoted to 
improve their trust fund solvency.  By the fall of 2003, NC was 
anticipating borrowing since their trust fund balance was below $11 
million.  
 
If the AHCM is accepted as a reasonable measure for unemployment trust fund solvency, then 
some finding of facts can be said.  The national AHCM for 2007 was 0.52.  For 2007, there were 
20 states under an AHCM of 0.50 and 19 states had an AHCM of 1.0 or higher.  Only 17 states 
have weathered the current recession storm by not having to borrow to replenish their 
unemployment trust fund.  Alaska, District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Utah, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  See Appendix D for additional state specific 
metrics. 
 
Common themes of these 17 states include: 
 Taxable wages for the state UI tax indexed to a state’s average wage variable; either 
average weekly wage or average annual wage total.  Most recent academic studies on 
trust fund deficits suggest one option is to increase and index the taxable wage base; 
 Each of the 17 state’s AHCM was way above the national average at the start of the Great 
Recession.  Eleven out of the 17 states had an AHCM of 1.20 or higher; 
 A new employer tax rate averaging 2.30 percent with 5 states indexing their new 
employer’s rate to the state’s industry average of that employer group.  Alaska had the 
highest new employer rate at 3.40 percent for 2011; and  
 A broader tax range.  Their maximum rate for high-use employers was higher than the 
traditional 5.4 percent.  Twelve states had a maximum rate above 5.4 percent with 5 
states (IA, NE, ND, UT, and WY) above 8.0 percent.  North Dakota and Wyoming have 
the highest maximum tax rate at 10.0 percent for 2011.   
 
UI tax schedules, or arrays, are designed to respond slowly in economic downturns due to the 
experience rating lag and also to avoid further negative impact on businesses.  Because of the 
experience rating lag, states are unable to expeditiously respond to rapidly worsening economic 
                                                 
2
 Karin Schill Rives, Higher Payroll Taxes on Way, http://www.newsobserver.com (February 8, 2002). 
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conditions and accelerating job loss cycles.  There were a few states that could not weather their 
austere economic conditions over the last five years.  In December 2007, Arizona (AHCM of 
1.10), Florida (AHCM of 1.04), Hawaii (AHCM of 1.88), Nevada (AHCM of 1.02), New 
Hampshire (AHCM of 1.16) and Vermont (AHCM of 1.21) have had to borrow to cover UI 
benefits being paid.  Florida and Nevada trust fund reserves could not sustain the high level of 
claims and benefit payments over an extremely extended period of time.  New Hampshire has 
since paid back its loan. 
E. Structure of States’ UI Financing Systems 
There are two primary approaches for UI financing models: pay as you go financing and forward 
financing.  Pay as you go financing assumes a state maintains a low trust fund balance and a 
relatively low level of UI taxes, and relies on the state’s ability to automatically increase UI taxes 
during economic downturns in order to finance the increased level of benefit outlays.  Forward 
financing assumes a state maintains a higher level of reserves in its UI trust fund through the use 
of higher UI taxes during economic expansions.  The primary reason a state might decide to 
utilize a pay as you go financing model is based on the theory that trust fund balances represent a 
lost "opportunity cost" that is better employed by keeping the “reserve” funds in the local 
economy, keeping state UI taxes lower.   
  
The ability of pay-as-you-go states to automatically increase their level of UI contributions 
during an economic downturn is based on a UI funding mechanism which has a high degree of 
flexibility.  Flexible financing allows the UI financing system to automatically and expeditiously 
increase the level of UI contributions as the level of UI reserves falls below certain “target” or 
“trigger” levels in the state’s UI trust fund.  The various triggers associated with UI trust fund 
targets might raise tax rates by moving to a new higher tax schedule, introducing a flexible 
taxable wage base, or implementing solvency taxes or other special assessments on employers.  
These measures typically allow for relatively rapid increases in UI taxes (in some cases 
combined with benefit cuts) in an attempt to finance UI benefit outlays when trust fund reserves 
are low.  This model tends to be less countercyclical than the forward financing model, 
depending on the extent of the business downturn. 
 
Because unemployment compensation is a mandatory entitlement, the benefit outlays that are 
associated with an increase in UI outlays will occur regardless of a state’s desire to affect those 
outlays.  While a state can reduce the eligibility of an eligible worker’s duration and amount of 
unemployment compensation, during times of economic contraction, state governments still will 
see a substantial increase in the level of unemployment compensation paid out; and in a 
recession that is as severe and extensive as the most recent recession, the breadth or the volume 
of individuals receiving unemployment compensation will  likely exceed or outpace the 
contributions collected by most state unemployment compensation systems.   
  
State governments and policymakers can, however, attempt to increase the flexibility or 
responsiveness of their unemployment compensation financial model in order to impose the least 
substantial burden on their state economies during economic contractions – periods of time when 
individuals and businesses in a state can least afford economic shocks, such as reduced benefits 
and increased taxes.  In some sense, by stabilizing the financial model of a state’s unemployment 
compensation system, the state allows for the full countercyclical benefits intended by the UI 
system to occur.  This is because, as we can see, whatever countercyclical benefits the 
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unemployment compensation system brings to the table could be considered negligible if, in 
order to finance those increased benefits, state governments are forced to increase taxes on 
employers or reduce the level of benefit outlays to eligible unemployed workers in order to 
finance those benefits.  In the ideal model, benefit outlays will stabilize the economic 
environment without the introduction of substantial increased burdens on the state’s businesses. 
 
When looking at North Carolina’s tax statistics for 2011 and comparing the numbers against her 
sister states, one difference stands out – new employer tax rate for North Carolina is about 55 
percent lower than the average of the other eight states.  North Carolina’s new employer tax rate 
allows new employers to come into North Carolina’s UI tax system as if they have already been 
experienced rated for three to five years.  Also, North Carolina’s percentage in 2011 for relieving 
charges to employers is slightly higher than some of her sister states. 
 
Mississippi was the only state of the nine with enough reserves to continue benefits without 
borrowing.  Mississippi’s average high-cost multiple (AHCM) in December 2007 was 1.70 
compared to North Carolina’s AHCM of 0.23.  Tennessee had to borrow, but has since repaid its 
loans with a 0.6 percent surcharge.  The remaining seven states as of May 1, 2012, have 
combined loans of $6.8 billion with $0.3 billion in interest due in September 2012.  North 
Carolina’s debt is $2.84 billion with $55.0 million in interest due.  Subsequent borrowing after 
May might result in a higher indebtedness; and additional interest will continue to accrue through 
September 2012. 
 





























AL 8,000 2.19% 8.34% 2.7% 7% 67%  N/A 
FL 8,500 1.03 5.40 2.7 22 63  11% 
GA 8,500 0.03 5.40 2.6 11 41  11 
KY 9,000 1.00 10.00 2.7 10 19  5 
MS 14,000 0.85 5.40 2.7 12 62  17 
NC 20,400 0.24 6.84 1.2 10 20  16 
SC 12,000 0.10 11.28 2.9 6 56  18 
TN 9,000 0.50 10.00 2.7 6 15  9 
VA 8,000 .77 6.87 3.2 10 69  7 
 
F. Solvency Status since 4th Quarter 2007 
As mentioned earlier, the FUA provides for a loan fund for state unemployment programs to 
ensure a continued flow of benefits during times of economic downturn. As of April 18, 2012, 
there are 30 states (AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IL, IN, KS, KY, MA, MI, MN, 
MO, NV, NJ, NY, NC, OH, PA, RI, SC, VA, VI, VT, and WI) currently borrowing to cover 
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unemployment benefits.  Combined there are $41.5 billion in outstanding loans and $736.1 
million in accrued interest.   
 
In November 2011 states that borrowed from the federal unemployment trust fund account in 
2009 were required to pay off the outstanding balances on those loans.  States that did not make 
this payment or did not qualify for credit reduction avoidance received a 0.3 percentage point 
reduction to the credit applied to their FUTA tax rate for 2011.  The credit reduction is 0.3 
percentage points for the year beginning with the calendar year in which the state misses the 
repayment deadline and increases by 0.3 percentage points for each year there is an outstanding 
loan.  In order to qualify for credit reduction avoidance, a state must pay the amount that the 
credit reduction would produce prior to November 10 of the year for which avoidance is to 
apply, repay all FUA loans received during the one-year period prior to November 10, increase 
solvency for the taxable year through legislative action by an amount equal to or greater than the 
amount of the FUTA credit reduction, and not borrow from the fund for the three-month period 
from (November 1 through-January 31 of the next year). 
 
Employers in 21 states with outstanding UI loans had a reduction in FUTA credit for 2011 (3 
states had a reduction for 2010).  The 2011 credit reduction applies to the 2012 payroll for 
employers in those 21 states: 
 
 Michigan will have a credit reduction of 0.9 percent (0.6 percent in 2010) 
 Indiana will have a credit reduction of 0.6 percent (0.3 percent in 2010) 
 Nineteen states will have a credit reduction of 0.3 percent.  These states are: Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, North 
Carolina, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, 
Virgin Islands and Wisconsin. 
 South Carolina qualified for credit reduction avoidance, so it will not have a credit 
reduction for 2011.  SC had a 0.3 percent reduction in 2010. 
G. Reducing Benefit Outlays  
Adequate benefit amounts and the duration of those UI benefits are left to a state to determine 
based on local economic conditions and the will of state leadership.  USDOL in its 1962 UI 
legislative policy guidelines reminded states of the fundamentals behind adequate benefits. 
Different requirements as to filing claims and registration for work are necessary in cases of 
claimant’s partially unemployed, totally un-employed, or totally unemployed except for odd 
jobs.  These, however, are matters of administrative detail, in which discretion and flexibility are 
desirable, and they can be handled more readily by regulation than by statute.  The weekly 
benefit amount for total unemployment under all State laws varies with the claimant's prior 
wages. It is generally accepted that weekly benefits should be less than weekly wages--in fact 
less than take-home pay--to give claimants an incentive to return to work. On the other hand, 
benefits should be adequate to enable claimants to maintain themselves between jobs.” 
“What is an adequate benefit?  If the program is to accomplish its purpose, to provide real 
security against the hazard of unemployment, the weekly benefits should be sufficient to cover 
the basic necessities of most claimants and their families without requiring them to resort to 
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relief or to reduce substantially their level of living while drawing benefits.  Items, which must 
be met, whether or not a worker is employed, are food and rent, heat and utilities, and medical 
care.  Over short periods, purchase of clothing may be deferred, but claimants cannot be 
expected to reduce substantially the amount they spend for food, or to move to less expensive 
quarters, or to neglect an illness or injury requiring medical care, while they are temporarily out 
of work.  The proportion of wages spent for these items is, of course, higher for workers with 
low earnings and for workers with dependents than for high-paid workers and for workers 
without dependents. Some benefit formulas reflect these facts by giving low-paid workers a 
higher proportion of their wages as weekly benefits and by giving claimants with dependents and 
allowance for the dependents in addition to the basic weekly benefit.”  “There is general 
agreement that weekly benefits, exclusive of dependents' allowances, should replace at least 50 
percent of wages.”  
In the U.S. Supreme Court decision (California Human Resources Department vs. Java, 402 U.S. 
121, (1971)), the court noted that the Social Security Act received its impetus from the Report of 
the Committee on Economic Security.  In its report to Congress, the Committee recommended a 
program of UI compensation as a first line of defense for unemployed workers for a limited 
period during which there is an expectation that he or she will soon be reemployed.  The 
Committee also concluded that UI benefits “should be a contractual right not dependent on any 
means test” and it should “carry workers over most, if not all, periods of unemployment in 
normal times without resort to any other form of assistance.”    
In looking at the fourth quarter 2011 national UI information, the average weekly was $275 with 
a range of $16 minimum to a maximum of $625.  When looking a North Carolina’s weekly 
benefit amounts over the last few years and comparing the numbers against her sister states, one 
anomaly stands out – maximum weekly benefit amount is over 70 percent higher than the 
average of the other eight states.  When looking at the average weekly benefit amount as a 
percentage of the average weekly wage and exhaustion rate, North Carolina is within a normal 
range of the other surrounding states.   





























as % of 
AWW 
US   $295 53.4 %   $297 48.8%   
AL $45 $265 204 44.2 $45 $265 204 39.9 $766 26.7% 
FL 32 275 229 67.0 32 275 232 55.9 803 28.7 
GA 44 330 268 54.0 44 330 268 50.9 848 31.7 
KY 39 415 285 41.9 39 415 287 35.6 746 38.5 
MS 30 235 188 47.9 30 235 191 45.2 655 29.1 
NC 43 506 292 60.7 43 525 291 55.3 797 36.6 
SC 20 326 233 55.8 42 326 238 54.6 726 32.6 
TN 30 275 233 53.0 30 275 238 49.8 800 29.3 
VA 54 378 285 50.1 60 378 288 49.2 935 30.4 
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The 1972 Java U.S. Supreme Court case also referenced the Report of the Committee on 
Economic Security for “estimates of possible amounts and duration of unemployment benefits 
were made by the actuarial staff of the Committee.  On the basis of 1922-1933 statistics, it was 
estimated that 12 weeks of benefits could be paid with a two-week waiting period at a 4% 
employer contribution rate.  The longest waiting period entering into the estimates was four 
weeks, indicating an intent that payments should begin promptly after the expiration of a short 
waiting period.”  While there is no federal requirement concerning the maximum duration a state 
has to pay for their regular UI program, in 1962, the USDOL recommended states provide at 
least 26 weeks of benefits if using a uniform-duration formula, or 30 weeks of benefits if using a 
variable-duration formula.  
Duration History Chart of UI Benefits 
Maximum Duration of Regular UI Benefits (in weeks) 
Number of States With: 
 12-15 16-20 21-25 26 27-39 
 Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks Weeks 
1940 13 35 2 1 0 
1950 1 28 9 13 0 
1960 0 2 8 32 9 
1970 1 0 0 42 9 
1980 0 1 0 43 9 
1990 0 1 0 50 2 
2000 0 0 0 51 2 
2010 0 0 0 51 2 
2011 0 2 1 48 2 
2012* 0 4 3 44 2 
Source: USDOL; Only Montana (28 weeks) and Massachusetts (30 weeks) have greater maximum duration 
weeks. * as of April 2012 
As borrowing states tackle budgetary deficit and decreased revenue problems in a sluggish 
economy, many legislatures have taken to curtailing the number of weeks of allowable UI 
benefits for unemployed workers in an effort to save money.  Seven states currently have 
reduced maximum duration over the last eighteen months.  Georgia became the recent state to 
cut duration for UI benefits.  The seven states are: 
1. Arkansas – 25 weeks (July 2011). 
2. Florida – 23 weeks (January 2012).  First state to tie duration to TUR; average 2011 3rd 
quarter was 10.7 percent.  Depending on TUR, duration range is 12 to 23 weeks.  If TUR 
is 5 percent or less, UI benefit duration is12 weeks. 
3. Georgia – 20 weeks (July 2012).  Second state to tie duration to TUR; Depending on 
TUR, duration range is 14 to 23 weeks. As the TUR increases or decrease by a half 
percentage point between 6.5 percent and 9.0 percent, the duration adjusts by 1 week. 
4. Illinois – 25 weeks. 
5. Michigan – 20 weeks (January 2012).  MI is the first state to start the discussion about 
reducing duration. 
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6. Missouri – 20 weeks (April 2011).  The state legislators compromised when enacting the 
three-year look back for the EB program and cut duration to 20 weeks. and 
7. South Carolina – 20 weeks (June 2011).   
VII. Federal Laws Regarding State UI Financing Models 
A. FUTA Tax Requirements 
UI is a federal-state program jointly financed by federal taxes under the FUTA and by state 
payroll taxes under the SUTA.  Generally, employers must pay both state and Federal 
unemployment taxes if: they pay wages to employees totaling $1,500, or more, in any quarter of 
a calendar year; or, they had at least one employee during any day of a week during 20 weeks in 
a calendar year, regardless of whether or not the weeks were consecutive. 
  
The FUTA is the original legislation that allows the federal government to tax businesses with 
employees for the purpose of collecting revenue that is then allocated to state unemployment 
agencies and paid to unemployed workers who are eligible to claim unemployment insurance.  
FUTA covers the costs of administering the UI and Job Service programs in all states. In 
addition, FUTA pays one-half of the cost of extended unemployment benefits (during periods of 
high unemployment) and provides for a fund from which states may borrow, if necessary, to pay 
benefits.  Since the 0.2 percent FUTA surtax expired on June 30, 2011, FUTA taxes for calendar 
year 2012 will be calculated using 6.0 percent of taxable wages paid in a calendar year.  The 
taxable wage base, or the maximum level of wages on which FUTA taxes can be charged, is the 
first $7,000 paid in wages to each employee during 2012.  Employers in states with programs 
approved by the federal government and with no delinquent federal loans may credit 5.4 
percentage points against the 6.0 percent tax rate, making the minimum net federal 
unemployment tax rate 0.6 percent, regardless of the rate of tax paid to the state.  Therefore, the 
net FUTA tax rate for wages paid in 2012 is generally 0.6 percent (6.0 percent - 5.4 percent), for 
a maximum FUTA tax of $42.00 per employee, per year (.006% X $7,000. = $42.00). 
 
In an effort to ensure an equitable distribution of state UI taxes and to deter employers from 
engaging in the practice of seasonal lay-offs, state UI tax rates are levied against employers in a 
staggered distribution according to each employers relative “experience-rating.”  Employers are 
experience-rated according the level of claimants they are responsible for separating from the 
workforce; in most states, the more UI benefits paid to its former employees, the higher the tax 
rate of an employer, up to a ceiling established by state law. 
B. Title XII of SSA: Borrowing for States to Finance UI Benefit Payments 
States are required by federal law to pay UI benefits to eligible workers; regardless of the 
solvency status of a state unemployment trust fund.  Thus, if a state’s fund is insolvent, the state 
will be forced to borrow money from the dedicated federal UI loan account, the FUA, other state 
revenues, or from the private market.  If the state chooses to borrow funds from the FUA, not 
only will the state be required to continue paying benefits, it will also be required to repay the 
funds (plus any interest due) it has borrowed from the federal loan account.   
Since 1982, states are charged interest on new loans that are not repaid by the end of the fiscal 
year in which they were obtained.  The interest is the same rate as that paid by the federal 
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government on state unemployment trust fund reserves in the unemployment trust fund for the 
fourth calendar quarter of the preceding year, but not higher than 10 percent annually charged 
against the average daily outstanding balance owed by a state in a calendar year.  States are 
restricted from paying the interest owed on federal loans using funds obtained directly or 
indirectly from their state fund.  States may borrow without interest from the FUA during the 
year if they meet a number of pre-determined conditions.  Note: USDOL Title XII options 
attachment D. 
Finally, states with outstanding loans from the FUA must repay them fully by November 10 
following the second consecutive January 1 on which the state has an outstanding loan. If the 
outstanding loan is not repaid by that time, the state will face a reduction in the federal 
unemployment tax credit applied to employers in their state, or an effective FUTA tax increase.  
Thus, the FUTA tax increase ignores the state’s experience rating financing model and uniformly 
applies the tax increase to every employer in the state. 
VIII. Simulation Analysis of North Carolina Benefit Financing  
 
Unemployment insurance is intended to provide adequate partial income replacement to workers 
during temporary periods of involuntary joblessness.  The North Carolina UI system meets the 
accepted standard of benefit adequacy by providing 50 percent wage replacement for 
approximately 80 percent of beneficiaries (ACUC 1996, p. 22).  The latter is assured by having 
the maximum weekly benefit amount (WBA) annually adjusted to two-thirds of the average 
weekly wage (AWW) in UI covered employment.   
 
To have a UI system that is balanced and sustainable for the long-run, revenues should match 
expenditures on average over business cycles.  The accepted standard for UI benefit financing is 
based on the principle of forward funding.  To meet this standard, state accounts in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) should maintain balances “sufficient to pay at least one year 
of unemployment insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous “high cost.” (ACUC 
1996, p. 11).  The previous high cost is defined as benefits paid over a 12 month period in 
proportion to total payrolls.  The historical high cost rate for North Carolina was 2.46 in 1975.  
The USDOL has not objected to the ACUC rule that states should hold one year of reserves in 
the UTF at a high cost rate equal to the average of the three highest cost rates experienced in the 
prior twenty years.
3
  For North Carolina that rate is 1.54 (USDOL, 2012).  Based on 2011 total 
payrolls in UI covered employment, the target level of North Carolina UI reserves should be 
$2.42 billion.  At the end of 2011 the North Carolina fund was in debt to the U.S. Treasury by 
the amount of $2.67 billion.   
 
This report examines alternative strategies for achieving long term balance in the North Carolina 
UI system.  Analysis is conducted by simulation analysis using the Benefit Financing Model 
developed by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL).  “The Benefit Financing Model (BFM) is 
an econometric forecasting model designed to help analysts project the condition of their 
                                                 
3
This rule replaces the prior reserve adequacy criterion of a 1.5 high cost multiple, or 18 months of recession level 
benefits at the highest historic benefit charge rate on gross payrolls (Vroman 1990, p. 44).  The North Carolina 
historic high was 2.46 in 1975 multiplied by 1.5 implies required reserves of $5.7 billion in 2011.  The ACUC 
(1996) criterion suggests $2.4 billion.   
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Unemployment Insurance (UI) trust funds several years into the future, and quickly assess the 
financial impact of various economic scenarios and possible law changes” (USDOL 2010, p. 1).   
The BFM is maintained by the Division of Fiscal and Actuarial Services, Office of 
Unemployment Insurance, in the Employment and Training Administration of the USDOL in 
Washington, DC.  Professional staff at USDOL have initialized the BFM with data for North 
Carolina through 2010, and made the BFM available to the Upjohn Institute for use in preparing 
estimates for this report.  All simulation results reported in this chapter were generated using the 
BFM.    
 
The Benefit Finance Model (BFM) requires users to input forecast values for three exogenous 
variables: unemployment rate, wage growth rate, and labor force growth rate.  The forecasts used 
for these three variables were provided by the chief financial officer in the Division of 
Employment Security (DES) of the North Carolina Department of Commerce.  These estimates 
were provided to DES by the Assistant State Budget Officer, Office of State Budget and 
Management, through a contract with Global Insight. 
A. Strategy for analysis 
The objective of our simulation analysis is to provide the North Carolina Department of 
Commerce a menu of balanced options for reforming UI.  We start by enumerating the features 
of the North Carolina UI system that are subject to change.  We then inventory the current values 
of these variables and run the baseline simulation on current values of all program parameters 
and Global Insight forecast values of exogenous economic variables.  For each category of 
program parameter we then simulate the effect of changes in the parameter value relative to the 
baseline scenario.  For example, for the new employer tax rate we separately simulate each value 
in the range of possible tax rates and compare these singly to the baseline.   
 
We proceed with sensitivity testing for eight categories of tax parameters and four categories of 
benefit parameters.  After considering a full range of one-way contrasts to the baseline, we then 
examine bundles of program changes that balance tax and benefit changes in the same 
simulation.  The BFM was initialized by USDOL at calendar year-end 2010.  We were able to 
add three calendar quarters of updated baseline data.  All simulations produce forecast results for 
years ending 2012 through 2020. The key outcomes examined for each simulation are: the year 
in which debt is paid off, the fund balance at the end of the payoff year, the fund balance at year-
end 2020, the fund balance difference in 2020 from the baseline scenario, and the tax schedule in 
effect in year 2020.   
 Overview of UI system features examined 
 
Variations in parameter values for the eight categories of the North Carolina UI tax system 
features analyzed by simulation are summarized in tables 4.1 and 4.2.  Table 5.1 lists seven of 
these tax features.  Following is an enumeration of the parameter variations for each of these 
features.  Parameter values for all program features were chosen to include the values considered 
by TPRC (2011).   
 
New employer rate: starts at the current value of 1.2 percent then increases in nine increments 
of 0.3 percentage points.  The terminal value is set at 3.7 which was considered by TPRC (2011). 
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Minimum rate for positive balance employers: starts at the current rate of 0.0 and increases in 
12 increments of 0.1 percentage points to 1.1, as considered by TPRC (2011).  These changes are 
shown graphically against tax schedule A in Figure 5.3. 
 
Maximum rate for negative balance employers: starts at the current rate of 5.7 steps to 6.0 
then increases in 8 increments of 0.5 percentage points to 10.0.    These changes are shown 
graphically against tax schedule A in Figure 5.4. 
 
Minimum rate for negative balance employers and maximum rate for positive balance 
employers: The current system maintains a gap of 0.2 percentage points between positive and 
negative balance employers with 2.7 and 2.9 being the current respective rates around the zero 
reserve balance level.  This 0.2 point spread is maintained in two alternative simulations which 
increase the rates in two increments of 0.1 percentage points each to the pairs (2.8 and 3.0) and 
(2.9 and 3.1).    These changes are shown graphically against tax schedule A in Figure 5.5. 
 
Taxable wage base: the North Carolina UI taxable wage base is indexed to reset annually at 
fifty percent of average weekly wages (AWW) in UI covered employment.  A proportion of sixty 
percent was simulated for the TPRC (2011) report.  This study reports on a range of proportions 
starting at forty percent and increasing by 2.5 percentage points in eight steps to sixty percent.  
 
Upward shift of the tax schedule: Starting from the current tax schedule A, the TPRC (2011) 
examined the effects of shifting the schedule up by 0.2 and by 1.0 percentage points.  This study 
starts at the current schedule A and increases in six increments of 0.1 percentage points to 0.6.
4
  
These changes are shown graphically against tax schedule A in Figure 5.6.  An upward shift of 
1.0 is also considered, as is an upward shift in schedule A for positive balance employers that 
maintain the implicit slopes in the current tax function step schedule.  Finally under this heading 
we also examine the effect of redefining the triggers to shift between tax schedules.  The North 
Carolina tax system has nine rate schedules for positive balance employers labeled A through I.  
However, due to tax override legislation about two-thirds of these schedules are irrelevant.  We 
simulated a scheme that circumvents the 1.95 rule to make the full matrix of tax schedules A to I 
relevant.  Starting from schedule A with a fund ratio less than 0.25, each quarter point increase in 
the fund ratio drops the system to a new schedule with schedule I in effect with a fund ratio of 
2.0 or greater.   
 
Tax schedules to formulas: We simulated replacing the current tax schedule A with algebraic 
approximations that would permit employer rates to adjust more smoothly year to year.  Relative 
to the baseline, all the simulations in this section present conservative estimates of the schedule 
changes because the BFM limits tax schedules to 70 steps at most.  Therefore, we limit our range 
of variable rates to reserve ratios on the interval [-3.5, 3.5] and assign rates for every 0.1 increase 
in reserve ratio.  To calibrate simulations we start by simulating a truncated A schedule on the [-
3.5, 3.5] interval.
5
  Next we simulated a piecewise-linear formula to mimic schedule A.  Tax 
schedule A has negative slopes of two-thirds for negative balance employers, one for mildly 
positive balance employers (up to a reserve ratio of 2.4), and one-half for high positive balance 
employers.  Thirdly, we simulated a shift in the formula to three-quarters for negative balance 
                                                 
4
We do not report on upward shifts of 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9, because other features of the current system override the 
intended effects of such shifts.  This is explained more fully below.   
5
In this scheme those at -3.5 or lower pay the maximum tax, and those at 3.5 or higher pay the tax rate set for 3.5. 
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employers with an intercept of 3.0.  That intercept was shared with positive balance employers 
(eliminating the positive negative spread) who were given slopes of four-fifths and one-half for 
moderate and high balances respectively. Finally a cubic approximation to schedule A was tried.
6
  
These changes are shown graphically against the truncated tax schedule A in Figure 5.7. 
 
Under the current system with step schedules, a given employer can have reserve balances rise or 
fall somewhat while staying at the same rate.  In such a case the employer would be sliding along 
the tread of a single step.  At the same time other employers with reserve ratios near the edge of 
step could experience discrete drops or rises in rates given minor changes in their reserve ratios.   
 
Note that the reserve ratio can change even if there is no change in UI benefit charges.  This can 
happen if the denominator changes.  For example, a rise in payrolls due to expansion of 
employment or wage inflation will reduce the reserve ratio, and may move an employer to a 
higher tax step on the schedule.  The current UI tax schedules in North Carolina effectively have 
three sloped ranges between the minimum and maximum.  Employers with reserve ratios 4.0 
percent or higher pay zero tax.  From 4.0, for every 0.2 drop in the reserve ratio the rate rises by 
0.1 percentage points yielding an effective slope of -0.5 or one-half until the reserve ratio reaches 
2.4 percent.  From 2.4 to zero for every drop of 0.2 in the reserve ratio, the rate rises 0.2 
percentage points for an effective slope of -1.0 or one.  For negative reserve balances, for every 
0.3 drop in the reserve ratio the tax rate rises by 0.2 percentage points yielding an effective slope 
of the tax schedule at -0.67 or two-thirds.   
 
Ideal tax formulas would round the employer’s rate to the nearest basis point.  That is, one 
hundredth of a rate point. For example, rather than dropping the tax rate 0.2 points when a 
decline in the reserve ratio reaches 0.2 points, the tax code could have a formula be changed so 
that the tax rate drops 0.1 points for every 0.1 points in the reserve ratio. There are several 
reasons for this change. One reason is that an employer whose reserve ratio drops in a year may 
not drop far enough to receive a new tax rate. Likewise an employer who raises their reserve 
ratio might not see any benefit if the ratio is not raised enough.  
 
Solvency taxes: these assessments flow into the state reserve account, but do not improve 
reserve balances for individual employers.  As such they affect tax triggers, but do not affect 
individual employer experience rates.  We reexamined three scenarios considered by the TPRC 
(2011) with levies of 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 depending on accumulated reserves ranging up to $800 
million (see Table 5.2).  We also simulated two more gradual systems with rates ranging from 
0.1 to 1.0 rising in one-tenth increments with target reserve balances of either $1.0 billion or $2.0 
billion.  With a three year high-cost rate of 1.54, the target level of North Carolina UI reserves 
should be about $2.4 billion.  Therefore, the $2.0 billion is about 82 percent fully funded while 
$1.0 billion is half that much.  Variations in parameter values for four categories of the North 
Carolina UI benefits system are summarized in tables 4.3.  
 
Maximum potential duration of benefits: North Carolina currently has a uniform eligibility of 
26 weeks.  The standard of 26 potential weeks of UI benefits is a longstanding accepted feature 
of an adequate benefit system.  In recent months, a handful of states have reduced the potential 
maximum duration of benefits to something less than 26 weeks.  This is a draconian curtailment 
of benefit adequacy, but this feature is amenable to simulation.  Relative to the baseline of 26 we 
                                                 
6
The cubic form is: Tax rate = (0.25*(reserve ratio))
3
 - (reserve ratio) + 3. 
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consider six incremental one week declines to 20 weeks.  Many states have a variable entitled 
duration.  That is a more moderate strategy for sharing in sacrifice to balance the system.  Such 
simulations could be tried at a later date.  Furthermore it should be noted that the available 
duration of federally funded emergency extended benefits is normally tied to the available 
duration of state regular benefits. 
 
Maximum weekly benefit amount (WBA): North Carolina currently sets the maximum at two-
thirds of the AWW.   The baseline simulation starts at the current rate of 0.67 and decreases in 
one percentage point increments to 0.60.  
 
Waiting weeks: one week is common, and North Carolina has one week.  Many states do not 
require a waiting week, and no states require more than one.  We simulate the first order effects 
of adding a second waiting week that is the savings of one week for all who exhaust.  There is a 
likely second order effect to reduce entry into the system by those who expect to have very short 
durations of joblessness.  Any change in waiting week provisions will expend significant 
political capital.   
 
Replacement rate: North Carolina replaces fifty percent of high quarter wages below the 
maximum WBA.  This is the widely accepted standard of weekly benefit adequacy.  Indeed 
many states replace more than fifty percent below the maximum, and virtually none replace less.  
However, rather than applying a high quarter rule, many states use a multi-quarter rule.  We 
examined administrative records for a state neighboring North Carolina and found average wages 
in the second highest earning quarter of the base period to be significantly percent lower than the 
high quarter over the most recent fifteen years.  Applying the North Carolina WBA formula to 
these data we found that for those below the maximum WBA, (1/52) times (sum of two highest 
quarters) was five percent lower than (1/26) times (high quarter earnings).  We simulated the 
effect of this change on reserves. 
 Potential for UI financing reform 
 
Up until the early 1990s the North Carolina UI benefit financing system was in cyclical balance 
with the adequate UI benefit structure provided to involuntarily jobless workers in the state.  A 
series of system changes starting about 20 years ago set the system on a path to borrowing after 
the start of the Great Recession.  The tax changes included: lowering the new employer rate, 
instituting a zero rate for positive balance employers with a relatively high reserve ratio, and 
introducing system reserve balance triggers to slash all employer contribution rates by fifty or 
sixty percent across the board.  The latter feature rendered the majority of the rate matrix 
irrelevant leading up to the recession, and it a limiting factor in rebuilding system balance going 
forward. 
 
Figure 5.1 provides a graphical view of areas in the tax system where reform will contribute 
most significantly to system reserves.  The figure presents a graphical view of tax schedule 
operating most recently and for the foreseeable future.   The step function for negative balance 
employers with a slope of  negative two-thirds, and schedule A for positive balance employers 
with a slope of negative one for mildly positive balance and a slope of negative one-half for 
highly positive balance employers.  This blue line tax schedule is superimposed on a red 
histogram showing the frequency distribution of taxable payrolls plotted against reserve ratios 
for North Carolina UI contributing employers.  The figure illuminates revenue opportunities at 
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the maximum rate, the minimum rate, and among modestly positive balance employers.  
Naturally, any changes to the financing system must part of balanced reform that is publicly 
acceptable.  This graph provides some insight into areas where compromise may yield significant 
returns.    
 Special elements of North Carolina UI financing 
 
A graphical display of the UI tax schedules for North Carolina is given in Figure 5.2.  As can be 
seen in this graph, there is a single schedule for negative balance employers and a set of nine 
possible schedules for positive balance employers.  The right most schedule A is now in effect 
for North Carolina employers.  We have described the slopes of these schedules left to right as 
having negative slopes of two-thirds, one, and one-half.  This means, the marginal tax cost of UI 
benefit charges against an employer differs over the range of the schedule.  Alternatively we can 
say that for employers away from the maximum and minimum rates, the degree of UI tax 
experience rating differs.  For a particular employer, the degree of experience rating depends on 
the length of the tread where they are in the schedule and the size of the drop or rise at the edge 
of the tread.   
 
The North Carolina Employment Security Law (Chapter 96 Section 9) governs which rate 
schedule shall be in effect.  It is either A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, or I depending on the level of 
reserves available.  The fund ratio determines the effective tax schedule according to the 
following list: 
 
When the fund ratio is: 
As much as But less than Schedule 
–   2.0%   A 
2.0%   3.0%   B 
3.0%   4.0%   C 
4.0%   5.0%   D 
5.0%   6.0%   E 
6.0%   7.0%   F 
7.0%   8.0%   G 
8.0%   9.0%   H 
9.0%   or more  I 
 
However, “(t)he contribution rate of an employer whose contribution rate is determined by this 
Experience Rating Formula table shall be reduced by fifty percent (50 percent) for any year in 
which the balance in the Unemployment Insurance Fund on computation date equals or exceeds 
one and ninety-five hundredths percent (1.95 percent) of the gross taxable wages reported to the 
Division in the previous calendar year, and the fund ratio determined on that date is less than five 
percent (5 percent) and shall be reduced by sixty percent (60 percent) for any year in which the 
balance in the Unemployment Insurance Fund on computation date equals or exceeds one and 
ninety-five hundredths percent (1.95 percent) of the gross taxable wages as reported to the 
Division in the previous calendar year, and the fund ratio determined on that date is five percent 
(5 percent) or more.”  The fund ratio is the total amount available for benefits in the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund on the computation date divided by the total amount of the 
taxable payroll of all subject employers for the 12-month period ending June 30 preceding the 
computation date.”  (NCRS Chapter 96 Section 9)   This rule short-circuits operation of the 
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shifting positive balance tax schedules.  Rarely will schedule B be in effect, and never will D 
through I.  These provisions require serious reconsideration.   
  
While the schedule governor stated in the previous paragraph limits the financing flexibility of 
the North Carolina system, the Employment Security Reserve Fund (ESRF) increases the 
possibilities.  North Carolina's Special Reserve Fund is funded by a 20 percent tax on top of the 
tax schedule in effect at any time.  The tax is proportional, so the highest tax rate of 5.7 is scaled 
up to 6.84 and the lowest positive rate of 0.2 is raised to 0.24.  Modeling this tax in the BFM is 
slightly problematic.  Changing schedule A to reflect this tax causes inaccurate results as the 
BFM counts additional payments toward employers reserve accounts.  Such credits would move 
employers to lower tax tiers over time.  The BFM can simulate the effects of special solvency 
taxes that are not counted toward individual reserve, but are simply added fund total. 
 
The ESRF tax is in effect any time the fund balance is below $168 million.  If the state reserve 
fund balance is negative, every dollar from the ESRF goes to pay down debt.  If the state reserve 
fund is between $0 and $168 million, every dollar from the ESRF is deposited into the ES 
Reserve Fund.  Spending from the ES Reserve Fund may be for a variety of state employment 
and training uses as governed by NCRS Chapter 96 Section 5(f).   
 
Simulating the effect of the ESRF tax with the BFM required some creativity.  The BFM does 
not allow proportional tax rates, rather only additional points.  To model the Special Reserve tax 
correctly we had to simulate taxes under schedule A scaled up by 1.2.  The simulation suggested 
debts would be paid off in 2017.  In the BFM a uniform “solvency type” tax of 0.4 points yielded 
the same 2017 year-end balance, and the BFM could be set to turn off the tax after 2017 and 
continue the simulation through 2020.  Results from these simulations are reported in this paper.   
Labor market assumptions for analysis 
 
The BFM requires users to input current and expected future values of three labor market 
variables: unemployment rate, wage growth rate, and labor force growth rate.  Projections must 
be provided over the ten year period that the model simulates.  The values for these three 
variables used in this study were provided by the Chief Financial Officer of the North Carolina 
Department of Commerce (NCDC).  These projections were prepared for NCDC by Global 
Insight. Table 5.4 lists percentage growth rates for the years 2011 through 2020.  These values 
were used to initialize the BFM for baseline economic scenario simulations presented in this 
report. 
 
While Global Insight projected the total unemployment rate, it was not entirely the basis for our 
projections of the insured unemployment rate.  The BFM model runs off the insured 
unemployment rate (IUR) rather than the total unemployment rate (TUR).  Inputting TUR values 
into the model automatically generate the IUR through 2020.  However, discussions with the 
Department of Labor led us to believe that the relationship between TUR and IUR have changed 
from historic patterns.  The share of the unemployed who are long-term jobless has risen above 
previous levels.  While the unemployment rate may remain high and drop slowly in the near 
future, the long-term unemployed are not eligible for UI benefits and so we believe the IUR will 
drop and level off more swiftly than the TUR.  Therefore our benefit payment projections are 
slightly lower than the total unemployment rate might suggest.  Our projected insured 
unemployment rates are also shown in Table 5.4. 
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 Baseline simulation 
 
The baseline results presented in Table 5.5 show the trust fund being paid off in 2017. By 2020 
the trust fund is projected to have a positive balance of $625.2 million.  Employers will still be 
paying taxes on schedule A in 2020.  The system's fund ratio will be 1.01 in 2020, almost one 
full percentage point below the threshold to drop the tax system to Schedule B.
7
 
B. Analysis of UI tax features 
New employer rates 
 
The simulations relative to the baseline suggest that a 0.3 percentage point increase in the new 
employer rate increases the terminal reserve balance in 2020 by $73 million (Table 5.6).  
Additional incremental increases of 0.3 have an additive effect on tax contributions.  That is each 
0.3 increase adds another $73 million or so to the 2020 year-end balance.  This results from a 
relatively fixed amount of new employers in the state every year.  Regardless of the new 
employer rate examined, the payoff year remains 2017 for every level of new employer rate tried 
between 1.2 and 3.7, and the tax schedule in effect is always A for any of the new employer rates 
tried.  
Minimum and maximum rates 
 
Minimum rate: Currently employers with a reserve ratio of 4.2 and over pay no UI taxes. The 
North Carolina finance committee previously simulated adding a minimum tax rate of 0.2 or 1.1 
percent.  Simulations suggest that increasing the minimum rate in increments of 0.1 from zero to 
0.9 has an exponential effect on tax contributions, but increases to 1.0 and 1.1 lower the 2020 
year-end value of reserves because the trigger moves to tax schedule B (see Table 5.7).  The 
biggest marginal revenue effects occur for minimum rates between 0.5 and 0.9.     
 
Maximum Rate:  Raising the maximum tax rate yields diminishing returns as the tax goes 
higher. Notice in Table 5.8 that when the maximum rate is raised slightly there are significant 
returns. However, once the rate is raised beyond 7.0 percent rate of increased revenue falls.  
Furthermore, beyond a rate of 9.0 total reserves in 2020 fall, but debt payoff occurs one year 
earlier in 2016 for rates 9.0 and above.  The higher maximum rate on negative balance employers 
also shifts the rate schedule in effect. 
 
Middle Rates:  In addition to raising the top and bottom rates, we simulated raising the tax rates 
on employers in the reserve range from -0.5 to 0.7. Results of these changes were very modest. 
Raising these rates alone by 0.1 or 0.2 points generated little additional revenue relative to the 
baseline scenario.  Results are reported in Table 5.9.  The payoff year remains 2017.  The 0.1 
increase raises 2020 reserves by $7 million and the 0.2 increases raises them by $31 million.  
Like the baseline both these alternatives end on rate schedule A in 2020.  
  
                                                 
7
The fund ratio is total reserves divided by taxable payroll.  This is distinct from the reserve ratio which is total 
reserves divided by total payroll.   
66 
NC Final Report                                    CESER-UPJOHN 
Taxable wage base 
 
The taxable wage base in North Carolina is set at 50 percent of the AWW.  This study reports on 
a range of proportions starting at forty percent and increasing by 2.5 percentage points in eight 
steps to sixty percent.  As can be seen in Table 5.10, the effects of lowering and raising the 
taxable wage base are nearly symmetric.  Neither a 10 percentage point cut, nor increases 
changes the payoff year from 2017.  A cut of 10 points lowers the 2020 year-end balance by 
$351 million while a 10 percentage point increase raises the balance by $309.  The gains or 
losses are in arithmetic proportion to the change in the taxable wage base.   
Shift in tax schedules 
 
Several different options were simulated.  Similar to the finance committee report the schedule 
was raised by 0.1 and 1.0 points on every rate.  However, we also simulated several options in 
between.  Results are summarized in Table 5.11.  Raising the 0.1 points generated about $268 
million more than the baseline by year-end 2020, but did not change the payoff year or change 
the tax schedule in effect from A.  Raising tax schedule A by 0.4 percentage points yielded an 
additional $1 billion in 2020, and although the payoff year is 2017 as in the baseline, the tax 
schedule drops down to B.  Raising the schedule by 0.5 percentage points produced results 
similar to raising the maximum tax rate too far.  That is, the trust fund is paid off a year sooner, 
but the trust fund balance would be only $54 million above the baseline at year-end in 2020.  
Raising the schedule by 0.6 percentage points yielded a higher year-end reserve balance than 0.5, 
but still not as high as 0.4.  This is because of the switching between schedules that occurs as 
reserves are built up.  We also simulated raising the schedule by one whole point as in TPRC 
(2011). This yielded the largest gains, with the trust fund holding $2.27 billion in 2020, and tax 
schedule C in effect.  
 
Also simulated was an upward shift in only the positive balance part of schedule A that 
maintains the pattern of rates in all schedules.  In this scenario, as shown in Figure 5.5, the top 
tread of the positive balance employers is lengthened at the 2.7 rate to extend to reserve ratios up 
to 0.9, for ratios 0.9 to 2.5 the schedule shifts up by 0.2 points, and for ratios above 2.5 the tax 
rate shifts up by 0.1 point.  This change increases reserves by $209 million relative to the 
baseline at year-end 2020, and the system remains on that shifted positive balance tax schedule 
throughout the simulation time period from 2012 through 2020.  
Triggers for tax schedules 
 
Simulation results from circumventing the 1.95 fund ratio rule to make the full matrix of tax 
schedules A to I relevant are summarized in Table 5.11.  The simulated triggers assign schedule 
A when the fund ratio less than 0.25, and switch to a lower schedule with each quarter point 
increase in the fund ratio with schedule I in effect with a fund ratio of 2.0 or greater.  This 
simulation pays off the fund deficit by 2017 with a fund balance of $483 million that year, but 
ends in 2020 with a fund deficit of $316 million at year-end 2020.  The value of this simulation 
is not from relevance of the tax system tried, but rather from the interaction of the series of tax 
schedules available.  The BFM does not permit removal of the 1.95 override rule.  A richer 
simulation model could examine the results of eliminating the override and instituting a practical 
set of schedule triggers.  
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Solvency tax plans 
 
All five sets of simulation results for solvency tax plans presented in Table 5.12 show the trust 
fund being paid off in 2015.  The 2015 year-end balance is identical for four of the scenarios 
examined since they all start with a solvency tax rate of 1.0 percent.  For the three schemes 
considered by TPRC (2011) the 2020 year-end trust fund balances are projected to be higher 
when the solvency tax triggers off at a higher level.  Aggressive tax rates when the fund balance 
is low in the TPRC (2011) scenarios build up reserves early, and the system maintains high 
balances given the assumed steady labor market recovery over the period.  The two Upjohn 
scenarios gradually reduce the solvency tax and target fund reserve levels at $1 billion and $2 
billion.  These are modest targets being respectively about 41 and 82 percent of the twenty year 
average high cost rate as of 2011. 
From tax schedules to formulas 
 
Four simulations were run to examine the difference in revenue that would result from changing 
the tax system from schedules to equations.  These simulations transform the tax systems, from 
discrete steps to smoothly adjusting functions of the reserve ratio.  Results of the simulations are 
summarized in Table 5.13.  Changing the tax schedule from a stepped system to a smoother 
function does not change the payoff year of 2017, but does yield more revenue than the steps. 
Shifting the slope up slightly generates even greater revenue. 
 
The truncated A simulation sets the new baseline for equation simulations with a 2020 year-end 
reserve balance $39 million below the original baseline.  Relative to this mark the $98 million 
rise in 2020 reserves represents a nearly $140 million gain over the baseline by doing nothing 
more than smoothing the steps of the tax schedule.  Revenue rises by lifting schedule to lay on 
top of the outside corners of the step function.  The change also improves the responsiveness of 
the system, and therefore the degree of experience rating.  Raising the intercept and pivoting the 
linear rate system upward raises 2020 year-end reserves to an estimated $390 million.  The cubic 
approximation fits the negative balance employers well, but poorly fits the positive range, and 
yields $104 million less revenue at year-end 2020.  
C. Analysis of UI benefit features 
 
Changing benefits to recipients was also simulated, although there were fewer options to try than 
on the tax side.  We simulated lowering the maximum potential week’s duration of benefits, 
lowering the maximum weekly benefit amount (WBA), adding another waiting week before 
benefit receipt, and lowering the wage replacement rate below the maximum.  
Maximum potential duration of benefits 
 
Currently up to 26 weeks of regular compensation are available to every UI beneficiary in North 
Carolina.  Simulations were run reducing the maximum potential weeks incrementally by one 
week down to 20.  Simulation results are shown in Table 5.14.  Reducing the maximum potential 
duration of UI required creativity in the BFM. The BFM does not permit changing North 
Carolina rules regarding the maximum potential duration.  However, the model does allow for 
reducing the total amount of weeks paid each year.  Data published by the USDOL (2012) report 
an average of 43 percent of people between 2006 and 2011 exhausted their maximum eligibility 
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of 26 weeks.  Shortening the maximum entitled duration by one week translates into a decline in 
weeks compensated of 2.05 percent, additional weeks of shortening were considered up to 20 weeks 
which cut weeks compensated by 14.6 percent.  Simulations suggest that shortening entitled 
duration by one to five weeks will pay off the outstanding debt in 2017, but the year-end reserve 
balances are higher for each week removed from potential duration.  The reduction to 21 results 
in a shift to a lower tax schedule by 2020.  The reduction to 20 weeks, results in payoff one year 
earlier in 2016, but a negative year-end balance in 2020 because of a drop to a lower schedule in 
intervening years.   
Maximum weekly benefit amount 
 
The maximum weekly benefit amount (WBA) in North Carolina is currently indexed to the 
average weekly wage (AWW) of all UI covered workers in the state.  The index formula 
annually sets the max WBA at two-thirds (66.7%) of the AWW.  With the AWW at $787, the 
max WBA for 2012 is $522.  We simulated lowering the maximum rate from 66.7 to 60 percent 
in one percentage point increments.  Results are shown in Table 5.15.  None of the simulations 
changes the debt payoff year or lowers the tax schedule. When the maximum benefit is set to 60 
percent of the AWW, the 2020 year-end trust fund balance is just over $1 billion.  According to 
2010 American Community Survey data, about one third of employees in North Carolina earned 
$52,000 per year or more.  That is, about one-third of North Carolina workers would qualify for 
the maximum WBA if involuntarily jobless. 
Waiting weeks 
 
Of the 53 state UI programs 41 have one waiting week including North Carolina.  The remaining 
states do not require a waiting week, and no states require more than one.  We simulate the first 
order effects of adding a second waiting week, that is the savings of one week for all who 
exhaust.  We ignore the likely second order effect from reduced entry into the system by those 
who expect to have very short durations of joblessness.  Given that the average UI exhaustion 
rate was 43 percent between 2006 and 2011, therefore 57 percent of beneficiaries did not 
exhaust.  An added waiting week will shorten non-exhaustee durations with the average effect 
over the whole sample a reduction of about 2.05 percent. We introduce this percentage reduction 
in benefit payments to simulations in the BFM with a summary of the simulation presented in 
Table 5.16.  Adding a second waiting week is estimated to pay off the debt in 2017 leaving a 
reserve of $636 million that year and an increase in the 2020 year-end balance of $219 million 
above the baseline scenario with tax schedule A remaining in effect.   
Wage replacement rate below the maximum WBA 
 
Rather than changing the North Carolina rule to replace fifty percent of the prior wage rate below 
the maximum WBA, since it is the ideal standard of UI benefit adequacy, we simulated the effect 
of changing the formula from (1/26) times (high quarter earnings) to (1/52) times (sum of two 
highest quarters).  Computations based on administrative data from a state neighboring North 
Carolina suggested this change would lower system-wide benefit charges about five percent per 
year.  The main impacts will be on persons with uneven earnings patterns over the course of the 
year.  Table 5.16 summarizes results of the simulation.  This change pays off system debt by 
2017 leaving a year-end reserve balance of $765 that year and a system balance by year-end 
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2020 that is $402 million higher than the baseline scenario suggests.  The 2020 year-end balance 
for this change is more than double that for adding a second waiting week.   
D. Alternative plans for improving UI system financial integrity 
Balancing elements of system reform 
 
After reviewing results of simulations on individual changes to tax and benefit features of the 
North Carolina UI system, bundles of changes were combined for analysis.  A total of 15 bundles 
were chosen with the components of each bundle listed in Table 5.17 and 5.18.  Table 5.17 
contains seven bundles of changes without any bonding provisions.  Each of the seven bundles 
contains common elements.  The bundles were designed to present balanced approaches to 
improving the financial integrity of the North Carolina UI system.  All seven bundles involve 
modestly raising the minimum and maximum tax rates, as well as the new employer tax rate.  All 
of the bundles also include some sort of reduction in the benefit side of the system.  Finally, all 
seven bundles assume that additional funds are recovered from overpayments at the rate of about 
$5 million per year.
8
 Table 5.18 presents the parameter values for bundles 8 through 15. These 
bundles contain bonding simulations, solvency taxes, and bundles 12 to 15 restore the 1992 
North Carolina UI tax and benefit structure. 
 
Bundles one through four, listed in Table 5.17, introduce changes to existing tax and benefit 
systems, but do not add new tax features.  Taxes are raised either at the maximum and minimum 
only, or uniformly across rates.  None of these four bundles allow high positive balance 
employers to pay zero rates.  As noted in the TPRC (2011) report, taxing these employers does 
not generate large amount of revenue.  However, a modest positive tax improves equity, since all 
North Carolina workers and employers derive benefit from the stability maintained by the 
system.  Six of the seven bundles reduce the maximum WBA to 60 percent of AWW.  This 
reduction affects only the people at the highest end of earnings.  Most bundles assume the 
weekly benefit is computed as an average of the two high quarters of earnings.  Neither the 
additional waiting week, nor lowering the replacement rate are tried in these bundles of 
simulations.  Averaging earnings rather than using the high quarter is used in many other states 
and is projected to save significant amounts--about 5 percent per year on benefit payments.  Most 
state UI systems actually provide higher than 50 percent wage replacement for low wage workers 
and less than 50 percent for high wage workers.  Bundles five through seven add solvency taxes 
to the system, either targeting $1 or $2 billion dollars in reserve balances.  Bundle seven also 
changes the tax schedule triggers to the previously discussed system. 
  
Results of the no-bonding bundle simulations are shown in Table 5.19 and Figure 5.8.  Results 
vary significantly across the trials.  Bundles five and six, with their solvency taxes, generated the 
most revenue. However, bundle seven's solvency taxes were paired with the quickly decreasing 
rate schedule, and so while it gives the trust fund the most aggressive growth, it also levels off 
quickly and ends in 2020 essentially tied for fifth place.  Because of the different elements at 
play, some of the bundles behaved differently than expected in the simulations.  Bundle two, 
with both a uniform tax increase along with faster tax reductions generated an earlier payoff year 
                                                 
8
The Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) system for UI in USDOL identified about $33 million in North 
Carolina benefit over payments in 2010.  About half of these have been recovered to date.  Raising the recovery rate 
to the national average two-thirds would reduce system costs by about $5 million per year.   
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than the baseline, but ended 2020 with less total reserve than the baseline, and with tax schedule 
D operating in 2020.  Among those without solvency taxes, bundle four yields the highest 
balance in the payoff year, but the balance levels off quickly.  It is likely that both the higher 
maximum tax rate and the higher new employer rate along with benefit reductions cause the 
employers to move into higher reserve ratios and lower taxes.  
 
Results of the bonding simulations are show in Table 5.20 and Figure 5.9.  Bundles eight and 
nine include bonding alone, $3 billion dollars in 2012 or 2013 respectively.  Both simulations 
show the trust fund going negative in 2013 and not going positive again until 2016. Bundles 10 
and 11 contain solvency taxes and yield greater revenue in 2020, with Bundle 10 reaching the 
DOL targeted reserve for interest-free borrowing. Bundles 12 through 15 use the tax and benefit 
system in place in 1992.  The 1992 tax system generates higher revenue due to increase taxes and 
lower benefit charges due to averaging two high quarter wages. However, only with additional 
solvency taxes and bonding in 2012 are DOL reserve targets met in 2020 in bundles 14 and 15.    
 
In addition to simulating the bundles of changes on the baseline economic scenarios, four of the 
bundles were subjected to alternate economic projections. Shown in Table 5.21, in 2014 the 
insured unemployment rate was raised in the BFM.  Under the situation called "severe" the 
insured unemployment rate in 2014 was set to 5.14, the level in 2010. The IUR then declines as 
it has since then, with 2015 matching 2011 and so on.  The "moderate" scenario has a two-year 
jump in unemployment, 4.0 in 2014 and 3.5 in 2015, followed by returning to the previous 
projection.  The "mild" scenario has only a single unemployment spike to 4.0 percent in 2014. 
 
The alternate projections were applied first to the do-nothing scenario, shown in Table 5.22 and 
Figure 5.10. The severe scenario shows an interesting pattern.  The trust fund balance is not 
repaid until 2019, two years later than the baseline scenario.  However, the resulting balance is 
higher than the baseline by $771 million dollars.  It is likely that the combination of low reserve 
ratios and their resulting high tax rates, along with additional federal tax offset credits cause a 
massive influx of money into the system in 2020.  Unfortunately, we cannot model further than 
2020 to see how the system rights itself after that.  The modest and mild scenarios both yield 
more conventional results, with smaller balances in the trust fund than the baseline.  
 
Several of the bundles were not selected for the alternate economic scenarios. Bundles two and 
four had relatively low reserve balances in 2020.  Bundle five had the second highest balance at 
year-end 2020, but was not selected in favor of bundle seven for economic sensitivity analysis. 
While bundle seven also had a relatively low year-end balance in 2020, it seemed to be the most 
responsive approach with its decreasing solvency tax targeted at $1billion and the adjusted 
triggers set to lower the schedule more quickly.  Bundle nine is not included in the group for 
further analysis since it is similar to bundle eight.  Bundles 11, 12 and 13 did not generate 
enough net reserves so these were not selected.  Although bundle eight had a lower 2020 balance 
than the others, with the exception of the do-nothing scenario, it was select to see the effect of 
bonding alone under varying economic conditions. 
 
The results of the severe scenario on the four bundles and do-nothing scenario are shown in 
Table 5.23 and Figure 5.11.  Notice the bends in the lines at 2014.  The bundles without solvency 
taxes perform better than the do-nothing scenario initially, but end with lower balances.  Bundle 
seven generates quickest payoff, but the rapidly expiring solvency tax and downward shifting tax 
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schedule (F in 2020) mean that it ends 2020 with just over $1 billion, less than the current law 
scenario. 
 
Since the moderate and mild economic scenario simulation results did not differ much from the 
baseline, to check sensitivity of results to economic conditions, bundles eight through 15 were 
only simulated under the severe economic scenario.  Results are shown in Table 5.23 and Figure 
5.12.  The simulation results suggest that the do-nothing scenario actually reaches 2020 with a 
higher year-end balance, by nearly $700 million, due to federal offsets and increased taxes from 
employers not moving to higher experience rates.  Relative to the do-nothing system bundles 8 
and 10 both add a $3 billion bond in 2012, and B10 also adds a solvency tax scheme.  Notice that 
bundle eight yields a negative balance in 2013, and remains negative until 2019.  With the 
solvency tax targeting $2.2 billion, B10 provides the second highest pattern of reserves. Bundles 
14 and 15 restore the 1992 tax system as well as bonding and solvency tax.  Both use a solvency 
tax that declines to zero when reserves reach $2.2 billion (AHCM = 1.0), but B15 has a tax rate 
of 0.5 as the maximum, while B14 has a maximum of 1.0.  Bundle 14 is the only scenario that 
reaches the DOL target of $2.2 billion in reserve in 2019, although the target is not met in any 
prior year. 
 
The moderate unemployment scenario is shown in Table 5.22 and Figure 5.13.  Under this 
projection, bundle six generates the highest reserves by 2020, and bundle three has the second 
most in 2020. Bundle three has no solvency tax, but still does quite well.  Also, bundle seven 
ends 2020 on schedule H, the second lowest tax burden for employers.  The mild recession 
scenario is shown in Table 5.23 and Figure 5.14.  This scenario changes very little from the 
modest scenario, but yields higher balances in their payoff years (2017 for bundles with no 
solvency taxes and 2015 for those with solvency taxes) and in 2020. 
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G. Presentation of Simulation Results 













Reserve Balance Rates 
























1.2* 0.00* 5.7* 2.9* 2.7* 0.500* A* A* 
1.5 0.10 6.00 3.0 2.8 0.400 A+0.1 A** 
1.8 0.20† 6.50 3.1 2.9 0.425 A+0.2† Linear A 





2.4 0.40 7.50   0.475 A+0.4 Cubic A 
2.7† 0.50 8.00   0.500 A+0.5  
3.0 0.60 8.50   0.525 A+0.6  
3.3 0.70 9.00   0.550 A+1.0†  













1.10†    
  
 
 Notes: *Parameter values in Do-nothing simulation.   †Parameter values examined in TPRC 
(2011) report.  A’ shifts schedule A up in the same relation as A is to B.  Change in triggers (Δ 
Triggers) moved rates from schedules A thorough I in 0.25 point changes in reserves to taxable 
payrolls ratio from 2.0 down to 0.0 to undercut the tax rate override at the 1.95 ratio.  A** caps 
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Table 5.2  Summary of Solvency Tax Plans Analyzed in UI Financing Simulations 
Solvency Tax (NC1) Solvency Tax (NC2) Solvency Tax (NC3) 
0.0 $100m<B 0.0 $500m<B 0.0 $800m<B 
0.5 $25<B<$100 0.5 $100<B<$500 1.0 $100<B<$800 
1.0 B< $25m 1.0 B< $100m 2.0 B < $100m 
  
  
  Solvency Tax (ST3) 
(Target $1b = 0.41*HCM) 
Solvency Tax (ST4) 
(Target $2b = 0.82*HCM) 
  0.0 $1.0b 0.0 $2.0b 
  0.1 $0.9b 0.1 $1.8b 
  0.2 $0.8b 0.2 $1.6b 
  0.3 $0.7b 0.3 $1.4b 
  0.4 $0.6b 0.4 $1.2b 
  0.5 $0.5b 0.5 $1.0b 
  0.6 $0.4b 0.6 $0.8b 
  0.7 $0.3b 0.7 $0.6b 
  0.8 $0.2b 0.8 $0.4b 
  0.9 $0.1b 0.9 $0.2b 
  1.0 $0.0b 1.0 $0.0b 
  Notes: The high cost multiple (HCM) is the average over the past 20 years of the highest rates 
of regular UI payments as a proportion of total payrolls over a twelve month period.  That 
HCM for North Carolina is 1.56 or $2.42 billion for 2011.   
 
 




Maximum WBA  
Factor on AWW 
(AWW = $756 for 2011) 
Waiting 
weeks 
Replacement rate  
(factor on HQW) 
*26 *0.667 *$504 *1 *(1/26)*HQW 
25 0.650 $491 2 (1/26)*(HQ1+HQ2)/2 
24 0.640 $484 
  23 0.630 $476 
  22 0.620 $469 
  21 0.610 $461 
  20 0.600 $454 
  *Parameter values in Do-nothing simulation. 
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Table 5.4  Labor Market Assumptions through 2020 












2011 0.83 0.91 10.51 3.79 
2012 1.03 0.92 10.14 4.06 
2013 1.05 0.89 9.32 3.54 
2014 1.21 0.88 8.70 3.31 
2015 1.22 0.87 7.76 2.95 
2016 1.15 0.87 7.11 2.70 
2017 1.11 0.86 6.75 2.57 
2018 1.09 0.85 6.53 2.48 
2019 0.91 0.84 6.35 2.41 
2020 0.93 0.84 6.14 2.33 
Source:  Assistant State Budget Officer, Office of State Budget and Management,  North 
Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, Chief Financial 
Officer, projections from Global Insight. 
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1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 










Table 5.6  New Employer Rate Simulations Summary     
New Employer 
Rate Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 







1.2* 2017 483 625 0 A 
1.5 2017 525 699 73 A 
1.8 2017 567 772 147 A 
2.1 2017 610 846 220 A 
2.4 2017 652 919 294 A 
2.7† 2017 694 993 367 A 
3 2017 737 1,066 441 A 
3.3 2017 779 1,140 514 A 
3.7† 2017 835 1,238 612 A 
*Do-nothing 
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Table 5.7  Minimum Tax Rate Simulations Summary 
Minimum Tax 
Rate Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




0.0* 2017 483 625 0 A 
0.1 2017 490 636 11 A 
0.2† 2017 498 649 24 A 
0.3 2017 510 674 49 A 
0.4 2017 534 719 94 A 
0.5 2017 565 780 155 A 
0.6 2017 610 868 243 A 
0.7 2017 672 990 365 A 
0.8 2017 752 1,143 518 A 
0.9 2017 853 1,330 705 A 
1.0 2017 973 1,347 722 B 
1.1† 2017 1,094 1,282 657 B 
*Do-nothing  
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Table 5.8  Maximum Tax Rate Simulations Summary 
Maximum  
Tax  
Rate Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 





5.5 2017 413 515 -110 A 
5.7* 2017 483 625 0 A 
6.0 2017 583 782 157 A 
6.5 2017 741 1,032 407 A 
7.0 2017 888 1,263 638 A 
7.5 2017 1,030 1,357 732 B 
8.0 2017 1,157 1,393 768 B 
8.5 2017 1,277 1,549 924 B 
9.0 2016 91 918 293 A 
9.5 2016 181 801 176 A 





Table 5.9  Middle Tax Rate Simulations Summary 
Change Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 





Schedule A* 2017 483 625 0 A 
-0.5 to 0.7 raised 
by 0.1 2017 387 632 7 A 
-0.5 to 0.7 raised 
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Table 5.10  Taxable Wage Base Formula Change Simulations Summary 
Minimum Tax 
Rate Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




40.0% 2017 227 274 -351 A 
42.5% 2017 287 358 -267 A 
45.0% 2017 348 444 -181 A 
47.5% 2017 419 539 -86 A 
50.0%* 2017 483 625 0 A 
52.5% 2017 532 699 74 A 
55.0% 2017 584 769 143 A 
57.5% 2017 650 855 230 A 
60.0%† 2017 706 934 309 A 
*Do-nothing 









Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Diff from 




A* 2017 483 625 0 A 
A+.1† 2017 672 893 268 A 
A+.2 2017 865 1,166 541 A 
A+.3 2017 1,058 1,444 818 B 
A+.4 2017 1,253 1,648 1,023 B 
A+.5 2016 188 679 54 A 
A+.6 2017 548 1,000 374 A 
A+1.0† 2016 1,109 2,274 1,649 C 
Positive A+(.2,.1),  2017 648 834 209 A 
Change Triggers 2016 483 309 -316 C 
*Do-nothing 
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Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




No Solvency Tax* 2017 483 625 0 A 
North Carolina 1† 2015 497 797 172 A 
North Carolina 2† 2015 497 1,154 529 A 
North Carolina 3† 2015 1,403 1,728 1,103 B 
$1 Billion Target 2015 497 1,302 677 B 
$2 Billion Target 2015 497 2,124 1,499 C 
*Do-nothing 
†Used in Tax Policy Review Committee Models 
  
Table 5.13  Tax Formula Simulations 
Bundle Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 
from Do-nothing         
($ millions) 
Do-nothing* 2017 483 625 0 
Truncated A** 2017 435 586 -39 
Linear A 2017 526 723 98 
Linear A Shift 2017 707 1,015 390 
Cubic A 2017 403 521 -104 
*Do-nothing         
**Approximating Do-nothing 
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Table 5.14  Maximum Duration of Benefits Simulations 
Maximum 
Benefit Weeks Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




26* 2017 483 625 0 A 
25 2017 567 747 122 A 
24 2017 679 901 275 A 
23 2017 802 1,074 449 A 
22 2017 937 1,271 646 A 
21 2017 1,088 1,385 759 B 
20 2016 2 621 -4 A 
*Do-nothing 
 
Table 5.15  Maximum WBA Simulations Summary 
Maximum WBA Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




66.7% of AWW* 2017 483 625 0 A 
65.0% of AWW 2017 553 731 106 A 
64.0% of AWW 2017 609 812 186 A 
63.0% of AWW 2017 651 868 243 A 
62.0% of AWW 2017 681 920 294 A 
61.0% of AWW 2017 702 970 345 A 
60.0% of AWW 2017 726 1,008 383 A 
*Do-nothing 
 
Table 5.16  Waiting Week and Replacement Rate Simulations Summary 
Maximum 
Benefit Weeks Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




Do-nothing* 2017 483 625 0 A 
Average 2HQ 2017 765 1,028 402 A 
Additional 
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Table 5.17  Bundles of Reform Elements for Simulation, no Bonding 
 Simulation Bundle: B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 
Tax rate changes 
   
 





   














  Solvency taxes 
    
ST3 ST4 ST3 
  Change schedule triggers  Yes       Yes 
Benefit changes 
         Reduce Max WBA from 0.67 to   
0.60*AWW 0.6 0.6 
 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
  Reduce max potential duration 
  
25 
      Change WBA from (1/26)HQ to 
(1/52)(HQ1+HQ2)   2HQ 2HQ 2HQ     2HQ 
New employer rate changes 
         Raise new employer rate 1.8 1.8 2.7 2.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Other changes 
         Boost overpayment recovery 0.50 
to 0.67 $5m $5m $5m $5m $5m $5m $5m 
 
 
Table 5.18  Bundles of Reform Elements for Simulation, with Bonding  
 
Current Tax and Benefit 
System 1992 Tax And Benefit System 
Simulation Bundle: B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15 
Tax rate changes 
   
 
   
 
  Uniform rate increase 
   
 
   
 
  Raise max and min rates 














  Change schedule triggers 
    




       
 
  Reduce Max WBA from 0.67 
to   0.60*AWW 
       
 
  Reduce max potential 
duration 
       
 
  Change WBA from (1/26)HQ 
to (1/52)(HQ1+HQ2) 
    
 2HQ  2HQ 2HQ 2HQ 
New employer rate changes 
       
 
  Raise new employer rate 
    
2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 
Other changes 
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Table 5.19  System Reform Simulation Results, No Bonding 
Bundle Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




Do-nothing 2017 483 625 0 A 
B1 2017 945 1,371 746 A 
B2 2016 35 469 -156 D 
B3 2017 1,204 1,633 1,008 B 
B4 2016 292 1,060 435 A 
B5 2015 828 1,863 1,238 B 
B6 2015 828 2,226 1,600 C 
B7 2015 1,040 1,070 445 G 
 
 
Table 5.20 System Reform Simulation Results, with Bonding 
Bundle Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




Do-nothing 2017 483 625 0 A 
B8 2016** 244 372 -253 A 
B9 2016** 151 259 -366 A 
B10 2012 492 2,506 1,881 C 
B11 2012 254 1,753 1,127 B 
B12 2016 239 767 142 A (1992) 
B13 2012 276 880 255 A (1992) 
B14 2012 776 3,026 2,401 C (1992) 
B15 2012 526 2,621 1,996 C (1992) 
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Table 5.21  Labor Market Conditions under 
Alternate Economic Scenarios 
 
Insured Unemployment Rate 
Year 
Do-
nothing Severe Moderate Mild 
2010 5.14 5.14 5.14 5.14 
2011 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 
2012 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 
2013 3.54 3.54 3.54 3.54 
2014 3.31 5.14 4.00 4.00 
2015 2.95 3.79 3.50 2.95 
2016 2.70 4.06 2.70 2.70 
2017 2.57 3.54 2.57 2.57 
2018 2.48 3.31 2.48 2.48 
2019 2.41 2.95 2.41 2.41 





Table 5.22 Do-nothing Scenarios Alternate Economic Scenarios 
Bundle Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




Do-nothing 2017 483 625 0 A 
Severe 2019 1,202 1,324 699 A 
Moderate 2017 64 510 -115 A 
Mild 2017 252 408 -217 A 
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Table 5.23 System Reform Simulation Results under Severe Economic Impact 
Bundle Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




Current Law 2019 1,202 1,324 0 A 
B1 2018 363 557 -767 A 
B3 2018 699 980 -344 A 
B6 2016 911 1,993 668 B 
B7 2015 16 918 -406 F 
B8 2019 251 323 -302 A 
B10 2012 492 1,925 1,300 B 
B14 2012 776 2,327 1,702 C (1992) 
B15 2012 526 1,384 759 B (1992) 
 
 
Table 5.24 System Reform Simulation Results under Moderate Economic Impact 
Bundle Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




Current Law 2017 64 510 0 A 
B1 2017 554 1,013 504 A 
B3 2017 814 1,377 867 A 
B6 2015 326 2,132 1,622 C 
B7 2015 563 1,061 551 H 
 
 
Table 5.25 System Reform Simulation Results under Mild Economic Impact 
Bundle Payoff Year 
Payoff Year 
Balance         
($ millions) 
2020 
Balance      
($ millions) 
2020 Difference 




Current Law 2017 252 408 0 A 
B1 2017 744 1,179 771 A 
B3 2017 1,002 1,498 1,090 B 
B6 2015 564 2,256 1,848 C 
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IX. Explanation of Other Options Available to States to Access Capital 
A. Municipal Bond Basics 
Municipal bonds (munis) are debt securities issued by states, municipalities, counties, or 
agencies or commissions that act as agents of a state or local government to finance capital and 
operating expenditures.  While the investment income from municipal bonds – as well as the 
proceeds of the bond issue received by the issuing entity – are typically exempt from federal 
taxes and from most state and local taxes, any bond issued by a municipal entity is considered a 
municipal bond; even in the rare instances in which municipal entities issue taxable bonds (or 
‘market’ bonds).  Two varieties of munis exist in practice, general obligation bonds (GO bonds) 
or revenue bonds (although many sub-categories of revenue bonds are classified as separate 
varieties).  These varieties serve as classifications by which the municipal market is organized 
and define the type of expenditures a particular bond can be used to finance.   
GO Bonds 
 
GO bonds are only issued by states, counties and municipalities to provide short term – usually 
stop-gap – capital financing to cover the costs of a specific, finite liability or budget obligation.  
For example, a state might issue GO bonds to meet its obligation to pay the pensions of a 
specific criteria of retired state workers.  GO bonds could also be issued to fund the completion 
of a specified project that had potentially exhausted its capital financing from an alternative 
source (such as a federal grant or a private trust).  The primary feature of GO bonds, however, is 
the method by which they are backed – or the mechanism supporting the payment of interest and 
repayment of principal (referred to as “debt service”) owed to the bond’s investors.  Also 
referred to as the ‘security’ a bond issue affords its investors, GO bonds are backed by the full 
faith and credit of the issuing state, county, or municipality.  As such, issuing entities of GO 
bonds are obligated to make debt service payments using any and all streams of revenue at their 
disposal.  Thus, debt service payments on state GO bonds can be funded by the full taxing 
authority of the issuer (or by contributions of any taxation mechanism in the relevant state’s tax 
code).  Should the issuer of a GO bond fail to make the obligated debt service payments in a 
timely and complete fashion (or “default” on the bond issue), the issuer would be assumed 
insolvent.   
Revenue Bonds 
 
Revenue bonds can be issued by states, municipalities, counties, or agencies or commissions that 
act as agents of a state or local government to finance infrastructure projects or projects unique to 
the agency or commission issuing the bonds.  The majority of muni revenue bonds issued, as 
well as the majority of outstanding revenue bonds being traded in the secondary market provide 
financing for the construction of state or local facilities (like schools, hospitals, roads, highways 
and bridges), affordable housing to low-income individuals, or student loans; however, some 
state unemployment insurance agencies seeking an alternative means of UI financing have issued 
revenue bonds in order regain trust fund solvency or to avoid federal penalties as a result of 
maintaining outstanding Title XII loans.  Revenue bonds do not carry the same security as GO 
bonds in terms of the number of revenue sources available to the issuing entity to pay the debt 
service on the bonds.  Specifically, they do not have the backing of the full faith and credit of the 
issuing entity; rather, they are secured by a specific revenue stream collected by a special 
mechanism typically established by the issuer for the sole purpose of paying the relevant debt 
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service.  As such, revenue bonds often assume a higher cost of capital for the issuing entity than 
GO bonds; meaning that the rate of interest an issuing entity is required to pay investors on a 
revenue bond issue is often higher than the rate the entity (or an entity with similar credit 
characteristics) would be required to pay on a GO bond.    
B. Credit Ratings and Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations  
Most bond issuers maintain up-to-date credit ratings from at least one (and up to three) credit 
rating agencies, officially titled Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs).  There are ten NRSRO’s recognized by and registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), although municipal market participants only recognize and utilize 
the three NRSROs that are eligible to rate issuers of municipal securities, those are: Moody’s 
Investors Service, Inc., Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, or Fitch, Inc.  These organizations 
play a central role in the bond issuing process and are integral to maintaining the functionality of 
the secondary market for munis (in which outstanding municipal bond issues are traded among 
investors as debt securities).  The firms provide opinions (expressed as ratings) on the 
creditworthiness of an issuing entity as well as each of the entity’s proposed and outstanding 
bond issues.  These ratings provide investors with a documented statistical projection of an 
issuing entity’s likelihood of default on any or all of its outstanding bond issues; thereby 
distinguishing an entity or an individual issue as investment grade or non-investment grade.   
 
By acting as a barometer with which investors can measure the level of risk associated with 
individual debt securities, credit ratings have the effect of influencing investor appetite for a 
bond issue.  By stimulating or depressing market demand for an issuer, bond issue, or broad class 
of bond issues, credit ratings can adversely impact an issuer’s cost of capital (or borrowing costs) 
and disrupt the flow of available capital in the general market (thereby hindering the ability of 
future issuers to access cheap capital or issue bonds at all).  Credit ratings are also used by 
investment bankers during the bond structuring process to calculate the overall coupon rate of 
rate of interest the bonds will pay and the level of funds they will yield as a return on investment.     
C. Historical UI Bond Issues and Outlook for the Municipal Market 
Since 1987, a total of eight states have secured financing from the capital markets in eleven 
different bond issues.  Louisiana and West Virginia issued bonds in 1987, followed by a bond 
issue by the State of Connecticut in 1993.  In the years following the 2001 recession, from 2003-
2005, Illinois, North Carolina, and Texas each issued debt in the private market.  And thus far in 
the years following the 2007-2009 recession, three states, Michigan, Idaho, and Texas, have 
issued bonds in order to repay their outstanding Title XII loans from the federal government; in 
addition, several states (Arkansas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania) have indicated interest or 
expressed an intent to issue bonds to address UI solvency concerns in 2012 or 2013. 
  
The financial crisis upended the municipal market and rendered near-obsolete many of the 
financial products being used by market participants to inject liquidity into the capital markets.  
The collapse of Lehman Brothers investment bank resulted in a decreased investor demand for 
auction-rate securities (ARS) and variable rate demand obligations (VRDOs) in the municipal 
market vanishing.  As a result the municipal markets were overloaded with an available supply 
of bond issues in which to invest, and issuers faced substantial obstacles in their efforts to bring 
new bond issues to market.   
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Today, the municipal marketplace is a relatively attractive place for issuers; as record low 
interest rates help to ensure easy access to cheap capital.  Stock market volatility combined with 
monetary policies that attempt to maintain low rates of interest have both pushed investors 
seeking higher investment returns to the municipal market. Specifically, the Federal Reserve’s 
pledge to maintain incredibly low short-term interest rates through 2014, coupled with increased 
investor demand in the municipal market both afford eligible entities the opportunity to access 
short- and intermediate-term capital at a remarkably low cost.   
 
However, uncertainty associated with the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act’s mandate to further 
regulate municipal issuers, combined with fears that a federal tax reform proposal might 
eliminate the tax-free federal subsidy afforded to municipal issues, casts a shadow on the overall 
health of the municipal market.   While these fears have been mitigated in recent months, it is 
fair to say that uncertainty will likely remain a concern of municipal issuers and investors for the 
long term. 
D. Reasons to Issue Bonds: Potential Cost Savings and Program Benefits 
Before a state decides to issue debt in the municipal market, it should compare the cost of 
borrowing in the private sector verses that of obtaining a Title XII advance.  A state could decide 
to issue bonds if some substantial savings could occur compared to costs associated with 
obtaining (or maintaining outstanding) Title XII advances. 
 
When calculating the costs associated with a bond issue a state should review not only the 
interest paid for the bonds but also the liabilities associated with the issuance (not limited to 
prepayment penalties, interest rate protection fees, enhancement fees, hedging costs, bond 
counsel fees, underwriter’s counsel fees, bond rating fees, official statement printing fees, blue 
sky filing fees, and financial advisor fees) and maintenance (debt service costs) of the bond.  In 
addition to direct costs, a state should consider the political costs associated with a particular 
bond issue, including accumulating the political will necessary to pass a piece of legislation 
authorizing a bond issue (if applicable), as well as the adverse impact that a bond issue could 
have on a state agency if the costs to the state, as a result of the issue, are significantly greater 
than originally projected.   
 
In terms of benefits, a state agency should determine whether, and to what quantifiable extent the 
issuance of bonds is reasonably expected to result in a savings to the state as compared to the 
cost of borrowing or obtaining a Title XII loan, or whether it will allow the state to avoid an 
anticipated deficiency in its unemployment trust fund.  The following sections explain the 
potential benefits or cost savings associated with the issuance of unemployment insurance bonds 
and provide summaries of historical bond issues by states attempting to realize such savings or 
benefits.  
E. Achieving a Credit Spread 
Title XII loans have recently maintained higher rates of interest than the coupon rate available to 
states seeking to borrow from the private market.  If the difference (or the spread) between the 
rate of interest on a Title XII loan and the coupon rate a state could access borrowing in the 
private market results in a substantial net positive (or credit), the cost savings to the state would 
be classified as a “credit spread,” and the state might examine issuing bonds more closely to 
borrow for its UTF.  The current rate of interest for a Title XII loan is 2.94 percent.  Two states, 
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Louisiana and West Virginia, have attempted to issue bonds in order to achieve a credit spread 
and avoid borrowing funds from the federal government in the form of Title XII loans; neither 
state was particularly successful.  Louisiana’s attempt at cost savings through bond issuance 
failed, with the state likely paying more money in interest on the funds it acquired through 
bonding than it would have owed by accessing and maintaining Title XII loans.  West Virginia’s 
bond issue resulted in minimal cost savings.   
 
In 1987, Louisiana issued $1.315 billion in fixed rate bonds with a maximum potential maturity 
of 15 years.  The state repaid the principle on the bonds in 2002, seven years ahead of schedule.  
The decision to issue bonds did not result in the state achieving a cost savings compared to Title 
XII loans; in fact, the total costs associated with the bond issue resulted in a net debt to the state 
of $47.6 million compared to the costs the state would have otherwise faced accessing a Title XII 
loan.  
 
In 1987, West Virginia issued $259 million of fixed rate bonds with a maximum maturity of six 
years.  The state redeemed the full bond issue two years prior to maturity and resulted in a total 
cost savings or credit spread of approximately $700,000 when compared to the costs the state 
would have otherwise faced borrowing accessing a Title XII loan. 
F. Avoiding a FUTA Credit Reduction 
As previously described, Title XII of the SSA has provisions to ensure automatic repayment of 
outstanding debts known as the FUTA credit reduction.  The FUTA credit reduction is 
significant because it imposes a single, uniform tax rate on all employers in a state regardless of 
their individual experience rating.  This uniform tax increase is viewed by some states as 
inequitable, and a few have issued bonds in order to avoid the introduction or further imposition 
of a FUTA credit reduction on their corresponding employer base.   
 
To avoid the credit reduction a state must repay all loans for the most recent one-year period 
ending on November 9, plus the potential additional taxes that would have been imposed for the 
tax year.  In addition, the state must have sufficient amounts in the state unemployment trust 
fund to pay all compensation for the last quarter of that calendar year without receiving a loan.  
Finally, the state must also have altered its state law to increase the net solvency of its fund.  No 
state has avoided a FUTA credit reduction using this provision coupled with an influx of capital 
from the private market.   
 
States can also avoid the introduction or further imposition of the FUTA credit reduction by 
repaying the total amount of outstanding Title XII loans before the credit reduction is applied to 
the applicable state’s employers.  All three of the bond issuing states that have gone to market 
since the 2007-2009 recession have done so with the explicit intention of repaying their 
respective outstanding title XII loans to avoid FUTA tax increases. 
 
In late December 2011, Michigan issued $3.32 billion in variable rate demand obligations 
(VRDOs) with a maximum maturity of 30-months.  The state directed the bulk of the bond 
proceeds to repay outstanding title XII loans.  The deal was expedited in order for the State to 
avoid the further imposition of a FUTA tax increase on Michigan employers.  
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In 1993, Connecticut issued $1.021 billion in fixed ($450 million) and variable ($571 million) 
rate bonds in order to repay outstanding title XII advances and the accrued interest on the 
advances.  The bond issue was less than the total $1.142 billion authorized in the corresponding 
bonding legislation and the state repaid the principle in 2001, in line with the maximum maturity 
period originally planned. 
 
In 2011, the Idaho Department of Labor issued $188 million fixed-rate tax-exempt bonds with 
interest rates ranging from 2.0 percent to 5.0 percent and maturities between one and four years 
in order to repay its outstanding title XII advances. 
G. Avoiding the Accrual of Interest on Title XII Loans 
States might also issue bonds in the private market in order to avoid being charged interest on 
Title XII loans accessed from January 1 to September 30 of the current taxable year.  The SSA 
requires the payment of interest on Title XII advances; due before the first day of the Federal 
fiscal year (October 1).  No interest is due on advances made January 1 through September 30 
and repaid in full prior to October 1 in the same calendar year provided no additional advances 
are obtained before the end of the calendar year.     
 
From 2003 to 2005 North Carolina issued $519 million in tax anticipation notes (TANs).  All 
three of the individual TAN offerings, in 2003 ($172 million), 2004 ($270 million), and 2005 
($77 million) had a maximum potential maturity of one year, though the state never required the 
full year to repay the principal on the TANs.  The offerings were authorized by administrative 
action and were utilized by the state in order to repay its outstanding cash flow loans obtained 
from January to September of the corresponding year(s).  The TAN offerings allowed North 
Carolina to repay their outstanding cash flow loans, avoid interest payments on the outstanding 
loans, and finance the administrative expenses associated with the offerings.  In addition, the 
offerings allowed the state to set some of the proceeds aside to cover future benefit outlays. 
H. Borrowing to Avoid the Imposition of a State Tax 
A state might issue debt into the private market in order to avoid a specific state assessment that 
would otherwise be imposed on a state’s employers.  Texas law requires the imposition of a 
solvency tax whenever its trust fund balance falls below one percent of taxable payrolls on 
October 1st.  Any shortfall below this threshold requires the introduction of the solvency tax on 
the State’s employers the following year. The solvency taxes due in 2004 would have totaled 
about $1.0 billion if the tax would have gone into effect.  In 2003, the state decided to issue a 
mixture of tax-exempt and taxable bonds; the proceeds of the taxable issue ($1.12 billion) were 
transferred into the state UTF to avoid the imposition of the solvency tax. 
I. Borrowing to Qualify for Cash-Flow Loans under New Eligibility Criteria 
Finally, a state could issue bonds in order to meet the new eligibility standards required to access 
interest-free cash-flow loans that will begin a five-year phased implementation process starting 
in 2014.  As previously described, states may borrow without interest from the FUA from 
January to September in a given calendar year if they meet a number of pre-determined 
conditions.  These interest-free loans have been available since the inception of the UI program, 
as seasonal patterns of revenue inflows and benefit outlays have historically required that some 
states receive temporary assistance in the form of a stop-gap loan.  Since 1982, in order to 
qualify for a cash-flow loan, a state was required to repay, by September 30, any outstanding 
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loans made to the state during the prior nine months and not seek additional Title XII loans for 
the remaining three months of the corresponding calendar year.    
 
On September 17, 2010, USDOL issued a final rule to implement additional federal requirements 
to restrict states’ abilities to access cash-flow loans.  These new requirements conditioned a 
state’s receipt of interest-free loans upon the state meeting solvency goals and maintenance 
requirements established by the Secretary of Labor.  The rule will begin a five-year phased 
implementation beginning in 2014.  At that time, in order for a state to obtain an interest-free 
advance, it must have an AHCM of at least 0.5 in one of the five prior years.  Each subsequent 
year, the required AHCM will increase by 0.1 until 2019, at which point it will remain 1.0 
indefinitely.  It is likely that a majority of states will be unable to meet these eligibility 
requirements by 2014 and will thereby be restricted from accessing interest-free loans. 
 
States that currently maintain outstanding Title XII loans will need time to repay their loans and 
begin to build up their trust fund in concert with the economic recovery in their state.  The states 
heavily hit by the recession are most likely to be the ones with the longer recovery times and 
most strapped for cash.  For many of these states, the level of funds required to repay their 
current outstanding loans and capitalize their state trust funds to the degree required by the new 
regulations is prohibitively high.  It is politically infeasible for many states to implement the 
degree of benefit reforms or tax increases that would be required to obtain the mandated AHCM 
by 2014.  When such states finally reach the stage where they maintain zero positive trust fund 
balances, short-term cash flow loans may be all that they require in order to maintain solvency in 
the years following.   
 
States need all of the financing tools possible to regain financial stability after a recession.  Many 
will likely need cash-flow loans to maintain benefit payments in the early months of the year 
when monthly outlays are highest but revenues are lowest.  A state might decide to issue bonds 
to obtain an AHCM of 0.5 by December 31, 2014.  Because the solvency requirements for cash-
flow loans have yet-to-be implemented, no states have issued bonds in the past to meet an 
AHCM standard; however, the bonding process would not differ drastically in practice to the 
bonding process in which a state might engage in order to repay outstanding title XII loans. 
X. Issuing Bonds in North Carolina 
 
North Carolina might consider issuing bonds in order to avoid the imposition of an additional 
FUTA credit reduction on employers in the state, cap the level of the FUTA credit reduction, 
repay its outstanding title XII loans, or qualify for cash-flow loans when new regulations begin 
restricting their eligibility to do so in 2014.  
 
North Carolina State law provides eligible entities with the authority to issue short term tax-
exempt bonds or tax anticipation notes (TANs) using a special administrative capacity.  As a 
result, North Carolina would not be required to seek additional legislative authority to issuing 
bonds of some sort.  Issuing TANs offers North Carolina the ability to issue shorter-term debt 
directly through their state treasurers or comptrollers, similar to corporate commercial paper. By 
using state staff, without relying upon more costly outside underwriters and financial advisors, 
North Carolina can avoid substantially higher fees and costs they might otherwise incur when 
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bonding with the assistance of a national banking association, bank, trust company, investment 
banker or other financial institution in the private market. 
 
Unfortunately, State law prohibits the issuance of TANs that would exceed fifty percent (50 
percent) of the amount of the tax stream used by the state to repay outstanding TANs.  North 
Carolina’s UI agency has one revenue stream that can act as security for the issuance of TANs: 
the total level of UI contributions received by the State.  As a result, the North Carolina UI 
agency can only issue approximately $500 million in TANs at any point in time due to the fact 
that the revenue stream on which the Agency would rely to secure the TAN issuance would be 
the state UI taxes on employers, which total approximately $1 billion annually.  While the ability 
to access $500 million in short-term, low-cost credit is available to the State, even the full 
allowable TAN issuance would fail to provide the State with a level of capital adequate to cap or 
avoid the imposition of an additional FUTA credit reduction, repay its outstanding Title XII 
loans, or qualify for cash-flow loans under the new regulations beginning a staggered 
implementation in 2014.  As a result, if North Carolina is considering issuing bonds to help 
address its UI trust fund solvency concerns, the enactment of state bond authorizing legislation 
would be required.   
A. Bonds Authorizing Legislation 
The enactment of state legislation would be required to authorize a bond issue in North Carolina.  
The legislation would likely spell out the type of bond include language establishing a special 
assessment mechanism on which the State would rely to secure the bond financing and pay the 
debt service on the bond.  It is important that bond authorizing legislation afford flexibility to the 
issuer; including language which addresses virtually every scenario, cost, and variable associated 
with the issuance, administration, and maintenance of a bond issue, as well as the allowable 
use(s) of the proceeds resulting from the issuance.  And, while it is difficult for a piece of 
legislation to do all of these things in practice, the statutory language should, at a minimum 
provide guidance and procedural directions that are broad enough to allow for adjustments by the 
issuing entities.  The following sections review important aspects of state laws that have been 
enacted in the past to authorize bond issues.   
B. Loan Authorization Level 
The loan authorization level establishes the maximum dollar value a state is allowed to issue in a 
bond offering, and details the allowable uses of a bond issue’s proceeds in a state’s bond 
authorizing legislation.  Nearly every state that has issued bonds to finance some aspect of UI 
has used some of the proceeds from the bond issue to pay for the costs associated with the 
issuance and maintenance of the corresponding bonds.  It is important then that a state UI agency 
attempt to calculate any and all potential costs it might face during the administration of a bond 
issue, and communicate these calculations to the state legislature in order to ensure an adequate 
provision of funds.   
 
This section of bond authorization legislation often establishes the duration during which a state 
UI agency may issue the authorized bonds, and whether the authority to do so is revolving or 
renewable in nature.  Connecticut Public Act No. 93-243 authorized the State Bond Commission 
to issue bonds to repay outstanding Federal Advances and accrued interest, refinance such 
obligations, and meet current Connecticut UI benefit obligations. 
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House Bill 810, the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund Financing Act, authorized a 
bond issuance with the goal of reducing its reliance on Federal Advances, repay or refinance 
outstanding Federal Advances, refinance or purchase bonds issued under the authorizing 
legislation, or fund an UTF surplus.  Additionally, the state intended for the bond issue to ensure 
employers remained eligible for full credit against the FUTA tax. 
 
Article 6 of Senate Bill 280 authorized the Texas Finance Authority to issue bonds, subsequent 
to a resolution approved by the Authority’s governing board, on behalf of the Texas Workforce 
Commission (TWC) to bring the state’s UI trust fund level to between one and two percent of 
taxable payrolls as required by the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act.  Because of the 
renewable features and broad direction provided in this legislation, TWC was able to issue $1.4 
billion in bonds in 2003 to repay its Title XII loans and avoid a state solvency tax, and, under the 
same bond authorization, issue $1.96 billion in 2010 to repay its Title XII loans. 
 
The North Carolina Division of Employment Security would be able to access upfront funding to 
finance their bond issuance costs.  State law includes a provision that allows for short term 
borrowing, in the form of Bond Anticipation Notes (BANs), prior to an authorized bond issue, in 
anticipation of the receipt of the bond proceeds [§ 159‑161].   
C. Special Obligation Fund 
Most state bond authorizing legislation includes language that establishes a supplemental fund 
outside of the state unemployment trust fund, to act as a repository and clearing house for either 
the bond proceeds or the contributions collected by the state UI agency to pay the debt service on 
the bonds.  The unique organization of obligation assessment funds are critical features of bond 
authorization legislation, and can adversely affect the cost savings capacity of a bond issue. 
  
Connecticut’s 1993 bonding legislation (Public Act No. 93-243) created a separate 
“Unemployment Compensation Advance Fund” to hold special assessment revenues and pay the 
debt service on the bonds.  Within the Unemployment Compensation Advance Fund, the 
legislation established the Debt Service and Reserves Account, which made interest and 
principal payments on the bonds, and the Special Pledged Account, which collected any 
assessment revenues. 
 
Illinois’ 2003 bond authorizing legislation (H.B. 810) established a separate fund, the “Master 
Bond Fund,” to make bond principle and interest payments as well as, cover the bond issue’s 
administrative expenses, and act as the contribution repository for the Fund Building Receipts 
that were collected as surtax on the State’s employers from 2004-2009 to capitalize the Fund.  
The Master Bond Fund contains four main subaccounts, the Bond Proceeds Account, the 
Revenue Account, the Bond Administration Account, and the Debt Service Account. 
 
The 2003 Texas bonding legislation (S.B. 280) created a separate “Obligation Assessment Fund” 
that authorizes the receipt of contributions from an experience-rated assessment on State 
employers established by the state agency.  The assessment fund acts as the source of funding to 
pay the interest on the bonds, insurance, administrative expenses, and any interest due on future 
Title XII loans.  The Fund contains three separate accounts in which to distribute the assessment 
funds: a Debt Service Account, a Bond Administration Expenses Account, and a Redemption 
Account.  The legislation authorized the transfer of any surplus funds collected in the assessment 
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fund – in sequence and as available – to make interest payments due on Title XII loans, redeem 
or purchase outstanding bonds, or reserve funds to be used to pay future interest on federal 
advances. 
 
Michigan’s 2011 bond authorization legislation (Public Act 268 of 2011) established an 
obligation fund, the “Obligation Trust Fund” to house the proceeds of the bond issue as well as 
any special contributions.  The Fund is managed by the State Treasurer and is considered a 
separate fund in the State Treasury, the assets of which shall not be comingled with any other 
fund and cannot be considered part of the general fund of the State.  The fund is capitalized 
through transfers of special obligation assessments established by the legislation.   
 
Idaho’s 2011 bond authorizing legislation (House Bill 108) did not require the establishment of a 
special obligation fund; instead, debt service on the bond is made through the Bond Principal 
Account in the Employment Security Reserve Fund.  The State ES Law establishes in the State 
Treasury a separate trust fund known as the Employment Security Reserve Fund, the moneys in 
which may be used by the Director for loans to the employment security fund, as security for 
loans from the federal unemployment trust fund, and for the repayment of any interest bearing 
advances, including advances made under Title XII of the Social Security Act as well as 
outstanding bond issues. 
 
North Carolina already has a special reserve fund in state law that could serve in a function 
similar to that of an obligation assessment fund. The “Employment Security Commission 
Reserve Fund” is capitalized with a portion of the contributions collected under the State’s 
special reserve tax (if the tax is in effect) [96.5 (f)].  The moneys in the reserve fund may be used 
for loans to the state UTF, as security for loans from the federal UTF, and to pay any outstanding 
interest on title XII advances.  
D. Special Assessments 
All bond authorizing legislation includes provisions addressing the mechanisms or methods a 
state will use in order collect the funds necessary to pay the debt service on the outstanding 
bonds.  Most bonding legislation establishes a special tax or assessment, to be assessed against a 
state’s employers and collected by the state UI agency in order to repay the bonds.  These special 
assessments are structured in different ways, but they are often similar in their rate calculations 
and activation triggers to a state solvency or reserve tax. 
 
Connecticut’s 1993 bonding legislation (Public Act No. 93-243) required the State Treasurer to 
annually impose ‘Special Assessments’ and ‘Additional Special Assessments’ on the State’s 
employers.  These assessments were calculated in order to provide 100percent  of the 
administrative costs and 120 percent  of the interest and principle payments necessary to fund an 
outstanding bond issue for a specified duration.  Revenues collected from the Assessments went 
into the Fund’s Special Pledged Account and were then transferred – in sequence and as 
available – to sub accounts to pay administrative expenses associated with the bond issue, debt 
service on the outstanding bond issue, meet reserve requirements in the state Unemployment 
Trust Fund in order to avoid a State solvency tax or other solvency assessment, or redeem 
outstanding bonds from the debt issuance.  
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Illinois’ 2003 bond authorizing legislation (H.B. 810) established a surtax (to provide for the 
Master Bond Fund’s ‘Fund Building Receipts’); the surtax was calculated by adding between .4 
and 0.9 percent every year (but not cumulatively) to the contribution rates on employers that 
would otherwise be in effect, from 2004 to 2009.  Additionally, the authorizing legislation 
established ‘Requisitioned Receipts,’ a special tool to ensure that the State would have the cash 
flows necessary to make its biennial debt service payment.  In the event that Illinois did not have 
access to the necessary capital to make the bond interest payments to investors, the Receipts 
acted as a mechanism to withdraw money from the State Unemployment Trust Fund (provided 
the money could legally be withdrawn) and transfer said funds to the Master Bond Fund to pay 
the associated debt service costs. 
 
The 2003 Texas bonding legislation (S.B. 280) authorized the Texas Finance Authority to 
establish an “Obligation Assessment” to be charged against a State’s employers as long as a 
bond issue remained outstanding.  The contribution rates on the annual assessment were 
calculated to be greater than or equal to the sum of: 150 percent of the total debt service owed on 
any outstanding bond issues due within the next calendar year, the outstanding interest owed on 
Title XII advances (due within the next calendar year), and the projected administrative expenses 
associated with the authorized bond issue in the next calendar year. 
 
Michigan’s 2011 bond authorization legislation (Public Act 268 of 2011) established a special 
obligation assessment to go into effect each year in which any bond obligation is outstanding.  
The contribution rate associated with the obligation assessment is to be determined by the State 
Treasurer, and is based on the sum of the 2011 bond issue’s issuance, remarketing, and credit 
enhancement costs.  The assessment is collected from all contributing employers, but it is not 
uniform due to the fact that it can take into account an employer’s experience rating from the 
previous year to determine said employer’s obligation assessment rate. 
 
Idaho’s 2011 bond authorizing legislation (House Bill 108) established a reserve tax, due and 
payable at the same time and in the same manner as the state’s regular UI contributions.  The 
reserve tax will go into effect if the funding level in the Employment Security Reserve Fund is 
less than one percent (1 percent) of state taxable wages in the year as of September 30 of the 
preceding calendar year.  If it is in effect, the contribution rate assessed through the reserve tax is 
equal to the tax rate assigned to an employer (on the date the special assessment is computed), 
minus the assigned contribution rate and training tax rate assigned to the employer on the 
computation date. 
  
North Carolina state law currently includes a reserve tax that is similar in form and structure to 
the type of special assessment the issuance of revenue bonds might require. 
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XI. Appendices  
A. Supporting Tables 
This appendix presents detailed results from simulations summarized in tables appearing in the 
body of this report.  There is one table in this appendix for each simulation scenario run.  The 
numbering of tables in this appendix is linked to the numbering of tables summarizing results in 
the body of this report.  The first set of appendix tables are numbered 4.6.1 to 4.6.9.  These are 
the nine tables supporting each of the nine rows appearing in the text as summary Table 5.6.  The 
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Table 5.6: New Employer Rate 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,075 0 1,075 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   32,829 699   1,034   1,053 0 1,053   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,082 0 1,082 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,090 0 1,090 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   39,627 846   1,034   1,068 0 1,068   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,097 0 1,097 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   43,026 919   1,034   1,076 0 1,076   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,105 0 1,105 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,112 0 1,112 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   49,824 1,066   1,034   1,091 0 1,091   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,120 0 1,120 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   53,223 1,140   1,034   1,099 0 1,099   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,130 0 1,130 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Table 5.7: Minimum Tax Rate 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,068 0 1,068 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29,942 636   1,034   1,046 0 1,046   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,069 0 1,069 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,073 0 1,073 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   31,681 674   1,034   1,051 0 1,051   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,078 0 1,078 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   33,729 719   1,034   1,057 0 1,057   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,086 0 1,086 
 
60,550 143,118 






NC Final Report                                    CESER-UPJOHN 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,097 0 1,097 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   40,436 868   1,034   1,078 0 1,078   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,112 0 1,112 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   45,925 990   1,034   1,095 0 1,095   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,131 0 1,131 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,153 0 1,153 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   61,428 1,330   1,034   1,138 0 1,138   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,180 0 1,180 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   68,419 1,347   1,034   959 0 959   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































978 0 978 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Table 5.8  Maximum Tax Rate Simulations Summary 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,058 0 1,058 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   24,239 515   1,034   1,037 0 1,037   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,080 0 1,080 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,100 0 1,100 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   48,542 1,032   1,034   1,079 0 1,079   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,119 0 1,119 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   59,493 1,263   1,034   1,095 0 1,095   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,130 0 1,130 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,018 0 1,018 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   69,122 1,393   1,034   991 0 991   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,018 0 1,018 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   76,879 1,549   1,034   990 0 990   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,167 0 1,167 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,180 0 1,180 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   34,820 801   1,034   1,151 0 1,151   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,192 0 1,192 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   42,243 959   1,034   1,165 0 1,165   61,418 145,753 
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Table 5.9 Middle Tax Rate Simulations Summary 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,071 0 1,071 
 
60,209 141,747 
2020   29,167 632   1,044   1,055 0 1,055   61,085 144,413 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,065 0 1,065 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Table 5.10 Taxable Wage Base Formula Change Simulations Summary 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,051 0 1,051 
 
58,259 143,118 
2020   13,200 274   1,034   1,028 0 1,028   59,126 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,052 0 1,052 
 
58,856 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,056 0 1,056 
 
59,436 143,118 
2020   21,019 444   1,034   1,037 0 1,037   60,303 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,060 0 1,060 
 
60,001 143,118 
2020   25,451 539   1,034   1,041 0 1,041   60,868 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,069 0 1,069 
 
61,036 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,070 0 1,070 
 
61,557 143,118 
2020   35,909 769   1,034   1,056 0 1,056   62,473 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,074 0 1,074 
 
62,064 143,118 
2020   39,867 855   1,034   1,061 0 1,061   62,978 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,080 0 1,080 
 
62,556 143,118 
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Table 5.11 Changes in Tax Schedules and Triggers Simulations Summary 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,080 0 1,080 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   42,252 893   1,034   1,059 0 1,059   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,094 0 1,094 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,110 0 1,110 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   68,512 1,444   1,034   1,091 0 1,091   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,091 0 1,091 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   79,439 1,648   1,034   1,065 0 1,065   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,144 0 1,144 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,163 0 1,163 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   44,880 1,000   1,034   1,143 0 1,143   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,249 0 1,249 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   105,841 2,274   1,034   1,213 0 1,213   61,418 145,753 
 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































932 0 932 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,073 0 1,073 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   39,635 834   1,034   1,050 0 1,050   61,418 145,753 
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Table 5.12 Solvency Tax Simulations Summary 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   37,951 797   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,038 0 1,038 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   84,573 1,728   1,034   1,027 0 1,027   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,021 0 1,021 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   63,883 1,302   1,034   1,014 0 1,014   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,021 83 1,103 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Table 5.13 Tax Formula Simulations 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,068 0 1,068 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   27,253 586   1,034   1,053 0 1,053   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,081 0 1,081 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,103 0 1,103 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   47,483 1,015   1,034   1,085 0 1,085   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,062 0 1,062 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   24,411 521   1,034   1,041 0 1,041   61,418 145,753 
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Table 5.14 Maximum Duration of Benefits Simulations 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,050 0 1,050 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   36,913 784   1,012   1,037 0 1,037   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,038 0 1,038 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,023 0 1,023 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   54,501 1,146   965   1,002 0 1,002   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,009 0 1,009 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   64,182 1,346   939   985 0 985   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































942 0 942 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































970 0 970 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Table 5.15 Maximum WBA Simulations Summary 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,052 0 1,052 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   34,341 731   1,018   1,040 0 1,040   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,048 0 1,048 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,043 0 1,043 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   40,948 868   999   1,027 0 1,027   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,039 0 1,039 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   43,457 920   990   1,021 0 1,021   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,037 0 1,037 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,032 0 1,032 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Table 5.16 Waiting Week and Replacement Rate Simulations Summary 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 
 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,050 0 1,050 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   37,713 801   1,011   1,035 0 1,035   61,418 145,753 
 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,030 0 1,030 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   48,581 1,028   982   1,019 0 1,019   61,418 145,753 
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Table 5.19 System Reform Simulation Results under Economic Baseline 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,060 0 1,060 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   64,446 1,371   971   1,044 0 1,044   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































902 0 902 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   22,827 469   923   898 0 898   61,418 145,753 
 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,023 0 1,023 
 
60,550 143,118 





NC Final Report                                    CESER-UPJOHN 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,092 0 1,092 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   46,969 1,060   923   1,064 0 1,064   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,018 0 1,018 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   90,093 1,863   971   1,003 0 1,003   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































977 0 977 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































845 0 845 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   52,539 1,070   923   896 0 896   61,418 145,753 
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Table 5.20 System Reform Simulation Results, with Bonding 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   29 625   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   16,881 372   1,034   1,045 0 1,045   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,067 0 1,067 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































991 121 1,112 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   124,025 2,506   1,034   990 15 1,005   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,016 181 1,198 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   82,680 1,753   1,034   1,000 130 1,130   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,099 0 1,099 
 
62,556 143,118 
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Aggregate  Payroll 
Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,099 0 1,099 
 
62,556 143,118 
2020   38,723 880   982   1,083 0 1,083   63,470 145,753 









Aggregate  Payroll 
Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,000 0 1,000 
 
62,556 143,118 
2020   149,029 3,026   982   964 0 964   63,470 145,753 









Aggregate  Payroll 
Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,060 62 1,122 
 
62,556 143,118 
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Table 5.23 System Reform Simulation Results under Severe Economic Impact 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,274 241 1,515 
 
60,493 142,328 
2020   62,412 1,324   1,216   1,245 30 1,275   61,386 145,204 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,270 29 1,299 
 
60,493 142,328 
2020   22,808 557   1,147   1,241 0 1,241   61,386 145,204 
 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,279 29 1,309 
 
60,493 142,328 
2020   45,655 1,027   1,131   1,241 0 1,241   61,386 145,204 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,039 82 1,121 
 
60,493 142,328 
2020   43,347 918   1,089   1,038 61 1,100   61,386 145,204 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,283 29 1,312 
 
60,493 142,328 
2020   43,241 980   1,136   1,248 0 1,248   61,386 145,204 
 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,274 241 1,515 
 
60,493 142,328 
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Aggregate  Payroll 
Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,274 377 1,650 
 
60,493 142,328 
2020   82,734 1,925   1,216   1,194 367 1,562   61,386 145,204 









Aggregate  Payroll 
Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,239 263 1,502 
 
62,479 142,328 
2020   107,975 2,327   1,155   1,178 140 1,318   63,424 145,204 









Aggregate  Payroll 
Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,290 312 1,602 
 
62,479 142,328 
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Table 5.22 System Reform Simulation Results under Moderate Economic Impact 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,100 30 1,130 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   23,009 510   1,034   1,069 0 1,069   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,091 0 1,091 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   45,947 1,013   971   1,070 0 1,070   61,418 145,753 
 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,095 0 1,095 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   64,812 1,404   962   1,076 0 1,076   61,418 145,753 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































848 0 848 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   53,677 1,061   923   850 0 850   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,100 0 1,100 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Table 5.25 System Reform Simulation Results under Mild Economic Impact 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,080 0 1,080 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   18,299 408   1,034   1,057 0 1,057   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,075 0 1,075 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   54,558 1,179   971   1,056 0 1,056   61,418 145,753 
 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,085 0 1,085 
 
60,550 143,118 
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Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































796 0 796 
 
60,550 143,118 
2020   53,746 1,073   923   862 0 862   61,418 145,753 











Year   Interest 
Ending 















































































1,090 0 1,090 
 
60,550 143,118 
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B. Title XII Advance Activities Schedule  
















Alabama $99,117,632 $50,000,000 $5,685,648 $877,181 
 
Arizona 435,411,499 60,000,000 28,138,424 6,966,888 
 
Arkansas 317,049,781 20,000,000 0 6,287,294 
 
California 10,835,807,121 800,000,000 453,000,000 186,272,506 
 
Colorado 435,207,616 60,000,000 15,911,731 6,573,027 
 
Connecticut 797,015,992 40,000,000 19,715,746 14,709,444 
 
Delaware 76,168,758 10,000,000 4,957,390 1,240,740 
 
Florida 1,808,627,401 200,000,000 28,400,000 33,615,605 
 
Georgia 760,781,100 35,000,000 27,400,000 13,889,179 
 
Hawaii 7,827,653 30,000,000 12,363,546 8,642 
 
Idaho 0 0 0 0 
 
Illinois 2,583,728,665 280,000,000 91,836,503 41,322,606 
 
Indiana 2,069,251,554 75,000,000 40,019,612 37,658,863 
 
Kansas 141,714,190 35,000,000 11,146,181 1,400,342 
 
Kentucky 958,379,155 48,000,000 10,000,000 18,109,587 
 
Maryland 0 0 0 0 
 
Massachusetts 231,786,560 300,000,000 106,189,115 450,559 
 
Michigan 201,209,803 150,000,000 66,156,902 32,975,124 
 
Minnesota 325,365,966 300,000,000 53,135,468 3,895,529 
 
Missouri 796,023,422 40,000,000 17,891,556 14,249,832 
 
Nevada 839,773,531 55,000,000 23,543,476 14,606,952 22,552,947 
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 
 
New Jersey 1,828,464,594 260,000,000 141,159,489 28,180,939 
 
New York 4,048,576,467 200,000,000 127,733,156 65,452,412 
 
North Carolina 2,860,726,640 175,000,000 75,385,842 50,687,997 
 
Ohio 2,282,770,339 100,000,000 52,313,000 42,489,604 
 
Pennsylvania 3,856,609,653 250,000,000 142,591,744 63,230,175 
 
Rhode Island 286,227,510 30,000,000 17,384,749 4,475,757 
 
South Carolina 782,283,237 0 0 15,211,639 
 
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 
 
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 
 
Texas 0 0 0 0 
 
Vermont 77,731,861 10,000,000 0 1,482,028 
 
Virginia 350,454,000 28,500,000 16,971,952 5,343,090 
 
Virgin Islands 33,559,394 1,500,000 0 579,975 
 
Wisconsin 1,412,709,630 200,000,000 63,127,762 23,823,831 
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C. UI State Trust Fund Loans: Date of First Loan 
Updated April 18, 2012 
 
State   Began Borrowing 
Alabama  November 2011 
Arizona  March 2010 
Arkansas  March 2009 
California  January 2009 
Colorado  January 2010 
Connecticut  October 2009 
Delaware  March 2010 
Florida   August 2009 
Georgia  December 2009 
Hawaii   April 2012 
Illinois   July 2009 
Indiana  December 2008 
Kansas   March 2010 
Kentucky  January 2009 
Massachusetts  March 2012 
Michigan  September 2006 
Minnesota  July 2009 
Missouri  February 2009 
Nevada  October 2009 
New Jersey  March 2009 
New York  January 2009 
North Carolina February 2009 
Ohio   January 2009 
Pennsylvania  March 2009 
Rhode Island  March 2009 
South Carolina December 2008 
Vermont  March 2010 
Virgin Islands  August 2009 
Virginia  October 2009 
Wisconsin  February 2009 
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D. Important Dates for Title XII Advances and Repayments 
 
Interest Due and Payable (see 20 CFR 606.30) 
For funds borrowed from the Federal Unemployment Account to pay 




 Cash Flow loans 
 May/September Delay 
 High Unemployment Deferral 
 High Unemployment Delay 
 
Cash Flow Loans (see 20 CFR 606.32(b)) 
Applies to funds borrowed from January 1
st
 through September 30
th
 to pay 
Unemployment Insurance benefits.  No interest will be assessed if the state: 
1. The administrator of the State agency must notify the Secretary of 
Labor no later than September 10
th
 which loans will be deemed Cash 
Flow Loans 
2. Repays all outstanding loan amounts by September 30
th
 and  
3. Does not borrow between October 1
st
 and December 31
st
 of the same 
year. 
 
May/September Delay (see 20 CFR 606.40) 
Payment of interest accrued on loans taken in May through September may be 
delayed until December 31
st
 of the following calendar year.   
 
Governor of the state must notify the Secretary of Labor by September 1
st
 that the 
state will utilize this delay. 
 
High Unemployment Deferral (see 20 CFR 606.41) 
A state may defer interest payments if it’s IUR equals or exceeds 7.5 percent  for 
the first six months of the previous calendar year. The state must pay one-fourth 
of the interest due on September 30
th
 and one-third of the remaining interest 
balance on September 30
th
 in each of the 3 years following the 1st payment.  
 
The governor must request deferral no later than July 1
st
 of the year for which 
deferral is requested. 
  
High Unemployment Delay (see 20 CFR 606.42) 
A state may request delay of interest payment for nine months after September 
30
th
 if the TUR averaged 13.5 percent  or higher for the most recent 12 months. 
The state must pay interest in full by July 1
st
 of following year. No interest 
accrues on delayed interest.  
 
The state must apply no later than July 1
st 
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Avoidance of Credit Delay (see 20 CFR 606.24) 
To avoid a Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) credit reduction for a taxable 
year, a State must submit an application to the Secretary of Labor prior to July 1
st
 
of the year for which avoidance is sought. To obtain avoidance the state must: pay 
the amount that the credit reduction would produce prior to November 10
th
 of the 
year for which avoidance is to apply; repay all FUA loans received during the 
one-year period ending November 9
th
 prior to November 10
th
; increase solvency 
for the taxable year through legislative action by an amount equal to or greater 





Cap on Credit Reduction (see 20 CFR 606.22) 
To qualify for a cap on credit reductions, beginning with the second taxable year a 
credit reduction is applicable, a state must: submit an application to the Secretary 
of Labor prior to July 1
st
 of the year for which a cap is sought; take no action 
(legislative, judicial, or administrative) during the 12-month period ending 
September 30
th
 of the year for which a cap is requested that would reduce taxes or 
solvency for the period ending September 30
th
; have an average tax rate on total 
wages for the taxable year that equals or exceeds the average benefit cost ratio for 
the five years ending with the preceding calendar year; and have a loan balance on 
September 30
th
 of the taxable year that is less than or equal to the loan balance on 
September 30
th
 of the third preceding year. 
 
Fifth Year Waiver (see 20 CFR 606.25) 
The additional tax credit reduction under FUTA, section 3302(c) (2)(C), beginning in the 
fifth consecutive year of a balance of outstanding advances shall be waived and the 
additional tax credit reduction under FUTA, section 3302(c)(2)(B), shall be 
substituted, if a state submits an application to the Secretary of Labor prior to July 1
st
 
of the year for which the waiver is requested; and the state takes no action 
(legislative, judicial, or administrative) during the 12-month period ending September 
30
th
 of the year for which the waiver is requested that would reduce solvency for the 
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E.      Significant State Metrics: 
As of April 4, 2012   
States That Did Not Receive Title XII Advances in Yellow 








TUR TUR TUR TUR New Min Max Taxable Per/Employee 








2012 2010 2009 2007 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 
AL 97,813,234 766,230 -   0.52 0.72 7.6 11.0 10.9 4.0 2.70% 0.59% 6.74%          8,000   $         539  
AK     0.89 2.39 1.07 3.36 7.1 8.6 8.9 6.5 3.40% 1.00% 5.40%        34,600   $      1,868  
AZ 428,910,130 6,482,248 0.18 0.01 1.10 1.10 8.7 9.6 9.3 4.7 2.00% 0.02% 5.86%          7,000   $         410  
AR 323,340,207 5,926,134 -   0.32 0.49 7.6 7.8 7.6 5.9 3.80% 1.00% 6.90%        12,000   $         828  
CA 10,821,293,733 174,160,762 -   0.27 0.40 10.9 12.6 12.5 6.1 3.40% 1.50% 6.20%          7,000   $         434  
CO 428,634,421 6,085,980 0.07 0.01 0.67 0.74 7.8 7.9 6.9 4.5 1.70% 1.00% 5.40%        10,000   $         540  
CT 786,840,063 13,824,271 -   0.54 0.76 7.8 9.2 8.8 5.0 3.70% 1.90% 6.80%        15,000   $      1,020  
DE 72,460,868 1,157,595 0.20 0.01 0.91 1.10 7.0 9.2 8.7 3.8 2.60% 0.10% 8.00%        10,500   $         840  
DC     0.91 1.09 1.11 1.47 9.9 11.6 11.9 6.1 2.70% 1.60% 7.00%          9,000   $         630  
FL 1,832,805,994 31,561,540 -   1.04 0.85 9.4 12.3 11.2 4.7 2.70% 1.03% 5.40%          7,000   $         378  
GA 761,600,000 13,030,007 -   0.96 0.90 9.1 10.6 10.2 4.8 2.62% 0.03% 5.40%          8,500   $         459  
HI 5,651,288 1,187 0.42 0.32 1.88 3.17 6.4 6.9 7.2 3.2 4.00% 1.20% 5.40%        34,200   $      1,847  
ID 0 0 -   0.46 1.10 8.0 9.4 9.0 3.0 3.36% 0.96% 6.80%        33,300   $      2,264  
IL 2,573,448,778 38,412,941 -   0.34 0.79 9.1 11.5 11.0 5.5 3.80% 0.70% 8.40%        12,740   $      1,070  
IN 2,090,662,499 35,313,834 -   0.29 0.35 8.4 9.9 9.8 4.5 2.50% 0.70% 9.50%          9,500   $         903  
IA     0.43 0.55 0.89 1.81 5.3 6.8 6.7 4.0 1.90% 0.00% 9.00%        24,700   $      2,223  
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KY 957,950,391 17,028,256 -   0.21 0.45 8.7 10.7 11.2 5.7 2.70% 1.00% 10.00%          8,000   $         800  
LA     0.71 1.77 0.93 2.54 7.0 6.9 7.4 4.2 In Avg 0.11% 6.20%          7,700   $         477  
ME     1.20 1.94 1.64 3.19 7.1 8.2 8.2 5.1 3.02% 0.86% 7.95%        12,000   $         954  
MD 0 0 0.11 0.01 0.78 1.14 6.5 7.7 7.3 3.8 2. 0% 2.20% 13.50%          8,500   $      1,148  
MA 186,380,678 225,225 0.09 0.01 0.50 0.90 6.9 9.3 8.9 4.5 2.83% 1.26% 12.27%        14,000   $      1,718  
MI 236,930,246 32,717,023 -   -   8.8 14.1 15.1 7.6 2.70% 0.06% 10.30%          9,000   $         927  
MN 316,573,268 3,536,148 -   0.38 0.59 5.7 7.4 7.6 4.9 2.91% 0.50% 9.40%        27,000   $      2,538  
MS     1.11 1.57 1.70 2.60 9.5 11.5 9.8 6.8 2.70% 0.85% 5.40%        14,000   $         756  
M
O 
798,478,356 13,351,254 -   0.12 0.14 7.4 9.5 9.7 5.5 3.51% 0.00% 9.75%        13,000   $      1,268  
MT     0.82 1.05 1.45 2.47 6.2 7.1 6.4 3.6 In Avg 0.82% 6.12%        26,300   $      1,610  
NE     0.71 0.48 1.21 1.16 4.0 5.0 4.9 3.2 2.50% 0.00% 8.66%          9,000   $         779  
NV 831,772,046 13,666,938 -   1.02 1.73 12.3 13.4 13.0 5.8 2.95% 0.25% 5.40%        26,600   $      1,436  
NH 0 0 0.08 0.02 1.16 1.08 5.2 7.0 6.8 3.6 3.70% 0.01% 7.00%        12,000   $         840  
NJ 1,772,388,380 26,159,582 -   0.21 0.38 9.0 9.8 9.7 4.2 2.80% 0.50% 5.80%        29,600   $      1,717  
NM     0.87 0.98 1.85 2.59 7.2 8.8 7.9 3.7 2.00% 0.05% 5.40%        21,900   $      1,183  
NY 3,999,088,897 60,921,261 -   0.09 0.11 8.5 8.6 9.0 4.7 4.10% 1.50% 9.90%          8,500   $         842  
NC 2,842,030,261 47,481,189 -   0.23 0.31 9.9 11.3 11.0 4.9 1.20% 0.24% 6.84%        19,700   $      1,347  
ND     0.52 0.81 0.80 1.68 3.1 4.0 4.2 3.3 1.37% 0.20% 10.00%        25,500   $      2,550  
OH 2,280,194,111 39,920,385 -   0.12 0.27 7.6 11.0 10.5 6.0 2.70% 0.70% 9.60%          9,000   $         864  
OK     0.82 0.88 1.54 1.94 6.0 6.6 7.1 4.1 1.00% 0.30% 7.50%        18,600   $      1,395  
OR     0.75 1.74 1.46 3.67 8.8 10.9 11.0 5.2 3.30% 2.20% 5.40%        32,300   $      1,744  
PA 3,786,166,952 58,939,726 -   0.30 0.83 7.6 12.6 8.8 4.7 3.70% 2.68% 10.82%          8,000   $         866  
PR     0.77 2.20 1.00 3.22 15.0 15.9 15.7 11.0 3.30% 2.40% 5.40%          7,000   $         378  
RI 280,625,950 4,157,153 -   0.37 1.08 11.0 12.6 12.9 4.5 2.46% 1.69% 9.79%        19,000   $      1,860  
SC 782,352,168 14,330,947 -   0.26 0.38 9.1 12.2 12.1 6.6 2.24% 0.10% 11.28%        10,000   $      1,128  
SD 0 0 -   0.33 0.27 4.3 4.8 5.0 3.0 1.20% 0.00% 9.50%        11,000   $      1,045  








TX 0 0 -   0.44 0.46 7.1 8.2 8.3 4.5 2.70% 0.78% 8.25%          9,000   $         743  
UT     0.87 1.18 1.44 2.32 5.7 7.2 6.5 3.2 In Avg 0.40% 9.40%        28,600   $      2,688  
VT 77,731,861 1,394,522 0.14 0.02 1.21 2.28 4.9 6.5 6.5 4.0 1.00% 1.30% 8.40%        13,000   $      1,092  
VI 33,693,187 542,106 -   0.78 1.96 - - - - 3.00% 0.10% 9.00%        22,600   $      2,034  
VA 358,861,000 4,942,231 -   0.70 0.58 5.7 7.4 6.6 3.5 3.17% 0.77% 6.87%          8,000   $         550  
WA     1.00 2.13 1.54 3.76 8.2 9.5 9.3 4.6 In Avg 0.49% 6.00%        37,300   $      2,238  
WV     0.22 0.34 0.45 1.40 7.2 8.5 8.4 4.1 2.70% 1.50% 7.50%        12,000   $         900  
WI 1,400,275,867 22,243,140 -   0.29 0.72 6.9 8.8 8.4 4.8 3.60% 0.27% 9.80%        13,000   $      1,274  
WY     0.71 1.45 1.13 2.89 5.4 7.3 7.4 3.1 In Avg 0.67% 10.00%        22,300   $      2,230  
US 41,302,283,293 689,522,741 - 0.19 0.52 0.80 8.2 9.7 10.2 5.0 In Avg -    
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I.   Comparisons of State UI Benefit Laws 
 




State Legislation Affecting UI Program Features that Impact Solvency, 2009-2011 
 
A. Introduction of a Flexible Taxable Wage Base or an Increased Taxable Wage Base 
B. Modification of New Employer Tax Rate 
C. Implementation/Authorization of a Special Assessment/Surtax/Solvency Tax/UTF 
Adjustment Factor 
D. Modification of Employer Tax Schedule 
E. Modification of Formulas for Tax Schedule Triggers 
F. Increase of Employer Tax Rates 
G. Elimination of Zero-Rated Options for Employers 
H. Modification of Experience Rating Formula 
I. Modification of Benefit Charging Methodology 
J. Modification of Experience Rating Formula: Moving from a Reserve Ratio 
Experience Rating Formula to a Benefit Ratio Experience Rating Formula or a 
Payroll Decline Experience Rating Formula 
K. Modification of Minimum/Maximum Weekly Benefit Amounts and/or Modification 
of Requirements for Base Period Wages (Monetary Eligibility) 
L. Modifying Wage Replacement Ratio 
M. Modification of Minimum/Maximum Weekly Benefit Amounts 
N. Introduction or Extension of a Wait-Period (a Waiting Week) 
O. Targeting resources for Reemployment Services to Claimants or Implementing a 
Work-Share Program 
P. Introduction of Enhanced Integrity Efforts or Overpayment Recovery Efforts 
Q. Reducing the Eligible Duration of Unemployment Compensation for Claimants 
R. Introduction of Alternate Base Period 
S. Introduction or Modification of a Special Set-Aside Obligation Fund (for Training, 
Benefit Payments, Bond Debt Service, Repayment of Title XII Loans, or Repayment 
of Interest on Title XII Loans) 
T. Authorization/Reauthorization of Bond Issuance or Means of Alternative Financing 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor’s reports on State Legislation, 2009 to 2011 
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A. Introduction of a Flexible Taxable Wage Base or an Increased Taxable Wage Base 
 
ARKANSAS SB 429 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 3, 2009 (Act No. 802) 
Increases the taxable wage base from $10,000 to $12,000 for any calendar year beginning after 
December 31, 2009.  
 
VERMONT HB 442 ENACTED AND EFFECTIVE June 9, 2009 
Increases the taxable wage base from $8,000 to $10,000 from January 1, 2010, through 
December 31, 2010. 
 
FLORIDA         SB 810 ENACTED June 1, 2009 EFFECTIVE June 1, 2009, or as noted 
Increases the taxable wage base from $7,000 to $8,500 effective January 1, 2010.  Decreases the 
taxable wage base from $8,500 to $7,000 effective January 1, 2015.  
 
NEBRASKA L 631 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 26, 2009 
Increases the taxable wage base to $9,500 during a calendar year beginning after December 31, 
2009 (previously $7,000).  
 
WEST VIRGINIA   SB 246 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 11, 2009 
Defines the term “threshold wage” (also referred to as the taxable wage base) to mean the wage 
amount the employer pays unemployment taxes on for each person in his or her employ during a 
calendar year.  Effective May 11, 2009, increases the threshold wage from $8,000 to $12,000; 
provided that when the moneys in the unemployment fund reach $220 million on February 15 of 
any year, the taxable wage base, thereafter, will be reduced to $9,000; provided however, that 
each year thereafter the taxable wage base will increase or decrease by the same percentage that 
the state’s average wage increases or decreases.  
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE SB 129  ENACTED August 7, 2009 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010  
Raises the taxable wage base as follows:  $10,000, effective January 1, 2010 (previously $8,000);  
$12,000, effective January 1, 2011; and $14,000, effective January 1, 2012. 
 
TENNESSEE HB 2324 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE June 25, 2009 
Establishes a flexible taxable wage base based on the balance in the state’s unemployment trust 
fund on June 30 and December 31 of each year as follows: When the balance is greater than 
$1,000,000,000, the wage base shall be $7,000; When the balance is greater than $900,000,000 
but less than or equal to $1,000,000,000 the wage base shall be $8,000; and when the balance is 
less than or equal to $900,000,000 the wage base shall be $9,000.  
 
FLORIDA  HB 7033 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 2, 2010 (Retroactive to June 29, 
2009) 
Maintains the taxable wage base at $7,000 for calendar years 2010 and 2011 (supersedes 
previous legislation increasing it to $8,500). Increases the taxable wage base to $8,500 for 
calendar years 2012, 2013, and 2014.  Decreases the taxable wage base from $8,500 to $7,000 
for calendar year 2015 and each year thereafter.  Increases the taxable wage base to $8,500 in 
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any calendar year in which repayment of the principal amount of a Title XII advance is due to 
the Federal government. 
 
SOUTH DAKOTA  SB 186  ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 10, 2010  
Increases the taxable wage base from $9,500 to $10,000 for calendar year 2010; $11,000 for 
calendar year 2011; $12,000 for calendar year 2012; $13,000 for calendar year 2013; $14,000 for 
calendar year 2014; and $15,000 on or after January 1, 2015.  
INDIANA           SB 23 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 25, 2010 
Reduces the taxable wage base for calendar year 2010 to $7,000 (previously $9,500).  Beginning 
with calendar year 2011, increases the taxable wage base to $9,500.  
 
KENTUCKY HB 5a ENACTED June 4, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 15, 2010, or as noted 
Increases, effective for calendar year 2012, the taxable wage base from $8,000 to $9,000 which  
shall increase by an additional $300 on January 1 of each subsequent year to 2022, not to exceed 
$12,000. 
 
MISSISSIPPI HB 1718 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 8, 2010 
Increases the taxable wage base from $7,000 to $14,000, beginning January 1, 2011, and 
thereafter. 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA SB 391 ENACTED June 3, 2010  EFFECTIVE January 1, 2011, or as 
noted 
Changes the taxable wage base from $7,000 to $10,000 for calendar year 2011 and for calendar 
years 2012-2014, the wage base will be $12,000.  Beginning with calendar year 2015, the wage 
base will be $14,000. 
 
VERMONT  SB 290 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 24, 2010, or as noted  
Increases the taxable wage base from $10,000 to $13,000 for calendar year 2011 and to $16,000 
for calendar year 2012.  After January 1, 2012, whenever the unemployment compensation fund 
has a positive balance and all Title XII advances to the state unemployment compensation fund 
have been repaid as of June 1, the taxable wage base shall be adjusted on January 1 of the 
following year by the same percentage as any increase in the state annual average wage.  When 
contribution rate schedule I or III is in effect, the taxable wage base shall be reduced by $2,000 
the following January 1 and shall be adjusted annually thereafter on January 1 of the following 
year by the same percentage as any increase in the state annual average wage.   (Effective July 1, 
2010.)  
 
HAWAII     HB 2169 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 11, 2010 
Changes the calculation of the taxable wage base for calendar years 2010 and 2011 only.  
“Wages” do not include remuneration in excess of the wages paid with respect to employment to 
an individual by an employer during the calendar year that exceeds 90 percent (previously 100 
percent) of the average annual wage (retroactive to January 1, 2010), thereby, increasing the 





B. Modification of New Employer Tax Rate 
 
NORTH DAKOTA   SB 2101 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 22, 2009 
Adds that calculations of unemployment compensation contribution rates for the following 
employers must be rounded to the nearest one-hundredth of one percent: new employers 
assigned a rate that is 90 percent of the positive employer maximum rate or a rate of 1 percent, 
whichever is greater, unless classified in construction services; and employers assigned rates 
according to the positive employer rate group schedule or the negative employer rate group 
schedule. 
 
NEBRASKA L 631 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 26, 2009 
Establishes new employer rate of 2.5 percent for each CY after December 31, 2009.  For state or 
political subdivisions of the state, employer contribution rate is raised to 1.6 percent (from 1 
percent) after December 31, 2009.  
 
MISSISSIPPI SB 2027 ENACTED January 12, 2010 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010 
Provides that during years that the Workforce Enhancement Training contribution is in effect, 
instead of paying a 2.7 percent tax rate, each newly subject employer shall be assigned a tax rate 
of 2.4 percent to which will be added the 0.3 percent Workforce Enhancement Training 
contribution. Requires the deposit of Workforce Enhancement Training contributions into the 
Mississippi Department of Employment Security clearing account, and requires the transfer of 
such contributions within 2 business days to the Workforce Enhancement Training Fund holding 
account.  Any Workforce Enhancement Training contribution transactions not honored by a 
financial institution will be transferred back to the clearing account out of funds in the 
Workforce Enhancement Training contribution holding account.  
 
INDIANA           SB 23 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 25, 2010 
Increases the new employer rate to 2.7% (previously 2.5%) for calendar year 2010.  Beginning  
with calendar year 2011, the new employer rate decreases to 2.5%.   (Effective January 1, 2010.)  
Requires employers, during calendar year 2010, to pay a rate of not less than 5.6 percent if:   (1) 
the required contribution and wage reports are not filed within 31 days following the  
computation date and (2) all contributions, penalties and interest due have not been paid within 
the specified time frame.  Beginning with calendar year 2011, an employer’s rate shall be 
increased by 2 percent if the required contribution and wage reports are not filed within 31 days 
following the computation date and all contributions, penalties and interest due have not been 
paid within the specified time frame.   (Effective January 2, 2010.) 
 
MINNESOTA SB 2510 ENACTED May 15, 2010  EFFECTIVE May 16, 2010, or as 
noted 
Changes the computation of the tax rate for new taxpaying employers in a high experience rating 
industry who do not qualify for an experience rating from 8.0 percent plus the applicable base 
tax rate and any additional assessments to the higher of that provided for new taxpaying 
employers not in a high experience rating industry or the tax rate computed to the nearest one 




C. Implementation/Authorization of a Special Assessment/Surtax/Solvency Tax/UTF 
Adjustment Factor 
 
COLORADO SB 76 ENACTED June 2, 2009 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2009 
Deletes the paragraph which:  annually establishes a surcharge based on benefits paid and not  
chargeable to any employer’s account; calculates the surcharge tax rate by dividing the benefits 
not changed by the total taxable payroll; allocates 50 percent to the unemployment compensation 
fund (UCF) and 50 percent to the employment support fund; and adds the surcharge tax rate to  
employer’s standard or computed tax rate with 80 percent of the surcharge tax revenues  
considered as revenues for calculating the tax surcharge and which will be the employer’s tax  
rate for the ensuing calendar year.  Provides that the surcharge tax established must be 
segregated and deposited in the employment support fund.   (Formerly only 50 percent was 
deposited in such fund.)  Provides that, effective calendar year 2009, allocates 30 percent 
(previously 50 percent) of the annual surcharge tax rate to the UCF (previously general fund), 50 
percent to the employment support fund, and 20 percent to the employment and training 
technology fund.  Provides that, effective January 1, 2017, allocates 50 percent of the surcharge 
tax rate to the UCF and 50 percent to the employment support fund.   Provides, notwithstanding 
any provision to the contrary, beginning July 1, 2009, through  December 31, 2016, 20 percent of 
the surcharge tax must be credited to the employment and  training technology fund, which is 
hereby created in the State treasury.  Moneys in such fund  must:  be used for employment and 
training automation initiatives, be subject to annual  appropriation, must not revert to the general 
fund or any other fund at the end of any fiscal year,  and be exempt from limitations on 
uncommitted reserves.  If the balance of the UCF falls below  $25 million, the moneys in the 
employment and training technology fund must be allocated to  the UCF.  At any other time, the 
moneys in the employment and training technology fund may  be allocated to the UCF at the 
discretion of the Executive Director of the Department of Labor  and Employment. 
 
FLORIDA         SB 810 ENACTED June 1, 2009 EFFECTIVE June 1, 2009, or as noted 
Provides that, effective January 1, 2010, if the balance of the Unemployment Compensation  
Trust Fund on June 30 of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year for which 
the contribution rate is being computed is less than 4 (previously 3.7) percent of the taxable 
payrolls for the year ending June 30, a positive adjustment factor must be computed by dividing  
the sum of the total taxable payrolls for the year ending June 30 of the current calendar year into  
a sum equal to one-third (previously one-fourth) of the difference between the balance of the  
fund as of June 30 of that calendar year and the sum of 5 (previously 4.7) percent of the total  
taxable payrolls for that year.  The positive adjustment factor remains in effect for subsequent  
years until the balance of the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund as of June 30 of the year 
immediately preceding the effective date of the contribution rate equals or exceeds 5 (previously  
3.7) percent of the taxable payrolls for the year ending June 30.  Beginning January 1, 2015, and 
for each year thereafter, the positive adjustment authorized must be computed by dividing the 
sum of the total taxable payrolls for the year ending June 30 of the current calendar year into a 
sum equal to one-fourth of the difference between the balance of the fund as of June 30 of that 
calendar year and the sum of 5 percent of the total taxable payrolls for that year.  The positive 
adjustment factor remains in effect for subsequent years until the balance of the Unemployment  
Compensation Trust Fund as of June 30 of the year immediately preceding the effective date of 
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the contribution rate equals or exceeds 4 percent of the taxable payrolls for the year ending June 
30 of the current calendar year. Provides that if, beginning January 1, 2015, and each year 
thereafter, the balance of the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund as of June 30 of the year 
immediately preceding the calendar year for which the contribution rate is being computed 
exceeds 5 (previously 4.7)  percent of the taxable payrolls for the year ending June 30 of the 
current calendar year, a  negative adjustment factor must be computed.  The negative adjustment 
factor must be computed annually beginning on January 1, 2015, and each year thereafter, by 
dividing the sum of the total taxable payrolls for the year ending June 30 of the current calendar 
year into a sum equal to one- fourth of the difference between the balance of the fund as of June 
30 of the current calendar year and 5 (previously 4.7) percent of the total taxable payrolls of that 
year.  The negative adjustment factor remains in effect for subsequent years until the balance of 
the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund as of June 30 of the year immediately preceding 
the effective date of the contribution rate is less than 5 (previously 4.7) percent, but more than 4 
(previously 3.7)  percent of the taxable payrolls for the year ending June 30 of the current 
calendar year.  This authorized negative adjustment is suspended in any calendar year in which 
repayment of the principal amount of an advance received from the Federal Unemployment 
Compensation Trust Fund is due to the Federal government.  
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE SB 129  ENACTED August 7, 2009 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010 unless 
otherwise specified 
Provides for a 0.5 percent emergency surcharge when the trust fund fails to equal or exceed $150 
million. Establishes a deduction in any calendar quarter from every employer’s contribution rate, 
based on the trust fund balance, throughout the next preceding calendar quarter, to be: 0.5 
percent when the fund equals or exceeds $250 million; 1.0 percent when the fund equals or 
exceeds $275 million; and 1.5 percent when the fund equals or exceeds $300 million.  
FLORIDA         HB 7033 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 2, 2010 (Retroactive to June 
29, 2009) 
Assesses an additional rate on contributing employers to pay for interest due on Title XII 
advances.  The additional rate shall be assessed no later than February 1 in each calendar year in 
which an interest payment is due.  The amount of such interest shall be estimated no later than 
December 1 of the calendar year preceding the calendar year in which an interest payment is due.  
The basis for the estimate include at a minimum: The amounts actually advanced to the trust 
fund; amounts expected to be advanced to the trust fund based on current and projected 
unemployment patterns and employer contributions; the interest payment due date; and, the 
interest rate that will be applied by the Federal Government to any accrued outstanding balances. 
 
RHODE ISLAND HB 7397 ENACTED June 12, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2010 
Removes the provision requiring a surtax of 0.3 percent of taxable wages be levied  during years 
when the amount in the employment security fund available for benefits, net of obligations owed 
to the Federal government, is less than zero at the end of the second month of any calendar 
quarter.  Increases the Job Development Assessment from 0.21 percent to 0.51 percent beginning 
with the 2011 tax year. Provides that beginning on January 1, 2011, 0.02 percent of the Job 
Development Assessment shall be used to support necessary core services in the unemployment 
insurance and employment services programs, and further provides that 0.3 percent of the Job 
Development Assessment shall be deposited in a restricted receipt account to be used solely to 
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pay the principal and/or interest due on Title XII advances; however, if the Title XII advances 
are repaid through a state revenue bond or other financial mechanism, the funds in the account 
may be used to pay the principal and/or interest that accrues on the  debt. 
 
MISSISSIPPI SB 2027 ENACTED January 12, 2010 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010 
Provides that during years that the Workforce Enhancement Training contribution is in effect, 
instead of paying a 2.7 percent tax rate, each newly subject employer shall be assigned a tax rate 
of 2.4 percent to which will be added the 0.3 percent Workforce Enhancement Training 
contribution. Requires the deposit of Workforce Enhancement Training contributions into the 
Mississippi Department of Employment Security clearing account, and requires the transfer of 
such contributions within 2 business days to the Workforce Enhancement Training Fund holding 
account.  Any Workforce Enhancement Training contribution transactions not honored by a 
financial institution will be transferred back to the clearing account out of funds in the 
Workforce Enhancement Training contribution holding account.  
 
MISSISSIPPI HB 1718 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 8, 2010 
Provides that the Workforce Enhancement Training Contribution shall be assessed at a rate of 
0.3 percent through December 31, 2010.  In calendar year 2011, and each year thereafter, the 
Workforce Enhancement Training Contribution shall be assessed at a rate of 0.15 percent. 
Training contributions shall be reduced as necessary to prevent any employer from having a 
combined rate greater than 5.4 percent.  Suspends for rate years 
beginningJanuary1,2010,theWorkforce Enhancement Training Contributions if the insured 
unemployment rate (IUR) exceeds an average of 5.5 percent for 3 consecutive months 
immediately preceding the effective date of the new rate year and shall remain suspended 
throughout the duration of that rate year. The suspension continues until the 3 consecutive 
months immediately preceding the effective date of any subsequent rate year has an IUR of less 
than an average of 4.5 percent. Provides that beginning January 1, 2010, the target “size of fund 
index” (SOFI) will be fixed at 1.0.  If the IUR exceeds a 4.5 percent average for the most recent 
completed July to June period, the target SOFI will be 0.8 and remains at 0.8 until the computed 
SOFI equals 1.0 or the average IUR falls to 4.5 percent or less for any July to June period.  If the 
IUR falls below 2.5 percent for any July to June period, the target SOFI shall be 1.2 until the 
computed SOFI is equal to or greater than 1.0, or the IUR is equal to or greater than 2.5 percent 
at which point the target SOFI returns to 1.0. 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA SB 391 ENACTED June 3, 2010  EFFECTIVE January 1, 2011, or as 
noted 
Requires a surcharge on all employers when the Trust Fund is insolvent to pay interest on the 
outstanding debt calculated by dividing the estimated interest by the taxable payroll rounded to 
the next higher one hundredth of one percent.  
HAWAII     HB 2169 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 11, 2010 
Provides that whenever the State requests a Title XII advance to pay expected benefit claims 
during a specified period of time, the Director, Hawaii Department of Labor and Industrial 
Relations, may assess all employers the amounts that are sufficient to pay the principal and 
interest costs on the advance, provided that the Director develops a mechanism of distributing 




HAWAII     HB 1077 ENACTED February 23, 2011 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2011 
Adds that monies in the employment and training fund may be used also for funding the payment 
of interest due on Title XII advances.  Amends the law to provide that every employer, except 
reimbursable employers, shall be subject to an employment and training fund assessment at a 
rate of 0.01 percent of taxable wages. (Previously employers assigned a minimum rate of 0.0 
percent or the maximum rate of 5.4 percent were not required to pay this assessment).  Adds that 
if interest is due on a Title XII advance, the employment and training fund assessment shall be 
increased to pay the interest due.  The director shall have the discretion to determine the amount 
of the increase in the employment and training assessment rate for the calendar year 2011.  The 
increase in the employment and training assessment rate shall be in increments of .01 percent.  
Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary, if interest payments on a Title XII advance are 
subsequently waived by federal law, the aggregate amount of interest payments collected shall 
constitute the total employment and training assessments payable by employers for the calendar 
year 2012 only, and no employment and training assessment shall be collected from any 
employer in that year and no refund shall be paid retroactively to any employer based on the 
federal waiver of interest payments. 
 
ARKANSAS HB 1909 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 24, 2011 
Extends the period from July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2011, to July 1, 2007, through June 30, 
2015, for the proceeds of the stabilization tax in the amount of 0.025% of taxable wages  
collected to be deposited and credited to the Department of Workforce Services Training Trust 
Fund, there to be used for worker training.  Extends, however, the period from July 1, 2007, 
through June 30, 2011, to July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2015, for the proceeds of the 
stabilization tax in the amount of 0.025% of taxable wages collected to be deposited and credited 
to the Department of Workforce Services Unemployment Insurance Administration Fund, there 
to be used for operating expenses of the unemployment insurance program necessary for the 
proper administration of the Department of Workforce Services Law as determined by the 
Director of the Department of Workforce Services. 
 
ARIZONA   HB 2619 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 25, 2011 
Requires each employer to pay a special assessment in 2011 and 2012 at a rate determined by the 
Director, Arizona Department of Economic Security (Department).  Provides that for calendar 
year 2011 the determined rate shall not exceed 0.4 percent of the taxable wages paid for the tax 
year and, for calendar year 2012, shall not exceed 0.6 percent of the taxable wages paid for the 
tax year.  Waives the assessment for the quarter if the amount of an employer’s assessment in 
any one quarter is less than $10. Provides that the special assessment will be reported and 
collected in accordance with the unemployment insurance law and payable on or before the date 
the quarterly contribution and wage reports are due, except that the assessment for taxable wages 
paid for the first 3 calendar quarters of tax year 2011 is payable with the employer’s quarterly 
state unemployment insurance contributions on or before October 31, 2011.  The assessment for 
all other calendar quarters in tax years 2011 and 2012 is payable with the employer’s quarterly 





INDIANA           HB 1450 ENACTED February 24, 2011 EFFECTIVE February 24, 2011, 
Provides that for a calendar year beginning January 1, 2011, an experience rated employer who 
paid wages during the calendar year, and whose contribution rate for the calendar year was 
determined, and has had a payroll in each of the 3 preceding 12-month periods must pay an 
unemployment insurance surcharge equal to 13 percent of the employer’s contribution for 
calendar year 2011 if, during the calendar year, the state is required to pay interest on the Title 
XII advances made to the state from the federal unemployment account in the federal 
unemployment trust fund. Federal law; and (2) the state's outstanding loan balance to the federal 
unemployment account on January 1 of the year. Requires that the unemployment insurance 
surcharge be paid quarterly at the same time as employer contributions are paid, and failure to 
make such payments is a delinquency. Allows the Indiana Department of Workforce 
Development to use amounts from the surcharge to pay interest on the Title XII advances and 
requires the deposit of any amounts received and not used to pay interest on Title XII advances 
into the unemployment insurance benefit fund. Provides that amounts paid and used to pay 
interest on Title XII advances do not affect and may not be charged to the experience account of 
any employer.  Amounts paid and used for purposes other than to pay interest on Title XII 
advances must be credited to each employer's experience account in proportion to the amount the 
employer paid during the preceding 4 calendar quarters. Establishes the unemployment insurance 
solvency fund for the purpose of paying interest on Title XII advances, to be administered by the 
department. Requires that money received from the unemployment insurance surcharge that the 
Indiana Department of Workforce Development elects to use to pay interest on Title XII 
advances shall be deposited in the fund for the purposes of the fund. Requires the Treasurer of 
State to invest the money in the fund not currently needed to meet the obligations of the fund in 
the same manner as other public money may be invested.  Interest that accrues from these 
investments shall be deposited at least quarterly in the fund. Provides that money in the fund at 






















D. Modification of Employer Tax Schedule 
 
INDIANA HB 1379 ENACTED May 13, 2009 EFFECTIVE May 13, 2009, except as 
otherwise indicated 
Establishes a new fund ratio schedule and new rate schedules (which include additional  
schedules and different ranges of rates for accounts with credit or debit balances for calendar 
years after December 31, 2009.  Rates range from .75 percent to 10.2 percent for Schedule A 
(previously 1.2 to 5.7 percent) and 0 percent to 5.4 percent for Schedule I (new).    For calendar 
year 2010, Schedule B will be used to assign each employer’s contribution rate. 
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE SB 129  ENACTED August 7, 2009 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010 unless 
otherwise specified 
Adds a new rate schedule to determine employer contributions and increases the contribution 
rate for employers in Schedule I. 
 
TENNESSEE HB 2324 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE June 25, 2009 
Revises the Premium Rate Chart by removing table 6b and table 6a of the previously enacted 
chart becomes table 6.  However, under the new table 6, if the reserve ratio percent is 20 and 
over, then the premium amount is "0.01" instead of "0.00". Most favorable table - trust fund 
balance of $850,000,000 or more with minimum  rate of 0.01 percent and a maximum rate of 
10.0 percent.  Least favorable table - trust fund balance of less than $450,000,000 with a  
minimum rate of 0.50 percent and a maximum rate of 10.0 percent.  Imposes an additional 
premium of 0.6 percent on all rates in Tables 1, 2, and 3, until the unemployment trust fund 
balance equals or exceeds $650,000,000.  
 
MISSISSIPPI SB 2027 ENACTED January 12, 2010 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010 
Provides for the computation of the “cost rate criterion” which shall be adjusted only through 
annual computations and additions of future economic cycles.  Modifies the definition of “size of 
fund index” and, beginning January 1, 2010, the target fund size will be fixed at 1.0 percent. 
Provides that beginning on and after January 1, 2010, no employer’s unemployment contribution 
rate shall be less than 0.4 percent (previously 0.1 percent). 
 
SOUTH DAKOTA  SB 186  ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 10, 2010 
Increases, for calendar year 2010 and thereafter, the maximum contribution rate from 8.50 
percent to 9.50 percent.  The minimum contribution rate remains at 0.00 percent. The increased 
contribution rates apply to and are retroactive to taxable wages paid on and after January 1, 2010. 
Provides for incremental increases in employer’s rates if on the last day of any calendar quarter 
the amount in the unemployment compensation fund, including amounts receivable as federal 
reimbursements due the state for shareable benefit payments, is less than $11 million.  The rate 
increases range from 0.1 percent when the balance is greater than or equal to $10.5 million and 
less than $11 million to 1.5 percent when the balance is less than $5.5 million. Provides that 
when tax rates increase due to a reduction in the unemployment  compensation fund the 
maximum contribution rate payable by any employer, including  the adjustment percentage, is 12 
percent (previously, 10.5 percent.)  The increased  contribution rates shall not exceed 1.0 percent 
for taxable wages paid for calendar year  2010 and may not exceed 0.75 percent for taxable 
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wages for calendar year 2011.  Effective January 1, 2012, any rate increase based on the 
reduction of the unemployment compensation fund will remain in effect for 4 consecutive 
calendar quarters.  The rate for the second, third and fourth quarters may increase based on the 
fund balance on the last  day of the immediately prior quarter, but may not decrease from the 
prior quarter during the 4 consecutive quarters.  The contribution rates apply to and are 
retroactive to taxable wages paid on and after January 1, 2010. 
 
INDIANA           SB 23 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 25, 2010 
Provides for the calculation of 2010 employer contribution rates using one of four schedules (A, 
B, C, or D) with rates ranging from 1.1 percent to 5.6 percent under schedule A to 0.1 percent to 
5.4 percent under schedule D.  Establishes new fund ratio schedules and new rate schedules 
(which include additional schedules and different ranges of rates for accounts with credit or debit 
balances) for calendar years after December 31, 2010.  Rates for new schedules range from 0.75 
percent to 10.2 percent for schedule A and 0.0 percent to 5.4 percent for schedule I.  Requires 
schedule B will be used for calendar year 2011 to assign each employer’s contribution rate. 
 































E. Modification of Formulas for Tax Schedule Triggers 
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE SB 129  ENACTED August 7, 2009 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010  
The minimum contribution rate shall not be less than 0.10 percent. Establishes an inverse 
minimum rate to adjust certain employer’s contribution rates when the preceding calendar 
quarter trust fund balance falls below certain levels:  1.5 percent when the fund fails to equal or 
exceed $250 million; 1.0 percent when the fund fails to equal or exceed $275 million; and 0.5 
percent when the fund fails to equal or exceed $300 million. 
 
TENNESSEE HB 2324 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE June 25, 2009 
Revises the Premium Rate Chart by removing table 6b and table 6a of the previously enacted 
chart becomes table 6.  However, under the new table 6, if the reserve ratio percent is 20 and 
over, then the premium amount is "0.01" instead of "0.00". Most favorable table - trust fund 
balance of $850,000,000 or more with minimum  rate of 0.01 percent and a maximum rate of 
10.0 percent.  Least favorable table - trust fund balance of less than $450,000,000 with a  
minimum rate of 0.50 percent and a maximum rate of 10.0 percent.  Imposes an additional 
premium of 0.6 percent on all rates in Tables 1, 2, and 3, until the unemployment trust fund 
balance equals or exceeds $650,000,000.  
 
FLORIDA         SB 1736 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 17, 2010 
Establishes that September 30 (previously June 30) is the date the Unemployment  
Compensation Trust Fund balance is determined for purposes of computing a positive adjustment 
factor, beginning January 1, 2012. 
 
SOUTH DAKOTA  SB 186  ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 10, 2010 
Increases, for calendar year 2010 and thereafter, the maximum contribution rate from 8.50 
percent to 9.50 percent.  The minimum contribution rate remains at 0.00 percent. The increased 
contribution rates apply to and are retroactive to taxable wages paid on and after January 1, 2010. 
Provides for incremental increases in employer’s rates if on the last day of any calendar quarter 
the amount in the unemployment compensation fund, including amounts receivable as federal 
reimbursements due the state for shareable benefit payments, is less than $11 million.  The rate 
increases range from 0.1 percent when the balance is greater than or equal to $10.5 million and 
less than $11 million to 1.5 percent when the balance is less than $5.5 million. Provides that 
when tax rates increase due to a reduction in the unemployment  compensation fund the 
maximum contribution rate payable by any employer, including  the adjustment percentage, is 12 
percent (previously, 10.5 percent.)  The increased  contribution rates shall not exceed 1.0 percent 
for taxable wages paid for calendar year  2010 and may not exceed 0.75 percent for taxable 
wages for calendar year 2011.  Effective January 1, 2012, any rate increase based on the 
reduction of the unemployment compensation fund will remain in effect for 4 consecutive 
calendar quarters.  The rate for the second, third and fourth quarters may increase based on the 
fund balance on the last  day of the immediately prior quarter, but may not decrease from the 
prior quarter during the 4 consecutive quarters.  The contribution rates apply to and are 





INDIANA           SB 23 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 25, 2010 
Provides for the calculation of 2010 employer contribution rates using one of four schedules (A, 
B, C, or D) with rates ranging from 1.1 percent to 5.6 percent under schedule A to 0.1 percent to 
5.4 percent under schedule D.  Establishes new fund ratio schedules and new rate schedules 
(which include additional schedules and different ranges of rates for accounts with credit or debit 
balances) for calendar years after December 31, 2010.  Rates for new schedules range from 0.75 
percent to 10.2 percent for schedule A and 0.0 percent to 5.4 percent for schedule I.  Requires 
schedule B will be used for calendar year 2011 to assign each employer’s contribution rate. 
 
KENTUCKY HB 5a ENACTED June 4, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 15, 2010, or as noted 
Changes the trust fund trigger date (the date the funds balance is determined) from December 31 
to September 30. Changes the computation date (the end of the period used to determine the 
employer’s experience) from October 31 to July 31. Provides that the applicable rate schedule 
for the year is based on the trust fund balance as of September 30 (previously December 31).  
Changes the amount of money required in the trust fund to effectuate Schedules A, B, and C of 
Table A as follows.  If the trust fund balance: equals or exceeds $500,000,000 (previously 
$350,000,000) but is less than the amount required to trigger the Trust Fund Adequacy Rates, the 
rates in Schedule A shall be in effect; equals or exceeds $350,000,000 (previously $275,000,000) 
but is less than $500,000,000 (previously $350,000,000), the rates listed in Schedule B shall be 
in effect; and equals or exceeds $250,000,000 but is less than $350,000,000 (previously 
$275,000,000), the rates listed in Schedule C shall be in effect. 
MINNESOTA SB 2510 ENACTED May 15, 2010  EFFECTIVE May 16, 2010, or as 
noted 
Amends the tax rate provisions by providing that the base tax rate of 0.4 of one percent will be 
applicable if the trust fund is less than 0.55 percent, but has a positive balance.  Additionally, a 
new base tax rate of 0.5 of one percent will be applicable if the trust fund has a negative balance 
and is borrowing from the federal unemployment trust fund in order to pay unemployment 
benefits. 
 
MISSISSIPPI HB 1718 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 8, 2010 
Provides that the Workforce Enhancement Training Contribution shall be assessed at a rate of 
0.3 percent through December 31, 2010.  In calendar year 2011, and each year thereafter, the 
Workforce Enhancement Training Contribution shall be assessed at a rate of 0.15 percent. 
Training contributions shall be reduced as necessary to prevent any employer from having a 
combined rate greater than 5.4 percent.  Suspends for rate years 
beginningJanuary1,2010,theWorkforce Enhancement Training Contributions if the insured 
unemployment rate (IUR) exceeds an average of 5.5 percent for 3 consecutive months 
immediately preceding the effective date of the new rate year and shall remain suspended 
throughout the duration of that rate year. The suspension continues until the 3 consecutive 
months immediately preceding the effective date of any subsequent rate year has an IUR of less 
than an average of 4.5 percent. Provides that beginning January 1, 2010, the target “size of fund 
index” (SOFI) will be fixed at 1.0.  If the IUR exceeds a 4.5 percent average for the most recent 
completed July to June period, the target SOFI will be 0.8 and remains at 0.8 until the computed 
SOFI equals 1.0 or the average IUR falls to 4.5 percent or less for any July to June period.  If the 
IUR falls below 2.5 percent for any July to June period, the target SOFI shall be 1.2 until the 
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computed SOFI is equal to or greater than 1.0, or the IUR is equal to or greater than 2.5 percent 
at which point the target SOFI returns to 1.0. 
 
HAWAII     HB 2169 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 11, 2010 
Provides that for calendar year 2011 (previously from calendar 2011 and thereafter) “adequate 
reserve fund” means an amount equal to the amount derived (previously, equal to 1½ the amount 
derived) by multiplying the benefit cost rate by the total remuneration paid by all employers. 
Provides that notwithstanding the ratio of the current reserve fund to the adequate reserve fund, 
contribution rate schedule D shall apply for calendar year 2010 and contribution rate schedule F 
shall apply for calendar year 2011.  For schedule D the minimum rate is 0.20 percent and the 
maximum rate is 5.4 percent, and for schedule F the minimum rate is 1.20 percent and the 
maximum is 5.4 percent.   (Retroactive to January 1, 2010.)  
 
NEW MEXICO HB 144 ENACTED March 8, 2010  EFFECTIVE July 1, 2010 (or as indicated). 
 
Requires the use of Contribution Schedule 0 (zero) for assigning each employer’s contribution 
rate from July 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010. Requires the use of Contribution Schedule 1 
for assigning each employer’s contribution rate from January 1, 2011, through December 31, 
2011. Requires the use of one of the following Contribution Schedules 0 - 6 for each calendar 
year after 2011, except as otherwise provided, to assign each employer’s rate: Contribution 
Schedule 0 if the fund equals at least 2.3 percent of the total payrolls (most favorable schedule 
with rates ranging from 0.03 percent  to 5.40 percent); Contribution Schedule 1 if the fund equals 
less than 2.3 percent but not less than 1.7 percent of the total payrolls; Contribution Schedule 2 if 
the fund equals less than 1.7 percent but not less than 1.3 percent of the total payrolls; 
Contribution Schedule 3 if the fund equals less than 1.3 percent but not less than 1.0 percent of 
the total payrolls; Contribution Schedule 4 if the fund equals less than 1.0 percent but not less 
than 0.7 percent of the total payrolls; Contribution Schedule 5 if the fund equals less than 0.7 
percent but not less than 0.3 percent of the total payrolls; or, Contribution Schedule 6 if the fund 
equals less than 0.3 percent of the total payrolls; (least favorable schedule with rates ranging 


















F. Increase of Employer Tax Rates 
 
NEBRASKA L 631 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 26, 2009 
After December 31, 2009, in addition to other conditions and requirements, raises the rate to 12 
percent (previously 5.6 percent) for employers who fail to file required contribution and wage 
reports within 31 days following the computation date, and who fail to pay all contributions, 
penalties, and interest due and owing by the employer or predecessor before and including the 
computation date within 31 days following the computation date, or within 10 days after written 
notice of delinquency or failure to file, whichever is the later date.  Rate may be waived if the 
employer’s failure to meet deadlines was for excusable cause.  Requires written notice to the 
employer before the additional condition or requirement will apply. 
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE SB 129  ENACTED August 7, 2009 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010 unless 
otherwise specified The minimum contribution rate shall not be less than 0.10 percent. 
Establishes an inverse minimum rate to adjust certain employer’s contribution rates when the 
preceding calendar quarter trust fund balance falls below certain levels:  1.5 percent when the 
fund fails to equal or exceed $250 million; 1.0 percent when the fund fails to equal or exceed 
$275 million; and 0.5 percent when the fund fails to equal or exceed $300 million. 
 
INDIANA           SB 23 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 25, 2010 
Reduces the standard contribution rate to 5.6 percent for calendar year 2010 (previously 12.0 
percent).  Beginning with calendar year 2011, increases the standard contribution rate to 12.0 
percent. (Effective January 1, 2010.)  
 
INDIANA           SB 23 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 25, 2010 
Provides for the calculation of 2010 employer contribution rates using one of four schedules (A, 
B, C, or D) with rates ranging from 1.1 percent to 5.6 percent under schedule A to 0.1 percent to 
5.4 percent under schedule D.  Establishes new fund ratio schedules and new rate schedules 
(which include additional schedules and different ranges of rates for accounts with credit or debit 
balances) for calendar years after December 31, 2010.  Rates for new schedules range from 0.75 
percent to 10.2 percent for schedule A and 0.0 percent to 5.4 percent for schedule I.  Requires 
schedule B will be used for calendar year 2011 to assign each employer’s contribution rate. 
 
MISSISSIPPI HB 1718 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 8, 2010 
Eliminates, beginning on and after January 1, 2010, the 0.3 percent reduction in contribution 
rates for employers whose assigned contribution rate equals or is less than 5.4 percent.  Removes 
the table used to reduce contribution rates. Provides that beginning on and after January 1, 2010, 
no employer’s unemployment contribution rate shall be less than 0.4 percent (previously 0.1 
percent). 
 
NEW JERSEY SB 1813 ENACTED AND EFFECTIVE July 2, 2010 
Provides that notwithstanding any other provisions of law and notwithstanding the actual fund  
reserve ratio, for fiscal year 2011, requires the use of Column C of the Experience Rating Tax  
Table to determine the contribution rate for employers liable to pay contributions.  Column C  
provides that rates range from 0.5 percent to 3.6 percent for positive-reserve employers and from  
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5.1 percent to 5.8 percent for deficit-reserve employers.  During fiscal year 2011, the tax rate for 
new employers shall be 2.8 percent. 
 
NEW MEXICO      HB 144 ENACTED March 8, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2010, or as 
indicated Requires the use of Contribution Schedule 0 (zero) for assigning each employer’s 
contribution rate from July 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010. Requires the use of 
Contribution Schedule 1 for assigning each employer’s contribution rate from January 1, 2011, 
through December 31, 2011. Requires the use of one of the following Contribution Schedules 0 - 
6 for each calendar year after 2011, except as otherwise provided, to assign each employer’s rate: 
Contribution Schedule 0 if the fund equals at least 2.3 percent of the total payrolls (most 
favorable schedule with rates ranging from 0.03 percent  to 5.40 percent); Contribution Schedule 
1 if the fund equals less than 2.3 percent but not less than 1.7 percent of the total payrolls; 
Contribution Schedule 2 if the fund equals less than 1.7 percent but not less than 1.3 percent of 
the total payrolls; Contribution Schedule 3 if the fund equals less than 1.3 percent but not less 
than 1.0 percent of the total payrolls; Contribution Schedule 4 if the fund equals less than 1.0 
percent but not less than 0.7 percent of the total payrolls; Contribution Schedule 5 if the fund 
equals less than 0.7 percent but not less than 0.3 percent of the total payrolls; or, Contribution 
Schedule 6 if the fund equals less than 0.3 percent of the total payrolls; (least favorable schedule 
with rates ranging from 2.7 percent to 5.40 percent).  
 
MASSACHUSETTS SB 8 ENACTED February 17, 2011 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2011 
Assigns for calendar year 2011 contribution rate schedule E with tax rates for negative balance 
employers ranging from 7.24 percent to 12.27 percent and from 1.26 percent to 6.14 percent for 
positive balance employers. 
 
INDIANA           HB 1450 ENACTED February 24, 2011 EFFECTIVE February 24, 2011 
Provides that for calendar years 2011 through 2020, Schedule E applies in determining and 




















G. Elimination of Zero-Rated Options for Employers 
 
TENNESSEE HB 2324 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE June 25, 2009 
Revises the Premium Rate Chart by removing table 6b and table 6a of the previously enacted 
chart becomes table 6.  However, under the new table 6, if the reserve ratio percent is 20 and 
over, then the premium amount is "0.01" instead of "0.00". Most favorable table - trust fund 
balance of $850,000,000 or more with minimum  rate of 0.01 percent and a maximum rate of 
10.0 percent.  Least favorable table - trust fund balance of less than $450,000,000 with a  
minimum rate of 0.50 percent and a maximum rate of 10.0 percent.  Imposes an additional 
premium of 0.6 percent on all rates in Tables 1, 2, and 3, until the unemployment trust fund 
balance equals or exceeds $650,000,000.  
 
MISSISSIPPI HB 1718 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 8, 2010 
Provides that beginning on and after January 1, 2010, no employer’s unemployment contribution 

































H. Modification of Experience Rating Formula 
 
KENTUCKY HB 5a ENACTED June 4, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 15, 2010, or as noted 
Changes the date the reserve ratio will be determined from September 30 to June 30 immediately 
preceding the computation date. 
 
MISSISSIPPI HB 1718 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 8, 2010 
Provides that after calendar year 2010, the general experience rate in no event shall be less than 
0.2 percent.  For any year the general experience rate is computed as an amount less than 0.2 
percent, such rate shall be established at 0.2 percent. 
 
OKLAHOMA HB 2704 ENACTED May 6, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2010 
Modifies the experience rate table, and the contribution rate for employers for each calendar 
quarter after July 1, 1010, shall be calculated using the modified table based on the state 
experience factor and the employer’s benefit wage ratio.  
 
SOUTH DAKOTA  SB 125 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 15, 2011 
Changes the period for computing an employer’s contribution rate from at the beginning of any 
calendar year to June 30 of the preceding year beginning calendar year 2012 and each year 
thereafter. Provides that the employer's reserve ratio for calendar year 2010 and 2011 shall be the 
result obtained by dividing the balance of credits existing in the employer's experience rating 
account by the total taxable payroll of the employer for the preceding 3 calendar years.  For 
calendar year 2012 and thereafter, the employer's reserve ratio is the result obtained by dividing 
the balance of credits existing in the employer's experience-rating account as of June 30 
preceding the year for which the rate is to be computed by the total taxable payroll of the 
employer for the preceding 3 fiscal years.  The employer's experience-rating account balance for 
2012 and thereafter is the balance on July 31 of the year preceding the year for which rates are 
computed and is the difference between the contributions paid through July 31 and the benefits 



















I. Modification of Benefit Charging Methodology 
 
NEW JERSEY AB 3457 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE January 27, 2009 
Eliminates the noncharging provision that provided that if the total amount of benefits paid to a 
claimant and charged to the account of the appropriate employer exceeds 50 percent of the total 
base year, base week wages paid to the claimant by that employer, then such employer will have 
canceled from his account such excess benefit charges. 
 
WASHINGTON     SB 5963 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 14, 2009 
Provides that unemployment insurance benefit payments are charged to the experience rating 
accounts of employers in the same amount that benefits are paid out.  
 
TEXAS SB 638 ENACTED April 28, 2011 EFFECTIVE September 1, 2011 
Provides that if  all or part of the experience of the predecessor employer is transferred to the 
successor, any surplus credit applicable to the predecessor employer is also transferred to the 
successor, and the predecessor employer is not entitled to receive any portion of the surplus 
credit that is based on the experience transfer. Prohibits the transfer of the surplus credit if the 
experience transfer was accomplished solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining a lower 





























J. Modification of Experience Rating Formula: Moving from a Reserve Ratio 
experience Rating Formula to a Benefit Ratio Experience Rating Formula or a 
Payroll Decline Experience Rating Formula 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA SB 391 ENACTED June 3, 2010  EFFECTIVE January 1, 2011, or as 
noted Changes employer experience rating system from a reserve ratio to a benefit ratio system.  
For the period of January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2013,  provides that the benefit ratio is 
calculated annually to the sixth decimal place on July 1 by dividing the average of all benefits 
charged during the 40 calendar quarters (10 years) preceding the calculation date by the 
employer’s average taxable payroll during the same period.  Beginning with calendar year 2014, 
the benefit ratio will be determined using 12 calendar quarters (3 years) or using available data if 
employer has fewer than 12 quarters.   (Previously all prior benefits and wages were used.) 
Provides that the average required rate will be determined by dividing the income needed to pay 
benefits and reach the solvency target by the estimated taxable wages for the calendar year. For 
each calendar year the trust fund is in debt status, requires the department to estimate, with 
specified procedures, the amount of income needed to pay benefits for that year, the amount 
necessary to avoid automatic FUTA credit reductions and an amount necessary to repay all 
outstanding federal loans within 5 years; requires interest costs to be determined concurrently. 
After the trust fund returns to solvency, requires the department to promulgate regulations 
regarding the income needed to pay benefits each year and to return the trust fund to an adequate 
target level (fund adequacy target means an average high-cost multiple of one). Establishes a 
system to group employers in a 20 class array system based on their benefit ratio, with lowest to 
highest, to determine their contribution rate.  Requires each class must have 5 percent of the total 
taxable wages (excluding reimbursable wages) paid in covered employment during the 4 
completed calendar quarters preceding the computation date.  The rate for class one must be zero 
and the class 20 rate must be at least 5.4 percent.  If the benefit rate for class 20 exceeds 5.4 
percent, the rate for each preceding class shall be equal to 90 percent of the rate calculated for 
the succeeding class, except that class 12 shall be set at 25 percent of the rate calculated for class 
20.  If the computed rate for class 20 is less than 5.4 percent, the rate for class 20 shall be 5.4 
percent and: the rate for class 12 must be calculated by multiplying the average tax rate needed 
to achieve solvency by 20, subtracting by 5.4 percent and then dividing by 19; class 11 through 1 
must be equal to 90 percent of the rate for the succeeding class, provided the rate for class 1 shall 
be 0; the rate for class 13 must be equal to 120 percent of the rate calculated for class 12; and the 
rate for class 19 must be set at an amount that allows for average contributions, beginning at 
class 18 and ending with class 14, that are equal to 90 percent of the preceding class. If an 
employer qualifies for two classes, he will be afforded the lower rate.  Employers with identical 
ratios will be assigned the same class.  Employers with less than 12 consecutive months of 










K. Modification of Minimum/Maximum Weekly Benefit Amounts and/or Modification 
of Requirements for Base Period Wages (Monetary Eligibility) 
 
MARYLAND HB 740 SB 576 ENACTED May 7, 2009EFFECTIVE October 1, 2009, or 
as noted Increases, effective October 1, 2009, the maximum weekly benefit amount from $380 to 
$410;  the minimum qualifying wages needed in the base period to qualify for the maximum 
weekly benefit amount from $13,680 to $14,760; and the high quarter wages needed in the base 
period to qualify for the maximum weekly benefit amount from $9,096.01 to $9,816.01.  
Applicable to claims filed establishing a new benefit year on or after October 4, 2009.  Increases, 
effective October 1, 2010, the maximum weekly benefit amount from $410 to $430; the 
minimum qualifying wages needed in the base period to qualify for the maximum weekly benefit 
amount from $14,760 to $15,480; and the high quarter wages needed in the base period to 
qualify for the maximum weekly benefit amount from $9,816.01 to $10,296.01.  Applicable to 
claims filed establishing a new benefit year on or after October 3, 2010. 
 
INDIANA HB 1379 ENACTED May 13, 2009 EFFECTIVE May 13, 2009, except as 
otherwise indicated 
Effective on and after January 1, 2010, increases the wage credits required for an individual to 
qualify for benefits to 1.5 (previously 1.25) times the wages in the highest quarter, wage credits 
of $2,500 in the last 2 quarters (previously $1,650), and total base period wages of $4,200  
(previously $2,750). 
 
VIRGINIA   HB 535   ENACTED April 11, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2010 or as indicated  
Provides that for claims effective on or after July 6, 2008, but before July 3, 2011, (previously 
July 4, 2010) the minimum weekly benefit amount remains at $54 and the  maximum weekly 
benefit amount remains at $378; a total of $2,700 in the 2 high quarters  of the base period 
remains the amount needed to monetarily qualify, and a minimum of  $18,900.01 remains as the 
amount required for the maximum weekly benefit amount.  Provides that for claims effective on 
or after July 3, 2011, the minimum weekly benefit amount increases from $54 to $60 and the 
maximum weekly benefit amount remains at $378; a total of $3,000 (previously $2,700) in the 2 
high quarters of the base period is need to monetarily qualify, and a minimum of $18,900.01 
remains as the amount required for the maximum weekly benefit amount. 
 
MARYLAND SB 107 ENACTED AND EFFECTIVE March 25, 2010 
Increases the minimum weekly benefit amount from $25 to $50; the minimum qualifying wages 
needed in the base period to qualify for the minimum weekly benefit amount from $900 to 
$1,800; and the high quarter wages needed in the base period to qualify for the minimum weekly 
benefit amount from $576.01 to $1,176.01.  Increases the maximum weekly benefit amount from 
$410 to $430; the minimum qualifying wages needed in the base period to qualify for the 
maximum weekly benefit amount from $14,760 to $15,480; and the high quarter wages needed 
in the base period to qualify for the maximum weekly benefit amount from $9,816.01 to 
$10,296.01.   (Effective March 1, 2012, applicable to claims filed establishing a new benefit year 




SOUTH CAROLINA SB 391 ENACTED June 3, 2010  EFFECTIVE January 1, 2011, or as 
noted Changes the qualifying requirement for monetary eligibility (definition of insured worker) 
to $4,455 in the base period and $1,092 in the high quarter (from $900 in the base period and 
$540 in the high quarter). Changes the minimum weekly benefit amount from $20 to $42. 
 
UTAH HB 43 ENACTED MARCH 29, 2010 EFFECTIVE May 9, 2010, or as noted 
Changes the formula calculating the weekly benefit amount from 1/26th, disregarding any 
fraction of $1, of insured wages paid in the base period’s highest quarter to 1/26th minus $5, 
disregarding any fraction of $1 of insured wages paid in the base period’s highest quarter. 
(Applicable to benefit years beginning on or after December 12, 2010.)  Changes the formula 
calculating the maximum weekly benefit amount payable from 62.5 percent of the insured 
average fiscal year weekly wage during the preceding fiscal year, disregarding any fraction of $1 
to 62.5 percent of the insured average fiscal year weekly wage during the preceding fiscal year 
minus $5, disregarding any fraction of $1.   (Applicable to benefit years beginning on or after 
December 12, 2010.) 
 
VERMONT  SB 290 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 24, 2010, or as noted   
Adjusts the $425 maximum weekly benefit amount on the first day of the first calendar week of 
July by a percentage equal to the percentage change during the preceding calendar year in the 
state average weekly wage when the state unemployment compensation fund has a positive 
balance and all Title XII advances to such fund have been repaid as of December 31, of the last 
completed calendar year.  When contribution rate schedule III is in effect, the maximum weekly 
benefit amount shall be adjusted on the first day of the first calendar week of July to an amount 
equal to 57 percent of the state annual average wage.  The maximum weekly benefit amount 
shall not increase in any year that Title XII advances remain unpaid.   (Effective July 1, 2011.) 
Changes the maximum total amount of benefits payable (benefit entitlement) from 26 times an 
individual’s weekly benefit amount to the lesser of 26 times an individual’s weekly benefit  
amount or 46 percent of the total base period wages paid.  Limits the benefit entitlement when  
discharged by the last employing unit for misconduct connected with the work to the lesser of the 
amount computed in the previous sentence or 23 times an individual’s weekly benefit amount, 
provided that the individual has not already received more than 23 weeks in the benefit year. 
(Effective July 1, 2011.) 
 
HAWAII     HB 2169 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 11, 2010 
Provides that the maximum weekly benefit amount (MWBA) for calendar years 2010 and 2011 
shall be calculated at 75 percent of the average weekly wage.   (For 2010, the MWBA is $559 
and in 2011 it will decrease to $549.)  Beginning with calendar year 2012, the MWBA shall be 
calculated at 70 percent.   (Previously the reduction to 70 percent was to begin with calendar year  
2011.) 
 
VIRGINIA   SB 1010 ENACTED March 1, 2011 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2011, 
Provides that for claims effective on or after July 6, 2008, but before July 1, 2012, (previously 
July 3, 2011) the minimum weekly benefit amount remains at $54 and the maximum weekly 
benefit amount remains at $378; a total of $2,700 in the 2 high quarters of the base period 
remains the amount needed to monetarily qualify, and a minimum of $18,900.01 remains as the 
23 
 
amount required for the maximum weekly benefit amount. Provides that beginning July 1, 2012, 
(previously July 3, 2011) for claims effective on or after July 1, 2012, (previously July 3, 2011) 
the minimum weekly benefit amount increases from $54 to $60 and the maximum weekly 
benefit amount remains at $378; a total of $3,000 (previously $2,700) in the 2 high quarters of 
the base period is needed to monetarily qualify, and a minimum of $18,900.01 remains as the 
amount required for the maximum weekly benefit amount. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA   SB 1030 ENACTED June 20, 2011 EFFECTIVE June 20, 2011, 
Provides that notwithstanding any other provisions, for calendar year 2012, the maximum 
weekly benefit rate shall be frozen at the rate calculated for calendar year 2011 ($573). 
Thereafter, the maximum weekly benefit rate established:  For calendar year 2013, shall be no 
greater than a 1 percent increase above the calendar year 2012 rate. For calendar year 2014, shall 
be no greater than a 1.1 percent increase above the calendar year 2013 rate. For calendar year 
2015, shall be no greater than a 1.2 percent increase above the calendar year 2014 rate. For 
calendar year 2016, shall be no greater than a 1.3 percent increase above the calendar year 2015 
rate. For calendar year 2017, shall be no greater than a 1.4 percent increase above the calendar 
year 2016 rate. For calendar year 2018, shall be no greater increase than 1.5 percent increase 
above the calendar year 2017 rate.  
 
MISSISSIPPI SB 2238  ENACTED March 30, 2011 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2011 
Provides that notwithstanding any other provision of law, if an employee's weekly benefit rate as 
calculated is less than $70, the employee shall be ineligible to receive any amount of 
compensation.  If the employee's weekly benefit rate is not a multiple of $1, it shall be rounded 
to the next lower multiple of $1.   (Effective January 1, 2013.) 
 
ARKANSAS   SB 593 ENACTED March 31, 2011 EFFECTIVE March 31, 2011, 
Decreases the minimum weekly benefit amount from $82 to $81 and the maximum weekly 
benefit amount from $457 to $451, effective July 1, 2012.  Changes the qualifying wages needed 
in the base period to monetarily qualify from 37 times the weekly benefit amount to 35 times the 
weekly benefit amount.  Provides that to requalify for a succeeding benefit year, individuals must 
have been paid wages in insured work equal to at least 35 (previously 37) times their weekly 
benefit amount in at least 2 base period calendar quarters and subsequent to filing the claim 
which established the previous benefit year, they had insured work and were paid wages for 
work equal to 8 (previously 3) times their weekly benefit amount. 
 
INDIANA           HB 1450 ENACTED February 24, 2011 EFFECTIVE February 24, 2011 
Changes the computation of the weekly benefit amount beginning July 1, 2012, from 5 percent 
of the first $2,000 of the individual's wage credits in the highest quarter of the base period; and 4 
percent of the individual's remaining wage credits in the highest quarter; to 47 percent of the 
individual's prior average weekly wage, rounded, if not already a multiple of $1, to the next 







L. Modifying Wage Replacement Ratio 
 
NEW MEXICO      HB 144 ENACTED March 8, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2010, or as 
indicated 
Changes the calculation of the weekly benefit amount to 53½ percent of the average weekly 
wage for insured work in the base period quarter in which total wages were highest (previously 
60 percent through June 30, 2011).  The weekly benefit amount may not be more than 53½ 
percent of the state’s average weekly wage for all insured work (previously 10 percent through 
June 30, 2011). 
 
MISSISSIPPI SB 2238 ENACTED March 30, 2011 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2011 
Provides that the Table Specified for the Determination of Rate and Amount of Benefits shall be 
extended or contracted annually, automatically by regulations to a point where the maximum 
weekly benefit rate shall equal 66 2/3 percent of the average weekly wage for the 36-month 
(previously 12-month) period ending June 30 preceding each calendar year.  If the maximum 
weekly benefit rate is not a multiple of $1, it shall be rounded to the next lower multiple of $1. 
(Previously, increased by $1 and then rounded to the next lower multiple of $1.) Provides that for 
the purpose of determining the maximum weekly benefit rate, the Pennsylvania average weekly 
wage in covered employment shall be computed on the basis of the average annual total wages 
reported (irrespective of the limit on the amount of wages subject to  contributions) for the 36-



























M. Modification of Minimum/Maximum Weekly Benefit Amounts 
 
INDIANA HB 1379 ENACTED May 13, 2009 EFFECTIVE May 13, 2009  
Provides for a reduced maximum benefit amount for individuals separated from employment 
under disqualifying conditions or who fail to apply for suitable work (amounts rounded to the 
next higher dollar):  75 percent - first separation/failure to apply; 85 percent of the amount in 1 - 
second separation/failure to apply; 90 percent of the amount in 2 - third and subsequent 
separation/failure to apply.  Modifies the definition of   “discharge for just cause” to include 
violation of an employer rule regarding attendance or unsatisfactory attendance if the employer 
does not have an attendance rule and the individual cannot show good cause for absences or 
tardiness.  
 
KENTUCKY HB 5a ENACTED June 4, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 15, 2010, or as noted 
Changes the amount required in the trust fund to determine the maximum weekly benefit rate 
(MWBR) as follows.  If the trust fund balance as of September 30 immediately preceding the 
benefit year: equals or exceeds $120,000,000, but is less than $200,000,000 (previously 
$150,000,000), the MWBR shall not exceed the prior year's MWBR by more than 6 percent; 
equals or exceeds $200,000,000 (previously $150,000,000) but is less than $300,000,000, 
(previously $250,000,000), the MWBR shall not exceed the prior year's MWBR by more than 8 
percent. equals or exceeds $300,000,000 (previously $250,000,000), but is less than 
$400,000,000 (previously $275,000,000), the MWBR shall not exceed the prior year's MWBR 
by more than 10 percent; equals or exceeds $400,000,000 (previously $275,000,000), but is less 
than $500,000,000 (previously $350,000,000), the MWBR shall not exceed the prior year's 
MWBR by more than 12 percent; equals or exceeds $500,000,000, the MWBR shall not exceed 























N. Introduction or Extension of a Wait-Period (a Waiting Week) 
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE SB 129  ENACTED August 7, 2009 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010 unless 
otherwise specified 
Adds a waiting week, with no reduction in the individual’s maximum benefit amount, for benefit 
years commencing on or after January 3, 2010. 
 
KENTUCKY HB 5a ENACTED June 4, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 15, 2010, or as noted 
Establishes a waiting week, applicable to initial claims made on or after January 1, 2012, and 
which is required for each benefit year whether or not consecutive.  The waiting week becomes 
compensable once the remaining balance on the claim is equal to or less than the compensable 
amount for the waiting week. 
 
VERMONT  SB 290 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 24, 2010, or as noted 
Provides that to be eligible to receive benefits (including short-time compensation benefits) a 
totally or partially unemployed individual must serve a 1-week waiting period during the benefit 
year and any extended eligibility period, effective July 1, 2012.  Repeals the 1-week waiting 
period, effective July 1, 2017, or when the balance of the unemployment compensation fund has 





























O. Targeting Resources for Reemployment Services to Claimants or Implementing a 
Work-Share Program 
 
FLORIDA         SB 1736 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 17, 2010 
Requires individuals (except non-Florida residents, persons on a temporary layoff, union 
members hired through a union hiring hall, or persons claiming benefits under an approved 
short-time compensation plan) to be eligible to receive benefits to register with the agency for 
work and subsequently report to the one-stop career center as directed for reemployment 
services. 
 
COLORADO SB 28 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE June 9, 2010 
Requires the Director to establish a voluntary work share program allowing the payment of 
unemployment compensation benefits to employees whose wages and hours have been reduced 
by at least 10 percent and not more than 40 percent.  The maximum number of weeks payable is 
18 weeks.  A negative excess employer is not eligible to participate in the work share program.  
Work share benefits paid shall be charged to the account of the participating employer in the 
same manner as regular benefits.  Requires continuation of health insurance, retirement benefits 
received under a pension plan, paid vacation and holidays, sick leave, or any other similar 
employee benefits provided immediately prior to submitting the work share plan, if the employer 
provides benefits to his/her employees. The period of an approved plan is for 12 months.  Allows 
modifications to the work share plan to meet changed conditions, if the modification meets 
certain requirements.  If the Director finds that the work share program causes insolvency of the 
unemployment insurance cash fund to accelerate, the work share provisions shall be repealed 
effective July 1, 2013. 
 
VERMONT  SB 290 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 24, 2010 
Requires the Department to implement reemployment services and a policy that prioritizes 
claimants for such services, effective July 1, 2010.  Provides that in determining if available for 
work during any week, an individual may be required to participate in reemployment services. 
 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA    B 731 ENACTED July 2, 2010 EFFECTIVE September 
24, 2010 - Eliminates the $4 million cap on the annual amount that may be deposited in the 
Unemployment Compensation Administrative Assessment Account beginning fiscal year 2014.  
Renames the “Administrative Assessment Account” as “Unemployment and Workforce 













P. Introduction of Enhanced Integrity Efforts or Overpayment Recovery Efforts 
 
ARKANSAS SB 429 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 3, 2009 
Removes the provision (concerning the recovery of an overpayment resulting from a false 
statement, misrepresentation or omission that was knowingly made by a claimant) which 
provided that beginning July 1, 2001, a person will not be liable to repay such amount to the 
fund, except through the deduction of future benefits after 10 years from the date the 
determination of the amount of the overpayment becomes final.  Provides that the amount of the 
final overpayment will accrue interest at the rate of 10 percent  per annum (formerly 11/2 percent 
per month) beginning 30 days after the date of the first billing statement.  Removes the provision 
which provided that any person held liable to repay an amount to the fund or to have the amount 
deducted from any future benefits payable will not be liable to repay the amount nor will 
recovery be made from any future benefits after 4 years from the date the determination of the 
amount of the overpayment becomes final. Provides for intercept of Federal income tax refunds 
for benefits obtained as a result of fraud as provided by Federal law and regulations. 
 
MONTANA    SB 150 ENACTED March 25, 2009  EFFECTIVE March 25, 2009, or as 
noted 
Establishes repayment methods for the department to collect a benefit overpayment and any 
penalty by: having the claimant pay the amount owed directly to the department by check, 
money order, credit card, debit card, or electronic funds transfer; or, offsetting the amount of the 
overpaid benefits owed against future unemployment benefits to be received by the claimant.  
(Effective January 1, 2010.) Provides that the claimant is responsible for any penalty established 
and costs or processing fees associated with using the repayment methods.   (Effective January 1, 
2010.)  Allows the department to enter into an agreement with a claimant for the repayment of 
any benefit overpayment and penalty provided the repayment in full is made within 5 years of 
the date establishing that an overpayment occurred.   (Effective January 1, 2010.)   Allows the 
department to collect any benefit overpayment and penalty by directing the offset of any funds 
due the claimant from the state, except future unemployment benefits and retirement benefits. 
The department through the department of revenue must provide the claimant with notice of the 
right to request a hearing on the offset action which must be made within 30 days of the date of 
the notice.   (Effective January 1, 2010.)  Establishes that the debt can be transferred for offset 
prior to being determined uncollectible. (Effective January 1, 2010.)  Allows the department to 
direct the offset of funds owed a person under 26 U.S.C. 6402 if the person owes a covered 
unemployment compensation debt.   (Effective January 1, 2010.)  
 
NEBRASKA L 631 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE May 26, 2009 
Allows the agency to intercept Federal income tax refunds to repay fraudulent overpayments and 
contribution delinquencies consistent with the requirements of Federal law and regulation.  
Provides that the employer’s experience account must be charged 50 percent of the benefits paid 
if the employer did not provide information and the individual was later determined to be 
ineligible.  If the employee repays all or part of the benefits on which determination is based, the 
employer must receive a credit equal to the amount of the repayment.  If the employee repays 
benefits, the employer must receive a credit equal to the amount repaid by the employee up to the 




COLORADO HB 1310 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE June 2, 2009 
Creates the Office of Employee Misclassification to investigate the misclassification of 
employees as independent contractors.  This office will be responsible for enforcing the 
requirements of the law regarding classification of employees and payment of obligated 
employment taxes for covered employment.  Employers found engaged in the misclassification 
of employees will be ordered to pay back taxes owed and interest.  
 
MINNESOTA HB 2088 ENACTED May 14, 2009 EFFECTIVE May 14, 2009 or as 
noted  
Permits an employer to be assessed a $100 administrative penalty for failing to provide a weekly 
breakdown of money earned by an applicant if the information is necessary to detect applicant 
fraud.  The breakdown notice must state that this penalty may be assessed.  This $100 penalty 
and the existing $500 penalty for refusing to allow record audits or for failing to make all records 
available must be credited to the trust fund. (Previously penalties were credited to the 
administration account for use to ensure integrity in unemployment insurance program 
administration.)   (Effective August 2, 2009, and applicable to determinations and decisions 
issued on or after that date.) Includes under the definition of construction/independent contractor 
that for purposes of this chapter, section 181.723 determines whether a worker is an independent 
contractor or an employee when performing public or private sector commercial or residential 
building construction or improvement services.   (Effective August 2, 2009, and applicable to 
determinations and decisions issued on or after that date.) Defines the meaning of and establishes 
procedures for “continued request for unemployment benefits.”  Each applicant must file such 
request either by electronic transmission or by mail by the time period required.  The application 
is not accepted and the applicant is ineligible for benefits for failing to meet the required time 
period, unless good cause is shown for such failure.   (Effective August 2, 2009, and applicable 
to determinations and decisions issued on or after that date.) Provides that if the Internal Revenue 
Service assesses a fee for offsetting from a federal tax refund the amount of any fraud 
overpayment, including penalties and interest, the amount of the fee may be added to the total 
amount due.  The offset amount must be put in the trust fund and credited to the total amount due 
from the applicant.   (Effective August 2, 2009, and applicable to determinations and decisions 
issued on or after that date.) Provides that nonfraud and fraud overpayments, penalties, and 
interest assessed may also be collected by the methods allowed under state and Federal law.   
(Previous law allowed collections by the same methods as delinquent payments from an 
employer.)   (Effective August 2, 2009, and applicable to determinations and decisions issued on 
or after that date.) 
 
WISCONSIN AB 884 ENACTED May 12, 2010 EFFECTIVE July 4, 2010 
Allows fees and expenses assessed by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury for use of the Treasury 
Offset Program to be withdrawn from the Unemployment Reserve Fund. Increases the maximum 
fine from $500 to $1,000 for anyone who: Makes a deduction from the wages of an employee 
because of liability for contributions or payments in lieu of contributions; Refuses or fails to 
furnish an employee any notice, report or information required by the statute; Promises to 
reemploy, threatens not to employ, or to terminate or induces employees to refrain from claiming 
benefits, participating in an audit or investigation by the Department, or testifying at a hearing; 
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or Discriminates or retaliates against an individual because the individual claims benefits, 
participates in an audit or investigation by the Department, or testifies at a hearing. Allows 
offsetting overpayments resulting from fraud by intercepting the individual’s Federal income tax 
refund. 
 
MICHIGAN HB 4408 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 29, 2011 
Creates in the Department of Treasury contingent fund a separate, special fraud control fund. The 
special fraud control fund shall consist of money collected or received by the unemployment 
agency as follows: All interest and penalties collected under specific provisions of law. All gifts 
to, interest on, or profits earned by the special fraud control fund. Amounts credited under 
specific provisions of law. Specifies that the money in the special fraud control fund is 
continuously appropriated only to the unemployment agency and may not be transferred or 
otherwise made available to any other state agency.  Specifies that all amounts in the special 
fraud control fund are to be used first for the acquisition of packaged software that has a proven 
record of success with the detection and collection of unemployment benefit overpayments and 
then for administrative costs associated with the prevention, discovery, and collection of 
unemployment benefit overpayments, as included in the biennial budget of the Michigan 
unemployment agency and approved by the legislature. Requires the Michigan unemployment 
agency to submit a report to the clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the 
Senate at the close of the 2-year period beginning on March 29, 2011, to show how the money 
from the special fraud control fund was used and the results obtained from the special fraud 
control fund.  Requires the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs to implement the 
initial detection and collection software package by September 1, 2011. Provides for the 
























Q. Reducing the Eligible Duration of Unemployment Compensation for Claimants 
 
MICHIGAN HB 4408 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 29, 2011 
Decreases the number of benefit weeks payable to an individual in a benefit year from not more 
than 26 weeks of benefits or less than 14 weeks of benefits to not more than 20 weeks of benefits 
or less than 14 weeks of benefits.   (Effective on or after January 15, 2012.)  Provides that the 20-
week limitation of total benefits set forth in this paragraph does not apply to claimants declared 
eligible for training benefits in accordance with the State unemployment insurance law. 
 
TEXAS SB 638 ENACTED April 28, 2011 EFFECTIVE September 1, 2011 
Provides that otherwise eligible employees are entitled to up to a maximum of 26 weeks of 
benefits provided they had 18 or more credit weeks during their base year.  Removes language 
that employees are entitled to 16 or 26 weeks provided they had 16 or 17 credit weeks during the 
base year.  Provides that notwithstanding any other provision, employees with less than 18 credit 
weeks (previously 16 credit weeks) during their base year shall be ineligible to receive any 
amount of compensation.   (Effective January 1, 2015.) 
 
ARKANSAS   SB 593 ENACTED March 31, 2011 EFFECTIVE March 31, 2011 
Changes the formula for calculating the number of benefit weeks from the lesser of 26 times the 
weekly benefit amount or 1/3 times the base period wages to the lesser of 25 times the weekly 
benefit amount or 1/3 times the base period wages.  
 
FLORIDA         HB 7005 ENACTED June 27, 2011 EFFECTIVE June 27, 2011, 
Provides that, effective January 1, 2012, each otherwise eligible individual is entitled during any 
benefit year to a total amount of benefits equal to 25 percent of the total wages in his or her base 
period, not to exceed $6,325 or the product arrived at by multiplying the weekly benefit amount 
by the number of weeks determined in the next paragraph, whichever is less.   (Under prior law, 
entitlement was limited to $7,150.) Provides that for claims submitted during a calendar year, the 
duration of benefits is limited to: Twelve weeks if this state's average unemployment rate is at or 
below 5 percent. An additional week in addition to the 12 weeks for each 0.5 percent increment 
in this state's average unemployment rate above 5 percent. Up to a maximum of 23 weeks if this 

















R. Introduction of Alternate Base Period 
 
CALIFORNIA AB 29c ENACTED and EFFECTIVE March 27, 2009 
Establishes an alternative base period for any new claim filed on or after April 3, 2011, or earlier 
consisting of the last 4 completed calendar quarters to use if a valid claim or benefit year cannot 
be established using the regular base period.  Requires the quarter with the highest wages to be 
used to determine the individual’s weekly benefit amount.  Provides that wages used in 
determining benefits payable may not be used again in any subsequent benefit year.  
 
MINNESOTA SB 4 ENACTED January 29, 2009 EFFECTIVE for unemployment benefits 
filed effective on or after July 1, 2009 
Modifies the term “base period” as follows:  
Base Period: The base period, unless otherwise provided, means the last 4 completed calendar 
quarters before the effective date of an individual’s application for unemployment benefits if the 
































S. Introduction or Modification of a Special Set-Aside Obligation Fund (for Training, 
Benefit Payments, Bond Debt Service, Repayment of Title XII Loans, or Repayment 
of Interest on Title XII Loans) 
 
COLORADO SB 76 ENACTED June 2, 2009 EFFECTIVE July 1, 2009 
Deletes the paragraph which:  annually establishes a surcharge based on benefits paid and not  
chargeable to any employer’s account; calculates the surcharge tax rate by dividing the benefits 
not changed by the total taxable payroll; allocates 50 percent to the unemployment compensation 
fund (UCF) and 50 percent to the employment support fund; and adds the surcharge tax rate to  
employer’s standard or computed tax rate with 80 percent of the surcharge tax revenues  
considered as revenues for calculating the tax surcharge and which will be the employer’s tax  
rate for the ensuing calendar year.  Provides that the surcharge tax established must be 
segregated and deposited in the employment support fund.   (Formerly only 50 percent was 
deposited in such fund.)  Provides that, effective calendar year 2009, allocates 30 percent 
(previously 50 percent) of the annual surcharge tax rate to the UCF (previously general fund), 50 
percent to the employment support fund, and 20 percent to the employment and training 
technology fund.  Provides that, effective January 1, 2017, allocates 50 percent of the surcharge 
tax rate to the UCF and 50 percent to the employment support fund.   Provides, notwithstanding 
any provision to the contrary, beginning July 1, 2009, through  December 31, 2016, 20 percent of 
the surcharge tax must be credited to the employment and  training technology fund, which is 
hereby created in the State treasury.  Moneys in such fund  must:  be used for employment and 
training automation initiatives, be subject to annual  appropriation, must not revert to the general 
fund or any other fund at the end of any fiscal year,  and be exempt from limitations on 
uncommitted reserves.  If the balance of the UCF falls below  $25 million, the moneys in the 
employment and training technology fund must be allocated to  the UCF.  At any other time, the 
moneys in the employment and training technology fund may  be allocated to the UCF at the 
discretion of the Executive Director of the Department of Labor  and Employment. 
 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA    B 731 ENACTED July 2, 2010 EFFECTIVE September 
24, 2010 
Eliminates the $4 million cap on the annual amount that may be deposited in the Unemployment 
Compensation Administrative Assessment Account beginning fiscal year 2014.  Renames the 
“Administrative Assessment Account” as “Unemployment and Workforce Development 
Administrative Fund” and expands the purpose of the fund to include reemployment services. 
 
MISSISSIPPI SB 2027 ENACTED January 12, 2010 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2010 
Provides that during years that the Workforce Enhancement Training contribution is in effect, 
instead of paying a 2.7 percent tax rate, each newly subject employer shall be assigned a tax rate 
of 2.4 percent to which will be added the 0.3 percent Workforce Enhancement Training 
contribution. Requires the deposit of Workforce Enhancement Training contributions into the 
Mississippi Department of Employment Security clearing account, and requires the transfer of 
such contributions within 2 business days to the Workforce Enhancement Training Fund holding 
account.  Any Workforce Enhancement Training contribution transactions not honored by a 
financial institution will be transferred back to the clearing account out of funds in the 




HAWAII     HB 1077 ENACTED February 23, 2011 EFFECTIVE January 1, 2011 
Adds that monies in the employment and training fund may be used also for funding the payment 
of interest due on Title XII advances.  Amends the law to provide that every employer, except 
reimbursable employers, shall be subject to an employment and training fund assessment at a 
rate of 0.01 percent of taxable wages. (Previously employers assigned a minimum rate of 0.0 
percent or the maximum rate of 5.4 percent were not required to pay this assessment).  
 
ARIZONA   HB 2619 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 25, 2011 
Establishes an unemployment special assessment fund which consists of the monies collected 
from the special assessment.  Provides that notwithstanding any other law, if the state has an 
outstanding loan to pay unemployment insurance benefits, fund monies will be used to pay the 
costs of the loan as follows: Fund monies shall first be used to pay interest charges incurred on 
the loan.  If the state is granted a waiver of interest charges in either 2011 or 2012, the amount of 
the assessment will be reduced by 0.1 percent in each calendar year in which the interest charge 
is waived. Fund monies shall then be used to retire the loan principal on or before November 10, 
2012. Provides that if the Department determines that the fund monies will not be sufficient to 
pay the interest charges and retire the principal on or before November 10, 2012, the Department 
may increase the assessment for 2012 at a rate determined by the Director which shall not exceed 
0.2 percent of the taxable wages paid for the tax year. Requires any monies remaining in the fund 
after payment of all principal and interest on the loan to be transferred to the unemployment 
compensation fund.  
 
ARKANSAS   SB 305 ENACTED April 4, 2011 EFFECTIVE April 4, 2011, 
Establishes a special restricted fund to be known as the "Bond Financing Trust Fund", to be 
maintained and administered by the Department of Workforce Services into which shall be 
deposited collections of the unemployment obligation assessment and any penalties and interest 
with respect to the unemployment obligation assessment.  Provides that moneys in the Bond 
Financing Trust Fund may be used, among other things, to make refunds of the unemployment 
obligation assessment, and interest and penalty payments that were erroneously paid, and to 
return moneys to the Unemployment Compensation Fund Clearing Account which may have 
been incorrectly identified and erroneously transferred to the Bond Financing Trust Fund.  
 
INDIANA           HB 1450 ENACTED February 24, 2011 EFFECTIVE February 24, 2011, 
Provides that for a calendar year beginning January 1, 2011, an experience rated employer who 
paid wages during the calendar year, and whose contribution rate for the calendar year was 
determined, and has had a payroll in each of the 3 preceding 12-month periods must pay an 
unemployment insurance surcharge equal to 13 percent of the employer’s contribution for 
calendar year 2011 if, during the calendar year, the state is required to pay interest on the Title 
XII advances made to the state from the federal unemployment account in the federal 
unemployment trust fund. Federal law; and (2) the state's outstanding loan balance to the federal 
unemployment account on January 1 of the year. Requires that the unemployment insurance 
surcharge be paid quarterly at the same time as employer contributions are paid, and failure to 
make such payments is a delinquency. Allows the Indiana Department of Workforce 
Development to use amounts from the surcharge to pay interest on the Title XII advances and 
35 
 
requires the deposit of any amounts received and not used to pay interest on Title XII advances 
into the unemployment insurance benefit fund. Provides that amounts paid and used to pay 
interest on Title XII advances do not affect and may not be charged to the experience account of 
any employer.  Amounts paid and used for purposes other than to pay interest on Title XII 
advances must be credited to each employer's experience account in proportion to the amount the 
employer paid during the preceding 4 calendar quarters. Establishes the unemployment insurance 
solvency fund for the purpose of paying interest on Title XII advances, to be administered by the 
department. Requires that money received from the unemployment insurance surcharge that the 
Indiana Department of Workforce Development elects to use to pay interest on Title XII 
advances shall be deposited in the fund for the purposes of the fund. Requires the Treasurer of 
State to invest the money in the fund not currently needed to meet the obligations of the fund in 
the same manner as other public money may be invested.  Interest that accrues from these 
investments shall be deposited at least quarterly in the fund. Provides that money in the fund at 


































T. Authorization/Reauthorization of Bond Issuance or Means of Alternative Financing 
 
MISSOURI   HB 1075 ENACTED June 12, 2009 EFFECTIVE June 12, 2009 or as noted 
Removes the language providing that the unpaid principal amount of any outstanding credit 
instruments, combined with the unpaid principal amount of any financing agreement entered into 
will not exceed $450 million at any time.  Removes all other language referring to the $450 
million limit on borrowing from credit instruments including interest. 
 
WEST VIRGINIA   SB 219 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE April 5, 2011 
Authorizes the Governor by executive order, after first notifying appropriate officials in writing, 
to borrow funds from the Revenue Center Construction Fund for deposit into the Unemployment 
Compensation Fund (UCF), to be expended accordingly.  The amount of funds borrowed and 
outstanding may not exceed $20 million at any one time, or the amount the Governor determines 
is necessary to adequately sustain the balance in the UCF at a minimum of $20 million, 
whichever is less. Restricts the Governor borrowing funds from the Revenue Center 
Construction Fund unless the Executive Director of Workforce West Virginia has projected that 
the balance in the state's UCF will be less than $20 million at any time during the next 30 days 
Provides that any funds borrowed shall be repaid from funds on deposit in the Unemployment 
Trust Fund in excess of $20 million or from other funds legally available for such purpose, 
without interest, and redeposited to the credit of the Revenue Center Construction Fund within 




ARKANSAS   SB 305 ENACTED April 4, 2011 EFFECTIVE April 4, 2011, 
Creates the Unemployment Trust Fund Financing Act of 2011 (the Bond Act).  
Authorizes the Arkansas Development Finance Authority, subject to the approval of the voters in 
a statewide election, to issue Arkansas Unemployment Trust Fund Bonds in the amount of 
$500,000,000, repaid/payable from revenues raised by an unemployment obligation assessment 
imposed on employers. Provides that the unemployment obligation assessment shall be based on 
the aggregate principal amount of bonds issued for nonrefunding purposes and shall be 
determined by multiplying the employer’s contribution rate in effect on the date that the 
Governor issues a proclamation calling an election on the issuance of the bonds for employers 
with accounts as of such date and the employer's contribution rate as of the employer's liability 
date for employers establishing  
accounts after the date of the proclamation by: 25% if the aggregate principal amount of bonds 
issued is $350,000,000 or less; 30% if the aggregate principal amount of bonds issued is 
$350,000,001 to $400,000,000; 33.5% if the aggregate principal amount of bonds issued is 
$400,000,001 to $450,000,000; And 37.5% if the aggregate principal amount of bonds issued is 
$450,000,001 to $500,000,000. Provides that, among other things, the purpose of the bond 
issuance shall be to:   (1) repay the principal and interest on Title XII advances from the federal 
trust fund; (2) pay the costs of issuance of the bonds; and (3) pay unemployment benefits by 
depositing bond proceeds into the Unemployment Compensation Fund.  Provides that the 
unemployment obligation assessment shall not be collected until the qualified voters of the state 
approve the issuance of bonds and shall be collected until the end of the quarter immediately 
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following the repayment of all bonds authorized under the Bond Act. Provides that the Arkansas 
Development Finance Authority may issue the Arkansas Unemployment Trust Fund Bonds for 
the purpose of refunding bonds previously issued if the total amount of bonds outstanding after 
the refunding is completed does not exceed the total amount authorized. Provides that to the 
extent that refunding bonds are issued and the principal amount of the refunding bonds is not in a 
greater principal amount than the outstanding principal amount of the bonds being refunded, the 
principal amount of the refunding bonds shall not be subject to the $500,000,000 limit. Provides 
that, if the refunding bonds are issued in a greater principal amount than the bonds being 
refunded, the principal amount of the refunding bonds shall not count against the $500,000,000 
limit so long as the aggregate debt service on the refunding bonds is less than the aggregate debt 
service on the bonds being refunded. Requires each contributing employer to pay a separate and 
additional assessment, to be known as the unemployment obligation assessment, on wages paid 
by that employer with respect to employment in addition to the contributions, stabilization and 
extended benefits taxes, and advance interest taxes levied. Provides that the effective date of the 
unemployment obligation assessment shall be the first day of the calendar quarter immediately 
following the month in which the Secretary of State certifies the vote of the voters approving the 
unemployment obligation assessment and the issuance of the bonds, and the assessment is 
effective until the end of the quarter immediately following the  repayment of all bonds. Provides 
that this unemployment obligation assessment shall not be credited to the separate account of any 
employer. Provides that the unemployment obligation assessment shall be levied and collected in 
the same manner as contributions and shall be subject to the same penalty and interest, 
collection, impoundment, priority, lien, certificate of assessment, and assessment provisions and 
procedures under the Arkansas Employment Security Law. Provides that receipts from the 
unemployment obligation assessment and any penalty and interest on the unemployment 
obligation assessment shall be deposited into the Unemployment Compensation Fund Clearing 
Account.  Provides that at least once each month, deposits of the unemployment obligation 
assessment payment and any interest and penalty payments applicable to the unemployment 
obligation assessment shall be deposited into the Department of Workforce Services Bond 
Financing Trust Fund. Provides that debt service on the bonds shall be paid in a timely manner 
and shall not be paid directly or indirectly by an equivalent reduction in unemployment 
contributions or taxes imposed.  Provides that upon retirement of all bonds, the following shall 
be transferred to the Unemployment Compensation Fund: Surplus unemployment obligation 
assessment collections; and Delinquent taxes, penalties, or interest due under the unemployment 
obligation assessment. 
 
MICHIGAN SB 484 ENACTED and EFFECTIVE December 19, 2011 
Creates the “Obligation Trust Fund” (Fund) as a separate fund in the State Treasury not to be 
considered part of the General Fund; money in the Fund would remain at the close of the fiscal 
year, and would not lapse into the General Fund.  The State Treasurer may receive and deposit 
money or other assets from any source into the Fund and shall direct the investment of money 
within the Fund, crediting to the Fund earnings from investments of money for the Fund.  
Requires the deposit of all “obligation” assessments (assessments) collected into the Fund.  All 
interest, penalties, and damages derived from the assessments along with portions of the 
proceeds from any obligations specified by the Michigan Finance Authority (MFA) shall be 
deposited into the Fund.  Requires the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs 
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(LARA) to administer the Fund for auditing purposes and expend money from the Fund only: To 
pay obligations, including administrative and associated expenses; •   To refund erroneously 
collected assessments; and For any other purpose for which the MFA could issue obligations. 
Permits the Director of LARA to request the MFA to issue obligations in order to repay Federal 
Title XII advances with interest on those advances, fund unemployment benefits, and fund 
capitalized interest, debt service reserve funds, and payment of costs of, and administrative 
expenses connected with, issuing “obligations.” Defines “obligation” as a note, bond, financial 
instrument, or other evidences of indebtedness issued. Stipulates that in 2011 and in each year 
thereafter in which any obligation is outstanding, employers are subject to, and shall be assessed, 
and shall pay an obligation assessment.  The assessment shall be collected quarterly in addition 
to required contributions, is not subject to the limiting provisions for required contributions, is in 
addition to and separate from the solvency tax imposed, is due at the same time, collected in the 
same manner, and subject to the same penalties and interest as contributions assessed, and shall 
be deposited into the Fund. The rate of the assessment shall be determined by the State Treasurer 
in consultation with the Director of LARA.  The assessment rate shall be applied to all 
contributing employers on the taxable wage base limit, and may take into account the employer’s 
experience rating from the previous year.  The assessment shall be sufficient to ensure timely 
payment of: The principal, interest, and redemption premiums on obligations; Administrative 
expenses, credit enhancement and termination fees, and any other fees derived from issuing 
obligations; All other amounts required to be maintained and paid under the terms of a MFA 
resolution, indenture, or authorizing statute under which obligations are issued; Amounts 
necessary to maintain ratings assigned by nationally recognized rating services on obligations at 
a level determined by the State Treasurer.  The yearly revenue generated by the assessment is 
irrevocably pledged to the payment of obligations and administrative expenses, and is subject to 
the pledge and lien described in the MFA resolution, indenture, and authorizing statue under 
which the obligation is issued. 
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BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































1½ x HQW; 
qualify for at least 
minimum WBA 
1/26 avg of 2 
highest qtrs 
 
$45 $265 $15 
Lesser of 1/3 
BPW or 26 x 
WBA 
15-26 
20 weeks or 








$2,500; wages in 
2 qtrs 
 
0.9-4.4% of annual 
wages + $24 per 
dep up to $72 
$56-
128 
$370-     
442 
$50 and ¼ 
wages over 
$50   
Weighted 
schedule of 
BPW to HQW 





1½ x HQW and 
$1,500 in 1 qtr; or 
wages in 2 qtrs 
with wages in 1 
qtr sufficient to 
qualify for 
maximum WBA, 










Lesser of 1/3 
BPW or 26 
WBA 
12-26 
20 weeks or 








35 x WBA; wages 
in 2 qtrs 
 
1/26 HQW $82 $457 40% WBA 
Lesser of 25 





10 or more 






$1,300 in HQ, or 
$900 in HQ with 
BPW = 1¼ x HQ 
1/23 to 1/26 HQW $40 $450 
Greater of 
$25 or 1/4 
wages 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or ½ 
BPW 
14-26 












Higher of 60% of 
1/26 of 2  consecu-
tive HQW, capped 
by 50% of State 
avg weekly earn-
ings or 50% of 1/52 
BP earnings 
capped by 55% of 







Lesser of 26  
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
13-26 
20 weeks or 







CT 40 x WBA 
1/26 avg of 2 
highest qtrs 
 + $15 per dep, up 
to 5; DA capped at 
WBA (For 
construction 











20 weeks or 







DE 36 x WBA 
1/46 total wages in 
2 highest qtrs 
 
$20 $330  
Greater of 
$10 or 50% 
WBA 
½ BPW 24-26 
20 weeks or 







1½ x HQW or 
within $70; not 
less than $1,950 
in 2 qtrs; $1,300 
in 1 qtr 
1/26 HQW $50 $359   
1/5 of wages 
plus $20 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or ½ 
BPW 





1½ x HQW; 
minimum $3,400; 
wages in 2 qtrs 
 
1/26 HQW $32 $275  
8 x federal 
hourly mini-
mum wage 
25% BPW 9-23 
20 weeks or 








Wages in 2 qtrs & 
150% x HQW or 
HQW divided by 
21 for WBA w/ 
total earnings at 
least 40 x WBA 
1/42 of wages in 
highest 2 qtrs or 
1/21 HQW 
$44 $330 $50 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or ¼ 
BPW 
6-26 
20 weeks or 








26 x WBA; wages 
in 2 qtrs  
1/21 HQW $5 $523 $150 
Uniform 
duration 




BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































1¼ x HQW; not 
less than the 
minimum 
qualifying wages 
in 1 qtr $1,872 
1/26 HQW $72 $343 ½ WBA 
Weighted 
schedule of 
BPW to HQW 
10-26 
20 weeks or 









47% of claimant’s 









20 weeks or 








1½ x HQW 
totaling at least 
$2,500 in last 2 
qtrs; not less than 
$4,200 in BP 
5% of 1st $2,000 of 
wage credits in HQ, 
4% of remaining 
HQW credits; wage 










28% BPW or 
26 x WBA 
8-26 
20 weeks or 








1¼ x HQW; 3.5% 
of the statewide 
AAW in HQ; ½ 
HQW in qtr not 
the HQ 
1/23 HQW or 1/19 
– 1/22 HQW for 




¼ WBA 1/3 BPW 7-26 
20 weeks or 








30 x WBA; wages 
in 2 qtrs 
 
4.25% HQW $111 $444 25% WBA 1/3 BPW 10-26 
20 weeks or 









1½ x HQW; 8 x 
WBA in last 2 
qtrs; $750 outside 
HQ 
1.923% BPW $39 $415 1/5 wages 1/3 BPW 15-26 
20 weeks or 









BPW; wages in 2 
qtrs; 1½ x HQW 
1/25 of the avg of 
wages in 4 qtrs of 
BP x 1.05 x 1.15 
$10 $247 
Lesser of ½ 




20 weeks or 








2 x AWW in 2 
different BP qtrs; 
total BPW = 6 x 
AWW 
1/22 avg wages 
paid in 2 highest 
qtrs of BP + $10 





$25 1/3 BPW 22-26 
20 weeks or 









1½ x HQW; 
$576.01 in HQ;  
 
$1,776.01 in HQ 
Eff. 3/4/12 
1/24 HQW + $8 per 







 $430   < $50  
Uniform 
duration 





30 x WBA; 
$3,500 minimum 
50% AWW + $25 





1/3 WBA 36% BPW 10-30 
13 weeks or 








1½ x HQW; at 
least $2,871 in 
HQ; or wages in 2 
or more BP qtrs 
totaling at least 
$17,206.80 (20 x 
State AWW  of 
$860.34) 
4.1% HQW + $6 for 

















20 weeks or 






At least $1,000 in 
HQ; $250 outside 
HQ 
Higher of 50% of 
1/13 HQW up to 
43% of State AWW 
or 50% of 1/52  
BPW up to 66⅔% 









Lesser of 1/3 
BPW or 26 x 
WBA 





40 x WBA; $780 
in HQ; wages in 2 
qtrs 
1/26 HQW $30 $235 $40 
Lesser of 1/3 
BPW or 26 x 
WBA 
13-26 
20 weeks or 








BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































1½ x HQW; 
$1,500 in 1 qtr; or 
wages in 2 qtrs 
of BP = 1½ 
maximum taxable 
wage base 
4% of the avg of 
the 2 HQWs 
$35 $320 
Greater of 
20% WBA or 
$20 
Lesser of 20 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
8-20 
20 weeks or 








BPW = 1½  x 
HQW and total 
wages > 7% of 
AAW or  BPW > 
50% of AAW 
1% BPW or 1.9% 
wages in 2 HQs  
$123  $431     
½ wages in 




BPW to HQW 










$3,868 in BP; 
$1,850 in HQW 
and wages in at 
least 1 other qtr 
of $800 
½ AWW $70 $354 ¼ WBA  
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
14-26 
20 weeks or 








1½ x HQW in BP 
and $400 in HQ; 
or wages in 3 of 4 
qtrs in BP and 
$400 in HQ 
1/25 HQW $16 $396 ¼ wages 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
12-26 








$2,800; $1,400 in 








20 weeks or 










employment at 20 
x State hourly 
minimum wage or 




60% of claimant’s 










base year up 
to 26 
1-26 










HQW and wages 
in at least 1 other 
qtr 
 
53.5% of AWW 
paid in BP qtr 







Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 
60% BPW 
16-26 
20 weeks or 








1½ x HQW; 
$1,600 in HQ 
1/26 HQW unless 
HQW ≤  $3,575  
then, 1/25 HQW 
$64 $405 














6 x AWW; wages 









HQW) x  
8 2/3 
13-26 
20 weeks or 








1½ x HQW; 
wages in 2 qtrs 
1/65 of  wages in 2 
HQs + ½ wages in 
3rd HQ 
$43 $470 60% WBA 
Weighted 
schedule of 
BPW to HQW 
12-26 
20 weeks or 











27.5% of State 
AWW; wages in 2 
qtrs 
 
½ claimant’s AWW 
+ DA of $1-$139 
based on 
claimant’s AWW 





20 x WBA + 
1 x WBA for 
each quali-
fying week in 
excess of 20 
20-26 
20 weeks or 








$1,500 and 1½  x 
HQW 
1/23 HQW $16 $368 $100 
Weighted 
schedule of 
BPW to HQW 
18-26  
20 weeks or 








BPW > $1,000 
and BPW > 1½ x 








1/3 WBA or 





Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 
3-26  
18 weeks or 







BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































$800 in HQ; 
$1,320 in BP; at 
least 20% of 
BPW outside HQ; 
16 credit weeks in 
BP 
1/23-1/25 HQW + $5 






$6 or 40% 
WBA 










40 x WBA; $280 
minimum; $77 in 
1 qtr; wages in 2 
qtrs 
1/11- 1/26 HQW $7 $133 WBA 
Uniform 
duration 






1½ x HQW.  200 
x minimum hourly 
wage in 1 qtr and 
400 x minimum 
hourly wage in 
BP; or 1,200 x 
minimum hourly 
wage in BP 
4.62% HQW + 
greater of $15 or 
5% of the benefit 
rate per dep, 
capped at the 
greater of $50 or 





1/5 WBA 36% BPW 
8-26  














1½ x HQW; 
$4,455 minimum; 
$1,092 in HQ 
1/20 HQW $42 $326 ¼ WBA 1/3 BPW 13-20  
20 weeks or 








$728 in HQ; 20 x 
WBA outside HQ 
1/26 HQW $28 $323 
¼ wages 
over $25 
1/3 BPW 15-26 
20 weeks or 








40 x WBA; 
$780.01 avg 
wages in highest 
2 qtrs; BPW 
outside HQW > 
the lesser of 6 x 
WBA or $900  







$50 or ¼ 
WBA 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or ¼ 
BPW 
13-26 
20 weeks or 








37 x WBA; wages 
in at least 2 qtrs 
 
1/25 HQW $61 $426 
Greater of 
$5 or ¼ 
WBA 
27% BPW 10-26 
20 weeks or 








$3,200 in BP and 
1½  x HQW 
1/26 HQW - $5 $25 $467 30% WBA 
27% 
BPW/WBA 





$2,203 HQW + 
BPW > 40% 
HQW 
Wages in the 2 
highest qtrs 
divided by 45 
$68 $425 
Greater of 
30% WBA or 
$40 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 
46% BPW 
21-26 
20 weeks or 








$2,700 in highest 
2 qtrs of BP 
1/50 of the 2 
highest qtrs 
$54 $378 $50 
See table in 
law 
12-26 
20 weeks or 








1½ x HQW and 
$858 in HQ; or 
$858 in HQ and 
39 x WBA in BP 
 









680 hours; wages 
in BP or alternate 
BP 
3.85% of avg of 
high 2 qtrs in BP 
$138 $583 
¼ of wages 
over $5 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 1/3 
BPW 






wages in 2 qtrs 
 
55% of 1/52 of 
median wages in 
worker’s wage 
class 




20 weeks or 








35 x WBA and 4 x 
WBA outside HQ 
4% HQW up to  







Lesser of 40 
X BPW or 26 
X WBR 
4-26 
20 weeks or 







BENEFITS COVERAGE TAXES 





Needed in Base 


































1.4 x HQW; at 
least 8% of 
statewide AAW 
4% HQW $32 $444 50% WBA 
Lesser of 26 
x WBA or 
30% BPW 





This document is prepared for general reference and may not reflect all the details of a State’s law.  It is posted on the Web site below.  Consult the State 
agency or the State law for authoritative information.  More detailed information may be found in the Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, 
which also includes information on Temporary Disability Insurance Programs, at http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp.  
 
KEY:    
Avg – Average AAW - Average Annual Wage AWW - Average Weekly Wage BP - Base Period 
BPW - Base Period Wages CQ - Calendar Quarter CY- Calendar Year Dep – Dependent 
DA - Dependents Allowance HQ - High Quarter  HQW - High Quarter Wages InAvg - Industry Average 
MBA - Maximum Benefit Amount WBA - Weekly Benefit Amount “=” - Equal To “>” - Greater Than 
“>” - Greater Than or Equal To “<” - Less Than or Equal To “%” - Percent “+” – Plus 
Qtrs - Quarters “x” - Times   
 
OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW: 
Waiting Week – Most States require a 1-week waiting period where the claimant must meet all eligibility conditions before benefits are payable.  The 
following States do not require a waiting week:  CT, DE, GA, IA, MD, MI, NV, NJ, VT (until 7/1/12), and WY.  The waiting week may be paid after a specified 
period of unemployment in AL, MO, TN, and TX.  In some States, it may be suspended under certain conditions. 
 
Base Periods – Almost all qualifying earnings are determined using a BP consisting of the first 4 of the last 5 completed CQs.  A few States use a different 
BP.  In the following States, more recent earnings may be used in an alternative BP under certain conditions:  AK,  AR, CA (effective 04/01/12) CO, CT, DE, 
DC, GA, HI, ID, IL, IA, KS, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OK, OR, RI, SC, SD, TN, UT, VT, VA, VI, WA, WV, and WI. 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
1 Reflects basic qualifying formula.  Some States have alternative qualifying formulas. 
2  When two amounts given, higher includes DA; the higher figure for both the minimum and maximum WBAs includes DA for the maximum number of deps.  
If state has a DA and only one amount is given, the maximum is the same with or without the allowance.  The total amount of DA payable in any week is 
limited by a cap.  CO and MN do not pay DA.  The lower amount is based on HQWs, and the higher amount is based on total BPWs. 
3 This column lists the amount of weekly earnings that are disregarded (will not reduce the WBA).  However, earnings in excess of those listed will be 
deducted from the WBA, resulting in a reduced payment.   
4 For States that use earnings, further calculation is needed to derive the number of benefit weeks--take the amount obtained from the formula listed (which 
is the claimant’s MBA) and divide it by the claimant’s WBA.  States with uniform duration do not have to calculate the number of benefit weeks since it is 
fixed at 25 or 26 weeks.  In MO, when calculating 1/3 BPW, BPW are limited to 26 x WBA for each quarter.  
5 Lists number of benefit weeks for only the regular program for total unemployment.  In States with uniform duration, all eligible claimants receive the same 
number of benefit weeks (in IL the maximum amount payable cannot exceed one’s BPW, resulting in some claimants being paid less than 26 weeks).  For 
FL the maximum number of weeks annually decreases from 23 with each half percent decline in the avg unemployment rate below 10.5% during the 3rd CQ 
of the preceding year; however, the maximum number of weeks cannot fall below 12 when the avg unemployment rate is less than 5%.  For WA the 
maximum number of benefit weeks decreases from 30 to the lesser of 26 or 1/3 BPW if the State unemployment rate falls to 6.8% or below. When MA is 
paying extended benefits and/or emergency unemployment compensation, the maximum number of weeks of regular benefits is 26.  For WI, with some 
limited exceptions, individuals with significant ownership interest in family partnerships, LLCs and corporations, and certain of their family members, are 
limited to 4 weeks of regular UI benefits.  In some States, additional weeks of benefits are payable under limited circumstances such as high unemployment, 
continuation of approved training, or workforce dislocations.  
6 Coverage is determined by the size of the employing unit’s payroll or the number of days or weeks worked during a CY and applies to employing units who, 
during any CQ in the current or immediately preceding CY, paid wages of $1,500 or more, or to employing units who employ one or more workers on at least 
1 day in each of 20 weeks during the current or immediately preceding CY; such employing units are liable for taxes, and the workers accrue benefit rights.  
For those States with “Any size,” all workers are covered regardless of payroll size or weeks worked.  States may have different thresholds for agricultural, 
domestic, and nonprofit employing units. 
7 Rates apply only to experience rated employers and do not include applicable non UI taxes, surtaxes, penalties, or surcharges.  In most States, rate year 
2011 begins on January 1, 2011, and ends on December 31, 2011.  In NH, NJ, TN, and VT rate year 2011 begins on July 1, 2011, and ends on June 30, 
2012.  Tax rates for 2012 will be posted in the July 2012 issue. For ME there is an additional 0.06% for the Competitive Skills Scholarship Fund on all 
employer rates.  The rates for IL include the fund building surcharge. 
8 New employer rate shown is the basic rate.  Higher rates may apply depending on industry classification and/or other factors:  AR (employers can elect to 
receive rate based on rate schedule), CO, DE (construction employers pay an avg industry rate), DC, IA (9.0% construction employers), IL (4.1%  
construction employers which includes the fund building surcharge), KS (6.0% construction employers), KY (foreign & domestic construction firms receive 
maximum rate), MA (8.62% new construction employers), ME (predetermined yield), MD (foreign contractors assigned avg industry rate, and in 2011 new 
construction employers headquartered in another state pay a 13.3% avg industry rate), MI (construction employers receive industry rate),  MN (high 
experience rating industries are assigned a rate of 9.69% plus base rate, assessments, and fees), MT, MO (greater of 3.51% or InAvg), NE, NJ, NY (highest 
rate assigned to employers with positive account balances or 3.4%, whichever is less), ND, OH (new construction employers pay InAvg), PA (new 
construction employers pay 9.7%), SD (6.0% construction employers), TN, TX, UT, VT (construction employers pay InAvg), WA (90% of InAvg), WV 
(construction & foreign entities pay 8.5%), WI (larger employers & new construction employers pay higher rate), and WY (InAvg, but not less than 1.0%).  NJ 
and LA rates depend on rate schedule in effect.  In RI new employers pay an additional 0.21% Job Development Fund. 
 
















This chapter discusses the financing of UI benefits and UI administration.  Generally, a Federal tax 
finances the administrative costs and some benefit payments.  State payroll taxes finance the costs of most 
benefits.  Federal law also considerably influences the financing provisions of state law.  
 
 
THE FEDERAL TAX AND THE FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TRUST FUND (UTF) 
 
AMOUNT OF TAX–Under the provisions of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), a Federal tax is 
levied on covered employers at a current rate of 6.2% on wages up to $7,000 per year paid to a worker in 
covered employment.  The law, however, provides a credit against Federal tax liability of up to 5.4% to 
employers who pay state taxes timely under an approved state UI program.  This credit is allowed regardless of 
the amount of the tax paid to the state by the employer.  Accordingly, in states meeting the specified 
requirements, employers pay an effective Federal tax of 0.8%, or a maximum of $56 per covered worker, per 
year.  This 6.2% tax includes a 0.2% tax increase scheduled to terminate at the end of June 2011.  The Federal 




Historical Note: Initially, the Federal tax was 1.0% (0.1% effective tax) of the total wages of a worker.  
By 1940, it had increased to 3.0% (0.3% effective tax) on wages up to $3,000.  Since then, the rate has increased 
a number of times, occasionally, on a temporary basis.  In 1985, the Federal tax reached its current level of 6.2% 
(0.8% effective tax) on taxable wages.  The taxable wage base increased to $4,200 in 1972; $6,000 in 1978; and 




 The credit against the Federal tax may be reduced if the state has an outstanding advance (commonly 
called a “loan”).  When states lack the funds to pay UI benefits, they may obtain loans from the Federal 
government.  To assure that these loans are repaid, Federal law provides that when a state has an outstanding 
loan balance on January 1 for two consecutive years, the full amount of the loan must be repaid before 
November 10 of the second year or the credit available to employers will be reduced until the loan is repaid.  
Section 3302(c), FUTA, provides for certain limits on this credit reduction.  Except for cash flow loans (loans 
obtained from January through September and repaid by September 30 of the same calendar year), interest is 
charged on all loans made on or after April 1, 1982 under permanent law.  The rate is the lesser of 10 percent or 
the rate of interest paid on the state reserve balance in the Federal UTF for the last quarter of the preceding 





USE OF FEDERAL REVENUES–The Federal tax funds the following costs: 
 
 Federal and state administrative costs for the UI program; 
 
 The Federal share of benefits paid under the Federal-State Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 1970 (this program “triggers on” during periods of high and rising 
unemployment);  
 
 The loan fund from which an individual state may obtain advances (or “loans”) whenever it lacks 
funds to pay UI due; and 
 
 Labor exchange services under the Wagner-Peyser Act, employment and training services for 
veterans and disabled veterans under Chapter 41 of Title 38 of the U.S. Code, and some labor 
market information program activities. 
 
THE UTF—The Federal UTF in the U.S. Treasury consists of 59 accounts: 
 
 One account for each state.  Each state account consists of the contributions and reimbursements 
collected by the state.  Interest earned on these amounts is credited to the state accounts.  Money 
is withdrawn from state accounts for benefits, refunds of contributions erroneously paid, and 
purposes authorized by Federal law.  
            
 The employment security administration account.  Each year, Congress appropriates from this 
account the funds necessary for administering the federal-state UI program, labor exchange 
services under the Wagner-Peyser Act, employment and training services for veterans and 
disabled veterans under Chapter 41 of Title 38 of the U.S. Code, and some labor market 
information program activities. 
 
 The extended unemployment compensation account reimburses the states for the Federal share of 
extended benefits. 
 
 The Federal unemployment account provides states with repayable advances for paying benefits. 
 
 The Federal employees compensation account finances benefit payments to former Federal and 
military employees. 
 
 Two accounts related to the Railroad Retirement Board. 
 
 All Federal payroll taxes are deposited into the employment security administration account.  Amounts 
equal to one-tenth of net monthly collections are automatically transferred to the extended unemployment 
compensation account. 
 
 On September 30 of each year, the net balance in the employment security administration account is 
determined.  If the amount in this account exceeds 40 percent of the prior year’s appropriation by Congress, then 
an “excess” exists.  This excess is transferred to the extended unemployment compensation account and/or the 
Federal unemployment account as provided by the Social Security Act unless the balance of each of these 
accounts exceeds its statutory ceiling.  The net balances of the extended unemployment compensation account 
and the Federal unemployment account are also determined on September 30 of each year. The statutory ceiling 
in the extended unemployment compensation account equals 0.5 percent of total wages in covered employment 
for the preceding calendar year.  For the Federal unemployment account, the statutory ceiling equals 0.5 percent 
of total wages in covered employment for the calendar year.  Excess balances are transferred between these 
accounts or to the administration account as required by the Social Security Act.  If all three accounts are at their 
statutory limits, then the excess amounts are distributed to the state accounts in the UTF in the same proportion 
that their covered payrolls bear to the aggregate covered payrolls of all states.  These are commonly called 







Technical Note:  The Social Security Act provides that the maximum balance in the extended 
unemployment compensation account is the greater of $750 million or 0.5 percent of total wages in covered 
employment.  Due to the growth in covered employment, the $750 million figure is effectively obsolete.  A 




With certain exceptions authorized by Federal law, Reed Act moneys may only be used for benefit 
payments.  A state may, through an appropriation of its legislature, use Reed Act moneys under certain 
conditions to supplement Federal administration grants in financing its UI program and system of public 
employment offices.   
 
Most states’ UI laws contain permanent provisions regarding the use of moneys transferred under 
Section 903 of the Social Security Act.  These provisions usually mirror the requirements of Federal law 
pertaining to “traditional” Reed Act distributions, including a provision that the moneys be used for the payment 
of UI benefits unless appropriated by the legislative body of the state for the administration of the state’s UI law 
or the state’s system of public employment offices. 
 
STATE TAXES AND OTHER STATE REVENUES 
 
 To enable employers to obtain credit against the Federal tax, all states finance the costs of UI benefits 
by imposing payroll taxes, commonly called “contributions,” on employers.  In addition, three states require 
employee contributions under certain conditions.  Federal law requires that nonprofit organizations, state and 
local governmental entities, and federally recognized Indian tribes be given the option of making “payments in 
lieu of contributions” (commonly called “reimbursements”). 
 
EMPLOYER TAXES—The amount of tax an employer pays depends on the number of its employees, the 
state’s taxable wages, and the contribution rate assigned the employer. 
 
 Since employers wish to receive the maximum credit of 5.4 percent against the Federal payroll tax, state 
laws provide for assignment of a contribution rate of 5.4 percent or higher.  In all states, an employer pays a 
contribution rate based on its “experience.”  In all states, new and newly covered employers pay a “new 
employer rate” until they meet the requirements for experience rating.  In some states, additional contributions 
are required when fund levels drop to specified points or to restore amounts expended for noncharged or 
ineffectively charged benefits.  Noncharged benefits are those charged to a general account rather than to an 
individual employer account.  Ineffectively charged benefits include those charged to inactive and terminated 
accounts, and those charged to an employer’s experience rating account after the previously charged benefits to 
the account were sufficient to qualify the employer for the maximum contribution rate.  In some states, the state 
UI agency collects additional taxes imposed on the employer’s payroll.  Although the revenues from these 
additional taxes are not deposited in the state’s unemployment fund, they sometimes serve UI or employment 
and training purposes. 
 
 In every state, an employer who has overpaid contributions is entitled to a refund.  These refunds may 










 Technical Note:  Federal and state laws provide for a “standard rate” of contributions.  At one time, the 
standard rate for Federal and state law purposes was identical; now this is not always the case.  For Federal 
purposes, a state must have a standard rate of at least 5.4 percent if its employers are to obtain the full credit 
against the Federal tax.  As a result, the Department of Labor accepts a 5.4 percent rate (or in its absence, the 
highest rate assigned based on experience) as being the standard rate for Federal law purposes.  Many state 
laws use the term standard rate in this sense.  Other state laws use the term differently; it may, for example, be 




EMPLOYEE TAXES—Only Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania levy UI taxes on workers.  The tax base is 
that applicable to employers except in Pennsylvania, where employee contributions are calculated on total gross 
covered wages paid for employment.  Worker taxes are deducted by the employer from the worker’s pay and 
forwarded with the employer’s taxes to the state agency.  In Alaska, the tax rate is equal to 27% of the average 
benefit cost rate, but not less than 0.5% or more than 1.0%.  In New Jersey, the tax rate is 0.3825% effective 
July 1, 2004 and thereafter.  Depending on the adequacy of the fund balance in a given year, Pennsylvania 
employees pay contributions ranging from 0.0% to 0.2% of total gross covered wages paid for employment.
  
 
INTEREST AND PENALTY FUNDS—In every state, an employer is subject to certain interest or penalty 
payments for delay or default in payment of contributions, and usually incurs penalties for failure or 
delinquency in filing required reports.  All states except Minnesota have set up special administrative funds, 
made up of such interest and penalties, to meet special needs.  The most usual statement of purpose includes one 
or more of these three items:  
 
 To cover expenditures for which Federal funds have been requested but not yet received, subject 
to repayment to the fund;  
 
 To pay costs of administration found not to be properly chargeable against funds obtained from 
Federal sources; or 
 
 To replace funds lost or improperly expended for purposes other than, or in amounts in excess of, 
those found necessary for proper administration.   
 
 A few of these states provide for the use of such funds for the purchase of land and erection of buildings 
for agency use or for the payment of interest on Federal advances.  In some states, the fund is capped; when it 
exceeds a specified sum, the excess is transferred to the unemployment fund or, in one state, to the general fund. 
      
TAXABLE WAGES—More than half of the states have adopted a higher tax base than that applicable under 
FUTA.  In these states, an employer pays a tax on wages paid to (or earned by) each worker within a calendar 
year up to the specified amount.  In addition, most of the states provide an automatic adjustment of the wage 
base if the FUTA is amended to apply to a higher taxable wage base than that specified under state law. 
 
 Some states have established flexible tax bases, i.e., bases that are automatically adjusted, generally on 
















Over $7,000 if 





Over $7,000 if 
Subject to FUTA 




Over $7,000 if 
Subject to FUTA 
AL $8,000 X AK* $34,600  AZ $7,000 X 
AR $12,000 X CO $10,000 X CT $15,000 X 
DE $10,500 X DC $9,000 X FL $7,0001 X 
GA $8,500 X HI* $34,200 X ID* $33,300  
IL* $12,740 X IN $9,500 X IA* $24,700 X 
KS $8,000 X KY $8,0002 X LA* $7,700 X 
ME $12,000 X MD $8,500 X MA $14,000 X 
MI $9,000 X MN* $27,000  MS $14,000 X 
MO* $13,000 X MT * $26,300 X NE $9,000 X 
NV* $26,600 X NH $12,0003  NJ* $29,600 X 
NM* $21,900 X NY $8,500 X NC* $19,700 X 
ND * $25,500 X OH $9,000  OK* $18,600  
OR* $32,300 X PA $8,000 X RI $19,000 X 
SC $10,0004 X SD $11,0005 X TN* $9,000 X 
TX $9,000  UT* $28,600 X VT $13,0006 X 
VA $8,000  VI* $22,600  WA* $37,300  
WV* $12,000 X WI $13,0007 X WY * $22,300 X 
NOTE: California and Puerto Rico are not included in this table since they neither have a taxable wage base above $7,000 nor a provision in 
their law that automatically adjusts the taxable wage base if FUTA is amended to apply to a higher amount than that specified under state law. 
 
¹ The taxable wage base is $7,000 for 2011, and $8,500 for 2012, 2013, and 2014.  Beginning in 2015, taxable wage base is $7,000 but increases 
to $8,500 any year principal is due on Title XII advances. 
2 The taxable wage base is $8,000 for 2011, $9,000 for 2012, and increases $300 annually until 2022, up to a maximum of $12,000. 
3 The taxable wage base is $12,000 for 2011, 2012, and 2013, and $14,000 for 2014.  
4 The taxable wage base is $10,000 for 2011, $12,000 for 2012, 2013, and 2014, and $14,000 for 2015. 
5  The taxable wage base is $11,000 for 2011, $12,000 for 2012, $13,000 for 2013, $14,000 for 2014, and $15,000 for 2015. 
6  The taxable wage base is $13,000 for 2011, $16,000 in 2012; beginning in 2013 when the trust fund has a positive balance and the state have 
no outstanding Title XII advances the taxable wage base increases by the same percentage as the increases in the state’s average annual wage.  
Additionally, beginning in 2013 the taxable wage base shall decrease by $2,000 if rates schedules I or III are in effect.  
7 The taxable wage base is $13,000 for 2011 and 2012, and $14,000 for 2013 and beyond. 
 













Table 2-2: COMPUTATION OF FLEXIBLE TAXABLE WAGE BASES 
Indexed Taxable Wage Base 
Computed As -- Period of Time Used -- 
State 





















75 rounded to  
nearest $100 
  X  N/A 
HI 
100 rounded to 
nearest $1001 
  X  N/A 
ID 
100 rounded to 
nearest $100 
   X N/A 
IL N/A X 
IA  
66 ⅔% of the state AWW, 
multiplied by 52, or the Federal 
taxable wage base; rounded to 
higher $100. 
X   N/A 
LA N/A X 
MN 
60 rounded to  
nearest $1,000 
 X   N/A 
MO N/A X 
MT 
80 rounded to  
nearest $100    X   N/A 
NV 
66 ⅔ rounded to 
nearest  $100    X   N/A 
NJ    
28 x state AWW 
rounded to higher $100   X N/A 
NM 
60 rounded to  
higher $100     X  N/A 
NC 
50 rounded to  
nearest $100    X   N/A 
ND 
70 rounded to  
nearest $100     X  N/A 
OK 
50 rounded to  
nearest $100      X X 
OR 
80 rounded to  
nearest $100      X N/A 
RI N/A X 
TN N/A X 
UT    
75% of the prior average  
fiscal year wage rounded to  
the higher $100 
 X  N/A 
VI 
60 rounded to  
nearest $100   X  N/A 
WA              
115% of previous year’s taxable 
wage base rounded to the lower 
$100, but not to exceed 80% of 
AAW for the 2nd preceding CY 
rounded to the lower $100 
X   N/A 
WV N/A X 
WY 
55 rounded to  
lower $100 
 X   N/A 








 All state laws use a system of experience rating by which individual employers’ contribution rates are 
varied on the basis of their experience with the risk of unemployment.  
 
 Experience rating systems are designed to encourage employers to stabilize employment, equitably 
allocate the costs of unemployment, and encourage employers to participate in the system by providing 
eligibility information. 
 
FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERIENCE RATING—State experience rating provisions have 
developed on the basis of the additional credit provisions of Section 3303(a), FUTA.  Federal law allows 
employers additional credit for a lowered rate of contribution if the rates were based on not less than 3 years of 
“experience with respect to unemployment or other factors bearing a direct relation to unemployment risk.”  
FUTA allows the states to extend experience rating tax reductions to new and newly covered employers after 
they have had at least 1 year of such experience.  Further, states allow new and newly covered employers a 
reduced rate (but not less than one percent) on a reasonable basis. 
 
 
STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERIENCE RATING—In most states, 3 years of experience with 
unemployment means more than 3 years of coverage and contribution experience.  Factors affecting the time 
required to become a “qualified” employer include: 
 
 The coverage provisions of the state law (“at any time” vs. “20 weeks”); 
 
 In states using benefits or benefit derivatives in the experience-rating formula, the type of base 
period and benefit year, and the lag between these two periods, which determine how soon a new 
employer may be charged for benefits;  
 
 The type of formula used for rate determination; and  
 
 The length of the period between the date as of which rate computations are made and the 




Historical Note:  The first state UI system in this country (Wisconsin) set up a separate reserve for 
each employer.  Employer contributions were credited to this reserve and benefits paid to former 
employees were charged to it as long as the account had a credit balance.  Most of the states enacted 
“pooled-fund” laws on the theory that the risk of unemployment should be spread among all employers and 
that workers should receive benefits regardless of the balance of the contributions paid by the individual 
employer and the benefits paid to such workers.  All states now have pooled unemployment funds. 
 
 
EXPERIENCE RATING FORMULAS—Within the broad Federal requirements, the experience rating 
provisions of state laws vary greatly. The most significant variations grow out of differences in the formulas 
used for rate determinations.  The factor used to measure experience with unemployment is the basic variable 
which makes it possible to establish the relative incidence of unemployment among the workers of different 
employers.  At present there are four distinct systems, usually identified as reserve-ratio, benefit-ratio, benefit-





 All systems have certain common characteristics.  All formulas are devised to establish the relative 
experience of individual employers with unemployment or with benefit costs.  To this end, all have factors for 
measuring each employer’s experience with unemployment or benefit expenditures, and all compare this 
experience with a measure of exposure - usually payrolls - to establish the relative experience of large and small 
employers.  However, the four systems differ greatly in the construction of the formulas, in the factors used to 
measure experience and the methods of measurement, in the number of years over which the experience is 
recorded, in the presence or absence of other factors, and in the relative weight given the various factors in the 
final assignment of rates. 
 
RESERVE-RATIO FORMULA—The reserve-ratio [(contributions minus benefits charged) divided by 
payroll] was the earliest of the experience rating formulas and continues to be the most popular.  The system is 
essentially cost accounting.  On each employer’s record are entered the amount of payroll, contributions, and the 
benefits paid to workers.  The benefits are subtracted from the contributions, and the resulting balance is divided 
by the payroll to determine the size of the balance in terms of the potential liability for benefits.  The balance 
carried forward each year under the reserve-ratio plan is ordinarily the difference between the employer’s total 
contributions and the total benefits received by workers since the employer became subject to the UI law.    
 
 Rates are assigned according to a schedule of rates for specified ranges of reserve ratios – the higher the 
ratio, the lower the rate.  Also, fluctuations in the state fund balance affect the rate that an employer will pay; an 
increase in the fund may trigger a tax rate schedule in which a lower rate is assigned and, conversely, a decrease 
in the fund balance may trigger a tax schedule requiring a higher rate.   
 
Table 2-3: RESERVE-RATIO FORMULA STATES 
State Years of Benefits and 
Contributions Used Years of Payrolls Used¹  State 
Years of Benefits and 
Contributions Used 
Years of Payrolls Used¹   
AZ All past years Average of 3 years, ending 6 
months before computation date 
AR All past years 
Average last 3 or 5 years, 
whichever is lower²   
CA All past years Average of 3 years, ending 6 
months before computation date 
CO All past years Average 3 years 
DC All since July 1, 1939 Average of 3 years, ending 3 
months before computation date 
GA All past years Average 3 years 
HI All past years Average 3 years ID All since Jan.1, 1940 Average 4 years 
IN All past years Aggregate 3 years KS All past years Average 3 years 
KY All past years Aggregate 3 years LA All since Oct.1, 1941 Average 3 years 
ME All past years Average 3 years MA All past years Last year 
MO All past years Average 3 years MT All years since Oct. 1, 
1981 
Average 3 years 
NE All past years Average 4 years NV All past years Average 3 years 
NH 
All past years. Last 5 years 
under specified conditions. 
Average 3 years NJ All past years 
Average last 3 or 5 years, 
whichever is higher 
NM All past years Average 3 years NY All past years 
Average of 5 years, ending 3 
months before computation date 
NC All past years Aggregate 3 years ND Last 6 years Average 3 years 
OH All past years Average 3 years PR Last 3 years Last 3 years 
RI All since Oct. 1, 1958 Average 3 years  
SD
All past years Aggregate 3 years 
TN All past years Average 3 years VI Last 3 years Last 3 years 
WV All past years Average 3 years WI All past years Last year 
¹ Years immediately preceding or ending on computation date, unless noted. 





BENEFIT-RATIO FORMULA—The benefit-ratio formula (benefits charged divided by employer’s payroll) 
also uses benefits as the measure of experience, but eliminates contributions from the formula and relates 
benefits directly to payrolls.  The theory is that, if each employer pays a rate which approximates his benefit 
ratio, the program will be adequately financed.  Rates are further varied by the inclusion in the formulas of 
schedules (effective at specified levels of the state fund in terms of dollar amounts), proportion of payrolls, or 
fund adequacy percentage.   
 
 Unlike the reserve-ratio, the benefit-ratio system is geared to short-term experience.  The following 
table shows the number of years used for each state in determining benefit ratios. 
 
Table 2-4: BENEFIT-RATIO FORMULA STATES 
State Years of Benefits 
Used 
Years of Payrolls Used 
(Years Immediately Preceding 
or Ending on Computation 
Date, Unless Noted) 
State Years of Benefits 
Used 
Years of Payrolls Used 
(Years Immediately Preceding or 
Ending on Computation Date, 
Unless Noted) 
AL Last 3 fiscal years Last 3 fiscal years CT Last 3 years Last 3 years, ending 6 months before 
computation date 
FL Last 3 years Last 3 years, ending 3 months 
before computation date IL Last 3 years Last 3 years 
IA Last 5 years Last 5 years MD Last 3 years Last 3 years 
MI1 Last 5 years Last 5 years MN Last 4 years Last 4 years 
MS Last 3 years Last 3 years OR Last 3 years Last 3 years 
PA1 All past years Average 3 years SC2 Last 10 years Last 10 years 
TX Last 3 years Last 3 years UT 
Last 4 years. If 4 
years not available, 
will use up to 1 year 
minimum. 
Last 4 years. If 4 years not available, 
will use up to 1 year minimum. 
VT Last 3 years Last 3 years VA Last 4 years Last 4 years 
WA Last 4 years Last 4 years WY Last 3 years Last 3 years 
1 Benefit-ratio predominates.  State also has a reserve ratio component. 
2 Beginning CY 2014, 3 years will be used.  State also uses an array system.   
 
 
BENEFIT-WAGE-RATIO FORMULA—The benefit-wage formula is radically different.  The formula is 
designed to assess variable rates which will raise the equivalent of the total amount paid out as benefits.  The 
percentage relationship between total benefit payments and total benefit wages in the state during 3 years is 
determined.  This ratio, known as the state experience factor, means that, on the average, the workers who drew 
benefits received a certain amount of benefits for each dollar of benefit wages paid and the same amount of 
taxes per dollar of benefit wages is needed to replenish the fund.  The total amount to be raised is distributed 
among employers in accordance with their benefit-wage ratios; the higher the ratio, the higher the rate. 
 
 Individual employers’ rates are determined by multiplying the employer’s experience factor by the state 
experience factor.  The multiplication is facilitated by a table which assigns rates that are the same as, or slightly 
more than, the product of the employer’s benefit-wage ratio and the state factor.  The range of the rates is, 
however, limited by a minimum and maximum.  The minimum and the rounding upward of some rates tend to 
increase the amount which would be raised if the plan were effected without the table; the maximum, however, 









Table 2-5: BENEFIT-WAGE-RATIO FORMULA STATES 
State Years of Benefits Used Years of Payrolls Used (Years Immediately 
Preceding or Ending on Computation Date) 
DE Last 3 years Last 3 years 
OK Last 3 years Last 3 years 
  
PAYROLL VARIATION PLAN—The payroll variation plan is independent of benefit payments to individual 
workers; neither benefits nor any benefit derivatives are used to measure unemployment.  Experience with 
unemployment is measured by the decline in an employer’s payroll from quarter to quarter.  The declines are 
expressed as a percentage of payrolls in the preceding period, so that experience of employers with large and 
small payrolls may be compared.  If the payroll shows no decrease or only a small percentage decrease over a 
given period, the employer will be eligible for the largest proportional reductions. 
 
 Alaska measures the stability of payrolls from quarter to quarter over a 3 year period; the changes 
reflect changes in general business activity and also seasonal or irregular declines in employment.  Also, Alaska 
arrays employers according to their average quarterly decline quotients and groups them on the basis of 




 Since various methods are used to identify the employer(s) who will be charged with benefits when a 
worker becomes unemployed and receives benefits, the laws address this issue in some detail.  In the reserve-
ratio and benefit-ratio states, it is the worker’s benefit payments that are charged; in the benefit-wage ratio 
states, the benefit wages.  There is no charging of benefits in the payroll-decline systems. 
 
 In most states, the maximum amount of benefits to be charged is the maximum amount for which any 
worker is eligible under the state law.  
 
 In the states with benefit-wage-ratio formulas, the maximum amount of benefit wages charged is usually 
the amount of wages required for maximum annual benefits. 
 
 
CHARGING MOST RECENT OR PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER—Some states charge the most recent 
employer on the theory that this employer has primary responsibility for the unemployment. All of the states that 
charge benefits to the last employer relieve the employer of these charges if only casual or short-time 
employment is involved. Charging the most recent base period employer assumes that liability for benefits is 
inherent in wage payments.  
  
Table 2-6: STATES THAT CHARGE MOST RECENT OR PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER 
State Employer Specified State Employer Specified 
GA Most recent.   ID 
ER who paid largest amount of BPW.  Charges omitted if 
worker continues to perform services for the ER. 
IL 
Most recent.  Charges omitted for ERs who employed 
claimant less than 30 days, except if the earnings from the 
ER allow the claimant to requalify following a 
disqualification. 
KY 
Most recent.  Charges omitted for ERs who employed 
claimant less than 10 weeks. 
ME 
Most recent.  Charges omitted for ERs who employed 
claimant less than 5 weeks. 
MI 
Most recent ER charged for first 2 weeks of benefits.  
Thereafter, BP employers charged proportionately (with 





Table 2-6: STATES THAT CHARGE MOST RECENT OR PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER 
State State State State 
NV 
ER who paid 75% of a claimant’s BPW, except if a 
reimbursing ER is liable.   
NH 
Most recent.  Charges omitted for ERs who paid claimant 
less than 4 consecutive weeks.  Benefits paid following 
disqualifications for voluntary leaving, discharge for 
misconduct and refusal of suitable work will be charged to 
the ER’s account who furnished the employment. 
NY 
Most recent ER charged 7 x claimant’s WBA; thereafter, BP 
ERs charged proportionately (with respect to wages). 
PR 
Most recent ER charged 50% of benefits paid and the 
remaining 50% charged proportionately to all BP employers. 
RI Most recent BP employer. SC 
Most recent.  Charges omitted for ERs who employed 
claimant less than 8 x WBA. 
VA 
Most recent.  Charges omitted for ERs who employed 
claimant less than 30 days or 240 hours. 
KEY:  ER = Employer 
 
CHARGING BASE-PERIOD EMPLOYERS IN INVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER—Some states 
limit charges to base-period employers but charge them in inverse order of employment.  This method combines 
the theory that liability for benefits results from wage payments with the theory of employer responsibility for 
unemployment; responsibility for the unemployment is assumed to lessen with time, and the more remote the 
employment from the period of compensable unemployment, the less the probability of an employer being 
charged.  A maximum limit is placed on the amount that may be charged any one employer; when the limit is 
reached, the next previous employer is charged.  The limit is usually fixed as a fraction of the wages paid by the 
employer or as a specified amount in the base period or in the quarter, or as a combination of the two.  Usually 
the limit is the same as the limit on the duration of benefits in terms of quarterly or base-period wages. 
 
 If a worker’s unemployment is short, or if the last employer in the base period employed the worker for 
a considerable part of the base period, charging employers in inverse chronological order gives the same results 
as charging the last employer in the base period.  If a worker’s unemployment is long, such charging gives much 
the same results as charging all base-period employers proportionately. 
 
 All the states that provide for charging in inverse order of employment have determined, by regulation, 
the order of charging in case of simultaneous employment by two or more employers. 
 
Table 2-7: STATES THAT CHARGE BASE-PERIOD EMPLOYERS IN INVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER 
State Inverse Order of Employment up to Amount Specified State Inverse Order of Employment up to Amount Specified 
CO ⅓ wages up to ⅓ of 26 x current WBA IA In proportion to BPW 
MA 36% of BPW NE ⅓ BPW 
SD In proportion to BPW.  Charges omitted for employers who 




CHARGING IN PROPORTION TO BASE-PERIOD WAGES—On the theory that unemployment results 
from general conditions of the labor market more than from a given employer’s separations, the largest number 
of states charge benefits against all base-period employers in proportion to the wages earned by the worker with 
each employer.  Their charging methods assume that liability for benefits is inherent in the wage payments 
creating the worker’s eligibility.  (Note that states combining this method with charging the most recent 









Table 2-8: STATES THAT CHARGE IN PROPORTION TO BASE-PERIOD WAGES 
State Special Provisions State Special Provisions 
AL X AZ X 
AR X CA X 
CT Charges omitted for ERs who paid claimant less than $500. DE X 
DC  X FL Charges omitted for ERs who paid worker less than $100. 
HI X IN 
Law also provides for charges to BP employers in inverse 
order. 
KS X LA X 
MD 
Principal ER will be charged for shut downs for 
convenience.  ERs participating in shared work will bear all 
charges. 
MN X 
MS X MO 
Charges omitted for ERs who employed claimant less than 
28 days or paid him less than $400. 
MT X NJ X 
NM X NC 
Amount charged to a BP employer’s account is the benefit 
allocated to such ER multiplied by 120%. 
ND X OH X 
OK 
If ER recalls a laid-off or separated EE and the EE 
continues to be employed, or voluntarily terminates 
employment or is discharged for misconduct within the BY, 
benefit charges may be reduced by the ratio of remaining 
weeks of eligibility to the total weeks of entitlement. 
OR X 
PA X TN X 
TX X UT X 
VT X VI X 
WA Charged to separating ER for certain quits with good cause. WV X 
WI 
Benefits are not charged to an ER constituting less than 5% 
of a claimant’s BPW. 
WY X 
KEY:  ER = Employer; EE = Employee    
 
 
                                    
 
NONCHARGING OF BENEFITS 
 
 Many states recognize that certain benefit costs should not be charged to individual employers.  This has 
resulted in “noncharging” provisions in practically all state laws using benefits in their formulas.  In the states 
which charge benefits, certain benefits are omitted from charging as indicated in the following information; in 
the states which charge benefit wages, certain wages are not counted as benefit wages.  
 
  The postponement of charges until a certain amount of benefits has been paid results in noncharging of 
benefits for workers whose unemployment was of very short duration.  In many states, charges are omitted when 
benefits are paid on the basis of an early determination in an appealed case and the determination is eventually 
reversed.  In many states, charges are omitted in the case of benefits paid under a combined wage claim.  In 
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, dependents’ allowances are not charged 





 Another type of noncharging is for benefits paid following a period of disqualification for a voluntary 
quit, misconduct, a refusal of suitable work, or for benefits paid following a separation for which no 
disqualification was imposed; e.g., because the worker had good personal cause for leaving voluntarily, or 
because of a job which lasted throughout the normal disqualification period and then was laid off for lack of 
work.  The intent is to relieve the employer of charges for unemployment caused by circumstances beyond the 
employer’s control.  The provisions differ with variations in the employer to be charged and with the 
disqualification provisions, particularly with respect to the cancellation and reduction of benefit rights.  In this 
summary, no attempt is made to distinguish between noncharging following a period of disqualification and 
noncharging where no disqualification is imposed.  Most states provide for noncharging where voluntary 
leaving or discharge for misconduct is involved and, in some states, refusal of suitable work.  A few of these 
states limit noncharging to cases where a worker refuses reemployment in suitable work. 
 
The following table provides information on which benefits are excluded from charging in the states.   Alaska, a 
payroll variation state, is excluded because benefit charges are not a factor in determining experience rates. 
 
 


















Continues to Work 
for Employer on 
Same Part-Time 
Basis 
AL  X  X X  X 
AZ  X X 
limited to compelling 
personal reasons not 
attributable to 
employer and not 
warranting 
disqualification, and to 





X  X 
AR X   X X  X 
CA  X  
limited to quits to take 
other jobs, 
accompanying spouse 
and irresistible impulse 
to use intoxicant2 
X  X 
CO  X X X2,3 X   
CT    
X, including quits to 
accompany spouse due 
to change in location 
of spouse’s 
employment 
X X  
DE  X X 
X, including quits to 
accompany spouse or 
to care for ill or 
disabled family 
member 
X  X 
DC    X X  X 


























Continues to Work 
for Employer on 
Same Part-Time 
Basis 
GA  X X 
X, includes claimants 
who quit to follow 
military spouse or quit 








HI X  X X X  X 
ID X X X X X   
IL   X 
X, including quits to 
accept another job, or 
to accompany a spouse 
who has been 
reassigned by the 
military2 
X X X 
IN   X X X  X 
IA X X X X X X  
KS X   X X  X 
KY   X X X   
LA  X  
X, including quits from 
part-time or interim 
job in order to protect 
full-time or regular job 
X X X 







MD  X  
X, including quits 
without good cause 
attributable to work, to 
accept a better job, or 
to enter approved 
training 




MA  X  X2
 
for claimant 
convicted of felony 
or misdemeanor 
  
MI    
X, including quits to 
accompany military 
spouse to new duty 
location 
X  X 
MN   X X X   
MS    
X, including quits to 
accompany military 
spouse to new duty 
location 
X X X 
MO  X X X4 X X  






















Continues to Work 
for Employer on 
Same Part-Time 
Basis 




employment in a 
different city, new 
military duty station, 
or for accepting 
insured work in 
construction industry 
X  X 
NV X  X 
X, including quits to 
accompany military 
spouse and to take 
other employment 
X   
NH   X 
separations resulting 
from physician-
certified inability to 
perform job duties due 
to pregnancy, illness or 
non-work related 
injury 
  X 
NJ  X  
X, including BY 
employer if worker left 
that job by a 
disqualifying 
separation2 
X, including BY 
employer if worker 




BY employer if 
separation due 





NM X X  X2 X2   
NY X   X X  X 
NC  X  X, including quits to accompany spouse X  X 
ND  X  X X   
OH  X X 
X, including quits from 
interim or part-time 
job to protect full-time 
job 
X 





OK  X  
X, including quits due 
to compelling family 
circumstances2 
X  X 
OR X X X X X  X 
PA  X  X X  X 
PR X       
RI  X  X X   
SC X X  X2
 
X2 






SD X X  X X   






















Continues to Work 
for Employer on 
Same Part-Time 
Basis 
TX  X  X2 X2   
UT X X X X X  X 
VT   X X X X X 
VA   X X5 
Separation due to 
violation of law 
leading to jail time. 
Refusal of 





VI        
WA X X  X2
 
X  X 
WV  X  X X   
WI  X  
X, including quits due 
to illness, disability, 
domestic abuse and to 
accompany spouse2 
   
WY X X  X, including quits to follow military spouse2 X  X 
¹ Most states limit noncharging to specific situations such as benefits paid in excess of amount payable under state law or if claimant would 
have been ineligible using only the in-state wages. 
² Includes separations due to domestic violence. 
3 If quit one construction job to take a better construction job when conditions of law are met.  Also, does not charge employer if claimant 
separates due to compelling family reasons, or to relocate to a new residence from which it is impractical to commute due to death of military 
spouse who was an active duty member of the US. Armed Forces, stationed in Colorado, and who was killed in combat. 
4 For claimants leaving to accept more remunerative job or quit unsuitable work within 28 days.   
5 For quits to accept other employment, to enter approved training, because of a non-job related injury or medical condition, or required in work 
release programs as a condition of release/parole.  Also for quits to accompany active duty military spouse to new assignment if relocation is 
due to permanent change of station order, new location is not readily accessible from individual’s place of employment, and spouse’s new 
duty assignment is located in a state that does not consider a person accompanying a military spouse to be leaving work voluntarily without 
good cause.  
  
 
Four states (Arkansas, Colorado, Maine, and North Carolina) have special provisions or regulations for 
identifying the employer to be charged in the case of benefits paid to seasonal workers.  In general, seasonal 
employers are charged only with benefits paid for unemployment occurring during the season, and nonseasonal 
employers with benefits paid for unemployment at other times.  In Maine, the claimant must also have seasonal 
base period wages for the seasonal employer to be charged benefits during the season. 
 
 A few states, including Arizona, Colorado, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming, provide that an employer’s account will not be 
charged for benefits paid to an employee who quit to escape domestic violence.  Several states noncharge 
benefits for reasons other than those listed in Table 2-9, or in addition to those reasons listed in Table 2-9.  For 
example, some states noncharge benefits paid to individuals who— 
 
 Were unable to work due to a disaster; 
 Quit for personal reasons such as lack of adequate child care, to relocate with a military spouse, or to 
care for a sick or disabled family member; 
 Were in training with the approval of the UI agency; 
 Were laid off when a permanent who was called to military duty returned and claimed his/her job; or 





TAXES PAYABLE TO UNEMPLOYMENT FUND 
 
 The requirements for rate assignments vary greatly among the states.  Each state law incorporates at 
least the Federal requirements for assigning reduced rates.  Many states require that all necessary contribution 
reports must have been filed and all contributions due must have been paid. 
 
Taxes not paid into the state’s unemployment fund are listed later in this chapter under the heading 
“Additional Taxes.” 
 
RATES AND RATE SCHEDULES—Schedules are used to convert the results of the formula used (that is, the 
reserve-ratio, benefit-ratio, benefit-wage-ratio or payroll variation) into a tax rate.  In a few benefit ratio states, 
the benefit ratio is itself the employer’s rate.  Several states use an “array” system where employers are annually 
ranked against each other, rather than through a schedule using predetermined experience levels.  Rate classes in 
array systems are determined by segregating wages paid by all state employers. For example, the highest rate 
class will consist of employers with the highest costs.  A new rate class will be triggered when employers in the 
highest class represent a certain percentage of the wages paid under state law.  The following states use array 
systems:  Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and 
Vermont. 
 
MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM RATES—Tax rates depend on the state’s fund balance.  In most states, low 
balances trigger schedules with higher rates and higher balances trigger schedules with lower rates.  However, 




Note: The following table indicates the range of base contribution rates provided for in state law. It 
does not indicate what rates are in effect for the current year.  For that information, the appropriate state UI 




In some states, the state law establishes an overall contribution rate that is the sum of various 
components, such as a basic contribution rate, a solvency rate, and social cost add-on.  Solvency taxes and social 
cost taxes that are treated by state law as distinctly separate taxes and that are added-on after the contribution 
rate has been calculated are listed in Table 2-11.  
 
 
Table 2-10: FUND REQUIREMENTS AND RANGE OF RATES 
(Payroll used is that for last year except as indicated) 
Most Favorable Schedule Least Favorable Schedule 
Range of Rates Range of Rates State 
When Fund Balance 
Minimum Maximum When Fund Balance Minimum Maximum 
AL1 ≥125% of desired level 0.14% 5.4% <70% of desired level 0.59% 6.74% 
AK2 Law authorizes agency to set rates ≥1% ≥5.4% Law authorizes agency to set rates ≥1% ≥5.4% 
AZ ≥12% of taxable payrolls 0.02% 5.4% <3% of taxable payrolls 0.02% ≥5.4% 
AR3
 
>5% of payrolls 0.0% 5.9% <0.4% of payrolls 0.9% 6.8% 
CA4 >1.8% of taxable payrolls 0.1% 5.4% <0.6% of taxable payrolls 1.5% 6.2% 
CO ≥$450 million 0.0% 5.4% ≤$0 1.0% 5.4% 




Table 2-10: FUND REQUIREMENTS AND RANGE OF RATES 
(Payroll used is that for last year except as indicated) 
Most Favorable Schedule Least Favorable Schedule 
Range of Rates Range of Rates State 
When Fund Balance 
Minimum Maximum When Fund Balance Minimum Maximum 
DE Dependent upon the state experience 
factor 0.1% 8.0% 
Dependent upon the state experience 
factor 
0.1% 8.0% 
DC >3.0% of payrolls 0.1% 5.4% ≤0.8% of payrolls 1.9% 7.4% 
FL4 Current adjusted benefit ratio 0.1% 5.4% Current adjusted benefit ratio 0.1% 5.4% 
GA ≥State-wide reserve ratio of 2.7% 0.01% 5.4% <State-wide reserve ratio of 1.25% 0.03% 7.29% 
HI1 Ratio of the current reserve fund to 
the adequate reserve fund is > 1.69 0.0% 5.4% 
Ratio of the current reserve fund to 
the adequate reserve fund is < 0.2 2.4% 5.4% 
ID State calculated average high cost 
multiple 0.18% 5.4% 
State calculated average high cost 
multiple 0.96% 6.8% 
IL Dependent upon the adjusted state 







Dependent upon the adjusted state 







IN4 ≥1.6% of payrolls 0.0% 5.4% <.2% of payrolls .75% 10.2% 
IA Current reserve fund ratio/highest 
benefit cost ratio ≥ 1.3 0.0% 7.0% 
Current reserve fund ratio/ highest 
benefit cost ratio < 0.3 0.0% 9.0% 








KY ≥1.18% of payrolls 0.0% 9.0% <$150 million 1.0% 10.0% 
LA $>1.4 billion 0.07% 4.86% <$400 million 0.09% 6.0% 
ME6
 
Reserve multiple of > 1.58 Varies >5.4% Reserve multiple of < 0.25 Varies >5.4% 
MD >5% of taxable payrolls 0.30% 7.5% ≤3.0% of taxable payrolls 2.2% 13.5% 
MA ≥1.75% of taxable payrolls 0.8% 7.8% <0.5% of taxable payrolls 1.58% 15.4% 
MI4 Based on benefit ratio7 0.06% 10.3% Based on benefit ratio7 0.06% 10.3% 
MN ≥0.75% of payrolls 0.1% 9.0% <$0 0.5% 9.4% 
MS4 Depends on statutory variables that 
comprise the general experience rate  
0.2% 5.4% Depends on statutory variables that 
comprise the general experience rate 0.2% 5.4% 
MO8 >$750 million 0.0% 5.4% <$350 million 0.0% 7.8% 
MT ≥2.6% of payrolls 0.0% 6.12% <0.25% of payrolls 1.62% 6.12% 








NV Rates set by agency in accordance 
with authorization in law 0.25% 5.4% 
Rates set by agency in accordance 
with authorization in law 0.25% 5.4% 
NH9
 
≥$300 million 0.1% 5.5% <$250 million 0.1% 8.5% 
NJ10, 11 ≥1.4% of taxable wages in prior year 0.3% 5.4% ≤ 0.49% of taxable wages in prior 
year 
1.2% 7.0% 
NM ≥2.3% of payrolls 0.03% 5.4% <0.3% of payrolls 2.7% 5.4% 
NY ≥5% of payrolls 0.0% 5.9% <0% of payrolls 0.9% 8.9% 




Table 2-10: FUND REQUIREMENTS AND RANGE OF RATES 
(Payroll used is that for last year except as indicated) 
Most Favorable Schedule Least Favorable Schedule 
Range of Rates Range of Rates State 
When Fund Balance 
Minimum Maximum When Fund Balance Minimum Maximum 
ND Rates set by agency in accordance 
with authorization in law 0.01% ≥5.4% 
Rates set by agency in accordance 
with authorization in law 0.01% ≥5.4% 
OH1 ≥30% above minimum safe level 0.0% 6.3% ≤60% below minimum safe level 0.3% Not 
Specified12 
OK ≥3.5 x 5-year average of benefits 0.1% 5.5% <2 x 5-year average of benefits 0.3% 9.2% 
OR13 ≥200% of fund adequacy % ratio 0.41% 5.4% <100% of fund adequacy % ratio 2.11% 5.4% 
PA Law authorizes agency to set rates 0.3% 7.7% Law authorizes agency to set rates 0.3% 7.7% 
PR >$589 million 1.0% 5.4% <$370 million 2.5% 5.4% 
RI4, 14 ≥6.4% of  payrolls 0.6% 7.0% <2.75% of payrolls 1.9% 10.0% 
SC Based on benefit ratio 0.0% >5.4% Based on benefit ratio 0.00% >5.4% 
SD4 ≥$11 million 0.0% 9.5% <$5.5 million 0.0% 9.5% 
TN ≥$850 million 0.01% 10.0% <$450 million 0.5% 10.0% 
TX Based on benefit ratio 0.0% 6.0% Based on benefit ratio 0.0% 6.0% 
UT16 15 Based on reserve factor calculation 0.0% 9.0% Based on reserve factor calculation 0.0% 9.0% 
VT1 ≥2.5 x highest benefit cost rate 0.4% 5.4% <1.0 x highest benefit cost rate 1.3% 8.4% 
VA Fund balance factor is ≥120% 0.0% 5.4% Fund balance factor is ≤50% 0.1% 6.2% 
VI Ratio of current balance to adequate 
balance is ≥ 2 0.0% 6.0% 
Ratio of current balance to adequate 
balance is <0.2 0.0% 6.0% 
WA No requirements for fund balance in 
law 0.0% 5.4% 
No requirements for fund balance in 
law 0.0% 5.4% 
WV
 
>3.0% of gross covered wages 0.0% 8.5%16 <1.75% of gross covered wages 1.5% 8.5%16 
WI ≥$1.2 billion 0.0% 8.5% <$300 million 0.07% 8.5% 
WY4 Based on benefit ratio 0.0% 8.5% Based on benefit ratio 0.0% 8.5% 
GENERAL NOTE:  Table 2-10 incorporates the various methods of determining the minimum and maximum rates under the least and most 
favorable circumstances.  In some states, these calculations include adjustments for solvency and social cost after the rate.  The rates above only 
reflect those tax rate ranges for contributions to be deposited into the Unemployment Trust Fund. 
 
1  Desired level in AL is 1.4 x the product of the highest payrolls of any 1 of the most recent preceding 3 FYs multiplied by the highest benefits 
payroll ratio for any 1 of the 10 most recent FYs; temporary adjustment in the rate schedule expires 9/30/11.  In HI, adequate reserve fund 
defined as the highest benefit cost rate during past 10 years multiplied by total taxable remuneration paid by employers in same year.  In OH, 
minimum safe level defined as an amount equal to 2 standard deviations above the average of the adjusted annual average weekly unemployment 
benefit payment from 1970 to the most recent CY prior to the computation date.  In VT, highest benefit cost rate determined by dividing the 
highest amount of benefits paid during any consecutive 12-month period in the past 10 years by total wages during the 4 CQs ending within that 
period. 
2  The employer’s rate is calculated by multiplying 80% of the average benefit cost rate by the employer’s experience factor; however, employers in 
the maximum rate class may not have a rate lower than 5.4%. 
3  The rates shown above do not include the additional contribution assessments (applicable to certain maximum rated deficit employers) of up to an 
additional 4.0%, and they do not include additional contribution assessments that may be applied under State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA) 
dumping statutes.  The solvency adjustment (stabilization tax) is included in calculation shown in this table.  Through June 30, 2011 0.25% of 
taxable wages collected are deposited in both the Training Trust Fund and the Unemployment Insurance Administrative Fund.  See Table 2-17.   
4  Social costs and/or solvency adjustments included in calculation of basic tax rate shown in this table.  See Table 2-11 for states with other 
adjustments. 




Table 2-10: FUND REQUIREMENTS AND RANGE OF RATES 
(Payroll used is that for last year except as indicated) 
Most Favorable Schedule Least Favorable Schedule 
Range of Rates Range of Rates State 
When Fund Balance 
Minimum Maximum When Fund Balance Minimum Maximum 
6  All rates reduced by .02% for Competitive Skills Scholarship Fund assessment; contribution category 20 may not be reduced below 5.4%. 
7  The rate is made up of three components:  chargeable benefit component (CBC), account building component (ABC), and the nonchargeable 
benefits component. 
8  The maximum rates do not include the surcharge (applicable to certain maximum rated deficit employers) of up to 1.0%.  In 2011, this surcharge 
could total 1.5%.  Additionally all rates are reduced by 0.05% to offset the unemployment automation surcharge. 
9  The rates in this table are reduced by .2% to offset the Administrative Contribution. 
10 Fund reserve ratio defined as fund balance as of 3/31 as a percentage of taxable wages in prior year. 
11 If the fund reserve ratio is ≥5% but <7.5%, contributions, except for those at the maximum rate, are reduced by 25%; if the fund reserve ratio is 
≥7.5% but <10%, contributions, except for those at the maximum rate, are reduced by 50%. 
12 Once the trust fund is more than 15% below the minimum safe level, the minimum and maximum rates change from year to year because there is 
a formula for determining the Minimum Safe Level rates that includes a flat tax rate and a variable factor in the calculation.  The flat tax rate 
and factor may change from year to year which will change the minimum and maximum rates from year to year.  The formula for the Minimum 
Safe Level rate when the trust fund is 60% or more below the minimum safe level includes the flat 0.2% rate increase.  The flat rate increase is 
then multiplied by three and the product divided by the average experience rated contribution rate for all employers as determined by the director 
for the most recent calendar year.  The resulting quotient shall be multiplied by an individual employer’s contribution rate.  The resulting product 
shall be rounded to the nearest tenth of one per cent, added to the flat rate increase.  The total shall be rounded to the nearest tenth of one percent.  
This becomes the Minimum Safe Level rate used in the rate table.   
13 The rates in this table are reduced by 0.3% for all employers except those assigned a 5.4% rate, during the first quarter of each odd-numbered 
year. 
14 Rates are reduced by 0.21% to offset the job development assessment. 
15 Employer’s benefit ratio is multiplied by the annual reserve factor (based upon fund solvency) to determine his/her base tax rate. 
16 Includes 1.0% surtax for debit balance employers. 
 
 
LIMITATION ON RATE INCREASES—Wisconsin prevents sudden increases of rates for individual 
employers by limiting an employer’s rate increase in any year to no more than 2 percent higher than the 
previous rate.  In Oklahoma, for employers with rates of 3.4 percent or more, the limitation on the rate increase 
is 2 percent in any year.  For employers with rates below 3.4 percent, their rate may not be increased to more 
than 5.4 percent in any year. 
 
ADJUSTMENTS— Table 2-10 does not include solvency taxes and social cost taxes that are treated by state 
law as distinctly separate taxes from the employer’s contribution rate.  The following table lists taxes that are 
either: 
 
 Based on the balance in a state’s unemployment fund (commonly called a solvency tax), or  
 
 Based on unrecovered benefit costs, such as noncharged benefits or ineffectively charged benefits 
(commonly called a socialized cost).  
 
These adjustments may be in the form of a direct modification of the employer’s tax rate (for example, by 
adding 0.1% to the employer’s tax rate) or by taking these costs into account when calculating the employer’s 
experience rate (for example, charging a prorated portion of socialized costs to the employer’s account in a 
reserve ratio state).  Reimbursing employers are exempted from solvency adjustments since they may already 
reimburse the state’s unemployment fund for 100% of their benefit costs.  Please note that depending upon the 




Table 2-11: ADJUSTMENTS FOR SOLVENCY OR SOCIAL COST RECOUPMENT 
State Name Amount Purpose 
AL Shared Cost Assessment1, 2, 3 Varies Social Cost 




Table 2-11: ADJUSTMENTS FOR SOLVENCY OR SOCIAL COST RECOUPMENT 
State Name Amount Purpose 
Solvency Tax Surcharge Varies Solvency 
CO 
Surcharge Tax Rate4 0.22% Social Cost 
CT Fund Balance Tax Rate Up to 1.4% Solvency 
DE Supplemental Assessment Rate 0.2% - 2.5% Solvency 
IL Fund Building Factor5 0.4% - 0.55% Solvency 
Social Charge Tax6 Varies7 Social Cost 
LA 
Solvency Tax Up to 30% of contributions due Solvency 
MA Secondary Adjustment When in effect from 0.3% - 0.9% Solvency 
MN Additional Assessment Rate 0.0% - 14.0% Solvency 
NH Emergency Power Surcharge8 0.5% Solvency 
NJ Solvency Addition 0.0% or 10% of rate Solvency 
NY Subsidiary Contribution 0.0% - 0.925% Solvency 
OH Mutualized Contributions 0.0% - 0.5% Social Cost 
OK Temporary Surcharge 0.0% - 33⅓% Solvency 
State Adjustment Factor1 0.0% - 1.5% Social Cost 
PA Solvency Measures9 Surcharge adjustment from -1.1% - 5.8% and additional 
contributions from 0.0% - 0.65% 
Solvency 
SD Adjustment Percentage .1% - 1.5% Solvency 
TN Premium Rate10 0.6% Solvency 
Replenishment Rate Varies Social Cost 
Deficit Assessment Up to 2.0% Solvency TX 
Surplus Credit Ratio11 Varies Solvency 
UT Social Tax Rate Varies Social Cost 
Fund Balance Factor 0.0% or 0.2% Solvency 
VA 
Pool Charge Rate Varies Social Cost 
Social Cost Factor Varies Social Cost 
WA 
Solvency Surcharge 0.0% - 0.2% Solvency 
WI Solvency Rate 0.0% - 1.35% Solvency 
WY Adjustment Factor12 Up to 1.5% 
Social Cost & 
Solvency 
GENERAL NOTE:  Social cost recoupments are generally payable each year.  Solvency adjustments are triggered by fund 
balances. 
 
1 Excludes new employers. 
2 For states with benefit-ratio systems, a social charge/solvency ratio is calculated by dividing total social charges/solvency 
charges by total taxable wages.  This ratio is added to the individual employer’s benefit ratio to determine the experience rate. 
3 During years when schedule A is in effect, employers at the minimum rate are excluded; during years when schedule 
   B is in effect, employers at the minimum rate who have not had any benefit charges in the last 3 fiscal years are excluded. 
4 The proceeds from the surcharge are split: 50% to the employment support fund; 30% - unemployment fund; and 20% - 
employment and training technology fund (see Table 2-17).  
5 Not applicable during 1st quarter 2011. 
6 Depending upon the procedure in place in a given year, the formula for calculating the social charge rate varies.  One of these 
variables includes a provision for a portion of the proceeds to be treated as payable to the Incumbent Worker Training Account 
when the fund balance equals or exceeds $750 million (see Table 2-17).  
7 The social charge rate is calculated to the nearest .01% and may not raise an employer’s total rate above 6.2%. 
8 During any year when the unemployment trust fund fails to be ≥$150 million throughout the next preceding calendar quarter and 
should the Commission determine that the surcharge is necessary to preserve the solvency of the fund.  
9 The surcharge adjustment is applicable to all contributory employers; new employers are excluded from the additional 
contributions. 
10 In effect until trust fund ≥$650 million. 
11 Reduces the general and replenishment rates, but in no case can the rates be reduced below 0.0%. 
12 Proceeds are split: 60% - social cost to the unemployment fund; 40% - Employment support fund (see Table 2-17). 
 
 
COMPUTATION, FUND TRIGGER, AND EFFECTIVE DATES AND NEW EMPLOYERS—The 
computation date is the end of the period used to determine the employer’s experience.  For example, a benefit-
ratio state may compute an employer’s experience rate using the benefits paid in the 3 years immediately 
preceding the computation date.  If a new or newly-covered employer has accrued sufficient experience as 
required under state law as of the computation date, the employer will henceforth be assigned a rate based on 





 The fund trigger date is the date the fund’s balance is determined for purposes of determining which rate 
schedule is used for the following tax year. 
 
 All state laws contain provisions describing the treatment of employers who are not eligible for 
experience rates.  To conform to Federal law, all states assign employers with 3 years of experience a rate based 
on experience.  Federal law allows states to reduce the experience period to no less than one year before 
assigning rates based on experience and allows states to assign new employer rates on a “reasonable basis,” but 
not less than 1%.  Typically, states assign either a flat rate to all new employers or a rate based on the new 
employer’s industry type.  In some states, these two methods are combined.  Most new employers receive a flat 
rate, while some high-cost industries, such as construction, receive the higher industry rate.  In some cases, the 
flat rate varies from year to year, depending on such factors as the fund balance. 
 
 






for New Rates 
Years Needed to Qualify for 
Experience Rating1 Reduced Rate for New Employers
2 
AL June 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 1 2.7% 
AK June 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 11 1.96% 
AZ July 1 July 31 Jan. 1 1 2.0% 
AR June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 3 2.9%3 
CA June 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 1 3.4% 
CO July 1 July 1 Jan. 1 1 Greater of 1.7%, actual rate, or, for 
construction industry, average industry rate 
CT June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 11 2.9% 
DE Oct. 1 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 2 2.1% 
DC June 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 3 2.7% or average rate for all ERs if higher 
FL June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 2 ½ 2.7% 
GA June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 3 2.62% 
HI Dec. 31 Nov. 30 Jan. 1 1 3.0% 
ID June 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 1 1.0% 
IL June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 31 3.35% or average industry rate if greater 
IN June 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 31 2.5%; 1.6% for government employers 
IA July 1 July 1 Jan. 1 3 1.0% 
KS June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 2 4.0%; construction ERs receive 6.0% 
KY July 31 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 3 2.7%; foreign and domestic construction 
firms receive maximum rate 
LA June 30 Sept. 1 Jan. 1 3 Up to 6.2% based on average industry rate 
ME June 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 2 Greater of predetermined yield or 1% 











for New Rates 
Years Needed to Qualify for 
Experience Rating1 Reduced Rate for New Employers
2 
MA Sept. 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 1 2.83% 
MI June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 24 2.7%; construction ERs receive average 
industry rate 
MN June 30 March 31 Jan. 1 1 2.7474% 
MS June 30 Nov. 1 Jan. 1 1 1.0% - 1.2% depending on years of liability 
MO June 30 Oct 15 Jan. 1 1 Greater of 3.51% or rate assigned to ER’s 
industrial classification 
MT Sept. 30 Oct. 31 Jan. 1 3 Average industry rate 
NE Dec. 31 May 315 Jan. 1 11 1.29% 
NV June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 2½ 2.95% 
NH Jan. 31 Jan. 315 July 1 1 1.7% 
NJ Dec. 31 March 31 July 1 3 2.8% 
NM June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 3 2.0% 
NY Dec. 31 Dec. 31 Jan. 1 1 Highest rate assigned to ERs with positive 
account balances or 3.4%, whichever is less 
NC Aug. 1 July 31 Jan. 1 2 1.2% 
ND Sept. 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 3 1.6% 
OH July 1 July 1 Jan. 1 1 2.7%, except construction ERs pay industry 
average rate 
OK July 31 Dec. 316 Jan. 1 1 1.0% 
OR June 30 Aug. 31 Jan. 1 1 3.1% 
PA June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 1½1 3.7030%; construction employers pay 9.2% 
PR June 30 Dec. 31 Jan. 1 1 2.7% - 3.4% depending upon the tax schedule 
in effect 
RI Sept. 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 3 Higher of 1.0% or the 5-year benefit cost rate 
for non-rateable ERs up to a max. of 4.2% 
SC July 1 June 305 Jan. 1 11 Rate applicable to rate class 13 
SD Dec. 31 Dec. 31 Jan. 1 2 1.2% for first year; 1.0% for second if 
positive balance 
TN Dec. 31 Dec. 315 July 1 3 2.7%, except average industry rate when 
industry reserve ratio is 0.0% or less 
TX Oct. 17 Oct. 1 Jan. 17 1 Greater of 2.7% or industry rate 
UT July 1 June 30 Jan. 1 1 Average industry rate up to 9.5% 
VT Dec. 31 Dec. 31 July 1 1 Lower of average industry rate or rate class 
eleven, but not less than 1%8 
VA June 30 June 30 Jan. 1 1 2.52% 










for New Rates 
Years Needed to Qualify for 
Experience Rating1 Reduced Rate for New Employers
2 
WA July 1 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 21 
90, 100, or 115% of industry average rate 
depending upon benefits charged and taxes 
collected from new employers during the 
previous three years. 
WV June 30 Jan. 1 Jan. 1 3 2.7%, construction and foreign entities pay 
7.5% 
WI June 30 Sept. 30 Jan. 1 1½ 3.25% or 3.4% 
WY June 30 Oct. 31 Jan. 1 3 Average industry rate 
1 Period shown is period throughout which employer’s account was chargeable or during which payroll declines were measurable.  AK, CT, 
IN, and WA: in states noted, requirements for experience rating are stated in the law in terms of subjectivity; IL and PA: in which 
contributions are payable; NE: in addition to the specified period of chargeability, contributions payable in the 2 preceding CYs; SC: 
coverage. 
2 When rate varies, it must be no less than 1%.   
3 New employers who have been experience rated in another state are given the option of using their previous experience, or the new employer 
rate.  The new employer rate must be at least 1.0% plus the stabilization tax rate in effect. 
4 An employer’s rate will not include a nonchargeable benefits component for the first 4 years of subjectivity. 
5 MO uses a calculation based on the average balance of the 4 CQs.  In NE, May 30 is the last day the administrator decides the next year’s tax 
rate based on quarterly trust fund balances of preceding year.  NH can also use quarterly trust fund levels to activate quarterly changes in tax 
rates.  TN can also use June 30 trust fund balance to activate a 6-month tax schedule. 
6 In some circumstances, the trust fund trigger date can be July 1. 
7 For newly qualified employers, computation date is end of quarter in which employer meets experience requirements and effective date is 
immediately following quarter. 
8 Exception:  Foreign corporations classified in 236, 237, or 238 North American Industry Classification System code shall pay the average 
rate as of most recent computation date paid by all employers so classified. 
 
 
RATE REDUCTION THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS—In about half of the states, 
employers may obtain lower rates by making voluntary contributions.  In reserve ratio states, a voluntary 
contribution increases the balance in the employer’s reserve so that a lower rate is assigned which will save 
more than the amount of the voluntary contribution.  In benefit-ratio states, an employer pays voluntary 
contributions to cancel benefit charges to its account, thereby reducing its benefit ratio. 
 
 
Table 2-13: STATES PERMITTING RATE REDUCTION THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS 
State Due Date1 Additional Information2 
AZ On or before January 31. No additional information. 
AR On or before March 31. 
Not permitted if rate increased because of knowingly 
violating/attempting to violate state law regarding transfers of 
experience and assignment of rates. 
CA3 By last working day in March in CY to which reduced rate would 
apply. 
Cannot reduce by more than 3 rates.  ER must not have negative 
account balance or not have any unpaid amounts owed.  Not allowed 
for any year in which schedule E or F or emergency solvency 
surcharge in effect. 
CO Before March 15. No additional information. 
GA Within 30 days following the date upon which a notice is mailed. No additional information. 
IN Within 30 days of receipt of rate notice. No additional information. 
KS Within 30 days of mailing of rate notice.   
No rate may be reduced more than five rate groups for positive 
balance ERs.  Negative balance ERs may have their rates reduced to 
the highest five rates for positive balance ERs. 




Table 2-13: STATES PERMITTING RATE REDUCTION THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS 
State Due Date1 Additional Information2 
LA Within 30 days of mailing of notice of benefits charged to ER’s 
experience rating account. 
May not be permitted if solvency tax, advance interest tax, or special 
assessment to finance bonds used to prepay Federal loan is assessed. 
ME Within 30 days of mailing of rate notice.  Can be extended for 10 days 
for good cause. 
No additional information. 
MA 
No later than 30 days after date of issuance of notice of ER’s 
contribution rate. 
ER must be assigned contribution rate, file all required reports, and 
pay all contributions, interest, penalties due.   
MI Within 30 days of mailing of notice of adjusted contribution rate.  No additional information. 
MN Within 120 days of January 1. 
Contribute up to amount of benefits charged to account during 
period ending June 30 of preceding year plus 25% surcharge (No 
surcharge 2011-2013).  Not refundable unless request made in 
writing within 30 days of mailing of notice of new tax rate.  Must not 
be delinquent in any amount. 
MO On or before following January 15. ER must be eligible for experience rate and must include signed 
written statement identifying it as voluntary payment. 
NE Before January 10. Limited to amount likely to reduce one rate category. 
NJ 
Within 30 days of mailing of ER’s rate notice.  May be extended 60 
days for good cause.  If contribution not made within extended period, 
ER becomes subject to a penalty of 5% or $5.00, whichever is greater, 
up to $50.00.  
If ER transfers all/part of business to a successor in interest and both 
parties at time of transfer are under common ownership or control, 
neither may make voluntary transfers in year of transfer and the 
following year. 
NM On or before March 1. No additional information. 
NY On or before April 1. No additional information. 
NC Within 30 days of mailing of rate notice. No additional information. 
ND Within 4 months of beginning of year. No additional information. 
OH  By December 31 following computation date. No additional information. 
PA Within 30 days of mailing of rate notice.  Can extend for good cause. No additional information. 
SD Before February 1. No additional information. 
TX 
No later than 60 days after mailing date of rate notice.  May extend an 
additional 15 days.  If payment insufficient to cause decrease in ER’s 
rate, Commission will notify ER and grant an extension, not to exceed 
total of 75 days. 
No additional information. 
WA By February 15. 
May contribute part or all benefits charges from most recent 2 years 
ending June 30.  Only eligible if tax rate increased at least 12 rate 
classes from prior tax rate year.  
WV Within 30 days of mailing of rate notice. No additional information. 
WI 
During November or, if mailed, either postmarked by November 30 or 
received no later than 3 days following that date.  Under certain 
circumstances, can pay up to 120 days after beginning of CY. 
Can only lower one rate unless catastrophic event.  Not available if 
ER has outstanding tax liabilities.  Not available for 5 years for 
certain ERs whose benefit charges exceed their contributions. 
KEY:  ER = Employer 
 
1 Federal law requires that voluntary contributions must be made “prior to the expiration of 120 days after the beginning of the rate year” (Section 
3303(d), FUTA).  This column contains additional state limitations for the voluntary contribution to affect the applicable rate year. 
2 Since Federal law limits refunds to erroneous payments, if a voluntary contribution does not lead to a reduced rate or if an employer changes its mind, 
no refund can be made. 
3 Program is not in effect when rate schedule E or F is in effect, or in calendar years to in which the emergency solvency surcharge is in effect, as 









TRANSFER OF EMPLOYERS’ EXPERIENCE 
 
Because of Federal requirements, no rate can be granted based on experience unless the state has at least 
a 1-year record of the employer’s experience with the factors used to measure unemployment.  Without such a 
record, there would be no basis for a rate determination.  For this reason, all state laws specify the conditions 
under which the experience record of a predecessor employer may be transferred to an employer who, through 
purchase or otherwise, acquires the predecessor’s business.  In some states, the authorization for transfer of the 
record is limited to total transfers; i.e., the record may be transferred only if a single successor employer 
acquires the predecessor’s organization, trade, or business and substantially all of its assets.  In other states, the 
provisions authorize partial as well as total transfers; in these states, if only a portion of a business is acquired by 
any one successor, that part of the predecessor’s record which pertains to the acquired portion of the business 
may be transferred to the successor. 
 
 In most states, the transfer of the record in cases of total transfer automatically follows whenever all or 
substantially all of a business is transferred.  In the remaining states, the transfer is not made unless the 
employers concerned request it. 
 
 Under most laws, transfers are made whether the acquisition is the result of reorganization, purchase, 
inheritance, receivership, or any other cause.  Delaware, however, permits transfer of the experience record to a 
successor only when there is substantial continuity of ownership and management.   
 
 Some states condition the transfer of the record on what happens to the business after it is acquired by 
the successor.  For example, in some states there can be no transfer if the enterprise acquired is not continued; in 
3 of these states (California, the District of Columbia, and Wisconsin) the successor must employ substantially 
the same workers.  In 22 states1, successor employers must assume liability for the predecessor’s unpaid 
contributions, although in the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, successor employers are 
only secondarily liable. 
 
 Most states establish by statute or regulation the rate to be assigned to the successor employer from the 
date of the transfer to the end of the rate year in which the transfer occurs.  The rate assignments vary with the 
status of the successor employer prior to the acquisition of the predecessor’s business.  Over half of the states 
provide that an employer who has a rate based on experience with unemployment shall continue to pay that rate 
for the remainder of the rate year; the others provide that a new rate be assigned based on the employer’s own 
record combined with the acquired record. 
 
To address concerns regarding employers who avoid liability for UI benefits charged to their accounts 
through the manipulation of payrolls, Congress enacted the SUTA Dumping Prevention Act of 2004 (“SUTA” 
refers to state unemployment tax acts).  This Act required state UI laws to provide for: 
 
 mandatory transfers of experience when there is substantial commonality of ownership, 
management, or control at the time of acquisition of trade or business; and 
 
 no transfers of experience when the acquiring party is not otherwise an employer at the time of 
acquisition and when the state agency finds that acquiring the business was solely or primarily for 
the purposes of obtaining a lower rate of contributions. 
 
In all other situations, it is left to the states to determine the circumstances under which experience may be 
transferred.   
 
 
                         




The following table provides information about state UI law provisions about these other situations. 
 
Table 2-14: TRANSFER OF EXPERIENCE FOR EMPLOYER RATES 
Total Transfers Partial Transfers 
Rate for Successor Who Was an 
Employer Prior to Acquisition 












AL X   X   X 
AK X     X  
AZ X   X X X  
AR X   X X X  
CA  X  X X  X 
CO X   X X X  
CT By agency 
interpretation  
By agency 










Only if there is 
substantial 
continuity of 
ownership and  
management 
 X  X 
DC1 X    X X  
FL  X  X X  X 
GA X  





X X  X 
HI  X    X  
ID 
Only if predecessor 

















X  X 
IL X   X  X  
IN X   X  X  
IA X  X  X  X 
KS X   X X X  
KY X  X   X  
LA X  X   X  




Table 2-14: TRANSFER OF EXPERIENCE FOR EMPLOYER RATES 
Total Transfers Partial Transfers 
Rate for Successor Who Was an 
Employer Prior to Acquisition 












MD X   
Limited to firms 
formerly located 
in another state 
X X X 
MA X    X X  
MI X   X  X  
MN X  X    X 
MS X   X X X  
MO X  
Limited to 
acquisitions of all 
or substantially all 
of business 
 X  X 
MT X4   X4    X 
NE X  X    X 
NV  X  X   X 
NH X   X X X  
NJ X  







were not owned 
or controlled by 
same interest 
X Limited to total 
transfers only  
NM X   X X X  
NY X  X  X  X 
NC5 X   X  X  
ND1  X  X  X  
OH X  







were not owned 
or controlled by 
same interest 
X X  
OK X   X X  X 
OR X  X  X X6 X6 




were not owned 
or controlled by 
same interest 




were not owned 
or controlled by 
same interest 
X X  
PR X     X  
RI X  X   X  




Table 2-14: TRANSFER OF EXPERIENCE FOR EMPLOYER RATES 
Total Transfers Partial Transfers 
Rate for Successor Who Was an 
Employer Prior to Acquisition 












SD Except as noted in 
next column 
If ownership of 
both entities is 
not substantially 
the same 
   X  
TN X  X  X X 
 
 
TX X   X X X  
UT X  X    X 
VI X  X   X  
VT X    X  X 
VA X  X   X  
WA X  X    X 
WV X  
Limited to 
acquisitions of 
substantially all of 
a business 
  X  
WI X  X  X  X 
WY X      X 
1 In DC, if total wages allocable to transferred property are less than 25% of predecessor’s total; and in ND, transfer may be denied if good 
cause shown that transfer would be inequitable. 
2 If management, ownership, or control is substantially the same for the successor as for the predecessor and there is a continuity of the business 
activity by the successor. 
3 Any business purchased free and clear of liens through bankruptcy will receive the state average contribution rate, if contribution rate for the 
predecessor business is greater than the state average; otherwise, the successor business assumes the predecessor’s experience. 
4 Except if ownership, management, or control of both entities is not substantially the same, in which case the transfer is optional. 
5 No transfer when assets of predecessor are acquired in a sale in bankruptcy, unless successor employing unit shares common ownership with 
predecessor. 
6 The rate is dependent upon the date of transfer. 
7 If the predecessor’s experience rated account has a debit balance and when there is an acquisition or change in the form or organization of an 




This section discusses various payroll taxes that are not deposited in the state’s unemployment fund.  In 
general, it is limited to those taxes where state law contains a current taxing authority; taxes which by statute 
could be assessed only for a temporary period in the past are not included.  Reserve funds where the taxing 
authority has expired are, however, listed when the reserve fund continues to exist.  As will be noted from the 
following tables, not all states have additional taxes and not all of these apply to all employers. 
 
Loan and Interest Repayment Taxes — Some states have the authority to float bonds to pay benefit costs, 
thereby avoiding the need to obtain Federal loans.  In these states, special taxes may be assessed to pay off the 
bond as well as any costs associated with the bond.  Since interest must be paid on Federal advances and since 
interest may not be paid from the state’s unemployment fund, several states have established special taxes to pay 






Table 2-15: STATES WITH LOAN AND INTEREST REPAYMENT TAXES 
State Tax Amount1 When Payable Specific Purposes 
AL Additional rate 
Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
By May 15th following year interest 
becomes due 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
AR Advance interest tax 0.2% 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 





Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 





Rate determined based on 
amount due 
When bonds are outstanding 
Pay bonds issued to pay 
UC, Federal advances, and 
bond costs 
Bond assessment 
Not specified.  Assessment 
is a % of ER’s charged tax 
rate 
When bonds are outstanding 
Pay bonds issued to pay 
UC, Federal advances, and 
bond costs CT 
Special assessment 
 
Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 






Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
DC Interest surcharge 1% 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
FL Additional rate 
Rate determined based on 
amount due 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
HI Special assessment 
Rate determined based on 
amount due 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 




Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 






Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 





1.4% on $15,000 wage 
base2, 3 
When bonds are outstanding 
Pay bonds issued to pay 
Federal advances and bond 
costs 
ME Special assessment 
Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
MN Special assessment 2% to 8% of quarterly taxes 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 





Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
MO 
Bond and loan assessment 
 
Rate determined based on 
amount due 
When bonds or loans are 
outstanding 
Pay principle, interest, and 
administrative expenses 




Rate determined based on 
amount due 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
NJ Advance interest tax 
Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 





Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
PA Advance interest tax Up to 1.0%2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
PR Advance interest tax  
Rate determined based on 
amount due 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 





.3% wages Quarterly Pay principal and interest 
SC Additional surcharge 
Rate determined base on 
amount due 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
TN Interest tax 
Rate determined based on 
amount due2 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 





Table 2-15: STATES WITH LOAN AND INTEREST REPAYMENT TAXES 




Based on amount due2 
When bonds or loans are 
outstanding 
Interest and cost of bonds  
WA Interest payment tax 0.15%2 
Based on balance of interest 
payment fund and projected interest 
due 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
WV Assessment 
0.35% on EEs, % on ERs 
on $21,000 tax wage base = 
to EE assessment3 
When bonds are outstanding 
Retire bonds used to pay 
Federal advances and cost 
of bonds 
 
WI Federal interest tax 5 
Rate determined based on 
amount due 
When interest is due on Federal 
advances 
Pay interest on Federal 
advances 
KEY:  ER = Employer; EE = Employee 
 
1 Percentage figures include percent of taxable payroll, unless otherwise indicated.   
2 AL, CT, ID, LA, ME, MO, OR, PA, TX, and WA exclude reimbursing ERs.  CO excludes governmental entities, reimbursing 
nonprofit organizations, political subdivisions electing the special rate, negative balance ERs, and ERs with positive balances of 7.0% 
or more.  NJ excludes reimbursing employers, nonprofit organizations, and governmental entities or instrumentalities.  TN excludes 
ERs with no benefit charges for 2 years and no negative balance for the same 2 years; IA excludes governmental ERs and ERs 
assigned a zero rate; OR excludes zero rated ERs; DE excludes reimbursing governmental entities or instrumentalities and nonprofit 
organizations; PA excludes new ERs.  In some states, it is not clear whether the tax applies only to contributory employers. 
3   The proceeds from the assessment is split: 0.19% - administration and job development; 0.02% - core UI and employment services; 
and 0.3% principal and interest account (See Table 2-17). 
4 Interest payment is not the sole purpose of interest payment surtaxes in the following states.  LA: also used for payment of bonds 
issued to pay Federal advances, debt service, and administrative costs; TX: also to pay debt service on bonds issued to avoid or pay 
Federal advances; WV: also to retire bonds.   




Reserve Taxes —These taxes are deposited in a reserve fund established under state law.  The principal in the 
reserve fund is used for UI purposes (such as paying benefits or interest on Federal advances).  Any interest 
earned on the reserve fund is deposited in another fund where it is used for other purposes, such as job training 
and paying the collection costs of the reserve tax.  Unlike employer contributions, which are held in the Federal 
Unemployment Trust Fund until needed to pay benefits, these reserve fund moneys are not protected by the 
Federal withdrawal standard which restricts the use of contributions to the payment of benefits and other 
specified purposes.  This means that state legislatures may, if the state constitution allows, redirect the reserve 
fund’s principle to other uses.  Even if the taxing authority has expired, reserve taxes are listed in the following 
table when the reserve fund continues in existence.   
 
 
Table 2-16: STATES WITH RESERVE TAXES:  
PRINCIPAL USED FOR UI PURPOSES, INTEREST USED FOR UI OR NON-UI PURPOSES 
State Surtax Amount1 When Payable Purpose 
ID Reserve 
Taxable wage rate less the 
assigned contribution rate 
and training tax rate 
If as of September 30th of the preceding 
year the Reserve Fund balance is < 1% of 
state taxable wages or <= 49% of the 
Employment Security Fund 
Loans to the employment security fund, 
and interest on loans; interest accrued is 
deposited in the Dept. of Commerce and 
Labor Special Administration Fund 
IA Reserve 
0-50% of contributions due, 
not to exceed $50,000,000 in 
total contributions annually 
If as of July 1st of the preceding year the 
Reserve Fund balance is < $150,000,000 
Pay UI; interest accrued is used for UI 
and ES administrative costs 
NE State UI 0-20% of contributions due When unemployment fund meets 
specified solvency requirements2 
Pay UI; interest accrued is deposited 




Table 2-16: STATES WITH RESERVE TAXES:  
PRINCIPAL USED FOR UI PURPOSES, INTEREST USED FOR UI OR NON-UI PURPOSES 
State Surtax Amount1 When Payable Purpose 
NC Reserve Fund 20% of contributions due 
If as of August 1st of the preceding year 
the balance of the Reserve Fund is > 
$163,349,000 or the balance of the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund is > 
$500,000,000 
Pay UI or interest on Federal advances; 
interest accrued is deposited into the 
Worker Training Trust Fund 
KEY:  ES = Employment Service 
 
1 Percentage figures include percent of taxable payroll, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The reserve tax is in effect unless any of the following occur:  The average balance in the state unemployment fund at the end of any 3 months 
   in the preceding CY is greater than 1% of state taxable wages for the same preceding year; the balance in the state unemployment fund equals 
  or exceeds 30% of the average month-end balance of the state’s account in the Unemployment Trust Fund for the three lowest calendar 
  months in the preceding year; or the state advisory council determines that a 0% state UI tax rate is in the best interests of preserving the 




Taxes for UI Administration or Non-UI Purposes —States also collect a wide array of taxes which are 
established for administrative purposes.  These purposes may be UI administration, job training, employment 
service administration, or special improvements in technology.  These taxes are not deposited in the state’s 
unemployment fund, but in another fund designated by state law.  Since Federal grants for the administration of 
the UI program may not be used to collect non-UI taxes, almost all legislation establishing non-UI taxes provide 
that a portion of the revenues generated will be used for payments of costs of collecting the tax.  Expired taxes 




Table 2-17: STATES WITH TAXES FOR UI ADMINISTRATION OR NON-UI PURPOSES 





0.06%2 Expires September 30, 2011 Job search/placement 
State Training and 
Employment Program 
0.1%3  Each year Development of skilled workforce 
AK 
Technical and Vocational 
Education Program 
0.1% 2, 3 
 
Each year Vocational and technical training 
AZ Job Training Tax 0.1% Expires December 31, 2011 Job training 
Extended Benefit 0.1%2 When state’s EB account is 
≤0.2% payroll 
Pays noncharged costs of federal-
state EB 
AR 
Stabilization Tax -0.1% to 0.8%4 Through June 30, 2015 
0.25% of taxable wages collected 
are deposited in both the Training 
Trust Fund and the Unemployment 
Insurance Administrative Fund. 
CA Employment and Training Tax  
0.1%  (excluding negative 
balance ERs) 
Each year Training and administration costs 
CO Surcharge Tax Rate5 0.22%2 Each year 
50% - employment support fund, 
30% unemployment fund; and 20% 
employment and training technology 
fund  






0.2%  Quarterly 
Improve benefit claim eligibility 
determinations, reemployment 





Table 2-17: STATES WITH TAXES FOR UI ADMINISTRATION OR NON-UI PURPOSES 
State Tax Name Amount1 When Payable Purpose 
GA Administrative Assessment6 .08%2 Quarterly 
Employment services and 
administration 
HI 
Employment and Training 
Fund Assessment 
0.01%2 Quarterly Employment services and training 
ID Training Tax 3.0% of taxable wage rate  
Excludes deficit ERs from rate 
class 6.  Expires Dec. 31, 
2011. 
Training 
KY Additional Contribution 0.3%  
When insufficient Federal 
funds are made available 
Administration 
 
LA Social Charge Tax7  Varies8  
When fund balance is >$750 
million 
Training 













Quarterly, applies to ERs with 
6 or more EEs and 2 years as a 
subject employer 
Medical Security Trust Fund 
 
 MA 
Workforce Training Fund 
Contribution 
0.075%10 Quarterly Training 




0.15% of taxable wages2 
Quarterly, suspended if IUR 
>5.5% until IUR <4.5% 




0.05%2, 12 Expires Dec. 31, 2011 UI automation 
MT Administrative Fund Tax 0.13% or 0.18% (depending 
upon rate class)13 Quarterly Administration 
NV Employment and Training 0.05%2 Quarterly Employment and training of the 
unemployed  
NH Administrative Contribution 0.2% Quarterly Administration and training 
Medical Malpractice Liability 
Insurance Premium Assistance 
Fund 
$3 per employee Each year 
Medical malpractice liability 
insurance premium assistance 
Supplemental Workforce Fund 
for Basic Skills 
0.0175% Quarterly Remedial education 
Surcharge for Catastrophic 
Illness in Children 




Catastrophic Illness in Children 




0.1% - Employer rate 
 
0.025% - Employee rate 
Quarterly  
Customized training grants to ERs 
and unions for incumbent workers, 
individual training grants for 
displaced workers, OSHA training 
grants, youth transition to work 
grants 









Wage Security 0.03%2 
1st quarter of every odd-
numbered year 
Pays last payroll check of bankrupt 
ERs 
PR Special Tax 1.0%2 Quarterly Employment, training, and 
administration 
RI Job Development Assessment 0.51% of taxable wages2, 14 Quarterly 
Administration, job development, 
core and employment services 
SC Administrative Contingency 
Assessment 0.06%
2 Quarterly Job placement for claimants  
SD Investment SD Future Fee 0 - 0.6% rated ERs; 0.05% 
new ERs2 Quarterly 





Table 2-17: STATES WITH TAXES FOR UI ADMINISTRATION OR NON-UI PURPOSES 




0.1% Quarterly Job training 
WA Special Unemployment 
Assistance    
0.02%2 
Quarterly, terminates if 
Federal funding increases 
Employment Assistance Program 
WI 
Administrative Account 
Contribution   
0.2%, but agency may reduce Quarterly UI and ES administration 
WY Adjustment Factor 
40% of annual 
noncharged/ineffectively 
charged adjustment factor2 
Quarterly Workforce development program, 
administration 
KEY:  ER = Employer; EE = Employee 
 
1 Percentage figures include percent of taxable payroll, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 AK, AL, AR, HI, MN, MO, RI, SD, WA, and WY exclude reimbursing ERs; AL excludes new ERs, and ERs assigned the minimum rate under 
schedule A and any ER whose account has not been charged during the 3 preceding FYs but pay the min. rate under schedule B, and also 
excludes reimbursing ERs, new ERs and ERs paying at least 5.4% but not more than 5.45%; CO excludes governmental entities, reimbursing 
nonprofit organizations, and political subdivisions electing the special rate, and exempts ERs whose benefit charge account balance for the last 3 
FYs is less than $100, and ERs whose benefit charge balance is zero; GA excludes reimbursing ERs and ERs who are assigned the minimum 
positive reserve rate or maximum deficit reserve rate; MS excluded state boards, instrumentalities, and political subdivisions and nonprofit 
organizations; NV excludes reimbursing ERs and ERs who pay 5.4%; OR excludes ERs paying 5.4%; PR excludes governmental entities and 
political subdivisions, those employers with a rate of higher than 4.4% shall have the special tax rate capped so as to not increase the employer’s 
rate above 5.4%;  SC excludes nonprofit organizations, certain governmental ERs and ERs paying 5.4%. 
3 Taken from employee portion of unemployment tax. 
4 Through June 30, 2011, 0.25% of taxable wages collected are deposited in both the Training Trust Fund and the Unemployment Insurance 
Administrative Fund. 
5 The proceeds from the surcharge are split: 50% to the employment support fund; 30% to the unemployment fund; and 20% to the employment 
and training technology fund (see Table 2-11). 
6  Administrative assessment is repealed December 31, 2011. 
7 Depending upon the procedure in place in a given year, the formula for calculating the social charge rate varies.  One of these variables includes a 
provision for a portion of the proceeds to be treated as payable to the Incumbent Worker Training Account when the fund balance equals or 
exceeds $750 million (see Table 2-11). Incumbent Worker Training Program must be reauthorized prior to July 1, 2014. 
8 The social charge rate is calculated to the nearest .01% and may not raise an ER’s total rate above 6.2%. 
9  Contribution rates may not be reduced for new ERs below 1% nor below 5.4% for employers in category 20.  
10 Administrator shall adjust rate to substantially equal $18 million.  
11 Scheduled to fall to 0.1% on July 1, 2011.  
12 The percentage of the surcharge may be adjusted downward to ensure the total amount of the surcharge does not exceed $13 million annually. 
13 Governmental contributory ERs pay 0.05% through 6/30/08 and 0.09% thereafter, and reimbursable ERs pay 0.08%. 
14 The proceeds from the assessment is split: 0.19% - administration and job development; 0.02% - core UI and employment services; and 0.3% 
principal and interest account (See Table 2-15). 
 
 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR FINANCING BENEFITS PAID TO EMPLOYEES OF 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND INDIAN 
TRIBES 
 
THE REIMBURSEMENT OPTION—As discussed in the Coverage chapter, amendments made to FUTA in 
1970, 1976, and 2000 require coverage of most services performed for certain nonprofit organizations, state and 
local governments, and federally recognized Indian tribes.  These amendments also require that states permit 
these entities to elect to make “payments in lieu of contributions” (more commonly called “reimbursements”) to 
a state’s unemployment fund.  Prior to these amendments, states were not permitted to allow nonprofit 
organizations or Indian tribes to finance their employees’ benefits on a reimbursable basis because of the 
experience-rating requirements of Federal law. 
 
 Most state laws provide that reimbursing employers will be billed at the end of each calendar quarter, or 
other period determined by the agency, for the benefits paid during that period which are attributable to service 
in their employ.  A second method, mostly limited to nonprofit organizations, bills the nonprofit at the end of 
each calendar quarter, or other time period specified by the agency, at a flat rate which is based on a percentage 




because it spreads benefit costs more uniformly throughout the calendar year.  Alabama and North Carolina 
mandate this second method for nonprofits, while 17 states2 permit a nonprofit the option of choosing either 
method, subject to the approval of the state agency.   Arkansas is the only state to extend this method beyond 
nonprofits.  Arkansas requires the State of Arkansas to use the first method, while nonprofit organizations and 
political subdivisions that choose reimbursement must use the second method. 
 
 Although states may noncharge benefits to reimbursing employers, few do.  Unlike contributing 
employers, who share noncharged benefit costs through such devices as minimum contribution and solvency 
rates, a reimbursing employer will not fully pay its noncharging costs. Only one state which noncharges benefits 
to reimbursing employers has developed a system for having such employers bear the costs of such noncharges.  
In Mississippi, political subdivisions reimbursing the fund may elect to pay 0.25 percent of taxable wages as a 
condition of having benefits noncharged under the same conditions as contributory employers. 
 
 Some state laws permit two or more reimbursing employers jointly to apply to the state agency for the 
establishment of a group account to pay the benefit costs attributable to service in their employ.  This group is 
treated as a single employer for the purposes of benefit reimbursement and benefit cost allocation. 
  
SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS—Generally, state laws treat 
governmental entities the same as nonprofit organizations and Indian tribes for financing purposes.  However, 
treatment of governmental entities differ in the following ways: 
 
 The state law may designate the state as a whole as a governmental entity and choose for it the 
financing option.  (Effectively, the state legislature elects the state’s financing option.)   
 
 Governmental entities using the contribution option must or may, depending on state law, use a 
contributions system different than those applicable to other employers in the state.  (Unlike 
nonprofit organizations and Indian tribes, the Federal experience-rating requirements do not apply 
to state governments and their political subdivisions.) 
 
 A governmental entity may be liable for the full amount of extended benefits paid based on 
service in its employ.  The Federal government does not share these costs because governmental 
entities do not pay the FUTA tax which pays the Federal share.  (This extended benefit rule 
applies to Indian tribes as well.) 
 
The following table indicates how states treat governmental entities. 
 
Table 2-18: FINANCING PROVISIONS FOR GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
Options in Addition to 
Reimbursement 
Options in Addition to 
Reimbursement 
State State’s Method 




State State’s Method 




AL Reimbursement X  AK  X  
AZ  X  AR  X  
CA  X X CO Reimbursement X  
CT Reimbursement X  DE   X 
DC  X  FL  X  
GA Contribution1 X  HI  X  
                         




Table 2-18: FINANCING PROVISIONS FOR GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
Options in Addition to 
Reimbursement 
Options in Addition to 
Reimbursement 
State State’s Method 




State State’s Method 




ID  X  IL2 Reimbursement X  
IN  X  IA  X X 
KS  X X KY  X  
LA  X  ME Contribution1   
MD  X  MA   X 
MI  X  MN  X  
MS Reimbursement X X MO  X  
MT   X NE  X  
NV  X  NH Reimbursement X  
NJ  X X NM Reimbursement X X 
NY Reimbursement X  NC  X  
ND  X X OH  X  
OK Contribution  X OR  Reimbursement X X 
PA Reimbursement X  PR  X  
RI  X  SC  X  
SD Reimbursement X  TN  X X 
TX   X UT Reimbursement X  
VT3 Reimbursement X  VA  X  
VI  X  WA Reimbursement X X 
WV  X  WI Reimbursement X  
WY  X  
 
 
1 GA and ME: governmental entities can elect direct reimbursement. 
2 Benefits paid to state employees are financed by appropriation to the state Department of Employment Security, which then reimburses the 
  unemployment compensation fund for benefits paid. 
3 State institutions of higher education have an option of contributions or reimbursement; all other state agencies must reimburse. 
 
 California has three separate plans for governmental entities.  The state is limited to contributions or 
reimbursement.  Schools have, in addition to those two options, the option of making quarterly contributions of 
0.5 percent of total wages to the School Employee’s Fund plus a variable local experience charge to pay for 
“administrative indiscretions.”  The Local Public Entity Employee’s Fund and School Employee’s Fund have 
been established in the state Treasury to which political subdivisions and schools, respectively, contribute a 







 Kansas and Massachusetts have developed a similar experience-rating system applicable to 
governmental entities that elect the contributions method.  Under this system, three factors are involved in 
determining rates:  required yield, individual experience, and aggregate experience.  In Kansas, the rate for 
employers not eligible for a computed rate is based on the benefit cost experience of all rated governmental 
employers.  In this state, no employer’s rate may be less than 0.1 percent.  In Massachusetts, the rate for 
employers not eligible for a computed rate is the average cost of all rated governmental employers but not less 
than 1 percent.  Massachusetts also imposes an emergency tax of up to 1.0 percent when benefit charges reach a 
specified level.  
  
 In Montana, governmental entities that elect contributions pay at rates ranging from 0.06% to 1.5% (in 
0.1 percent intervals) on total wages.  Rates are adjusted annually for each employer under a benefit-ratio 
formula.  New employers are assigned the median rate for the first year in which they elect contributions.  
Governmental rates become effective July 1, rather than January 1, as is the case of the regular contribution rate 
system.  
 
New Mexico permits political subdivisions to participate in a “local public body unemployment 
compensation reserve fund” which is managed by the risk management division.  This special fund reimburses 
the state unemployment fund for benefits paid based on service with the participating political subdivision. The 
employer contributes to the special fund the amount of benefits paid attributable to service in its employ plus an 
additional unspecified amount to establish a pool and to pay administrative costs of the special fund. 
 
 North Dakota political subdivisions contribute to a special fund managed by the Office of Management 
and Budget.  This fund reimburses the state’s unemployment fund for benefits paid based on service with the 
participating political subdivision. 
 
 Oregon has a “local government employer benefit trust fund” to which a political subdivision may elect 
to pay a percentage of its gross wages.  The rate is redetermined each June 30 under a benefit-ratio formula.  No 
employer’s rate may be less than 0.1 percent nor more than 5.0 percent.  This special fund then reimburses the 
state unemployment compensation fund for benefits paid based on service with political subdivisions that have 
elected to participate in the special fund and repayments of advances and any interest due because of shortages 
in the fund. 
 
 In Tennessee, governmental entities who are contributing employers will pay rates ranging from 0.3 
percent to 3.0 percent determined according to its reserve ratio. 
 
 In Washington, counties, cities, and towns may elect regular reimbursement or the “local government 
tax.”  Other political subdivisions may elect either reimbursement or regular contributions.  Rates are 
determined yearly for each employer under a reserve ratio formula.  The following minimum and maximum 
rates have been established: 0.2 percent and 3.0 percent.  No employer’s rate may increase by more than 1.0 
percent in any year.  At the discretion of the Commissioner, an emergency excess tax of not more than 1.0 
percent may be imposed whenever benefit payments would jeopardize reasonable reserves.  New employers pay 
at a rate of 1.25 percent for the first two years of participation. 
 
 
BONDING REQUIREMENTS—Since reimbursing employers pay the unemployment fund after benefits have 
been paid, Federal law expressly authorizes states to establish bond or other reasonable requirements to assure 
that, in the event the reimbursing employer ceases to exist or otherwise does not pay, the unemployment fund is 
not left with unreimbursed costs.  The following table lists those states which have imposed bond or other 













AL X  Percent of taxable payrolls determined by director or administrator.  Not to exceed the maximum percentage charged to contributing employers. 
AK X  Amount determined by regulation. 
AR X  Prepays estimated charges each quarter. 
CO  X1 Greater of 3 x amount of regular and ½ EB paid, based on service within part year or sum of such payments during past 3 years, but not to exceed 3.6% nor less than 0.1% of taxable payrolls. 
CT  X2 Percent of taxable payrolls not to exceed the maximum contribution rate in effect. 
DC  X 0.25% of taxable payroll. 
GA X  2.7% of taxable payroll as of various alternative dates, or if none, as determined by the Commissioner. 
HI X  0.2% of total payrolls. 
ID  X Determined on basis of potential benefit cost. 
IA X  2.7% of taxable payrolls.  (Provision currently inoperative) 
KS  X 5.4% of taxable payrolls. 
KY  X3 2.0% of total payrolls. 
ME X X By regulation; not to be less than 2.0% nor more than 5.0% of taxable wages. 
MD X  2.7% of taxable wages if the organization has taxable wages less than 25 x the taxable wage base or 5.4% of taxable wages if the organization’s taxable wages equal or exceed 25 x the taxable wage base. 
MA  X Percent of taxable payrolls not to exceed the maximum contribution rate in effect. 
MI X4  4.0% of estimated annual payroll. 
MS  X 1.35% of taxable payrolls for nonprofit organizations and 2.0% of taxable payrolls for governmental entities. 
NC X  Non-profits must keep 1% of prior year’s taxable payroll in unemployment fund. 
NJ  X Percent of taxable payrolls not to exceed the maximum contribution rate in effect. 
NM X5  2.7% of contributions x the organization’s taxable wages. 
OH X  3.0% of taxable payrolls but not more than $2,000,000. 
OR X  2% of total wages for the 4 CQs immediately preceding effective date of election to reimbursable status. 
PA X  1.0% of taxable payroll for the most recent 4 CQs prior to election of reimbursable status. 
PR X  Determined by rule. 
RI  X No greater than double amount of estimated tax due each month, but not less than $100. 
SC  X 
Bond from nonprofit organizations which do not possess real property and improvements values in excess 
of $2 million.  Regulation requires bond or deposit of minimum of $2,000 for employers with annual 
wages of $50,000 or less.  For annual wages exceeding $50,000, an additional $1,000 bond required for 
each $50,000 or portion thereof. 
SD  X Maximum effective tax rate x organization’s taxable payroll. 
TX  X Higher of 5.0% of total anticipated wages for next 12 months or amount determined by the commission. 









VA  X Determined by commission based on taxable wages for preceding year. 
VI X  1.35% of taxable payrolls. 
WA  X Amount sufficient to cover benefit costs but not more than the amount organization would pay if it were liable for contributions. 
WI X  4.0% of taxable payrolls of preceding year or anticipated payroll for current year, whichever is greater. 
WY  X No amount specified in law. 
1 Regulation states that bond or deposit shall be required if it is $100 or more. 
2 If agency deems necessary because of financial conditions. 
3 Bond or deposit required as condition of election unless agency determines that the employing unit or a guarantor possesses equity in real or 
personal property equal to at least double the amount of bond or deposit required. 
4 Applies only to nonprofit organizations who pay more than $100,000 in remuneration in a CY. 

















This chapter deals with the monetary requirements of state UI laws, including work history, benefit 
amounts, and the length of time during which a worker may receive UI. 
 
 Although the states have developed many different ways to determine monetary entitlement to UI, there 
are also many similarities.  This chapter discusses the following: 
 
 The wages and employment needed in a “base period” to qualify.   
 
 The period during which UI may be collected, commonly called the “benefit year.” 
 
 The amount payable for a week of total or partial unemployment. 
 
 Dependents’ allowances. 
 
 Waiting periods. 
 







While most workers are employed in the state in which they reside, many workers regularly commute to 
a different state to work, work in more than one state, or move to a different state to look for new work when 
they become unemployed.  The law of the state under which the worker claims UI benefits applies as it would 
for any other worker.   Determinations on eligibility, disqualifications, and the amount and duration of benefits 
are made by the state in which the wages were paid.  However, the process by which these workers apply for UI 
benefits may vary.  (For example, the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan provides a method of filing for UI 
benefits in the state in which a worker has qualifying wages even though the worker is not physically present in 
that state.) 
 
Although this chapter analyzes monetary factors separately, the relationship between these factors is 





Note:  Information regarding deductible income provisions are located in the nonmonetary 




BASE PERIOD AND BENEFIT YEAR 
 
 As previously stated, a worker's benefit rights are determined using wages and employment during a 
period of time called the base period.  Benefits may be paid during a period of time called the benefit year.  
Workers who exhaust their benefits before the end of a benefit year must wait until a new benefit year is 
established before they can again draw benefits. 
 
BENEFIT YEARS—The benefit year is a 1-year or 52-week period during which a worker may receive 
benefits based on a previous period of employment.  In all states, the beginning date of the benefit year depends 
on when a worker first files a “valid claim,” meaning the worker meets minimal wage and employment 
requirements.  In most states, the benefit year begins with the week in which the valid claim is filed.  Exceptions 
are: 
 
TABLE 3-1: WHEN BENEFIT YEAR BEGINS - OTHER THAN THE WEEK A FIRST CLAIM IS FILED 
AR Benefit year begins with the first day of the quarter in which a claim is first filed.  As a result, the benefit “year” ranges from 
40 to 52 weeks. 
NY Benefit year consists of 53 weeks beginning with the effective date of a valid claim. 
 
 
BASE PERIODS—The base period is the time period during which wages earned and/or hours/weeks worked 
are examined to determine a worker’s monetary entitlement to UI.  Almost all states use the first 4 of the last 5 
completed calendar quarters preceding the filing of the claim as their base period.  Massachusetts uses the four 
completed calendar quarters preceding the first day of the benefit year.  Minnesota uses the last four completed 
calendar quarters provided the effective date of the claim is not during the month immediately following the 
fourth completed calendar quarter.   
 
 Because base period employment and/or earnings are an imperfect proxy for labor market attachment, 
there are instances when workers with labor market attachment are ineligible for UI benefits.  To address this, 
some states developed expanded definitions of the base period. 
 
 
Alternative Base Periods (ABP)—A base period consisting of the first 4 of the last 5 completed calendar 
quarters results in a lag of up to 6 months between the end of the base period and the date a worker becomes 
unemployed/files a claim.  As a result, the worker’s most recent work history is not used when making an 
eligibility determination.  For workers failing to qualify under the regular base period, several states use an 
ABP.  For example, if the worker fails to qualify using wages and employment in the first 4 of the last 5 
completed calendar quarters, then the state will use wages and employment in the last 4 completed calendar 
quarters.   
 
 
Extended Base Periods (EBP)—Several states allow workers who have no wages in the current base period to 
use older wages and employment under certain conditions.  These conditions typically involve illness or injury.  
For example, a worker who was injured on the job and who has collected workers’ compensation benefits may 
use wages and employment preceding the date of the worker’s injury to establish eligibility.  (Note that some 
state laws may describe these base periods as “alternative” base periods.) 
 









TABLE 3-2: STATES WITH ALTERNATIVE AND EXTENDED BASE PERIODS 
State ABP/EBP State ABP/EBP 
AK 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  BP extended up to 4 quarters if claimant was 
incapable of working during the greater part of a 
quarter 
AR 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
-----------------------------------------------------------------  
EBP:  Up to 4 quarters if worker has insufficient wages to 
establish a claim because of a job-related injury for which the 
worker received worker’s compensation 
AZ 
EBP:  Last 4 completed quarters following previous BP 
when new BY overlaps preceding BY;  also, first 4 of 
last 5 completed quarters preceding the week a 
compensable industrial injury began if not qualified 
under normal base period, if claim is filed within 2 
years of beginning of disability 
CA 
 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters1   
 
CO ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   CT 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  Last 4 completed quarters preceding sickness or disability. 
DE ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   DC ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
GA ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters HI ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
ID 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
-----------------------------------------------------------------  
EBP:  A worker who experienced a temporary total 
disability may elect a BP of the first 4 of the last 5 
completed quarters preceding the disability if the 
worker filed a claim within 3 years of the disability and 
no longer than 6 months after the end of the disability 
IL  
APB:  Last 4 completed quarters 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  BP extended up to 1 year if the claimant received 
temporary total disability under a workers’ compensation act or 
occupational diseases act 
 
IN 
EBP:  Up to 4 quarters preceding the last day the 
worker was able to work 
IA 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
-----------------------------------------------------------------  
EBP:  BP extended 3 or more quarters if the worker received 
workers’ compensation or weekly indemnity insurance benefits 
for 3 or more quarters 
KS 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  Last 4 completed quarters preceding the date of 
qualifying injury2 
KY 
EBP:  BP extended up to 4 quarters, if a worker due to job-related 
injury or if a worker who has received workers’ compensation 
files a UI claim within 4 weeks after having received workers’ 
compensation 
ME 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  BP extended up to 4 quarters if 1 quarter has 
been used in a previous determination, extend the BY 
up to 1 week if there would otherwise be overlapping 
of the same quarter in 2 consecutive BPs 
MD1 ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
MA 
ABP:  Last 3 quarters, plus any weeks of work in 
quarter in which claim is filed. (Worker may also elect 
to use this ABP if it results in a 10% or more increase 
in WBA) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  BP extended to 52 weeks if claimant received 
compensation for temporary total disability under a 
workers’ compensation law for more than 7 weeks in 
BP 
MI 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters if individual fails to meet 
qualifying wage requirements 
MN 
ABP:  First 4 of last 5 completed quarters3 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  Up to 4 quarters depending on length of time a 
worker received compensation for temporary disability 
under a workers’ compensation law 
MT 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
-----------------------------------------------------------------  
EBP:  Up to 4 quarters preceding the disability if the claim was 
filed within 24 months from the date of the worker’s disability 
NE1 ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters NV 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
-----------------------------------------------------------------  
EBP:  Last 4 quarters preceding BY if 1 quarter has been used in 
a previous determination, extend the BY up to 1 week if there 
would otherwise be overlapping of the same quarter in 2 
consecutive BPs 
NH ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters NJ 
ABP:  BP may be one of two alternatives:  (1) last 4 completed 
quarters or (2) last 3 completed quarters, plus any weeks of work 
in quarter in which claim is filed 
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TABLE 3-2: STATES WITH ALTERNATIVE AND EXTENDED BASE PERIODS 
State ABP/EBP State ABP/EBP 
NM ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters NY ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
NC 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  Up to 4 quarters, if worker has insufficient 
wages to establish a claim because of a job related 
injury for which the worker received workers’ 
compensation 
 
OH ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
OK 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  4 quarters prior to regular base period 
 
OR 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  BP extended up to 4 quarters if the worker is disabled for 
the majority of a quarter.  If the worker received worker’s 
compensation, the base year can be extended up to 4 quarters 
preceding the illness or injury. 
PA 
EBP:  Last 4 completed quarters immediately 
preceding the date of the injury if the worker was 
eligible for workers’ compensation during the worker’s 
current BP 
RI 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  Worker who received workers’ compensation and has 
requested reinstatement to a previous position that no longer 
exists is eligible to have base period determined as of the date of 
the work related injury 
SC 
 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
 
SD 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  Worker who received temporary total disability payments 
under a workers’ compensation law may use a BP of the first 4 of 
the last 5 completed quarters preceding the disability, if a claim is 
filed within 24 months of the date the disability was incurred 
TN ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   TX 
EBP:  If an initial claim is filed within 24 months from the date a 
workers’ illness or injury began or occurred, the BP will be the 
first 4 of the last 5 completed quarters preceding the illness or 
injury 
UT 
ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EBP:  First 4 of last 5 completed quarters prior to date 
of illness/injury.  Worker must have received 
temporary disability payments during normal BP, filed 
initial claim no later than 90 days after release to work 
and within 36 months of the date the injury/illness 
occurred. 
VA ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters 
VI ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters VT 
ABP:  One of two alternatives:  (1) last 4 quarters or, if still 
ineligible, (2) last 3 quarters plus any weeks of work in quarter in 
which claim is filed 
WA ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters WV ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters4   
WI ABP:  Last 4 completed quarters WY 
EBP:  A worker who experienced a temporary total disability 
under Workers’ Compensation may elect a BP of the last 4 
completed quarters preceding the date of injury if the worker 
filed a claim within 3 years of the date of injury and no longer 
than 60 days after notice of the end of the disability 
GENERAL NOTE:  Information about various base periods used in MA and MN is located in paragraphs preceding this table. 
 
1 In CA, ABP effective for new claims filed on or after September 3, 2011; In MD, ABP effective March 1, 2011; In NE, ABP effective July 1, 
2011. 
2 Not implemented as of publication date. 
3 If the claim has an effective date during the month immediately following the last completed calendar quarter, the base period is the first 4 of 
the last 5 completed calendar quarters; however, the first 4 of the last 5 completed calendar quarters must be used if the claimant has more 
wage credits in those quarters than in the last 4 completed quarters. 









QUALIFYING WAGES OR EMPLOYMENT 
 
 All states require a worker to have earned a certain amount of wages or to have worked for a certain 
period of time (or both) within the base period to be monetarily eligible to receive any UI benefits.  Most 
workers qualify for benefits based on employment and wages in a single state.  However, some workers who 
work in more than one state will not have sufficient employment and wages in any single state to establish 
monetary eligibility, or would be eligible for a smaller weekly benefit amount.  Workers with employment and 
wages in more than one state can elect to file a claim combining employment and wages earned in all states 
where they worked into a claim filed under the law of one of the states in which they worked.  The “paying 
state” for a combined wage claim combines all base period employment and wages earned under its law with 
employment and wages transferred from other states to determine the worker’s monetary eligibility under its 
law.  For example, if the worker has earned wages in Illinois and Indiana, the worker may elect to file a 
combined wage claim using Illinois’ law.  Because of the potential of establishing more than one benefit year in 
more than one state, Federal regulations stipulate that employment and wages transferred from one state to a 
second state for use in establishing a combined wage claim in that second “paying” state cannot be used again to 
establish monetary eligibility.  The methods that states use to determine monetary eligibility vary greatly, as 
described in the following text.  
 
Multiple of High-Quarter Wages—Under this method, workers must earn a certain dollar amount in the 
quarter with the highest earnings of their base period.  Workers must also earn total base period wages that are a 
multiple–typically 1.5–of the high quarter wages.  For example, if a worker earns $5,000 in the high quarter, the 
worker must earn another $2,500 in the rest of the base period.  States require earnings in more than one quarter 
to minimize the likelihood that workers with high earnings in only one quarter receive benefits.  Although  
monetarily eligible, those workers wouldn’t be substantially attached to the labor market.   
 
Multiple of Weekly Benefit Amount—Under this method, the state first computes the worker’s weekly benefit 
amount.  The worker must have earned a multiple–often 40–of this amount during the base period.  For 
example, if a worker’s weekly benefit amount equals $100, then the worker will need base period earnings of 40 
times $100–or $4,000–before any UI would be paid.  Most states also require wages in at least two quarters.  
Some states have weighted schedules that require varying multiples for varying weekly benefits. 
 
Flat Qualifying Amount—States using this method require a certain dollar amount of total wages to be earned 
during the base period.  This method is used by most states with an annual-wage requirement for determining 
the weekly benefit and by some states with a high-quarter-wage/weekly benefit requirement.   
 
Weeks/Hours of Employment—Under this method, the worker must have worked a certain number of 
weeks/hours at a certain weekly/hourly wage.  
 
The following table provides information on the qualifying formulas used by the states and the minimum wages 
needed to qualify for UI in each state. 
 
 
TABLE 3-3: BASE PERIOD WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR BENEFITS 
Minimum Wages Needed 
to Qualify: 
State Qualifying Formula:  Wages or Employment  
High 
Quarter Base Period 
AL 1½ x HQW in BP and qualifies for at least the minimum WBA >$1,157 >$2,314 
(in 2 HQs) 
AK $2,500 flat amount and wages in 2 quarters of BP  $2,500 
AZ 
1½ x HQW in BP and $1,500 in one quarter 
or alternative:  flat-amount requirement - wages in 2 quarters of BP, wages in 1 quarter sufficient 
to qualify for the maximum WBA and total BPW ≥ the taxable wage base ($7,000) 
$1,500 $2,250 
AR 27 x WBA in BP and wages in 2 quarters of BP  $2,187 
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TABLE 3-3: BASE PERIOD WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR BENEFITS 
Minimum Wages Needed 
to Qualify: 
State Qualifying Formula:  Wages or Employment  
High 
Quarter Base Period 
CA $1,300 in HQ 
or alternative:  $900 in HQ with BPW = 1¼ x HQ 
$900 $1,125 
CO 40 x WBA or $2,500 in BP, whichever is greater $1,084 
(in 2 HQs) 
$2,500 
CT 40 x WBA in BP  $600 
DE 36 x WBA in BP.  If insufficient BPW, but (36 x WBA) – BPW ≤ $180, eligible for reduced 
WBA. 
 $720 
DC 1½ x HQW in BP, or within $70 of meeting the 1½ HQW in BP requirement, and $1,300 in HQ $1,300 $1,950 
FL 1½ x HQW in BP; minimum of $3,400 in BP; wages in 2 quarters $2,267 $3,400 
GA 1½ x HQW in BP 
or alternative:  1/21 HQW for WBA with 40 x WBA in BP and wages in 2 quarters  
$567 
$1,134 
(in 2 HQs) 
HI 26 x WBA in BP and wages in 2 quarters  $130 
ID 1¼ x HQW in BP and $1,872 in HQW.  Minimum HQW, determined on January 1, must equal 
50% of state minimum wage multiplied by 520 hours. 
$1,872 $2,340 
IL $1,600 flat amount and $440 outside HQ  $1,600 
IN 1½ x HQW totaling at least $2,500 in last 2 quarters of BP and not less than $4,200 in BP $2,800 $4,200 
IA 1¼ x HQW in BP (HQW must equal 3½% of the statewide AAW) and ½ HQW in another 
quarter 
$1,290 $1,940 
KS 30 x WBA in BP and wages in 2 quarters $2,542 $3,240 
KY 1½ x HQW in BP, 8 x WBA in last 2 quarters of BP, $750 outside HQ $1,963 $2,944 
LA 1½ x HQW in BP $800 $1,200 
ME 2 x AWW in each of 2 different quarters and total wages of 6 x AWW in BP 
$1,383 




1½ x HQW in BP, $576.01 in HQ and wages in 2 quarters.   If doesn’t meet qualifying 
requirement for WBA computed on HQW but does meet requirement for next lower bracket, 
eligible for lower WBA, step down of 6 brackets; the multiple (1½) is not applied to the worker's 
HQW, but the qualifying amount, shown in a schedule, is computed at the upper limit of each 
wage bracket (assuming a normal interval at the maximum benefit amount) 
>$576 $900 
MA 30 x WBA in BP and $3,500 minimum in BP  $3,500 
MI 1½ x HQW in BP  
or alternative:  BPW equal to 20 times the state AWW and wages in 2 quarters 
$2,871 $4,307 
MN $1,000 in HQ and $250 outside HQ $1,000 $1,250 
MS 40 x WBA in BP, 26 x minimum WBA in HQ and wages in 2 quarters $780 $1,200 
MO 
1½ x HQW in BP and $1,500 in one quarter; 






1½ x HQW in BP with total BP wages ≥ 7% of the AAW 
or alternative:  Total BPW ≥ 50% of AAW 
$1,521 $2,305 
NE $800 in each of 2 quarters; $2,807 in BP and $800 in HQ $800 >$2,807 
NV 
1½ x HQW in BP and $400 in HQ 
or alternative:  wages in 3 of the 4 quarters in the BP and $400 in HQ 
$400 $600 
NH $1,400 in each of 2 quarters $1,400 $2,800 
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TABLE 3-3: BASE PERIOD WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR BENEFITS 
Minimum Wages Needed 
to Qualify: 
State Qualifying Formula:  Wages or Employment  
High 
Quarter Base Period 
NJ 
20 base weeks (20% of AWW) 
or alternative:  1,000 times the state minimum hourly wage.  ($7.25/hr state minimum hourly 
wage) 
 $2,900 
NM Wages in 2 quarters $1,750 $1,751 
NY 1½ x HQW in BP and wages in 2 quarters $1,600 $2,400 
NC 6 x AWW in BP and wages in 2 quarters $1,118 $4,558 
ND 1½ x HQW in BP and wages in 2 quarters $1,864 $2,795 
OH 20 weeks employment with wages in each week of at least 27½% of the state AWW in BP and 
wages in 2 quarters 
 $4,300 
OK 1½ x HQW in BP and $1,500 in BP 
or alternative:  flat-amount requirement ≥$18,600 in BP (100% state taxable wage base) 
$375 $1,500 
OR 1½ x HQW in BP and $1,000 in BP 
or alternative:  flat-amount requirement 500 hours of employment in BP 
$667 $1,000 
PA 16 credit weeks and at least 20% BPW out of HQ (see table in law) $800 $1,320 
PR 
40 x WBA in BP and wages in 2 quarters; if fail to meet qualifying requirement for WBA 
computed on HQW but do meet qualifying requirement for next lower bracket, eligible for lower 
WBA, unlimited step-down provision.  PR has a flat qualifying requirement for agricultural 
workers.  Individual’s annual salary is used for agricultural workers. 
$77 $280 
RI 
1½ x HQW in BP and 200 x minimum hourly wage in 1 quarter and BP wages at least 400 x the 
minimum hourly wage 
or alternative:  $1200 x minimum hourly wage in BP 
$1,480 $2,960 
SC 1½ x HQW in BP and $1,092 HQW and $4,455 BPW $1,092 $4,455 
SD $728 in HQ and 20 x WBA outside HQ $728 $1,288 
TN 40 x WBA in BP and lesser of 6 x WBA or $900 outside HQ >$780 >$1,560 
TX 37 x WBA in BP and wages in 2 quarters $1,488 $2,220 
UT 1½ x HQW in BP (BPW must be 8% of state average fiscal year wages in BP, rounded to the 
higher $100)  
$2,066 $3,100 
VT 1.4 x HQW in BP (HQW will be adjusted by a percentage increase equal to the percentage 
increase in the state minimum wage for the prior year) 
$2,203 $3,085 
VA $2,700 in 2 highest 2 quarters of BP  $2,700 
(in 2 HQs) 
VI 1½ x HQW in BP 
or alternative:  flat-amount requirement $858 in HQW and 39 x WBA in BP 
$858 $1,287 
WA 680 hours employment in BP and wages in BP or alternate BP   
WV $2,200 flat amount and wages in 2 quarters  $2,200 
WI 35 x WBA in BP with 4 x WBA outside HQ and wages in at least 2 quarters $1,350 $1,890 
WY 1.4 x HQW in BP and wages in 2 quarters (BPW must be ≥ 8% of statewide AAW rounded 
down to lowest $50) 
$2,215 $3,100 
GENERAL NOTE:  Additional monetary requirements in some state laws result in minimum high quarter and/or base period wages that are 
higher than what the qualifying formula alone would require. 
 
QUALIFYING FOR A SECOND BENEFIT YEAR 
 
Since the standard base period established by the states’ laws results in a significant lag between the end 
of the base period and the establishment of a benefit year, a worker could conceivably use lag-period wages and 
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employment to qualify for 2 consecutive benefit years during one long unemployment spell (after benefits are 
exhausted and the first benefit year ended).  As a result, all states require workers to earn wages after the 
beginning of the first benefit year.  In many states, the amount a worker must earn is a multiple (from 3 to 10) of 
the weekly benefit amount.  A few states require a worker to earn wages sufficient to meet the minimum 































AL 8   X AK 8    
AZ 8    AR 3   X 
CA   
Equivalent 
qualifying 
wages as in 
preceding 
BY 
 CO $2,000    
CT 
5 or $300, 
whichever is 
greater 
  X DE  10  X 
DC 10    FL 3    
GA 10   X HI 5   X 
ID 
6; wages must 
be in bona fide 
work 
   IL 3    
IN 8   X IA $250   X 
KS 8   X KY   









  X ME 8   X 
MD 10   X MA 3    
MI 5    MN 8   X 
MS 8   X MO  












least 6 x 
WBA 
X 
NV 3    NH 
$700 during or 
subsequent to 
benefit year 
  X 
NJ 
4 weeks of 
employment 
and at least 6 x 
WBA in wages 
   NM 5    
NY 5    NC 10   X 
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ND  101  X OH 
3 x AWW and 
covered 
employment in 6 
weeks 
  X 
OK 10   X OR 6   X 
PA 6    PR 
3; for at least 
one CQ, but not 
< $50 
  X 
RI 
80 x the 
minimum 
hourly wage 
  X SC 8   
Insured 
work; must 
be with a 
single 
employer 
SD 4   X TN 5   X 
TX 6    UT 6   X 
VT 4   X VA 
30 days work or 
240 hours2 
  X 
VI 6    WA 6    
WV 8   X WI 8   X 
WY 8    
1 Does not apply to employment by a partnership, corporation, or limited 
liability company if, at the time claim is filed, ownership interest has 
been ceded. 
2 Must be with one employer. 
 
 
WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNT 
      
 After determining if a worker has sufficient wages and/or employment to qualify for UI benefits, it is 
necessary to determine what the weekly benefit amount - the amount payable for a week of total unemployment 
- will be.  As previously mentioned, UI is intended to provide partial wage replacement.  For this reason, all 
workers do not receive the same benefit amount.  Some states replace approximately 50% of workers’ lost 
wages up to a certain limit (usually the average weekly wage in the state).  As a result, states tend to replace a 
higher percentage of low wage workers’ income than they do for high wage workers.  Several states provide 
dependents’ allowances.  All states round weekly benefits to an even dollar amount. 
 
 States determine eligibility for UI on the basis of the calendar week (generally, Sunday through the 
following Saturday).  In many states, the claim week is adjusted to coincide with the employer's payroll week 
when a worker files a benefit claim for partial unemployment. 
 
 
METHODS OF COMPUTING WEEKLY BENEFITS 
 
As with qualifying wages, states utilize a variety of methods to determine a worker’s weekly benefit amount. 
 
High-Quarter Method—More than half of the states determine the weekly benefit amount by using the base 
period quarter in which wages were highest.  This quarter is viewed as the period most nearly reflecting full-
time work for the worker.  By dividing this amount by 13 - the number of weeks in a calendar quarter - the 
average weekly wage is calculated.  Based on the percentage of the weekly wage the state intends to replace, the 
weekly wage is divided and the weekly benefit amount is calculated.  For example, a worker who earns $2,600 
in the high quarter has an average weekly wage of $200 a week ($2,600 divided by 13).  If the state replaces ½ 
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of the average weekly earnings, the weekly benefit amount is $100.  To simplify the calculations, states 
determine the “overall” multiple of the high-quarter wages to determine the weekly benefit amount.  In the 
previous example, it would be 1/26 (1/13 times ½).  (Note that this type of formula is used by all states using a 
multiple of high-quarter wages to establish a benefit year.)  1/26 is the most common multiple used by states. 
 
 Since even the quarter of highest earnings may include some unemployment, some states use a fraction 
generating a higher weekly benefit (e.g., 1/23).  Some states use a weighted schedule, which gives a greater 
proportion of the high-quarter wages to lower-paid workers than to those earning more.  In these states, the 
maximum fraction varies from 1/11 to 1/26 while the minimum varies from 1/23 to 1/33.  
 
Multi-Quarter Method—Under this method, the weekly benefit amount is calculated as a multiple of the total 
or average quarterly wages paid in more than one quarter.  This approach is viewed as being more likely to 
reflect a worker’s usual full-time employment pattern since it surveys a greater period of time rather than just 
focusing on the quarter with highest earnings.   
 
Annual-Wage Method—Several states compute the weekly benefit as a percentage of annual wages in the base 
period.  This approach reflects the view that annual wages determine the worker’s standard of living.  Most 
states use a weighted schedule, which gives a larger proportion of annual wages to lower-paid workers to 
determine their weekly benefit amount. 
 
Average-Weekly-Wage Formula—Several states compute the weekly benefit as a percentage of the worker’s 
average weekly wages in the base period.  
 
The following table provides information on how states calculate weekly benefit amounts, what the minimum 
and maximum weekly benefit amounts are in each state, and the wages required in order to be eligible for the 
weekly benefit amounts. 
 
 
TABLE 3-5: WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
Minimum Wages Required  
for Maximum WBA State Method of Calculating and 
Formula 
Rounding to 
Minimum1 Maximum1 High quarter Base period  
AL MQ  
1/26 of average wages in 2 high quarters Higher $ $45 $265 N/A 
$13,730  
in 2 quarters 
AK AW 
0.9% - 4.4% BP wages + DA (see table in law) Nearest $ $56 - $128 $370 - $442 N/A $41,750 
AZ HQ 
1/25 Nearest $ $60 $240 $5,988 $8,981 
AR HQ 
1/26 Lower $ $81 $451 $11,726 $12,177 
CA 
HQ 
1/23-1/26 (if HQW < $1,833, see table in law; 
otherwise, 1/26 HQW) 




(1) 60% of 1/26 of 2 highest consecutive 
quarters, capped by 50% of average weekly 
earnings (low formula); or  
(2) 50% of 1/52 BP earnings, capped by 55% of 
average weekly earnings (high formula) 



















1/26 wages in 2 HQs + DA; for construction 
workers, 1/26 of HQW + DA 
Lower $ $15 - $30 $555- $630 $14,430 
 in 2 quarters $22,200 
DE MQ  
1/46 of wages earned in highest 2 quarters Lower $ $20 $330 N/A 
$15,180 in 2 
quarters 
DC HQ  
1/26 Lower $ $50 $359 $9,334 $14,001 
FL HQ  
1/26 Lower $ $32 $275 $7,150 $10,725 
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TABLE 3-5: WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
Minimum Wages Required  
for Maximum WBA State Method of Calculating and 
Formula 
Rounding to 
Minimum1 Maximum1 High quarter Base period  
GA 
MQ  
1/42 wages in 2 HQs; computed as 1/21 of HQW 
when alternative qualifying wages are used 
(Note:  If claimant would qualify for $27-$44, 
the claimant’s WBA is $44.) 
Lower $ $44 $330 N/A $13,860 in 2 
quarters 
HI HQ  
1/21 Higher $ $5 $549 $11,509 $14,274 
ID HQ  
1/26 Lower $ $72 $336 $8,736 $10,920 
IL 
MQ  
47% of the claimant's wages in highest 2 quarters 
divided by 26 + DA 




5% of the first $2,000 in HQ wage credits and    
4% of the remaining HQ wage credits 
Lower $ $50 $390 $9,250 $11,563 
IA 
HQ  
1/19 (4 or more dependents) - 1/23 (no 
dependents) 
Lower $ $56 - $67 $376 - $461 $8,484 $10,605 
KS HQ  
4.25% Lower $ $108 $435 $10,236 $13,050 
KY AW  
1.3078% BPW Nearest $ $39 $415 N/A $31,695 
LA 
MQ  
1/25 of the average wages in 4 quarters of BP x 
1.05 x 1.15 
Lower $ $10 $247 N/A $24,700  
ME 
MQ  
1/22 of the average of the 2 HQs + DA (see table 
in law) 
Lower $ $62 - $93 $359 - $533 N/A $15,796 
in 2 quarters 
MD HQ  
1/24 + DA Higher $ $25 - $65
2 
$430 





50% of 1/26 of total wages in 2 HQs up to 57.5% 
of state AWW 
Lower $ $33 - $49 $625 - $937 N/A 
$32,500 
in 2 high 
quarters 
MI HQ  
4.1% + DA Lower $ $117 - $147 
$362 





The higher of 50% of 1/52 BPW up to  
66⅔% of the state AWW, or 50% of 1/13 HQ up 
to 43% of the state’s AWW 























MS HQ  
1/26  Lower $ $30 $235 $6,110 $9,400 
MO MQ  
4.0% of the average of the 2 HQs Lower $ $35 $320 N/A 
$16,000 in 2 
quarters 
MT AW/MQ  
1.0% of BPW or 1.9% of wages in the 2 HQs Lower $ $120 $421 N/A 
$22,158 
in 2 quarters 
NE 
WW 
½ of AWW rounded down to nearest even $1.  
May not exceed ½ of state AWW. 
Lower even $ $30 $348 $9,048 $9,848 
NV HQ  
1/25 Lower $ $16 $398 $9,950 $14,925 
NH AW  
1.0% - 1.1% of BPW (see table in law) Nearest $ $32 $427 N/A $41,500 
NJ 
WW  
60% (base weeks’ wages/number of base weeks) 
+ DA 
Lower $ $87 - $100 
$598 
same with or 
without DA 
N/A $19,934 
in 20 weeks 
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TABLE 3-5: WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
Minimum Wages Required  
for Maximum WBA State Method of Calculating and 
Formula 
Rounding to 
Minimum1 Maximum1 High quarter Base period  
NM 
HQ  
53½% of AWW in HQ + DA; wages in 2 
quarters of BP
 
Lower $ $72 - $108 $386 - $486 $9,380 $9,381 
NY HQ 
1/26; 1/25 if HQW ≤ $3,575 Nearest $ $64 $405 $10,517 $15,776 
NC HQ  
1/26 Lower $ $43 $506 $13,156 $13,157 
ND 
MQ  
1/65 of (total wages earned in highest 2 quarters 
and ½ of total wages in third highest quarter) 
Lower $ $43 $442 N/A $28,730 
OH 
WW  
50% (wages in qualified weeks in BP / number 
of such weeks) + DA 
Lower $ $108 $387 - $524 N/A $15,480 
in 20 weeks 
OK HQ  
1/23
 Lower $ $16 $358 $8,234 $12,3513 
OR AW  
1.25% BP wages Lower $ $116 $496 N/A $39,680 
PA HQ  
1/23 - 1/25 + DA (see table in law) Lower $ $35 - $43 $573 - $581 $14,898 $22,840 
PR HQ  
1/11 - 1/26 Lower $ $7 $133 $3,458 $5,320 
RI HQ  
4.62% + DA    Lower $ $68 - $118 $551 - $688 $11,927 N/A 
SC HQ  
1/26   
Lower $ $42 $326 $8,476 $12,714 
SD HQ  
1/26 Lower $ $28 $314 $8,164 $14,444 
TN MQ  
1/26 of average of 2 HQs (see table in law) Lower $ $30 - $80 $275 - $325 N/A 
>$14,300 in 2 
quarters 
TX HQ  
1/25 Nearest $ $60 $415 $10,363 $15,337 
UT HQ  
1/26 - $5 Lower $ $24 $452  $11,882 $17,823 
VT MQ  
Wages in the 2 highest quarters divided by 45 Lower $ $64 $425 N/A 
$19,125 in 2 
quarters 
VA MQ  
1/50 of 2 HQs (see table in law) Lower $ $54
4 $378 N/A >$18,900 in 2 
quarters 
VI HQ  
1/26 Lower $ $33 $470 $12,220 $18,330 
WA MQ  
3.85% of average of 2 HQs    Lower $ $135 $570 N/A $29,611 
WV 
AW  
55% of 1/52 of median wages in worker’s wage 
class. (see table in law) 
Lower $ $24 $424 N/A $40,150 
WI HQ  
4.0% Lower $ $54 $363 $9,075 $12,705 
WY HQ  
4.0% Lower $ $31 $430 $10,750 $15,050 
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TABLE 3-5: WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
Minimum Wages Required  
for Maximum WBA State Method of Calculating and 
Formula 
Rounding to 
Minimum1 Maximum1 High quarter Base period  
KEY:     HQ = High Quarter Formula     MQ = Multi-Quarter Formula     AW = Annual Wage Formula     WW = Average Weekly Wage Formula 
              DA = Dependent’s Allowances 
 
GENERAL NOTE:  Since the high quarter and base period wage requirements for the minimum weekly benefit amount are the same as the wage and 
employment requirements to qualify for benefits, they are not repeated in this table.  (See Table 3-3.)  Additionally, in states where the benefit 
entitlement is calculated using multi-quarter, annual wage, or average weekly wage formulas, the high quarter cell is shown as N/A as no specific 
level of wages is required in the high quarter pursuant to state law. 
 
1 When 2 WBAs are listed, higher figure includes DA.  Higher figure for minimum and maximum WBAs includes DA for maximum number of 
dependents. 
2 Effective March 1, 2012, minimum WBA will increase to $50. 
3 The BPW can be comprised of both insured and non-insured wages.  To be eligible for the maximum WBA only $8,234 of the $18,600 of BPW 
must be taxable. 
4 For claims filed from July 6, 2008 to July 3, 2011, the minimum WBA is $54.  For claims filed on and after July 3, 2011, the minimum WBA will 
increase to $60.  
 
 
AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENTS TO WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS    
 
In those states where UI is intended to replace a specific percent of wages up to a fixed percent of the state’s 
average weekly wage, the calculation of benefit entitlement is determined by the state’s average weekly wage.  
Because wages increase, states recalculate the average weekly wage periodically to update the benefits schedule 
and continue to replace the desired percentage of a worker’s lost wages.  The maximum weekly benefit amount 
is usually more than 50 percent of the average weekly wage in covered employment within the state during a 
recent 1-year period.  In most states, the minimum weekly benefit is an amount specified in the law.  However, 
some states’ laws link the minimum weekly benefit amount with their average weekly wage as well.  The 
following table includes states with automatic adjustments to benefit amounts.  
 
TABLE 3-6: STATES WITH AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENTS TO BENEFIT AMOUNTS  
Method of Computation  
Annually as % of AWW in 
Covered Employment in: 
Semiannually as % of 
AWW in Covered 
Employment in:  
 


























AR X     66⅔% (high formula) 12% (low formula) July 1 
CO     X 55%  July 1 
CT   X   
60%; based on AWW of production 
and related workers  (may not be 





DC  X    66⅔%  January 1 
HI   X   75%  January 1 
ID X     
Percentage varies (52% - 60%) 
depending upon the base tax rate in a 
given year 
 January 1 
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TABLE 3-6: STATES WITH AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENTS TO BENEFIT AMOUNTS  
Method of Computation  
Annually as % of AWW in 
Covered Employment in: 
Semiannually as % of 
AWW in Covered 
Employment in:  
 


























IL X     
47%; for claimants with dependents, 
maximum is limited to 65.2% of 
state's AWW, which is based on 
percentage changes from year to 
year  
 January 1 
IA X     
53% for claimants with no 
dependents; for claimants with 





KS X     60% 25% of max WBA July 1 
KY X     
62%; cannot increase in any year 
when tax schedule increases from 
previous year (year-to-year increases 
limited depending on fund balance) 
 July 1 
LA  X    66⅔%  September1 
ME X     52%  June 1 
MA  X    57½%  1
st Sunday 
in October 
MN X     
Higher of 50% of the worker’s 
AWW in the BP to a maximum of 
66⅔% of the state AWW; or 50% of 
the worker’s AWW during the HQ 






MT X     67½% 20% July 1 
NV X     50%  July 1 
NJ X     56⅔%  January 1 
NM   X   53 ½% 10% 1
st Sunday 
in January 
NC X     66⅔%  August 1 
ND X     
62%; 65% of state AWW if trust 
fund reserves on Oct. 1 are ≥ the 
required amount and the state's 
average contribution rate is < the 





OH   X   Percentage used is not specified by law  
1st Sunday 
in January 
OK X     
The greater of $197 or 60%, 57.7%, 
55%, 52½% or 50% of state AWW 
of the second preceding CY, 
depending on the condition of the 
fund 
 July 1 
OR X     64% 15% Week of July 4 
PA   X   66⅔%  January 1 
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TABLE 3-6: STATES WITH AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENTS TO BENEFIT AMOUNTS  
Method of Computation  
Annually as % of AWW in 
Covered Employment in: 
Semiannually as % of 
AWW in Covered 
Employment in:  
 


























PR X     50%  July 1 
RI X     67%  July 1 
SC X     66⅔%  July 1 
SD X     50%  July 1 
TX X     47.6% 7.6% October 1 
UT   X   62½% - $5  January 1 
VT X     Percentage not specified by law  1
st Sunday 
in July 
VI   X   50%  January 1 
WA X     63%1 15% 1
st Sunday 
in July 
WV X     66⅔%  July 1 
WI    X  






and July 1 
WY X     55% 4% 1
st Sunday 
in July 




 Workers who are otherwise eligible for benefits must first serve a waiting period in most states.  In most 
states, the waiting-period requirement for weeks of partial unemployment is the same as for weeks of total 
unemployment.   The waiting period is served in or with respect to a particular benefit year.  Special provisions 
may exist for successive benefit years.  (When a worker, after intervening employment, has an additional spell 
of unemployment that continues beyond the end of the first benefit year, the worker may not have to serve 
another waiting week if he is monetarily eligible for benefits in the second year.)  
 
TABLE 3-7:  STATE INITIAL WAITING PERIODS  
State Duration (in weeks)* Becomes Compensable After: May Be Waived Under These Circumstances 
AL   11   
AK 1  
AZ 1   
AR 1   
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TABLE 3-7:  STATE INITIAL WAITING PERIODS  
State Duration (in weeks)* Becomes Compensable After: May Be Waived Under These Circumstances 
CA 12  
During a state of war emergency or a state of emergency if 
compliance with the waiting period requirement would prevent, 
hinder, or delay the mitigation of the effects of a state of 
emergency (e.g., natural disaster) 
CO 13   
CT No waiting period 
DE No waiting period 
DC 1   
FL 1   
GA No waiting period 
HI 1   
ID 1   
IL 1   
IN 13 
3 weeks of unemployment consecutive to 
such waiting week 
For individuals who become unemployed due to employer 
terminating business operations within the state, declaring 
bankruptcy, or initiating a workforce reduction pursuant to the 
Federal WARN Act 
IA No waiting period 
KS 1  
3 weeks of unemployment consecutive to 
such waiting week 
For individuals who become unemployed due to employer 
terminating business operations within the state; the employer 
declaring bankruptcy or a workforce reduction that is subject to 
the Federal WARN Act 
KY No waiting period 
LA 1    
ME 1   
MD No waiting period 
MA 1  No waivers though authority exists and has been used before 
MI No waiting period 
MN 1  
If the individual would have been entitled to DUA but has 
established benefit account 
MS 1  
If the President declares a major disaster in accordance with 
Stafford Act 
MO 1 
When remaining balance on claim is equal 
to or less than compensable amount for 
waiting week 
 
MT 1   
NE 1   
NV No waiting period 
NH 1   
NJ No waiting period 
NM 1  Natural disaster, extended benefit program  
NY 1  At the direction of the Governor 
NC 1  May be waived for major industrial disasters 
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TABLE 3-7:  STATE INITIAL WAITING PERIODS  
State Duration (in weeks)* Becomes Compensable After: May Be Waived Under These Circumstances 
ND 1   
OH 1   
OK 1   
OR 1   
PA 1   
PR 1   
RI 1  
For individuals who become unemployed due to a natural disaster 
or state of emergency 
SC 1   
SD 1   
TN 1 
3 consecutive weeks of compensable 
unemployment immediately following a 
waiting period 
 
TX 13 Receipt of benefits equaling 3 x WBA  
UT 1  
If Department approval for training is granted for the first eligible 
week of the claim 
VT No waiting period 
VA 1  
For an individual whose unemployment was caused by his 
employer terminating operations, closing its business, or declaring 
bankruptcy without paying the final wages earned as required by 
Section 40.1-29 of the Code of Virginia   
 
Authorized by the Governor under an executive order 
VI 13   
WA 1   
WV 1   
WI No waiting period 
WY No waiting period 
* For total unemployment, partial unemployment or in consecutive benefit years unless otherwise noted. 
1 The waiting period is served in the 14th week. 
2 One week waiting period is deferred if claimant is in continued claim status from a prior year’s claim.  The one-week waiting period must 
be served later in the new benefit year if there is an interruption of UI payments for one or more weeks.  Also, the 1-week waiting period 
credit for the new benefit year may be served in the last week of the prior benefit year if the claim was exhausted prior to the last week of 
that benefit year. 




BENEFITS FOR PARTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
 Often, instead of being laid off, workers may have their hours reduced during an economic downturn.  
Or, unemployed workers may find short-term work while looking for a permanent, full-time job.  These 
circumstances characterize partial unemployment.  The UI system is set up to permit benefit receipt by these 
workers as long as they meet all eligibility requirements.  However, the weekly benefit amount payable differs. 
 
 A week of total unemployment is commonly defined as a week in which the worker performs no work 
and with respect to which remuneration is not payable.  In Puerto Rico, a worker is deemed totally unemployed 
if earnings from self-employment are less than 1½ times the weekly benefit amount or if no service is performed 
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for a working period of 32 hours or more in a week.  In a few states, a worker is considered totally unemployed 
in a week even though certain small amounts of wages are earned.  In most states, a worker is partially 
unemployed in a week of less than full-time work and earnings of less than the weekly benefit amount.  In some 
states, a worker is partially unemployed in a week of less than full-time work when less than the weekly benefit 
amount plus an allowance is earned, either from odd-job earnings or from any source as indicated in the 
following table.   
 
 The worker’s UI payment will generally equal the difference between the weekly benefit amount and 
earnings.  All states disregard some earnings as an incentive to take short-term work. 
 
 When determining monetary entitlement to benefits, the state usually specifies a maximum dollar 
amount that can be received—usually equal to a specified number of weeks of benefits for total unemployment 
multiplied by the weekly benefit amount for total unemployment.  Consequently, a partially unemployed worker 
may draw benefits for a greater number of weeks than a totally unemployed worker. 
 
 Most state laws provide that the benefit for a week of partial unemployment will be rounded to the 
nearest or the lower dollar.  For example, in a state with a $30 earnings disregard and rounding to the nearest 
dollar, a worker with a $40 weekly benefit amount and earnings of $50.95 would receive a partial benefit of $19. 
 
 
TABLE 3-8: PARTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS DISREGARDED WHEN DETERMINING WEEKLY BENEFIT 
State 
Definition of Partial 
Unemployment - Week of 
Less Than Full-Time Work 
if Earnings are Less Than: 
Earnings Disregarded in 
Computing Weekly 
Benefit for Partial 
Unemployment 
State 
Definition of Partial 
Unemployment - Week of 
Less Than Full-Time Work if 
Earnings are Less Than: 
Earnings Disregarded in 
Computing Weekly 
Benefit for Partial 
Unemployment 
AL WBA $15 AK 1⅓ x WBA + $50 ¼ wages over $50 




CA WBA Greater of $25 or 
¼  of wages CO WBA ¼ WBA 
CT 1½ + basic WBA 
⅓ wages; includes holiday 
pay in the remuneration 
for determining partial 
benefits 
DE 
WBA + greater of $10  
or ½  WBA 
Greater of $10 or ½ WBA 
DC WBA + $20 1/5 wages + $20 FL WBA 
8 x Federal hourly minimum 
wage 
GA WBA 
$50; excludes payments 
for jury service 
HI WBA $150 
ID WBA + ½ WBA ½ WBA IL WBA ½ WBA 
IN WBA 
Greater of $3 or 1/5 WBA 
from other than base 
period employers; 
excludes payments for 
jury service 
IA WBA + $15 
¼ WBA; excludes payments 
for jury service 
KS WBA ¼ WBA KY 1¼ x WBA 1/5 wages 
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TABLE 3-8: PARTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS DISREGARDED WHEN DETERMINING WEEKLY BENEFIT 
State 
Definition of Partial 
Unemployment - Week of 
Less Than Full-Time Work 
if Earnings are Less Than: 
Earnings Disregarded in 
Computing Weekly 
Benefit for Partial 
Unemployment 
State 
Definition of Partial 
Unemployment - Week of 
Less Than Full-Time Work if 
Earnings are Less Than: 
Earnings Disregarded in 
Computing Weekly 
Benefit for Partial 
Unemployment 
LA WBA Lesser of ½ WBA or $50 ME WBA + $5 
$25; excludes wages 
received by members of the 
National Guard and 
organized labor, including 
base pay and allowances or 
any amounts received as a 
volunteer emergency 
medical services worker; 
also excludes earnings 
received as a result of 
participating in full-time 
Trade Act training, up to an 
amount equal to most recent 
WBA   
MD Augmented WBA $1001 MA WBA 
⅓ WBA; earnings plus 
WBA may not equal or 
exceed the worker's AWW 
MI 1½ x WBA 
For each $1 earned, WBA  
reduced by 50 cents  
(benefits and earnings 
cannot exceed 1½ WBA);  
earnings above ½ WBA 
result in dollar-for-dollar 
reduction in WBA; if the 
resulting WBA is zero, 
weeks of benefits payable 
reduced by 1 week 
MN WBA 
For each $1 earned, WBA  
reduced by 55 cents;  no 
deduction for jury pay and 
wages earned for services 
performed in National 
Guard and military reserve, 
and as a volunteer firefighter 
or in ambulance services 
MS WBA $40 MO 
WBA + $20 or 1/5 WBA, 
whichever is greater 
$20 or 1/5 WBA, whichever 
is greater; excludes 
termination pay, severance 
pay, and wages from service 
in the organized militia for 
training or authorized duty 
from benefit computation 
MT 2 x WBA ½ wages over ¼ WBA NE WBA ¼ WBA 
NV WBA ¼ wages NH WBA 3/10 WBA 
NJ 
WBA + greater of $5 or 1/5 
WBA 
Greater of $5 or 1/5 WBA NM WBA 
1/5 WBA; excludes 
payments for jury service 
NY 
Benefits paid at the rate of ¼ WBA for each effective day 
within a week beginning on Monday (effective day defined 
as 4th and each subsequent day of total unemployment in a 
week in which claimant earns not more than $300) 
NC 
Week of less than 3 customary 
scheduled full-time days 
1/10 AWW in HQ 
ND WBA 3/5 WBA OH WBA 1/5 WBA 
OK WBA + $100 $100 OR WBA 
⅓ WBA; or 10 x state 
minimum wage ($8.50 in 
2011); excludes wages from 
service in the organized 
militia for training or 
authorized duty from benefit 
computation 
PA WBA + 2/5 WBA Greater of $6 or 2/5 WBA PR 
1½ x WBA; week in which 
wages or remuneration from 
self-employment are less than 
1½ times claimant's WBA or 
the claimant performs no 
service for a working period of 




TABLE 3-8: PARTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS DISREGARDED WHEN DETERMINING WEEKLY BENEFIT 
State 
Definition of Partial 
Unemployment - Week of 
Less Than Full-Time Work 
if Earnings are Less Than: 
Earnings Disregarded in 
Computing Weekly 
Benefit for Partial 
Unemployment 
State 
Definition of Partial 
Unemployment - Week of 
Less Than Full-Time Work if 
Earnings are Less Than: 
Earnings Disregarded in 
Computing Weekly 
Benefit for Partial 
Unemployment 
RI2 Basic WBA 1/5 WBA SC WBA ¼ WBA 
SD WBA ¼ wages over $25 TN WBA Greater of $50 or ¼ WBA 
TX 
WBA + greater of $5 or ¼ 
WBA Greater of $5 or ¼ WBA UT WBA 3/10 WBA 
VT 
WBA + $15 provided the 
claimant works less than 35 
hours (35 hours is considered 
full-time employment) 
Greater of $40 or 3/10 
WBA VA WBA $50 
VI 1⅓ x WBA + $15 ¼ wages in excess of $15 WA 
1⅓ x WBA + $5; weekly hours 
of work temporarily reduced by 
employer by no more than 60% 
¼ wages over $5 
WV WBA + $61 $60 WI 
Any week the worker receives 
any wages.  No worker may be 
eligible for partial benefits if 
the benefit payment is < $5; or 
if an employer paid the worker 
at least 80% of the BPW; or the 
worker worked full-time for the 
employer in the week at the 
same, or a greater rate of pay as 
the worker was paid in the HQ. 
$30 plus 33% of wages in 
excess of $30 (excludes 
wages received as a 
volunteer firefighter or 
voluntary medical 
technician from benefit 
computation) 
WY WBA ½ WBA  
1 Effective March 1, 2011, $50.  
2 Special provision for totally unemployed workers who have days of employment between the end of the waiting period and the beginning of 
the first compensable week, and also for those who return to work prior to the end of a compensable week, provided they have been in receipt 
of benefits for at least 2 successive weeks of total unemployment.  For each day of unemployment in such week in which work is ordinarily 




 Although wages earned during the base period is the primary factor in determining the size of the 
payment a claimant receives each week, some states’ laws provide for a dependents’ allowance above and 
beyond the basic benefit amount payable.  The definition of dependent, for UI purposes, varies from state to 
state as does the allowance granted.  In general, a dependent must be wholly or mainly supported by the worker 
or living with or receiving regular support from the worker. 
 
DEFINITION OF DEPENDENT—All states with dependents’ allowances include children under a specified 
age.  The intent is to include all children whom the worker is morally obligated to support.  In most of these 
states, allowances may be paid on behalf of older children who are unable to work because of physical or mental 
disability.  In some states, children are not the only dependents recognized - spouses, parents, or siblings are also 
included in the definition.  The following table outlines, for the states that have dependents’ allowances, their 
definition of a dependent. 
 
TABLE 3-9: DEFINITION OF DEPENDENT 
Dependent Child Nonworking Dependent 


















Max. No. of 
Dependents 
AK 
Child must be unmarried; must have 
received more than half the cost of 
support from claimant or be lawfully 
in the worker's custody at the time 




    3 
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TABLE 3-9: DEFINITION OF DEPENDENT 
Dependent Child Nonworking Dependent 


















Max. No. of 
Dependents 
CT 21 if child is full-time student X3 X    5 
IL X2 X2 
Spouse must be 
currently ineligible 
for benefits in the 
State because of 
insufficient BPW 
   1 
IA X2 X2 
No dependency 
allowance paid for 
any week in which 
spouse earns more 
than $120 in gross 
wages 
X X X 4 
ME X2 X2, 3 
No dependency 
allowance paid for 
any week in which 
spouse is employed 
full time and is 
contributing to 
support of dependents
   X4
 
MD 162 X2    X 5 
MA5 
Child must be unmarried and by 




   X X4 
MI 
Must have received more than half 
the cost of support from claimant for 
at least 90 consecutive days or for the 
duration of the parental relationship2
 
X2, 3 X X6 X7 X 5 
NJ 19; child must be unmarried; 22 if 
child is full-time student2
 X2, 3 X   X 3 
NM 
Child must also be unemancipated.  
Child may be in legal custody of 
claimant pending adoption.  Court 
requires claimant to contribute to 
child’s support and no one else is 
receiving benefits for that child. 
     4 
OH 
Must have received more than half 
the cost of support from claimant 
within 90 days prior to BYB (or 
duration of parental relationship, if 
less than 90 days).  Child, stepchild, 
or adopted child may be 18 years of 
age or older if mentally or physically 
disabled and unable to work.2 
X2
 
May not be claimed 
as dependent if 
average weekly 
income is in excess of 
25% of the claimant's 
AWW 
  X 3 
PA  X X   X 2 
RI X2 X2    X 5 
TN 
Child must be an unemancipated 
minor child who is wholly or mainly 
supported by the claimant2 
     4 
1 In all states except MA, includes stepchild by statute. 
2 In AK, IL, IA, ME, MD, MI, NJ, OH, and RI, adopted child is included by statute; in MA, adopted child is included by interpretation; and 
in MA, legal guardians are included by statute. 
3 Full-time student included in CT, ME, MA, MI, and NJ.   
4 The dependent allowance is capped at 50% of the claimant’s WBA. 
5 Only dependents residing within the U.S., its Territories and possessions. 
6 Parents over 65 or permanently disabled for gainful employment. 





AMOUNT OF WEEKLY DEPENDENTS’ ALLOWANCES—As with the definition of dependents, there is 
much variation among states concerning the amount of weekly dependents’ allowance payable.  However, there 
are some commonalities.  For example, the allowance is ordinarily a fixed sum. In addition, all states have a 
limit on the total amount of dependents’ allowance payable in any week:  in terms of dollar amount; number of 
dependents; percentage of basic benefits, of high-quarter wages, or of average weekly wage.  This limitation 
results in reductions, for some workers, in the actual allowance per dependent or the maximum number of 
dependents on whose behalf allowances may be paid. In almost all states, the number of dependents is fixed for 
the benefit year when the monetary determination on the claim is made.  Likewise, in virtually all states, only 
one parent may draw allowances if both are receiving benefits simultaneously.  Workers who are eligible for 
partial benefits may draw dependents’ allowances in addition to their basic benefits in most of the states 
providing for these allowances.  They receive the full allowance for a week of partial unemployment.  
Consequently, the allowance for dependents may be greater than the basic benefit for partial unemployment.  
Alaska and Connecticut permit dependents’ allowances to be adjusted during the benefit year if a worker 
acquires additional dependents. 
 









Dependents’ Allowance for 
Minimum Weekly Benefit 
Maximum 
Dependents’ Allowance for 
Maximum Weekly Benefit 
AK $24 $72 $72 $72 
CT $15 Lesser of WBA or $75 $15 $75 
IL $26 - $147 $26 - $147 $26 $1471 
IA $2 - $14 Schedule $2 - $85 $11 $85 
ME $10 ½ WBA $30 $178 
MD $8 $40 $40 $0; same maximum WBA with or without 
dependents 
MA $25 ½ WBA $17 $314 
MI $6 $30 $30 $0; same maximum WBA with or without 
dependents 
NJ 7% of WBA for 1
st dependent and 4% for each of the 
next 2 dependents $13 
$0; same maximum WBA with or without 
dependents 
NM $25 ½ WBA up to $100 $35.50 $100 
OH $1 - $133 
Determined by schedule 
according to the AWW and 
dependency class 
$0 $133 
PA $5; $3 for one 
other dependent $8 $8 $8 
RI $15 Greater of $50 or 25% of WBA $50 $137 
TN $15 $50 $50 $50 
GENERAL NOTE:  Full dependents’ allowance (DA) given for weeks of partial benefits in all states with the following exceptions:  MD and 
PA - Not more than 26 DA payments for dependents may be made in any one BY (workers are partially unemployed if they earn less than the 
unadjusted WBA).  IL – DA shown is for child; spouse DA is different.   
 










DURATION OF BENEFITS 
 
 When states compute a worker’s monetary eligibility for benefits, in addition to calculating the weekly 
benefit amount, they determine the duration of benefits—how long benefits can be collected.  The duration is 
usually measured as a number of weeks of total unemployment.  Maximum weeks of benefits vary from 26 to 30 
weeks, most frequently 26 weeks.  A few states’ laws establish uniform durations of 26 weeks for all workers 
who meet the qualifying-wage requirements, whereas the rest of the states have variable durations.  Uniform 
duration states are not necessarily “more generous” than the other states because many of these states have 
comparatively high minimum wage thresholds to qualify for all but the lowest benefit levels.  Similarly, whether 
directly or indirectly, all uniform duration states require employment in more than one quarter for all - or most - 
workers to qualify for benefits.   
 
In variable duration states, duration is derived.  First, the state determines the limit on total benefits 
receivable in a benefit year (the maximum entitlement).  In most of these states, a worker’s benefits are limited 
to a fraction or percent of base-period wages if it produces an amount less than the specified multiple (usually 
26-30) of the worker’s weekly benefit amount.  The rest of the variable duration states - states using an average-
weekly-wage method - set maximum potential benefits as a fraction of weeks worked during the base period.  
Once the state calculates the maximum entitlement, it divides that amount by the weekly benefit amount to 
derive the duration.  Some states’ laws specify both the minimum and maximum duration, in weeks, along with 
the method of calculating benefit entitlement.  Since, in all of these states, the maximum potential benefit may 
be used for weeks of total or partial unemployment, workers can collect benefits longer than their stated duration 
(until they have exhausted their maximum entitlement). 
 
Depending on the distribution of wages in the base period, workers with the same total base period 
wages can have different durations and different weekly benefit amounts.  For example, workers whose wages 
are concentrated largely or wholly in the high quarter will have a higher weekly benefit amount but a shorter 
duration. 
 
In most states with variable duration, workers at all benefit levels are subject to the same minimum and 
maximum weeks of duration. 
 
 A few states include a limitation on wage credits in computing duration.  For example, in Colorado, 
only wages up to 26 times the current maximum weekly amount per quarter count.  This type of provision tends 
to reduce weeks of benefits for workers at the higher benefit levels. 
 
This section deals only with the regular UI program.  Extensions are addressed in the following chapter.   
 
The following table describes how each variable duration state calculates benefit entitlement and the 
duration of benefits (number of benefit weeks) a worker is eligible to receive.  Additionally, the minimum and 
maximum potential benefits, duration, and wage credits required to qualify for the maximum duration of the 
maximum weekly benefit amount are provided for all states. 
 
TABLE 3-11: BENEFIT ENTITLEMENT AND DURATION OF BENEFITS
 
Maximum Potential Benefits 








High quarter Base period  
Duration 
(Weeks) 
AL Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $675 $6,890 N/A $20,670 15 – 26 
AK Ratio of annual wages to HQW—from less 
than 1.50 to 3.5 or more $896 $9,620 -11,492 N/A $41,750 16 – 26 
AZ Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $720 $6,240 $5,988 $18,720 12 – 26 
AR Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $729 $11,726 $11,726 $35,178 9 – 26 
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TABLE 3-11: BENEFIT ENTITLEMENT AND DURATION OF BENEFITS
 
Maximum Potential Benefits 








High quarter Base period  
Duration 
(Weeks) 
CA Lesser of 26 x WBA or ½ BPW $560 $11,700 $11,675 $23,400 14 – 26 
















13 – 26 
CT N/A:  Uniform duration state $390 $14,430 - $16,380 $14,430 
in 2 quarters $22,200 
26 
uniform 
DE Lesser of 26 x WBA or ½ BPW $480 $8,580 N/A $17,160 24 – 26 
DC Lesser of 26 x WBA or 50% BPW $950 $9,334 $9,334 $18,668 19 – 26 
FL 25% BPW up to $7150 $288 $7,150 $7,150 $28,600 9 – 26 
GA Lesser of 26 x WBA or ¼ BPW $264 $8,580 N/A $34,320 6 – 26 
HI N/A:  Uniform duration state $130 $14,274 $11,509 $14,274 26 
uniform 
ID Ratio of BPW to HQW--from 1.25 to 3.5 $720 $8,736 $8,736 $30,576 10 – 26 
IL 
N/A:  Uniform duration state 
(Claimants are eligible for the lesser of 26 
weeks of benefits or their total BP wages) 





Lesser of 26 x WBA or 28% of BP wage 
credits; only specified amount of wages per 
quarter may be used for computing duration 
of benefits:  $8,733 
$400 $10,140 $9,250 $36,215 8 – 26 
IA 
Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW;  If laid off 
due to employer going out of business, ½ of 
wages in BP up to 39 weeks 
$646 $9,776 - $11,986 $8,484 $31,512 7 – 26 
KS Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $1,080 $11,310 $10,236 $33,930 10 – 26 
KY Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $585 $10,790 N/A $32,370 15 – 26 
LA N/A:  Uniform duration state $260 $6,422 N/A $23,786 26 
uniform 
ME Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $930 $9,334 - $13,858 N/A $28,002 22– 26 
MD N/A:  Uniform duration state $650 
$11,180 
same maximum 





Lesser of 30 x WBA or 36% BPW  (Reduced 
to 26 x WBA all of the local area SMSAs 
unemployment rate  ≤ 5.1%) 
$330 $18,750 - $28,110 N/A $52,084 10 – 30 
MI 43% BPW  $1,638 
$9,412 
same with or 
without DA 
$8,830 $22,251 14 – 26 
MN Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $418 
$9,672 
(based on HQW) 
 
$15,028 
(based on BPW) 
$9,672 
(based on HQW) 
 
Not applicable 
(based on BPW) 
$29,016 
(based on HQW) 
 
$60,112 
(based on BPW) 
11 – 26 
MS Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $390 $6,110 $6,110 $18,330 13 – 26 
MO Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $280 $8,320 N/A $24,960 8 – 26 
MT Ratio of BPW to HQW—from 1.0 to 3.5 or 
greater (See schedule in law) $968 $11,788 N/A $38,860 8 – 28
3 
NE Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $420 $9,048 $9,048 $27,144 14 – 26 
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TABLE 3-11: BENEFIT ENTITLEMENT AND DURATION OF BENEFITS
 
Maximum Potential Benefits 








High quarter Base period  
Duration 
(Weeks) 
NV Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $192 $10,348 $9,950 $31,044 12 – 26 
NH N/A:  Uniform duration state $832 $11,102 N/A $41,500 26 
uniform 
NJ Lesser of 26 x WBA or (100% of weeks 
worked in BP x WBA). 
$1,740 
$15,548 
same with or 
without DA 
N/A $25,914 1 – 26 
NM Lesser of 26 x WBA or 60% BPW $1,049 $10,036 - $12,636 $9,380 $16,127 16- 26 
NY N/A:  Uniform duration state $1,664 $10,530 $10,517 $15,776 26 
uniform 
NC (BPW / HQW) x 8⅔ $559 $13,156 $13,156 $39,468 13 – 26 
ND Ratio of BPW to HQW—from 1.5 to 3.2 $516 $11,492 N/A $61,293 12 – 26 
OH 
Lesser of 26 x WBA or 20 x WBA+ WBA for 
each qualifying week in excess of 20 up to a 
maximum of 26 weeks. 
$2,160 $10,062 - $13,624 N/A 
$20,124 
in 26 weeks 20 – 26 
OK 
Lesser of 26 x WBA or a variable percentage 
of the state’s AAW for the 2nd preceding year 
depending upon the conditional factor in place 
$256 $7,400 $8,234 $18,6004 18 – 26 
OR Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $348 $12,896 N/A $39,680 3 – 26 
PA 
A worker with at least 18 credit weeks is 
eligible for 26 weeks; with at least 16 credit 
weeks, 16 weeks.  A credit week is one in 
which claimant earned at least $50 
$560 $14,898 - $15,106 $14,898 $22,840 16 or 26 
PR N/A:  Uniform duration state $182 $3,458 $3,458 $5,320 26 
uniform 
RI Lesser of 26 x WBA or 36% BPW $544 $14,326 - $17,888 $11,927 $39,795 8 – 26 
SC Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $546 $8,476 $8,476 $25,428 13 – 26 
SD Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $420 $8,164 $8,164 $24,492 15 – 26 
TN Lesser of 26 x WBA or ¼ BPW $390 $7,150 N/A $28,600 13 – 26 
TX Lesser of 26 x WBA or 27% BPW $600 $10,790 $10,363 $39,963 10 – 26 
UT 27% BPW $240 $11,752 $11,882 $43,526 10 – 26 
VT N/A:  Uniform duration state $1,664 $11,050 N/A $19,125 26 
uniform 
VA 26 x WBA (see table in law) $648 $9,828 N/A >$37,800 12 – 26 
VI Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $429 $12,220 $12,220 $36,660 13 – 26 
WA Lesser of 26 x WBA or ⅓ BPW $135 $14,820 N/A $44,460 1 – 26 
WV N/A:  Uniform duration state $624 $11,024 N/A $40,150 
26 
uniform 
WI Lesser of 26 x WBA or 40% BPW $756 $9,438 $9,075 $23,595 14 – 265 
WY Lesser of 26 x WBA or 30% BPW $341 $11,180 $10,750 $37,267 11 – 26 
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TABLE 3-11: BENEFIT ENTITLEMENT AND DURATION OF BENEFITS
 
Maximum Potential Benefits 








High quarter Base period  
Duration 
(Weeks) 
GENERAL NOTE:  Since the high quarter and base period wage requirements for the minimum duration of the minimum weekly benefit amount are 
the same as the wage and employment requirements to qualify for benefits, they are not repeated in this table.  (See Table 3-3.)  Some states will 
extend duration under certain circumstances; see chapter 4 for additional information.  Additionally, in states where the benefit entitlement is 
calculated using multi-quarter, annual wage, or average weekly wage formulas the high quarter cell is shown as N/A as no specific level of wages is 
required to exist in the high quarter pursuant to state law. 
 
1 Minimum potential benefit amounts shown in this table are calculated by multiplying the minimum weekly benefit amount by the minimum 
duration; claimant may qualify for additional benefits based upon minimum monetary eligibility requirements.   
2 When 2 amounts are given, higher amount includes dependents’ allowance. 
3 To qualify for 28 weeks, individual’s ratio of total base period wages to HQ wages must be at least 3.5. 
4 The BPW can be comprised of both insured and non-insured wages.  To be eligible for the maximum WBA, only $8,234 of the $18,600 of BPW 
must be taxable. 
5 With some limited exceptions, individuals with significant ownership interest in family partnerships, LLCs and corporations, and certain members 
of their families, are limited to 4 weeks of regular UI benefits.   
 
 
SEASONAL EMPLOYMENT AND BENEFITS 
 
 Special provisions are found in several states’ laws restricting the payment of benefits to workers who 
earned some or a substantial part of their base-period wages for employers whose operations take place only 
during certain seasons of the year. 
 
 In these provisions, the term seasonal is defined - either in the statute or in the rules or regulations 
implementing the statute - in terms of: 
 
 the industry, employer, or occupation involved;  
 
 the wages earned during the operating period of the employer or industry; and  
 
 the worker. 
 
 In most states, the designation of seasonal industries, occupations, or employers and the beginning and 
ending dates of their seasons is made in accordance with a formal procedure, following action initiated by the UI 
agency or upon application by the employers or workers involving hearings and presentation of supporting data.  
Arkansas law provides that any employer classified as a seasonal employer may request not to be treated as a 
seasonal employer.  
 
 In other states, a seasonal pursuit, industry, or employer is defined as one in which, because of climatic 
conditions or the seasonal nature of the employment, it is customary to operate only during a regularly recurring 
period or periods of less than a specified number of weeks:  16 weeks in Massachusetts; 26 weeks in Colorado; 
26 weeks in Indiana; 26 weeks in Maine (except for seasonal lodging facilities, variety store or trading post, 
restaurants, and camps, where a period of less than 26 weeks applies); 26 weeks in Michigan; 26 weeks in Ohio; 
and 36 weeks in North Carolina. 
 
 In general, the restrictions on the payment of benefits to workers employed during the operating periods 
of these seasonal industries fall into one of two groups. 
 
 1.  The most frequent restriction provides that wage credits earned in seasonal employment are available 
for payment of benefits only for weeks of unemployment in the benefit year that fall within the operating period 
of the employer or industry where they were earned. Wage credits earned in non-seasonal work or in 
employment with a seasonal employer outside the operating period are available for payment of benefits at any 
time in the benefit year.  The states with this type of provision are listed in the following table, together with the 




TABLE 3-12: SEASONAL WAGE CREDITS AVAILABLE ONLY DURING SEASON 
AR 
Off-season wages of (a) less than 30 times the 
weekly benefit amount, if worker's seasonal 
wages were earned in an industry with an 
operating period of 2-6 months; or (b) less than 
24 times the weekly benefit amount, if seasonal 
wages were earned in an industry with an 
operating period of 7-8 months 
AZ 
For employment in transient lodging only; 
no benefits based on seasonal wages 
during the off-season if unemployment is 
due to substantial slowdown in operations 
CO 
Some seasonal wages 
in operating period of 
seasonal industry 
IN 
Some seasonal wages in operating period of 
seasonal employer 
ME 
Some seasonal wages in operating period 
or seasonal employer 
MA 
Some seasonal wages 
in operating period of 
seasonal industry 
MI 
Wages must be within seasonal period of 26 
weeks or less.  Designation of employment as 
seasonal is voluntary 
MS 
Off-season wages of (a) less than 30 times 
the weekly benefit amount, if worker's 
seasonal wages were earned in a cotton 
ginning industry or professional baseball 
with an operating period of 6-26 weeks; or 
(b) less than 24 times the weekly benefit 
amount, if seasonal wages were earned in a 
cotton ginning industry or professional 
baseball with an operating period of 27-36 
weeks 
NC 
25% or more of base 
period wages earned in 
operating period of 
seasonal employer 
OH 
Some seasonal wages earned in operating 
period of seasonal employer 
PA 
Seasonal wages for less than 180 days of 
work in operating period.  Applies only if 
reasonable assurance of reemployment 
exists 
SD 
Some wages earned in 
operating period of 
seasonal employer 
 
 2.  Other states have established differing seasonal provisions, which are listed in the following table.   
 
TABLE 3-13: OTHER SEASONAL PROVISIONS 
DE 
Individual with 75% or more of base period earnings in seasonal employment – defined as the processing of agricultural or seafood 
products - will be eligible only if the individual had been employed in the corresponding month of the base period 
WV Individual working less than 100 days in seasonal employment is not eligible unless the individual has non-seasonal employment 
earnings of at least $100 
WI Individual working less than 90 days for a seasonal employer is not eligible unless the individual is paid wages of $500 or more by at 
least one other employer 
     
 
DEDUCTIONS AND WITHHOLDING FROM BENEFITS 
 
 Under Federal law, UI must be paid to a worker as a matter of right and may not be intercepted to 
satisfy debts or other obligations.  However, Federal law provides some exceptions to this requirement and these 
are discussed in the following text.  
 
OVERPAYMENTS—All states reduce UI otherwise payable to recover earlier overpayments of UI.  See 
Chapter 6 for more information on this topic. 
 
CHILD SUPPORT—Federal law requires states to deduct child support obligations from UI only when the 
obligations are enforced by the state child support agency. 
 
OVERISSUANCES OF FOOD STAMPS—If the worker owes an uncollected overissuance of Food Stamps, 
states may deduct such amount from UI benefits payable.  The following table indicates which state laws 
provide for these deductions.  However, all of these states do not necessarily make these deductions; it depends 










TABLE 3-14: STATES WITH AUTHORITY TO DEDUCT FOOD STAMP OVERISSUANCES 
State  State  State  State  State  State  State  State  
AL X AK  AZ X AR X CA  CO X CT  DE X 
DC  FL  GA X HI X ID  IL X IN  IA X 
KS X KY  LA X ME X MD  MA X MI  MN  
MS  MO X MT X NE X NV  NH X NJ X NM X 
NY X NC  ND  OH  OK X OR  PA  PR  
RI  SC  SD X TN X TX X UT X VT X VI X 
VA X WA  WV  WI  WY X  
 
INCOME TAX—Federal law requires states to offer workers the opportunity to voluntarily have Federal 
income tax withheld from UI benefits at the rate of 10 percent.  Federal law also permits states to withhold state 
and local income tax from UI benefits.  The following table indicates which states offer workers the opportunity 
to have state (and/or local) income taxes withheld. 
 
 
HEALTHCARE COVERAGE—Illinois and Oklahoma law authorize the deduction of health insurance 
premiums from the UI weekly benefit amount if the worker so elects, provided that the state has an approved 
health care plan for unemployed workers.  However, neither state has implemented this authority.  
Massachusetts has a health insurance program for unemployed workers; however, it is unrelated to the UI 
program.   
TABLE 3-15: WITHHOLDING STATE AND LOCAL INCOME TAX AT CLAIMANT OPTION 
State State Local State State Local State State Local State State Local State State Local 
AZ X  CO X  CT X X DE X X DC X X 
GA X  HI X X1 ID X  IL X  IA X  
KS X X KY X  ME X X MD X  MA X  
MI X2  MN X  MS X X NE X  NH X X 
NM X X NY X X NC X  ND X  OK X2  
OR X  RI X  SC X  TN X  UT X  
VT X2  WV X  WI X        
GENERAL NOTE:  AK, FL, NV, NH, SD, TX, TN, WA, and WY have no state income tax. 
 
1 Local income taxes deducted and withheld from the worker's UI for other states and localities. 
2 If Federal taxes are elected to be withheld from UI benefits, then state taxes will be withheld as well. 
